

SUPPLEMENTS TO  
VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE

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# Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence



TIMO NISULA

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BRILL

## Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence

Supplements  
to  
Vigiliae Christianae

Texts and Studies of  
Early Christian Life and Language

*Editors*

J. den Boeft – B.D. Ehrman – J. van Oort  
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# Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence

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To Kirsi



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## PREFACE

Augustine claims in his preface to *de doctrina christiana* that learning, indeed knowing, is social. The claim has been verified through my personal experience during the writing of this book. Many people have inspired, helped, taught and encouraged me in different ways during the long process of creating this book. To these people I owe my deep gratitude.

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This book is dedicated to my wife Kirsi, *rarissimae avi*. She has shown me the objective reality of beauty, reason and love.

Timo Nisula

## ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Augustiniana.
ACW	Ancient Christian Writers.
Ages	Augustine through the Ages, An Encyclopedia (ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
AH	Augustin Handbuch (hrsg. Volker Henning Drecoll). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
AL	Augustinus-Lexikon. Basel: Schwabe. 1986–.
AM	Augustinus Magister I–III.
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. 1972–.
AS	Augustinian Studies.
Aug	Augustinianum.
AU	Augustinus.
BA	Bibliothèque Augustinienne. Les œuvres de saint Augustin. Paris: Insti- tut d'études augustiniennes. 1949–.
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium.
BSELK	Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. (7. Aufl.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht. 1976.
CAG2	Corpus Augustinianum Gissense 2. Basel: Schwabe. 2004.
CLCLT-5	The CETEDOC Library of Christian Latin texts.
DR	Downside Review.
FC	Fathers of the Church.
JECS	Journal of Early Christian Studies.
JRE	Journal of Religious Ethics.
JRS	Journal of Roman Studies.
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies.
LXX	Septuaginta.
NHMS	Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies.
OLD	Oxford Latin Dictionary (ed. P. Glare). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982.
RACH	Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum.
REAug	Revue d'études augustiniennes.
RechAug	Recherches Augustiniennes.
SLAG	Schriften der Luther-Agricola Gesellschaft.
SP	Studia Patristica.
SVF	Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (ed. Johannes von Arnim). Leipzig: B.G. Teubner. 1903.
ThPh	Theologie und Philosophie.
TLL	Thesaurus Linguae Latinae.
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen.

TWNT	Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.
VC	Vigiliae Christianae.
VCS	Vigiliae Christianae Supplementa.
ZKG	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT	Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie.
ZNW	Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft.
ZRG	Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte.
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

haec est namque poena inoboedienti homini reddita in semetipso, ut ei uicissim non oboediatur nec a semetipso.

c. adu. leg. 1, 18

in concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas est, in ambitione saeculi superbia est. qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix.

s. Denis 14, 2

uerum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam de uerbis cupidores esse contentionis quam ueritatis. apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam ciues sanctae ciuitatis dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum deum uiuentes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.

ciu. 14, 9

ego enim putabam dici ista non posse, nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnis concupiscentia subiugatos, ut facerent quidquid illa compelleret; quod de apostolo dementis est credere.

c. Iul. 6, 70

#### 1.1. THE TASK OF THE STUDY

Augustine's insights into evil desire became an immediate source of controversy during his lifetime and they have remained controversial to this day. Particularly during the past two or three decades, a great number of scholars have paid attention to those of Augustine's views that are related to *concupiscentia*. These views include not only such themes as original sin, baptism, and renewal, but also sex, sexual desire and gender. Furthermore, on the ecumenical front, the subject of *concupiscentia* has kept doctrinal



negotiators busy during the 1990s.<sup>1</sup> On a more general cultural level, Augustine's assessments of sexuality have been a rich quarry for those inclined to consider him to be the major representative of a repressive, ascetic Christian culture. From a scholarly angle, assessments of the Manichaean influence on Augustine's conceptions of sin in general and of *concupiscentia* in particular, have revived since the days of Albert Bruckner. *Concupiscentia* has thus indeed proved to be a matter of contention.

While controversies always tend to call for attention and study, they may also often obscure the original questions by framing them in terms of problems that were not part of the mindset in which they were originally presented. This study is an attempt to *present a general view of Augustine's concept of evil desire, and the uses or functions that he attributes to this concept in his thought*. In this respect, the goal of this study is to present, as fully and as completely as possible Augustine's own emphases on this topic; to identify the relevant points in his analysis of *concupiscentia*; to analyse the contexts in which he chose to think and develop his notion of it; and finally, to seek to evaluate these contexts and to form a judgment of their comparative importance to Augustine's thought. This leads us to the central proposition of this study. Rather than analyse the *sources* and *origins* of Augustine's notion of *concupiscentia*, this study is more interested in the question of how and for what *purposes* Augustine uses the notion itself.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the aim of this study is to describe the varying *functions* of *concupiscentia*. The basic conviction for such a quest arises from what one may call the hermeneutics of goodwill: *concupiscentia* is not disconnected from and irrelevant to Augustine's larger theological overview but, as will be shown in this study, *concupiscentia* was closely connected to his view of God's justice, to the general explanations of sin and evil, to apologetic concerns connected to the philosophical traditions of virtues and emotions, and finally, to divine grace and its effects on baptised Christians. Therefore, it is only reasonable

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<sup>1</sup> For the historical disagreement surrounding this issue, see e.g. Melancthon, *Apol.* II, 38, and his reliance on Augustine's authority. For the discussions between the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity and the Lutheran World Federation, see Rytönen & Saarinen 2007. In short, the Lutheran position adheres to Luther's formulation of the baptised Christian as *simul iustus et peccator*, and consequently supports a stronger emphasis on the sinful status of *concupiscentia*. On the contrary, the Roman Catholic position maintains the importance of Augustine's formulations of the weaker status of *concupiscentia* during renewal.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. O'Keefe & Reno (2005, 32) on Didymus' Neoplatonism: "[T]he point is not where he got the idea. What matters is how it is used."

to suggest that these attachments be approached systematically, searching for the theological purposes in which Augustine uses *concupiscentia* in different contexts.

To formulate the task in this way entails certain implications that should be explicated here. First, to formulate a *general* understanding of what Augustine meant by *concupiscentia* implies that the choice of the sources will focus to a degree on certain representative texts. A close reading of every passage that mentions *concupiscentia* (with relevant cognates) is not possible in the scope of this study.<sup>3</sup> However, the advantages of this approach are equally obvious: instead of focusing only on, for instance, the discussions in *ciu.* 9 and 14, or on the explosive and repetitive debate with Julian, this study seeks to offer a balanced and broader picture of *concupiscentia* in Augustine's works, and of how it is linked to certain other central theological concepts.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, this study is consciously concerned with Augustine's own way of describing and using the concept of *concupiscentia*; that is to say, it is not possible here to analyse other detailed expressions of, for instance, the corresponding ideas by Julian of Aeclanum than what they are relevant to Augustine's own position.

## 1.2. THE SOURCES OF THE STUDY

As noted above, this study charts the functions of *concupiscentia* during the span of Augustine's entire oeuvre. Thus, *in principle*, nothing has been excluded from the source material that is available. *In practice*, however, Augustine's discussions of topics that are both related to and relevant to the concept have, of course, resulted in certain works being central and deserving further attention.<sup>5</sup> The debates with the Manichaeans and Pelagians, and the works composed at that time, naturally carry more weight in this study than the works related to, for example, the Donatist controversy. The sheer quantity of the works related to the debates with the Pelagian positions, surpasses the volume of discussions on the relevant topics in the

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<sup>3</sup> To wit: the occurrences of the three terms, treated more or less synonymous in this study, are as follows: *concupiscentia* 1,760 occurrences (and the verb *concupisco* 1,312 occurrences), *cupiditas* 1,180 occurrences, and *libido* 983 occurrences. The wealth of material thus calls for prioritisation.

<sup>4</sup> The abbreviations for Augustine's work are taken from the Augustinus-Lexikon (Basel 1986–). For a comprehensive list of the abbreviations, see Bibliography.

<sup>5</sup> For the list of the sources, given in conventional chronological order, see pp. 361–364.

390s. Deliberate attention has therefore been paid to maintain the balance between the earlier and later works in order to avoid a distorted perspective that would work in favour of the later extensive polemics, which would be at the expense of the earlier formulations. Another choice of emphasis, again stemming from practice rather than principle, concerns Augustine's letters and sermons. These have been treated in this study as secondary source material that provides additional evidence to support the findings in the works composed for doctrinal, polemical and exegetical purposes. Occasionally, as in the case of *ep. lo. tr.*, the material from sermons has also been included in the primary discussion.

### 1.3. LINES OF RESEARCH ON *CONCUPISCENTIA*

Augustine and his insights into evil desire have been studied and debated extensively. However, *concupiscentia* (with cognates) has often been analysed from detailed and limited perspectives, whereby the state of research seems to be rather fragmented and suffering from atomisation. Some important studies are presented here and are categorised into four distinct 'traditions' or 'lines' of research.<sup>6</sup>

1. Due to the later significance attributed to the Roman Catholic and Protestant doctrines of original sin, Augustine's conception of *concupiscentia* has been an object of what could be called a tradition of *confessionally or ecumenically committed* research. From such a standpoint, Augustine's views on *concupiscentia* have sometimes been qualified by later theological formulations and systematizations. For example, in the 1950s, Charles Boyer and François-Joseph Thonnard debated on a detail concerning the concepts of *ignorantia* and *difficultas* in *lib. arb.*, but the debate was also related to the methodological issues of whether Augustine should be interpreted 'systematically' (for instance, as part of Roman Catholic doctrinal tradition) or 'historically' (that is, in terms of his own historical context). Thonnard argued for the latter view, which has, for understandable reasons, prevailed.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The 'lines' described here are heuristic, paedagogical devices and do not claim actual dependencies between individual contributions or schools of thought; they will illustrate the most important positions adopted on *concupiscentia* in recent decades, while also documenting the surprisingly open and fragmented state of research.

<sup>7</sup> Boyer 1954a; 1954b; Thonnard 1959. See, however, Lössl 2002, 204 n. 9 on Thonnard's 1965 article on Julian's Aristotelism: "[Thonnard's] fundamental point that Julian's thought

From a more neutral and historically accurate standpoint, Augustine's *concupiscentia* may be scrutinised explicitly because of its history of reception in the different ecclesial traditions even today, as has been done by Christoph Marksches in 2001. Marksches is interested in how Augustine analyses *concupiscentia* in conjunction with baptism, and surveys briefly the Pelagian debates in this respect. In the last section of his article, he then considers Martin Luther's reception of Augustine's views of *concupiscentia*,

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can only be 'properly' evaluated from an Augustinian point of view is questionable. It assumes that Augustine's is a kind of standard Christian position against which Julian's has to be measured." Cf. also DeSimone 1980, 214: "Augustine's complete, over-all teaching on concupiscence is basically sound, and his very phrases on concupiscence were enshrined in the Decree on Original sin issued by the Council of Trent." Staffner 1957 is an attempt to understand Augustine's concept of original sin ("das Wesen der Erbsünde") by consulting the formulations made in the Councils of Orange and Trent. Likewise, Mausbach (1929, i, 222–241) provides a systematic presentation of *cupiditas* as the "substance" (Wesen) of sin, both in grave forms ("schwere Sünde") and venial ("lässliche Sünde") forms, while admitting that the division may not yet be fully developed in Augustine's own works: "Diese Lehre [...] gab der Entwicklung Richtlinien [...] Es scheint bisweilen, als kenne Augustin noch andere Klassen von Sünden zwischen beiden." Mausbach 1929, i, 239. Mausbach (1929, ii, 170–207) discusses *concupiscentia* and its relation to guilt (*reatus*) separately, arguing against the Protestant views of Seeberg and Harnack: *concupiscentia*, while being an element of the original sin, is detached from 'guilt' (*reatus*) at the moment of baptism and cannot thereafter be sin. "Die 'concupiscentia cum reatu' macht nach Augustin das Ganze der Erbsünde aus; das Formelle in diesem Ganzen, dasjenige, wodurch das vitium originale zum peccatum originale wird und mit dessen Wegfall jede wirkliche Sünde völlig schwindet, ist der reatus." Mausbach 1929, ii, 189. The formulations of Thomas Aquinas (formal and material causes of sin being *priuationis iustitiae* and *concupiscentia*), the debate around Jansenius and the positions of Reformation and the Council of Trent lead Mausbach to a detailed discussion of the exact connection between *reatus* and *concupiscentia* in Augustine. Mausbach 1929, ii, 196, 198–207. For other confessionally committed positions, where the later developments and questions more or less define what we should expect from Augustine, and where the "substance" (das Wesen) of original sin plays an important part, see e.g. Seeberg 1923, 509 ("Danach also ist die Concupiscenz Strafe und als Strafe der Möglichkeitsgrund neuer Sünden, die aber durch die Zustimmung des Willens erst verwirklicht werden [...] und dann neue Strafen herbeiführen. Somit wäre also die Concupiscenz als solche nie Sünde, sondern nur Folge der Sünde und damit zugleich der Möglichkeitsgrund von Sünde [...] Nun wird aber diese in sich geschlossene Betrachtungsweise dadurch modifiziert, dass Augustin die Concupiscenz selbst zum Träger des reatus macht [...] also lehrt, die Concupiscenz werde dem Kinde zur Sünde und damit zur Schuld angerechnet [...]. Im ersten Fall ist die Concupiscenz die Folge der Anrechnung der Schuld, im zweiten Fall ist die Anrechnung der Schuld die Folge der Concupiscenz"); Anrup 1943; Trapè 1954; Gross 1954; 1960, 328–331 (see especially p. 375: "dass die Kirche wesentliche Teile der zeit- und ortsbedingten Erbsündentheologie Augustins zur Würde von Dogmen, d.i. absoluten, ewig gültigen und unveränderlichen Glaubenssätzen, erhob, hat sie weder der Menschheit noch sich selber einen Dienst erwiesen."); Thonnard 1964 (responding to Gross with "une optique thomiste," p. 374).

and his transformation of these views in his own thought. Marksches is convinced that the differences between Augustine and Luther should not be exaggerated.<sup>8</sup> Marksches concludes by suggesting that the differences between the Roman Catholic and Lutheran positions are two different ways of reading the common Augustinian heritage.<sup>9</sup>

2. The second line of research on Augustine's views on evil desire could be referred to as *source-oriented genetical research*. Here scholars have made an effort to identify the parallels, sources and genetic lines of influence that might have contributed to Augustine's concept of *concupiscentia*.

For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars connected to the Italian school of the history of religions adopted a comparative approach in analysing *concupiscentia*. The title of Pier Franco Beatrice's study, *Tradux peccati: Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale* (1978), describes well the standpoint of the comparative religious studies in this school: the goal of the work was to demonstrate how a marginal Jewish-Christian Encratite tradition had influenced Augustine's ideas of sexual desire.<sup>10</sup> Beatrice's work is characterised by exploring the parallel ways in which the rather divergent systems of belief all treat sexual desire as being inherently evil, and by a significant trust in the weight of evidence such parallels have in the history of theology.<sup>11</sup> Giulia Sfameni Gasparro has drawn similar conclusions in her research, despite harbouring reservations about Beatrice's positions.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, an idealistic notion of the common 'motivations' of 'protologies' and 'tradition of *enkrateia*' influenced both Beatrice and Sfameni Gasparro.<sup>13</sup>

A more specific line of inquiry has been pursued by observing the allegations by Julian of Aeclanum against Augustine's residual Manichaeism.<sup>14</sup> Thus, parallel to a more general interest in the Manichaean studies of recent decades, Augustine's notion of *concupiscentia* (*carnis*) has also called

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<sup>8</sup> Marksches 2001, 106: "Damit rücken aber—trotz aller Differenzen—Augustinus und Luther doch näher zusammen."

<sup>9</sup> Marksches 2001, 108: "zwei unterschiedliche Arten [...] das gemeinsame augustiniische Erbe zu lesen."

<sup>10</sup> Beatrice 1978, 310.

<sup>11</sup> For a critical, even hostile reception of the study, see Trapè 1979, DeSimone 1980.

<sup>12</sup> Sfameni Gasparro 1985a; 1985b; 1985c (cf. her note in 1985c, 160 n. 18 for reservations).

<sup>13</sup> For these motivations, see Bianchi 1985 and 1989.

<sup>14</sup> van Oort 1994; 1999, 199–207, 212–229, 351–352; 2010a; Coyle 2009, 307–328, and Eddy 2009 can be used as surveys for this approach.

for comparisons with the Manichaean views of sexuality.<sup>15</sup> In his studies from 1987, 1989 and 1994, Johannes van Oort noted the parallels between Manichaean mythology and Augustine's thought, including Augustine's way of treating *concupiscentia carnis*. Van Oort has analysed *inter alia* the characterisation of *motus inordinatus*, which is often connected to the notion of *concupiscentia* in Augustine. According to van Oort, it is likely that *motus inordinatus* follows an authentic Manichaean tradition of ἀτακτὸς κίνησις.<sup>16</sup> This particular parallel has since significantly influenced the assessments of Augustine's Manichaeism and *concupiscentia*.<sup>17</sup>

In 1986, Elizabeth Clark published her influential essay on Augustine's Manichaean residue by analysing sexual reproduction as tainted by the evil of *concupiscentia carnis*. Clark examines how Augustine treats the 'biological' explanation for the propagation of sin, and Clark does this by noting similarities between the Manichaean foundation myths of the archons' seduction, which resulted in a mixture of good and evil substances in the very act of human reproduction, and how Augustine combines the human seed and the propagation of evil. In general, Clark's article amplifies and summarises the arguments made by Julian against Augustine.<sup>18</sup>

During the past two decades, the approach of van Oort and Clark has attracted several other scholars. Apart from the general evaluations of the subject by Rudolph (2001),<sup>19</sup> Coyle (2009),<sup>20</sup> Eddy (2009),<sup>21</sup> and BeDuhn

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<sup>15</sup> The idea of Manichaean influences being in Augustine is by no means new. This has been advocated in varying forms by Bruckner 1897; Alfarić 1918; Adam 1952; 1958; Gross 1960, 372; Geerlings 1972 (especially on *concupiscentia*). For recent studies and discussions on how and to what degree the Manichaean doctrines influenced Augustine, see e.g. Coyle 2009, 251–263, 307–328; van Oort 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2011; BeDuhn 2010.

<sup>16</sup> See van Oort 1987. According to van Oort, the converging points in Augustine's and Mani's teachings on sexual desire are: 1) a highly negative way of speaking of *concupiscentia carnis* 2) the punitive character of sinful *concupiscentia* 3) the description of *concupiscentia* as a 'random motion.' Especially the third notion of *motus immoderatus* or *inordinatus* has won acceptance among scholars. An exclusively Manichaean authorship for this phrase has been doubted by Tarsicius van Bavel in 1993, and cited and approved by Verschoren 2002, 231–232.

<sup>17</sup> van Oort 1989.

<sup>18</sup> Clark's position was reviewed by Fredriksen 1988b.

<sup>19</sup> On *concupiscentia* in particular, Rudolph 2001, 10–11.

<sup>20</sup> On *concupiscentia* in particular, Coyle 2009, 325–326, relying on Geerlings 1972; van Oort 1987, 1989; and Clark 1986.

<sup>21</sup> On *concupiscentia* in particular, Eddy 2009, 333–336, again, building on Clark 1986; van Oort 1986, 1989.

(2010),<sup>22</sup> there have been more detailed studies by Geoffrey Harrison and Jason BeDuhn (2001) and by Mathijs Lamberigts (2001). Harrison and BeDuhn's study analyses an interesting Manichaean document, *epistula ad Menoch*, while Lamberigts's study examines Julian of Aeclanum's assessment of Augustine's Manichaeism. These studies contribute both indirectly and directly to the problem of the Manichaean influence on Augustine's concept of *concupiscentia carnis*. Harrison and BeDuhn's article argues in great detail for the authenticity of a Manichaean text attributed to Mani. The text, *ep. Men.*, provides several intriguing parallels between Mani and Augustine, common strategies to deal with *concupiscentia carnis*, and a common interest in certain verses of Paul.<sup>23</sup> In addition, while Mathijs Lamberigts emphasises that many of Julian's accusations of Augustine Manichaeism are based on polemical rhetoric and on an inability (or unwillingness) to discern between the fundamental differences in the Manichaean and Augustinian notions of evil, he also claims that "parallels at the level of *concupiscentia carnis* are [...] striking, given that Augustine's *motus inordinatus* is also—and particularly—found in Manichaean sources."<sup>24</sup>

3. Augustine's thoughts on evil desire have been studied in a more narrow historical context. This *historically oriented line* of research is sometimes linked to an interest in the history of the so-called Pelagian movement.<sup>25</sup> An influential scholar in Pelagian studies, Gerald Bonner, published an article in 1962 on the terminology of *libido* and *concupiscentia*, attempting to situate Augustine's linguistic and stylistic choices in a definite North-African context.<sup>26</sup> This geographical emphasis was continued in his article on the

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<sup>22</sup> BeDuhn 2010 is the first part of a planned trilogy on Augustine and his Manichaean legacy. See e.g. BeDuhn 2010, 83–96, for a discussion of human nature and salvation according to the Manichaean teaching.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. here Verschoren's (2002, 240) concluding statement on Lee's (1996) quest for Manichaean parallels in Augustine: "Could (part of) the common root looked for between Augustine and the Manichees not simply be Paul?"

<sup>24</sup> Lamberigts 2001, 135. Once more cf. van Oort 1987, 1989.

<sup>25</sup> Sometimes, as in the case of Gross 1960 or Flasch 1995, historical accounts are connected to the strong emphasis of showing how Augustine violently breaks with the previous traditions of Christian anthropology, or even with his own earlier, more "optimistic" views on sin, grace and moral responsibility.

<sup>26</sup> Bonner 1962. This geographical focus is adopted on a more ambitious level in Bonner 1967, which is an attempt to depict Augustine's anti-Pelagian reactions as a "doctrine du péché originel dans toute sa rigueur africaine" (Bonner 1967, 116). See also Bonner's articles on *concupiscentia* and *cupiditas* in AL.

Fall and on original sin in 1967.<sup>27</sup> During the past two decades, a considerable amount of research has been conducted on Augustine's aristocratic nemesis, Julian of Aeclanum. This research combines an ambition for a detailed and accurate picture of Pelagianism in general and of Julian's person and theology in particular, with notions that can be interpreted as a rehabilitation of the variegated group of theologians that was opposed to Augustine's determined interpretations of grace and human responsibility. Otto Wermelinger's study in 1975 has been a crucial general contribution to the discussion of the historical development of the Pelagian crisis.<sup>28</sup> Important representatives of the historical research conducted on Pelagianism today are Mathijs Lamberigts and Josef Lössl.<sup>29</sup> Lamberigts's articles on Augustine's position on sexuality and their modern critics (1997, 2000), on Julian's allegations of Augustine's Manichaean tendencies (2001), and on Julian's own position on concupiscence, all relate directly to the topic of this study. The articles by Marleen Verschoren can also be included in this line of research. Verschoren has studied the appearance of *concupiscentia* in Augustine's early works as well as the role of Romans 7 in the debate between Augustine and Julian.<sup>30</sup>

4. In what could be labelled as *philosophically oriented research*, Augustine's views on *concupiscentia* are explored in the larger context of the history of philosophy, both as transferring and transforming the ancient classical traditions regarding the emotions and their moral status, or as a philosopher of the will, with corollary topics.<sup>31</sup>

Richard Sorabji (2000) suggests that Augustine played a crucial role in the transformation of the clear Stoic distinction between the preparatory stages of emotion and the emotions proper. Sorabji argues that Augustine's contribution was to muddle this distinction and to adopt a position on emotions that endorsed *metriopatheia*. Sorabji also includes a discussion on the debate between Augustine and Julian on sexual desire, concluding

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<sup>27</sup> Bonner's thesis is questioned by Yates 2001.

<sup>28</sup> Wermelinger 1975.

<sup>29</sup> For Julian's doctrine of creation and moral responsibility, see Lamberigts 1988; on the diverging views of Augustine and Julian concerning the figure and role of Adam, see Lamberigts 1990. For a good introduction to the rehabilitation of Pelagianism, see Lamberigts 2008b with literature. On Julian in general, see Lamberigts 1999 and especially the massive study by Lössl 2001.

<sup>30</sup> Verschoren 2002, 2004.

<sup>31</sup> For general studies on Augustine as a philosopher, see also Kirwan 1989; O'Daly 1987; Rist 1994.



that Julian's critique was not satisfyingly answered by Augustine. Sorabji claims that "Julian won the philosophical, but Augustine the political, battle," regretting the fact that the Augustinian position prevailed in Christian doctrine over the "Pelagian view."<sup>32</sup>

Simo Knuuttila's description (2004) emphasises Augustine's Platonic understanding of the soul and emotions. According to Knuuttila's account, *concupiscentia* is an example of how Adam and Eve's Fall rendered the emotions somewhat autonomous. Moreover, Knuuttila maintains that Augustine regards the first phases of temptation as an "initial emotion" that should be stifled at the start, rather than as Stoically conceived preparatory movements.<sup>33</sup>

More recently, Jörn Müller (2009) has published an extensive study on the history of *akrasia*.<sup>34</sup> In a comprehensive chapter dealing with Augustine's development of the concept of the will, Müller occasionally reflects on the fine adjustments and changes in the history of philosophy that Augustine introduced. Müller studies Augustine's role in assigning the will a more independent role than it possessed in the preceding intellectualistic ancient tradition: to Müller, certain features in Augustine's thought paved the way for later voluntaristic approaches. Nonetheless, Müller argues that Augustine's own position between these options is somewhat synthetic: the will is oriented according to ultimately ordered and reasoned principles.<sup>35</sup> In his analysis of Augustine's early works, Müller examines the manner in which Augustine develops his conception of the will in the context of Romans 7, connecting Augustine's polarity of the evaluative forms of will (*cupiditas* vs. *caritas*) to the disjunction of the *ego* presented in Romans 7.<sup>36</sup> Müller notes how Augustine identifies *concupiscentia* by adopting an expanded concept of 'habit' (*consuetudo*, *hexis*) that comprises not only a hardened habit as personal evil actions, but also a 'punitive habit,' originating from the choices made by our human ancestors in Paradise.<sup>37</sup> Müller also notes how Augus-

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<sup>32</sup> Sorabji 2000, 416–417.

<sup>33</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 170–172.

<sup>34</sup> Müller covers partly the same discussions as Saarinen 1994.

<sup>35</sup> Müller 2009, 306, 308: "Es ist dieses dezisionistische Wollen, das Augustinus den Ruf eingetragen hat, der Begründer eines 'modernen' Willensbegriffs zu sein." See also Müller 2009, 339, and his excellent discussion of Augustine's description of the first evil action, 345–355. See also MacDonald 1999. For a caveat in using Augustine as a starting point for later developments, see Lössl 2003, who opts for an intellectualist representation of Augustine's philosophy of mind.

<sup>36</sup> Müller 2009, 315–317.

<sup>37</sup> Müller 2009, 318–319.

tine's strong notion of grace affects his way of treating the *concupiscentia* in a person *sub gratia*.<sup>38</sup> Ultimately, Müller passes a negative judgment on the philosophical value of Augustine's doctrine of grace in connection with *liberum arbitrium* (and implicitly with *concupiscentia*).<sup>39</sup>

#### 1.4. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study combines both a historical and a systematic approach. These approaches affect the structure of the work, and they both define the basic assumptions of the work.

The predilection for historical consideration is displayed by a modest interest in *development*. Thus, each chapter follows a chronological order, proceeding from the early works to later accounts.<sup>40</sup> The issues of chronology and development have long been an established and important convention in Augustinian scholarship, but there are different motivations for maintaining this convention, and these range from a rather neutral position of acknowledging Augustine's progressive way of thinking, to the more critical stance of suggesting a serious contradiction or incoherence of thought, or a breaking with earlier (and perhaps better) traditions.<sup>41</sup> This study subscribes to a moderate position: while acknowledging the indisputable changes in Augustine's reflections concerning *concupiscentia* and related matters, discontinuities are not pursued for their own sake. Rather, each chapter implies both constancy and development.

The systematic analysis of *concupiscentia* structures this study so that the suggested functions are considered separately in each chapter. This

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<sup>38</sup> Müller 2009, 336: "Sündigen im Sinne der Zustimmung des Willens zu der *concupiscentia carnalis* ist also weiterhin möglich, aber eben nicht mehr unausweichlich," 345.

<sup>39</sup> Müller 2009, 361: "Hier zeigen sich dann übrigens auch die philosophisch ruinösen Konsequenzen der späteren Gnadenlehre von Augustinus deutlich: Denn wenn dem Menschen seine guten voluntates durch die göttliche gratia praeveniens et operans eingegeben werden, er also in sittlicher Hinsicht keinerlei Initiative (und auch keine Möglichkeit der Ablehnung) hat, stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern man hier überhaupt noch von seinem Wollen bzw. Handeln sprechen kann. [...] Zumindest als Philosoph vermag man hier der Rede von individueller Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit keinen substanziellen Sinn mehr abzugewinnen—weder in libertarischer noch in kompatibilistischer Perspektive."

<sup>40</sup> In chronology I follow a reasonable consensus in the dating of the works in question. Where a conventional consensus is under dispute, it has been duly noted in the footnotes. Conventional lists of chronology can be found in e.g. *Ages*, xliii–il; *AH* 250–261.

<sup>41</sup> Each convention naturally has its disputants. In this case, Harrison S. 2006 and Harrison C. 2006 have acutely emphasised the basically continuous features of Augustine's thought.

structure facilitates the contemplation of Augustine's own, textually immanent conceptions of the meaning and place of evil desire within his thinking. This type of systematic approach does not, however, imply that for Augustine these functions would have been distinctly separate and disconnected. On the contrary, more than one function may appear in the context of the individual discussions and extracts of texts. One must, therefore, remember that the functions distinguished in connection with *concupiscentia* involve a certain amount of pedagogy or heuristics; thus, important texts such as *ciu.* 14 appear repeatedly in the following chapters, as they have relevance to many different functions of *concupiscentia*.

Combining the historical perspective with the systematic analysis of functions has advantages that could not be achieved by excluding one at the expense of other. An ahistorical, purely systematic treatment of Augustine can no longer be easily imagined.<sup>42</sup> Again, an exclusively historical or chronological account of the occurrence of *concupiscentia* would risk becoming a dense and unanalytical paraphrase of the host of discussions in which *concupiscentia* (with cognates) appears. The limitations of combining the two are equally obvious: the reader will need patience towards the repetition which unavoidably ensues when the distinguishable functions and their temporal development in the works of one author are explored.

Finally, it is important to remark on the terminology of the concept of 'evil desire.'<sup>43</sup> An entire chapter of this study is assigned to examining the relation between three different words that Augustine seems to use rather synonymously (these are *concupiscentia*, *cupiditas*, and *libido*). As will be demonstrated, Augustine is aware of the semantic problems concerning these words. Nonetheless, there appears to be no good grounds for treating these separately, with seriously diverging semantic connotations.

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. Hanby's (2003, 3) account of the history of the Augustinian view of the self, and his methodological point of departure: "I synthesize the *De Trinitate* and then allow that synthesis to interpret other Augustinian texts, including those written prior to *De Trinitate*." For Hanby, this represents a "constructive appropriation" (*ibid.*, p. 4). Couenhoven's (2005) short article claims to have "clarified what concupiscence actually is" (pp. 372–376), in a way that sketches the various elements of original sin in Augustine's works, and pays only slight attention to the historical and theological contexts in which the term occurs.

<sup>43</sup> Other options are 'sinful longing,' 'fleshly lust,' 'concupiscence,' or even 'passion,' to name but a few of the attempts to translate the original Latin terms. In this study, words such as 'concupiscence' and 'evil desire' combined with the original Latin terms (*concupiscentia* being prevalent) will be used, as varying signs relating to the same concept.

## 1.5. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

This work begins, as has been mentioned, with a review of Augustine's terminology of evil desire from a lexical and semantic point of view. A general overview of the occurrences of the negatively connoted words for 'desire' in Latin literature precedes a corresponding examination of Augustine's works. This lexical overview is divided into two parts; the first part is a survey of the words used for 'desire' in the pagan Latin literature, primarily in the fields of historiography and philosophy and the second part is a review of the usages of the Christian Latin authors. As for Augustine, we will first focus on his own reflections and distinctions on the three cognate words denoting evil desire. Consequently, the relative synonymy of these words will be explored, followed by a mapping of the varying textual contexts in which the terms seem to appear and to which they are attached. The goals of this linguistically oriented, introductory chapter are rather modest: it will be argued that despite certain preferences in the uses of the words, a sufficient degree of synonymy reigns so as to allow an analysis of the concept without tightly discriminating between the terms.

The study then proceeds to the properly theological analysis. This will be conducted in four chapters, each examining a distinct function of evil desire in Augustine's thought. The chapters follow each other in a theologically relevant order: Chapters 3 and 4 argue for the fundamentally theological character of evil desire as being both a punishment and a cause for evil actions. Chapter 5 then explains how the philosophical traditions of emotions became auxiliary tools in Augustine's theological programme concerning *concupiscentia*. Finally, Chapter 6 connects *concupiscentia* to Augustine's views of grace and Christian renewal.

Accordingly, Chapter 3 contains a description of how Augustine formulates his view of *concupiscentia* as a reciprocal punishment for Adam and Eve's disobedience to God in Paradise. This chapter opens with Augustine's early attempts to depict the effects of Adam's defective choice, and then links these attempts to the problems concerning the relation of divine punishment and divine justice. We will then see how Augustine gradually advocates the role of *concupiscentia* as the most fitting psychological punishment for what he describes as essentially a theological crime of lèse-majesté. This chapter will close by examining the searing critique against Augustine by Julian—this critique is useful at least in pinpointing the theological commitments that *concupiscentia*, even in its overtly sexual manifestations, had in Augustine's thought.

In Chapter 4, we will explore the function of evil desire as a fundamental cause for individual sinful acts. This function appears in Augustine's thought as an opposite form of love (predominately denoted by the word *cupiditas*). It will be argued that the function was formed both parallel to, and in answer to, Manichaean views on *concupiscentia*. Consequently, Chapter 4 will follow this line of thought and highlight two formally distinct but functionally similar images, namely, the image of evil desire as the 'root' (*radix*) of all evil, and the formula of threefold desire (*triplex cupiditas*), a scheme based on 1 Jn 2, 16 ('the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, the pride in riches').

Chapter 5 will approach *concupiscentia* in conjunction with the traditional philosophical positions on emotions. It will be argued that Augustine was well aware of these traditions from the outset of his literary career, and that they had an obvious influence on his explanation of the psychological processes in connection with *concupiscentia*. However, as these influences seem to be acknowledged rather well in the modern research on the history of philosophy, the problem will be considered further: we will explore how and why Augustine eventually deviated from the traditional analyses of the emergence of emotions, particularly concerning *concupiscentia*, and how this deviation became part of his theological apology. Indeed, it will be argued that apologetic motivations were part of this function of *concupiscentia* even in Augustine's earlier works, and they became more reflective and detailed in his final debates with Julian of Aeclanum, a theologian with a considerably high level of philosophical education.

Finally, Chapter 6 will offer an account of the function of *concupiscentia* as the sparring partner of a baptised Christian. How did Augustine conceive of the difference in status of *concupiscentia* between those who were not undergoing the process of Christian renewal and those who were? In other words, how did Augustine develop the notion of *concupiscentia* as a part of every human being, including baptised Christians? These questions will also be addressed in light of Augustine's interpretation of Romans 7, as this scriptural source text was constantly used to highlight the borders of Christian renewal, and Augustine's changing readings of the text are now well charted. The final chapter argues that the function of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal underwent what here is referred to as a process of 'domestication': the black-and-white tones of 'invincible evil desire' of the works of the 390s become softer shades of grey in later works, when Augustine starts to introduce *concupiscentia* more realistically into the life of a renewed Christian.

The final evaluations of the relative importance and status of the functions thus charted will be carried out in brief in the concluding Chapter 7.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE LANGUAGE OF DESIRE

uitam beatam concupiscere et desiderare sectari, omnium hominum esse  
arbitror

s. 150, 4

hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut, si cupiditas uel concupiscentia  
dicatur nec addatur cuius rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intellegi

ciu. 14, 7

In this Chapter, I shall discuss the three most common words for the negatively connotated desire in Augustine's works, namely the terms *concupiscentia-concupisco*, *cupiditas* and *libido*. A short survey in the lexical history of the words will be provided, and after that, questions pertaining to the degree of synonymy and varying contexts in which these words are used, shall be addressed. No comprehensive lexical analyses are pursued here, but only a rough outline of Augustine's terminology in the matter.

The standard treatises on lexical and semantic notions in the Augustinian concept of evil desire still remain those of Gerald Bonner.<sup>1</sup> Bonner has

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<sup>1</sup> Bonner 1962, 1986–1994, 1996–2002, 2002, 398–401. There are, of course, other positions to the semantics of the three words of desire. They are mostly of very general character, or noting a detail of the word uses in the Augustinian corpus. See the remarks of e.g. Brachtendorf 1997, 306 n. 52 (who notes the relative paucity of the word *concupiscentia* in *ciu.*), and Cipriani 2010, who treats the word in a “general sense” as synonymous to *cupiditas* and *concupiscentia*, but suggests then a “stricter sense,” by which *libido* refers to the desire for pleasure connected with the five bodily senses, and in “still stricter sense” may also denote a desire for sexual pleasure (Cipriani 2010, 981). The three words are handled as synonyms by e.g. Burnell 1999; Harrison C. 2000, 95. Schlabach (1998, 65–66, n. 26 and 30, 31) is ambiguous, positing on the one hand “subtle distinctions,” on the other hand he admits that the word choice depends mostly on metrical factors and on source texts. Lamberigts 2000 reconstructs different forms of *concupiscentia* (*c. bona*, *c. naturalis* and *c. carnis*), and refers to Bonner's articles (2000, 189, 191); see also Lamberigts 1997, 155 n. 19 and 157–158, where he suggests for *concupiscentia carnis* a translation: “sinful longing.” For other references to Bonner, see Markus 1990b, 258; Schlabach 1998, 59. As Lawless (2000, 251) points out, *concupiscentia* remains hard to translate in English: “A recent translation of *De nuptiis et concupiscentiis* [sic!], for example, as Marriage and Desire, is misleading and frankly, inept. Like *desiderium* and *cupido*, *concupiscentia* is a word with a distinctively biblical and Augustinian coloration. The English ‘desire’ does not reflect its many resonances.” Markus (1990a, 60) prefers “lust

stressed the non-sexual facets of the concept more or less consistently. His basic assumptions concerning the semantics and the uses of the words in his 1962 article are the following:

1. *Libido* and *concupiscentia* are interchangeable when they are used to describe sexual desire.
2. If any other lust is meant, *libido* has the clear prevalence, sometimes supplemented by *cupiditas*. The importance of *libido dominandi* in *ciu.* is stressed, and its debt to Sallust is noted.
3. *Libido* is classical Latin. *Concupiscentia* is a Christian technical term, used exclusively by Christian writers, and mostly with a sexual connotation.

Bonner also makes short surveys of both words in the preceding Latin literature, and attempts to show that *libido* has a wider range of meaning than the exclusively Christian word of *concupiscentia*. Bonner provides examples of the various uses of *libido* from Lucretius, Sallust, Livy, Cicero, Tacitus and concludes that for Classical Latin authors, this word lacks “strongly sexual overtones” which it has for Augustine.<sup>2</sup> In the *Augustinus-Lexikon* articles, the following modifications and additions are made:

4. Biblical Latin directed Augustine to use the word *concupiscentia* in both a positive and a negative sense, although the negative meaning prevails. Such ambivalence is due to the “African tradition” (i.e. Tertullian and Cyprian) that Augustine follows.<sup>3</sup>
5. *Concupiscentia* as such is not limited to sexual desire: it also has “wider implications” in human sinful behaviour (correcting (3) above). Sexual desire is one, but not the only manifestation of *concupiscentia*.

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of the flesh.” See, again, TeSelle 2001, 322, who opts for using “desire”: “Augustine is much criticized for his concern about desire (it sounds especially awful when it goes under the name of ‘concupiscence’”). Finally, Lössl (2008, xlii) suggests “‘carnal,’ or ‘evil,’ ‘hankering.’”

<sup>2</sup> Bonner uses the form *libido carnalis*.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed criticism of this assertion, see Yates 2001, who investigates both Cyprian and Tertullian focusing on their use of *concupiscentia*. According to Yates, the two pre-Augustinian writers cannot be shown to have influenced Augustine in any profound way (p. 56). If any preference is to be given, it belongs to Tertullian.

Concerning the emergence of *concupiscentia* in Africa, see also Mohrmann 1965, 103–106. Mohrmann notes that in the old Latin translation of Clem. *Rom. ep. ad Corinth.* (28, 1; 30, 1), the word *epithumia* is translated by *voluntas* instead of *concupiscentia*. This translation originates from the second century CE, and in all probability, from Rome. Mohrmann 1965, 103–106. However, in a few decades, it is *concupiscentia* that is found in the biblical quotations of Tertullian on the other side of the Mediterranean.

6. *Cupiditas* is, despite its occurrence in a few biblical passages, a classical Latin word that carries various meanings. It is more general than the sexually restricted *libido* (correcting (2) above).
7. The connection of *cupiditas* to the Stoic tetrachord of emotions is stressed as well as its opposition to Christian love.
8. In spite of (6), *cupiditas* can also have sexual connotations.

The arguments show that the three words of desire are interrelated in a complicated way within Augustine's own texts, and within the previous history of Latin literature and language. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 'general' or fixed meanings for words that seem to be very flexibly interchangeable, especially when, as in the case of Augustine, they are in frequent use and occur in highly varying contexts. Based on Bonner's arguments, the safest choice to pick would be to conclude that all of the three words have a more general connotation, and that all of them have some special connotations and that all of them can mean sexual desire. Obviously, this would not be of much use for a reader of Augustine who would like to know what a particular desire in a particular context means. More often than not, qualifications such as 'usually,' 'generally,' 'often' and 'sometimes' (frequently used by Bonner) are a way of saying that the semantic edges of the words denoting evil desire are not sharp, but blurred.<sup>4</sup>

What follows is an attempt to broaden the focus of Bonner's concise articles. While the scope of the present study does not allow a thorough semantic analysis of the word groups, nor a detailed study of the historical developments in their use, I will nevertheless try to give representative examples of Augustine's own reflections on the matter and of his use of the terms concerned. The word *cupiditas* has been included here, but the words *cupido* and *cupidus* are only incidentally noted due to their low occurrences in Augustine's writings.<sup>5</sup> The word group *libido* includes a small number of adjectives and a few adverbs. The major difference to Bonner's approach is

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<sup>4</sup> For the semantic edges in the prototype theory in the field of the study of semantic changes, see Geeraerts 1997, 10–23. That a given word has blurred semantic edges can be roughly outlined according to the prototype theory as following: the word occurs very often in the context X, but it is quite normal to also use it in the context Y, and the word seems to be used a couple of times even in the context Z. For some reason, the word never occurs in the context Q. The contexts would be subjectively labelled to contain certain qualities or categories.

<sup>5</sup> The words *Cupido* and *cupido* yield only 30 hits in a search (CAG2) over Augustine's oeuvre, whereas the adjective *cupidus* occurs 78 times.



that the word group *concupisc-* is not limited to the noun, as the verbal forms are included as well. While Bonner's omission may be excused by appealing to the imbalance created in comparing two nouns (*cupiditas*, *libido*) with the verbal forms of *concupiscere*, such an omission distorts the image of the development of the senses of the entire word group. *Concupiscentia* as a noun is not a purely Augustinian or Christian neologism, but a handy reformulation of an existing Latin verb that is frequently used even by Cicero. While there are many examples of hypercorrect loan translations (*calque*) in the Old Latin Bible, it would be quite natural to assume that *concupiscentia* as a noun was formed likewise, as a formal equivalent of the Greek ἐπιθυμία, which it normally translates as (the prefix *con-* denoting intensity). Obviously, however, Augustine was not restricted to the Old Latin translations of the Bible in his use of the word group of *concupiscentia-concupisco*.<sup>6</sup>

Some deliberate omissions have been made. For example, the words *desiderium* and *uoluptas* are left aside in the following considerations, not because they would not have impact on the concept of evil desire, but because of the vast material they would produce in the works of Augustine alone. In addition, the semantic field of these words seems to diverge from the group *concupiscentia*, *cupiditas*, *libido* in various ways; thus, *desiderium* denotes a large and general spectrum of wishes and volitions (cf. *appetitus*), while *uoluptas* is more related to the meanings of 'pleasure,' or 'enjoyment.' Together with the three nouns of evil desire, these words would then open an overwhelming set of other closely related lexemes that would definitely fall beyond the scope of this study.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Against Bonner 1962; 1986, 1114. For the practice and examples of calque in Old Latin Gospels, see Burton 2000, 129–136. In his classification *concupiscentia* would represent both a case of a "matching word" and a "calque proper."

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Mohrmann 1961, 26. As a rule, *uoluptas* appears as an object of *concupiscentia* (*carnis*) as in *uera rel. 70 concupiscentia carnis uoluptatis infimae amatores significat; conf. 6, 22 uictus libidine talis uoluptatis; c. Faust. 22, 31; 22, 48 concupiscentia percipiendae uoluptatis; nupt. et conc. 1, 5 sed isto bono male utitur qui bestialiter utitur, ut sit eius intentio in uoluptate libidinis, non in uoluntate propaginis* (note the *figura* here!); *c. ep. Pel. 1, 35 illa carnalis concupiscentia, cuius motus ad postremam, quae uos multum delectat, peruenit uoluptatem; c. Iul. imp. 4, 28 ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam uoluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare; en. Ps. 118, 1, 1 se miserum putat, cum ad suae concupiscentiae uoluptatem laetitiamque non peruenit*. See also *uera rel. 69 seruunt enim cupiditati triplici uel uoluptatis uel excellentiae uel spectaculi; Io. eu. tr. 15, 16*.

Sometimes the edge becomes somewhat blurred, however, as in cases like *conf. 10, 55 uoluptas pulchra, canora, suauia, sapida, lenia sectatur*; or in the parataxis of *c. Faust. 22, 47 flagrantia concupiscentiae carnalis et sordidae uoluptatis*; and *gr. et pecc. or. 2, 43*. See also

2.1. ROMAN LITERATURE AND *LIBIDO*, *CUPIDITAS*, *CONCUPISCO*

This section will shed light on the use of the vocabulary of evil desire in pagan classical literature.<sup>8</sup> Obviously, again, a systematic treatment of all instances would be beyond the purposes of this study, and the main objective of this section is to provide only a general background for later developments in the semantics of the vocabulary. I shall focus on historical and philosophical writing, the genres with which Augustine was most familiar.<sup>9</sup> As both *concupisco* and *cupiditas* were mostly unsuitable for poetic texts for metrical reasons, this naturally makes *libido* the most popular word of the three in poetry.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the use of the vocabulary in science and

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*en. Ps.* 8, 13, where *uoluptas*, together with *curiositas* and *superbia* appears as one of the *triplex concupiscentia* (1Jn 2, 16). Similarly in *s.* 284, 5.

In the debate with Julian, *uoluptas* and *concupiscentia* seem to be more closely attached together, for Julian seeks legitimacy for created emotions such as pleasure and (sexual) desire, whereas Augustine is keen to point out irrational and corrupted features of both. See *c. Iul.* 3, 28; 4, 64–65; 4, 71; 5, 39–40. In *Iul. c. Iul. imp.* 1, 71 Julian treats the terms as virtually synonymous: *naturalem esse omnium sensuum uoluptatem testimonio uniuersitatis docemus. hanc autem uoluptatem concupiscentiam ante peccatum in paradiso fuisse res illa declarat, quia ad delictum uia per concupiscentiam fuit, quae cum pomi decore oculos incitasset, spem etiam iucundi irritauit saporis; Iul. c. Iul. imp.* 3, 167 *Iul. et quamuis iam pro concupiscentia uel uoluptate carnis, quae etiam libido dicitur.* In his response, Augustine uses only *concupiscentia carnis* and *libido*. See also *Iul. c. Iul. imp.* 5, 11 *ipsa ergo [...] uirilitas [...] uis a me uoluptatis et concupiscentiae nominata est.*

In *Cic. Tusc.* 4, 7, 16; 4, 9, 20 *uoluptas* appears as a synonym for one of the four generic emotions of the Stoic theory, i.e. *laetitia*. Augustine follows this distinction e.g. in *ciu.* 14, 15 *uoluptatem uero praecedat appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatus libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis.* See also *c. Iul.* 3, 48 where the goal of Epicurean ethics is seen in *uoluptas: Epicureus [...] ille totum hominis bonum in corporis posuit uoluptate.*

Concerning *desiderium*, see e.g. *Gn. litt.* 10, 12, 20, where the word appears to be a neutral or a positive desire for 'spiritual' or divine things: *sed tamen carnem sine anima concupiscere nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. ex utroque enim fit: ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio nulla sentitur, ex carne autem, quod sine illa carnalis delectatio non sentitur.* For some other occasions, see the instances in sections 2.3.2. and 2.3.4.

<sup>8</sup> Augustine's classical readings have been studied e.g. by Hagendahl 1967 and O'Donnell 1980.

<sup>9</sup> Of course, *libido* was also consolidated in certain set phrases, such as *ex libidine quidquid facere* or *venire in libidinem*, or it was connected idiomatically to certain verbs and adjectives (e.g. *flagrare*). I shall not focus on these idioms and phrases. See Catull. 17; *Cic. inv.* 2, 45, 131; *Cluent.* 12; *Hor. carm.* 1, 25; *Plin. nat.* 14, 140; *Tac. ann.* 3, 54, 1; 6, 16, 2; *hist.* 2, 31, 1; *Suet. gramm.* 23, 5; *Sen. ira* 1, 17.

<sup>10</sup> Thus, *cupiditas* occurs very rarely in Plautus and Terence, whereas *cupido*, of course, is used in the poetry of the Early Empire (Ovid, Horace). Again, *libido* is used by Catull, Horace, Ovid, and by Martial and Juvenal but not once by Virgil. One could claim that, in view of

medical writing seems to be rather limited. For example, in Pliny the Elder, *libido* denotes the period when animals are in heat or sexual potency that various herbs either increase or decrease.<sup>11</sup> Again, in Celsus, *libido* seems always to denote simply 'sexual intercourse.' On the other hand, the majority of instances of *cupiditas* in Celsus refer to 'appetite,' and never to sexual desire. The few occurrences of *concupisco* in Celsus relate to sexual or alimentary objects (*concubitus*, *aqua*, *vinum*, and *cibum*). In Pliny the Elder, the verb has no sexual connotations.

### 2.1.1. Historical Writing

*Libido* and *luxuria* are popular targets in the historiography of the Late Republic as well as in the flourishing Empire.<sup>12</sup> One could speak of a literary *topos*: authors such as Livy, Sallust, Tacitus and Suetonius use *libido* frequently in their condemnations of sinister historical figures: the character descriptions of these villains are composed of vice lists in which *libido* is a regular member.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the vocabulary of desire is in active use in Sallust's descriptions of moral degeneration—*libido* has a higher prevalence than *cupiditas*, undoubtedly for stylistical reasons.<sup>14</sup> In Suetonius' *vitae Caesarum*, the emperors can be divided into two groups according to their position to the *libido*: the good emperors coerce economic and sexual *libidines*, whereas the bad ones do not hesitate to cast themselves into the most unusual and shameful sexual *libidines*.<sup>15</sup>

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Martial's subject matter, these words are used rather surprisingly seldom; *concupisco*, for instance, occurs only a couple of times, and never in sexual context.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Plin. *nat.* 26, 95; 26, 99.

<sup>12</sup> In addition to Livy's moral code, cf. the use of C. Nepos: *libido* always occurs with *luxus*.

<sup>13</sup> Tacitus' account of Seianus is very typical: Tac. *ann.* 4, 1, 3: *iuxta adulatio et superbia; palam compositus pudor, intus summa apiscendi libido, eiusque causa modo largitio et luxus, saepius industria ac vigilantia*. Cf. the introduction of Tigellinus in Tac. *ann.* 14, 51, 3, and the last moments of Messalina in Tac. *ann.* 11, 37, 4, *animo per libidines corrupto nihil honestum inerat*. Suetonius continues the tradition in his description of Nero (Suet. *Nero* 26, 1): *petulantiam, libidinem, luxuriam, auaritiam, crudelitatem sensim quidem primo et occulte et uelut iuuenili errore exercuit*.

<sup>14</sup> For the use of *cupiditas*, *cupido* and *libido* in Sallust, see Syme 1964, 269, 305–312. The pseudo-Sallustian invective, *epistulae ad Caesarem senem*, shows differences in the use of the words, *ibid.*, 328–328: "prone as Sallust is to 'libido' (at least 36 instances), he nowhere descends to 'malae libidines.' Indeed, he nowhere attaches an adjective to 'libidines.' Not an attractive locution, therefore. And, for other reasons, a doubt will arise about 'bona libido' (II. 13.6)."

<sup>15</sup> See the characterisations of Vespasian (11, 1) and Domitianus (22, 1). According to Lewis 1991, 3637, there is a distinction in Suetonius' *vitae* between the sexual affairs under *pudicitia* and *libidines*, the latter denoting heterosexual behaviour.

In Livy's introduction to *ab urbe condita*, the moral programme that includes the reproach of *libido*, is clearly dictated: the recent economical growth of Rome has led to greed (*avaritia*) and varying pleasures (*voluptates*), which in turn have created a need (*desiderium*) to corrupt everything with luxurious living (*luxus*) and licentious lifestyle (*libido*).<sup>16</sup>

Thus, it is clear that Livy does not always bother to nominate the *libidines* by clarifying attributes: it is evident that *libido* is used in negative contexts in the majority of cases, where licentious sexual behaviour, material greed or other arbitrary (and thus morally reproachable) acts are reported.<sup>17</sup> For example, if sexual desire is violent or otherwise criminal, it is denoted with the word *libido*.<sup>18</sup>

Because *libido* is often connected to greed (*avaritia*), sex or, more generally, to a dissolute style of living, it represents a certain kind of hubris, and is thus the opposite of modesty and temperance.<sup>19</sup> Reporting of disturbances in Britain, Tacitus forms a phrase where the two words of desire cannot be easily distinguished from each other: *nil iam cupiditati, nil libidini exceptum*.<sup>20</sup> Again, apologising for the German custom of polygamy, he excludes *libido* from the motives of such marital behaviour; the real reason, says Tacitus, lies in the traditional custom of local nobility.<sup>21</sup> Both *cupiditas* and *libido* denote excessive and intemperate greed. Very

<sup>16</sup> Liv. praef. 11–12 *ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit, aut nulla umquam res publica nec maior nec sanctor nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in quam civitatem tam serae avaritiae luxuriaque immigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit: adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat; nuper divitiae avaritiam et abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem pereundi perdendique omnia invexere.*

<sup>17</sup> Liv. 3, 50, 7; 28, 24, 9. *Libido* is not limited to masculine sexuality. See Tac. *ann.* 2, 85, 1; 13, 30, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Liv. 3, 44, 1 *Ap. Claudium virginis plebeiae stuprandae libido cepit*. Cf. Bonner 1962, 306 on the rape of Lucretia: "the point here, of course, is that it is a *mala libido*, which implies that libido, in itself, is not necessarily evil, and so has to be qualified to fit these circumstances." An overwhelming majority of occurrences of *libido* in Livy appears, however, without negative qualifications, although the context clearly compels us to interpret the *libido* as negatively connotated. The passage that Bonner quotes is in fact the only instance, where the attribute *mala* is used in Livy. For another illuminating example of the sexual *libido* in Livy, see 39, 8, 6; see also Tac. *ann.* 13, 44, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Liv. 30, 14, 5: *atqui nulla earum uirtus est propter quas tibi appetendus uisus sim qua ego aequae ac temperantiae et continentiae libidinum gloriatus fuero*; 24, 5, 5: *sequebantur contemptus omnium hominum, superbiae aures, contumeliosa dicta [...]* *libidines novae, inhumana crudelitas*. See also 29, 9, 11. Tac. *ann.* 16, 32, 3; *hist.* 1, 7, 2.

<sup>20</sup> Tac. *Agr.* 15, 2.

<sup>21</sup> Tac. *Germ.* 18, 1.

occasionally, Tacitus also mentions a desire for revenge or an appetite for unusual foods.<sup>22</sup>

Some remarks on omissions could be made as well. Sallust only uses *cupiditas* three times and *concupisco* twice. By contrast, Caesar never uses *libido*, though he uses *cupiditas* alongside with constructions with *cupidus*, nor does he use *concupisco*.

In Livy, *cupiditas* is typically used with the genitive objectives indicating material goods, authority or some action, usually reproachable in their context, including an erotic context.<sup>23</sup> The *cupiditates* are restrained by laws,<sup>24</sup> and the word is frequently used in a pejorative context, sometimes with an additional attribute,<sup>25</sup> although a desire 'to see the people and gods of Rome' is also possible.<sup>26</sup> Caesar's use of *cupiditas* is rather similar.<sup>27</sup>

Compared to the nouns *cupiditas* and *libido*, the verb *concupisco* is quite rare in the historical writings of the Late Republic and the Early Empire. In fact, Sallust uses the verb only twice.<sup>28</sup> In both instances, the object of the action refers to economics, and the word appears in a pejorative context. Likewise, Livy uses this verb extremely rarely (twice). One of these instances denotes a desire for wealth (*fortuna*), the other a strong wish (*tribunos plebis concupistis*).<sup>29</sup> In Cornelius Nepos, the verb denotes more than once a strong, excessive wish to attain a goal that is impossible to achieve.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, there are occurrences in Cicero that speak for a very flexible and indetermined use of *concupisco*: the verb denotes strong wishes (and neutral in connotations), and desires for wealth, power or reputation. It is interesting to note that the verb is not used once in the sexual contexts by the historical writers mentioned above, nor does it have particularly sexual connotations for Cicero either. A similar characterisation would suit Tacitus's use of *concupisco* as well.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Tac. *ann.* 12, 20, 1 *libido vindictae*; *hist.* 2, 62, 1 *epularum foeda et inexplebilis libido*; 4, 42, 4 *libido sanguinis*; 4, 49, 3 *adulandi libidine*.

<sup>23</sup> Liv. 6, 20, 5 *regni*; 6, 6, 1 *agri*; 5, 5, 2 *ulciscendi*; 28, 43, 5 *gloriae*; 1, 9, 16 *cupiditate atque amore*.

<sup>24</sup> Liv. 34, 4, 8.

<sup>25</sup> Liv. 7, 9, 4 *prava*.

<sup>26</sup> Liv. 42, 11, 3.

<sup>27</sup> Caes. *civ.* 3, 74, 2 *pugnandi*; *Gall.* 1, 2, 1 *regni*; 1, 41, 1 *belli gerendi*; 6, 22, 3 *pecuniae*; 7, 50, 4 *gloriae*.

<sup>28</sup> Sall. *Catil.* 2, 1; 5, 4; 21, 4 and 11, 3; 55, 33. In their context, both words refer to material or economical lust, and 'greed' would be a good English equivalent.

<sup>29</sup> Liv. 1, 56, 7; 3, 67, 7.

<sup>30</sup> Nep. *Con.* 5, 1; *Eum.* 2, 3; *Att.* 13, 4.

<sup>31</sup> A strong wish (*hist.* 4, 73, 3; *Agr.* 21, 2), in a pejorative context (*ann.* 16, 21, 1 *Nero virtutem ipsam excindere concupivit*), and sexual desire (*ann.* 14, 20, 5).

Based on notions above, following generalisations can be made:

1. *Libido* and *cupiditas* are used frequently by the historical writers of the Late Republic and the Early Empire. These words are used in moral condemnations of communities or individuals. They do not need pejorative attributes in order to have negative connotations; on the contrary, *libido* (*lubido*) seems to have such connotations independently.
2. Generally speaking, the words are used in two categories, to describe either excessive sexual needs or lusts, or desires for economic wealth, possession of land or 'luxuries,' which are all in opposition to 'traditional' Roman austerity and frugality.
3. The verb *concupisco* is rarely used and occurs even more rarely in sexual contexts.

### 2.1.2. *Philosophical Writing*

A large source for occurrences of *libido*, *cupiditas* and *concupisco* in Roman literature are the philosophically coloured moral treatises. The words in these texts are often reflected upon, and situated into a certain conceptual context: in the case of *libido* (and *cupiditas* as well) this context is, obviously, the theory of emotions. The main authors in this respect are Cicero, Seneca and (from Augustine's viewpoint) Apuleius. Cicero is the most interesting case, as he was an important link in translating the key concepts of Hellenistic philosophy into Latin. Again, the different genres used by Cicero make him a special case as well: for example, he uses the term *libido* in his forensic speeches in the same way as the historical writers.<sup>32</sup>

In the philosophical treatises, *libido* is one of the irrational movements of the soul. Its relation to the nearly synonymous *cupiditas* is loose. For instance, sometimes *libido* refers to a subspecies of the general *cupiditas*;<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> For instance, the Verrine speeches abound in *libidines*, cf. *Verr.* 3, 207; 5, 32; 5, 85. Verrine *libido* comes sometimes near to arbitrariness, see *Verr.* 3, 77; 82 and especially *Verr.* 3, 220. In *fam.* 9, 16, 3 *libido* is likewise contrasted with *voluntas*. A mean sexual innuendo is to be read in *Cic. Phil.* 2, 45 *nemo umquam puer emptus libidinis causa tam fuit in domini potestate quam tu in Curionis*. A more philosophically coloured use of language is not, of course, limited exclusively to Cicero's philosophical treatises, as can be seen from *leg. agr.* 2, 55: *o perturbatam rationem, o libidinem refrenandam, o consilia dissoluta atque perdit!*

<sup>33</sup> *fin.* 1, 18, 59 *quodsi corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates immensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum*. An interesting remark about the connotations of the words concerning evil desire is found in a rhetorical treatise by Cicero (*inv.* 1, 23, 32): *nam genus est omnium nimirum libidinum cupiditas, eius autem*

whereas in some other cases, the words are used in an interchangeable way.<sup>34</sup>

In *Tusculanae disputationes*, the same philosophical concept exhibits different nuances with different terms; thus, *cupiditas* is connected to money, and *libido* more generally to sensual pleasures.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, both *cupiditas* and *libido* stand in opposition to the qualities of a good man (*vir bonus*).<sup>36</sup> The word 'fault' (*peccatum*) occurs in the same context with *libido* and other emotions in *fin.* 3, 9, 32, where *libido* is viewed as a basic intention, deemed to be faulty even with no exterior results.<sup>37</sup> Sometimes *libido* occurs in a positive context, as in *off.* 1, 17, 54, where Cicero speaks of the *libido procreandi* as an element of a social bond (*societas*) between all living creatures.<sup>38</sup> Another interesting context of *libido* is to be found in *rep.* 6, 29, 136, where bodily and lustful pleasures are opposed to the laws of the gods and men.<sup>39</sup>

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*generis sine dubio pars est avaritia*. The words *libido*, *cupiditas* and *avaritia* are organised here as a scheme: *cupiditas* is a general category for all excessive *libidines*, of which *avaritia* is one. What remains unclear is, whether Cicero's scheme here reflects a genuine semantic nuance, or is constructed artificially for the purpose of clarifying a rhetorical fault. In any case, the example shows that in addition to its more technical meanings in philosophical treatises, the vocabulary of desire seems to have served as a cliché of moral reproach in the forensic discourse. *Libido* and *cupiditas* occur in *Rhet. Her.* (2, 2, 3) as motives for a crime. This categorisation is similar to Cicero's.

<sup>34</sup> *Tusc.* 3, 11, 24 *nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est immoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans,—ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut duo reliqua, metus et aegritudo, malorum*. See also *Tusc.* 4, 15, 34: *adpetitione nimia, quam tum cupiditatem tum libidinem dicimus; 4, 6, 12: quae autem ratione adversante incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur; 4, 26, 57: quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse?* See also *Verr.* 1, 78.

<sup>35</sup> *Tusc.* 3, 2, 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Lael.* 19.

<sup>37</sup> *fin.* 3, 9, 32 *nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu*. Note, however, that the text in the Reynolds's edition is here bracketed. Annas & Woolf 2001, 75: "The paragraph [...] has no relevance to the context."

<sup>38</sup> Columella speaks of this kind of *libido* in a somewhat more technical sense in e.g. *rus.* 8, 2.

<sup>39</sup> *rep.* 6, 29, 136 *namque eorum animi qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt, earumque se quasi ministros praeberunt, impulsuque libidinum voluptatibus oboedientium deorum et hominum iura violaverunt, corporibus elapsi circum terram ipsam volutantur, nec hunc in locum nisi multis exagitati saeculis revertuntur*. Cf. *prov.* 24, where Clodius' *libido* violates *religio* and *pudicitia*, the "two most holy things."

Concerning the word *concupisco*, the picture is twofold: on the one hand, this verb appears in the context of the theory of emotions: many instances of this are to be found in *Tusculanae disputationes*.<sup>40</sup> Here this verb is used to designate one of the four Stoic generic emotions. All three words may appear close to each other, referring to the same concept.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, *concupisco* may as well denote a strong, intensive wish in Cicero's use, with no condemning connotations.<sup>42</sup>

Seneca uses the vocabulary of desire in the context of moral philosophy, as would be expected. *Libido* is used less than *cupiditas*, and it has often very concrete and sexual overtones,<sup>43</sup> with lust (*libido*) said to be an addictive force.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, *libido* is listed as one of the natural, albeit tedious and futile, functions of human living.<sup>45</sup>

*Cupiditas*, however, seems to be the standard word for ἐπιθυμία in *de ira*, where Seneca classifies hate as a subcategory of desire.<sup>46</sup> The differing nuances of Seneca's vocabulary can be neatly seen in a passage from *consolatio ad Helviam*:

si avaritia dimisit, vehementissima generis humani pestis, moram tibi ambitio non faciet; si ultimum diem non quasi poenam, sed quasi naturae legem aspicias, ex quo pectore metum mortis eieceris, in id nullius rei timor audebit

<sup>40</sup> *Tusc.* 3, 9, 19 *nam si irascitur, etiam concupiscit; proprium est enim irati cupere, a quo laesus videatur, ei quam maximum dolorem inurere. qui autem id concupierit, eum necesse est, si id consecutus sit, magno opere laetari*; 4, 6, 12; 5, 7, 17; *ac.* 1, 38 *condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem.*

<sup>41</sup> *Tusc.* 4, 11, 24 *haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt, eaque oriuntur ex libidine et laetitia. nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, existitque morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli inveterata non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; similiterque ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur, ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur.* The word also has a sexual meaning. See also *Tusc.* 4, 32, 68 *turpes sunt, qui eferunt se laetitia tum cum fruuntur Veneriis voluptatibus, sic flagitiosi, qui eas inflammato animo concupiscunt.*

<sup>42</sup> *nat. deor.* 1, 22; *off.* 1, 19, 64.

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, *benef.* 7, 2, 2; 7, 26, 4.

<sup>44</sup> *epist.* 124, 3 *atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemnimus illos, qui nihil viriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu.*

<sup>45</sup> *epist.* 77, 6 *cogita, quamdiu iam idem facias: cibus, somnus, libido, per hunc circum curritur.*

<sup>46</sup> Thus, for instance, in *ira* 1, 3, 3, where the Stoic tradition (*nostra*) is stated as following: *Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest: ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi.* For Seneca's references to Aristotle, see Fillion-Lahille 1984, 203–210.



intrare; si cogitas libidinem non voluptatis causa homini datam, sed propagandi generis, quem non violaverit hoc secretum et infixum visceribus ipsis exitium, omnis alia cupiditas intactum praeteribit.<sup>47</sup>

Here *libido* is used as a special, sexual case of desire, whereas *cupiditas* denotes generally all disturbing wishes and appetites. Again, *cupiditas* occurs in contexts where Seneca presents the Stoic tradition of emotions (*perturbationes*), and where it is typically accompanied by fear (*metus*).<sup>48</sup> Together with the attribute 'blind' (*caeca*), *cupiditas* aims at wealth, dignity or power.<sup>49</sup> In accordance with the Stoic view, *cupiditas* is at hand if one's natural needs are driven to excess.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, the verb *concupisco* is used by Seneca in the context of emotions to denote the action of *cupiditas*:

Saepe enim noxia concupiscimus, nec dispicere, quam perniciosa sunt, licet, quia iudicium interpellat adfectus; sed cum subsedit cupiditas, cum inpetus ille flagrantis animi, qui consilium fugat, cecidit, detestamur perniciosos malorum munerum auctores.<sup>51</sup>

In Seneca, the verb *concupisco* refers to such excessive desires that go over the limits of necessary bodily needs.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the verb is used in connection with desiring money or sex.<sup>53</sup> On the other hand, Seneca also uses the verb in more neutral contexts, to denote a strong, even positive wish, as when he addresses Nero, who has strongly desired (*concupisti*) blamelessness.<sup>54</sup>

Moving closer to Augustine in time and space, a word may be said of *Apuleius*, who uses *libido* in two very distinct ways. In his philosophical treatises, Apuleius uses *libido* and *libidinosus* in the context of the Platonic theory of emotions on the desiring part of the soul.<sup>55</sup> If reason does not control the desiring and spirited parts of the soul, these begin to control

<sup>47</sup> *dial.* 12, 13, 2.

<sup>48</sup> *ira* 1, 8, 6. Or *timor* in 1, 10, 1 and in *epist.* 101, 8: *ex hac autem indigentia timor nascitur et cupiditas futuri exedens animum*. See also *benef.* 2, 14, 1; *epist.* 117, 25.

<sup>49</sup> *dial.* 11, 9, 5; *epist.* 7, 7.

<sup>50</sup> *dial.* 12, 11, 4; *benef.* 7, 10, 3; *epist.* 16, 9. Cf. *clem.* 2, 1, 4.

<sup>51</sup> *benef.* 2, 14, 1. See also *ira* 1, 3, 2.

<sup>52</sup> *dial.* 12, 10, 2 *corporis exigua desideria sunt: frigus summoverti vult, alimentis famem ac sitim extinguere; quidquid extra concupiscitur, vitiiis, non usibus laboratur*. Cf. *Tert. anim.* 38, 3.

<sup>53</sup> *epist.* 89, 6 *quomodo multum inter avaritiam et pecuniam interest, cum illa cupiat, haec concupiscatur, sic inter philosophiam et sapientiam; ira* 2, 28, 7 *is qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit et satis iustas causas putat amandi, quod aliena est, idem uxorem suam aspici non vult*.

<sup>54</sup> *clem.* 1, 1, 5.

<sup>55</sup> *Apul. Plat.* 2, 4 *quod accidere censebat, cum optima et rationabilis portio et quae etiam imperitare ceteris debet, servit aliis, illae vero vitiorum ducatrices, iracundia et libido, ratione sub iugum missa dominantur*. See also *Plat.* 2, 6.

one's life in a tyrannical fashion and subsequently lead one to believe that only the bodily reality matters.<sup>56</sup> The same applies for *cupiditas*, which is used in *de Platone et eius dogmate*, as a standard technical term for *pars ἐπιθυμητικόν*, together with the closely related *cupido*.<sup>57</sup>

In *Metamorphoses*, however, these philosophical connotations of *libido* seem to be absent. Nearly all the occurrences of the *libid-* group refer to sexual desire.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, *cupiditas* does not occur at all in this work, while *cupido* (often personified) is, of course, a crucial factor in love affairs.<sup>59</sup> Compared to these two nouns, the verb *concupisco* lies somewhat apart and is used infrequently. Furthermore, its usage is highly varied: one can desire (*concupiscere*) riches,<sup>60</sup> friendship,<sup>61</sup> and even the 'greatest good,'<sup>62</sup> but also a pretty girl or a donkey's blood.<sup>63</sup>

Again, the following generalisations can be made based on Cicero, Seneca and Apuleius:

1. All three words (the nouns *libido*, *cupiditas* and the verb *concupisco*) are used in the context of the theories of emotions, either to denote the Platonic desiring part of the soul or one of the four generic Stoic emotions.
2. Especially the term *libido* has strong sexual connotations and while these connotations are not totally absent from the verb *concupisco*, this verb is either used in a rather general manner to denote strong

<sup>56</sup> Apul. *Plat.* 2, 13 *necessitudinum et liberorum amor naturae congruus est, ille alius abhorrens ab humanitatis clementia, qui vulgo amor dicitur, est appetitus ardens, cuius instinctu per libidinem capti amatores corporum in eo quod viderint totum hominem putant; Plat.* 2, 15 *tyrannidis genus ex luxuriosa et plena libidinis vita, quae ex infinitis et diversis et illicitis voluptatibus conflata mente tota dominatur.*

<sup>57</sup> Apul. *Plat.* 1, 18 *tripertitam animam idem dicit: primam eius rationabilem esse partem, aliam excandescentiam vel irritabilitatem, tertiam appetitus; eandem cupiditatem possumus nuncupare.* Apul. *Plat.* 2, 6 *tertia pars mentis est cupidinum et desideriorum, cui necessario abstinentia comes est.* See also Apul. *Plat.* 2, 4; 2, 15; 2, 21.

<sup>58</sup> Apul. *met.* 2, 10; 2, 11; 2, 16; 2, 17; 2, 22; 3, 14; 3, 20; 7, 21; 8, 29; 9, 23; 10, 21.

<sup>59</sup> See e.g. Apul. *met.* 6, 24; 8, 22; 10, 2. In Gellius' *noctes Atticae*, a similar kind of difference may be suggested between *libido* and *cupiditas*: *libido* is used in varying contexts from sexual desire to gluttony and to other physical bodily needs, while *cupiditas* is used only twice, both times in the context of the theory of emotions. Gell. 15, 2, 2 *vini libidine*; 19, 2, 3 *libidines in cibos atque in Venerem prodigae*; 19, 4, 3 *libido urinae*; 15, 2, 5 *adfectionum cupiditatumque errores*; 19, 12, 3 *adfectionibus istis animi, quas παθή appellabat [...]* *cupiditatis*. *Concupisco* does not belong to Gellius' vocabulary.

<sup>60</sup> *apol.* 102.

<sup>61</sup> *flor.* 17.

<sup>62</sup> *Plat.* 2, 2.

<sup>63</sup> *met.* 4, 23; 8, 28.

desires, being sometimes morally condemned due to their excessive character, or sometimes only referring to intensive wishes.

3. Being part of the philosophical vocabulary of emotions, *cupiditas* is also connected more concretely to money and riches; thereby approaching the meaning 'greed.'

## 2.2. LATIN CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

This section offers an analysis of three Latin Christian writers and their uses of the word groups concerning desire. Whereas Tertullian and Cyprian were historical authorities for Augustine,<sup>64</sup> and he read enthusiastically especially Cyprian, Ambrose was partly a contemporary writer to Augustine.<sup>65</sup> In the following concise outline, the focus will be primarily on the use of *concupiscentia* and *concupisco*, but something will also be said of *cupiditas* and *libido*. As the sheer number of occurrences of these two words in Cyprian, Tertullian and Ambrose varies drastically in comparison to each other, it is not possible to draw definite conclusions on their influence on Augustine.<sup>66</sup>

The first occurrences of the noun *concupiscentia* are found in the writings of Tertullian, who uses it rather frequently, and more or less according to the senses that the verbal stem had in the previous Latin literature. *Concupiscentia* seems to be condemnable as such, without any other negative attributes.<sup>67</sup> For example, the soul is weakened by "lusts and desire."<sup>68</sup> More-

<sup>64</sup> Yates (2001) limits his study to a few instances in Tertullian and Cyprian and their use of *concupiscentia*.

<sup>65</sup> Obviously, I do not claim that all these three authors had equal importance for Augustine. One only has to take a look at the frequencies that the CAG2 lists for the quotations of these authors: compared to the importance of Cyprian and Ambrose, Tertullian seems to be a marginal character. This, however, may be explained by the ambivalent status of Tertullian as, at least partly, a heterodox author.

<sup>66</sup> Thus, Tertullian gets 105 hits in the CLCLT-5 with the *concup*-stem, whereas Cyprian gets only 31, but even together, these two African authors cannot compete with Ambrose (195 hits). Cf. Bonner 1962; 1986, and Yates 2001, who disagree on the question of whether Tertullian and Cyprian have had a significant influence on Augustine. Although Yates (2001, 39–40, 56) remains skeptical on how to assess this influence, he prefers the contribution of Tertullian to Cyprian. Both Bonner and Yates ignore Ambrose in their studies.

Statistically, Jerome seems to have preferred the noun *libido* to both *cupiditas* and *concupiscentia*. A search in the CLCLT results in 257 occurrences of *libido*, but only 60 occurrences of *cupidus/cupido/cupiditas* and 64 occurrences of *concupiscentia*. Most of the occurrences of *libido* can be found in sexual contexts.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. the use in e.g. *spect.* 14, *anim.* 40, 2–4, *idol.* 23, 3.

<sup>68</sup> *apol.* 17, 4–5 *libidinibus et concupiscentia evigorata*.

over, a “weak faith” always tends to strive for the secular joys of *concupiscentia*.<sup>69</sup> The spiritual foes of the Christian also are characterised by malice and by all kinds of *concupiscentia*.<sup>70</sup> In a pointed statement, Tertullian claims that all sins are due to idolatry and *concupiscentia saeculi*.<sup>71</sup>

In contrast to the preceding Latin authors and their use of *concupisco*, the majority of the occurrences of *concupiscentia* in Tertullian appear in a negative sexual context. Tertullian’s reproaches of sexual desire often combine the gaze of the eye and *concupiscentia* as the first precondition to the act of adultery, as in Mt 6. “What could be a more perfect way to check adultery or even to reject the secret lust of the eyes?”<sup>72</sup> While the hands are apt to steal, the eyes thus are an instrument of adultery.<sup>73</sup> In a more mixed tone, Tertullian describes the temptations of the widow and how they emerge from *carnalis concupiscentia*.<sup>74</sup> Tertullian exhorts to humiliate the desire of the flesh by the spiritual affect of self-control, thus annulling these earthly and unstable wishes by eternal goods.<sup>75</sup>

However, Tertullian admits that there are many kinds of worldly desires (*concupiscentiae saeculi*): one can have lust for money, social distinction, gluttony, sex (*libido*) or glory and last but not least, for pleasures (including those that are derived from compulsive gambling and exciting spectacles).<sup>76</sup> These distinctions serve mainly rhetorical purposes, but at least they show that Tertullian did not narrow himself to reproach only sexual desires. Tertullian also uses *libido* when speaking of the vast array of harmful desires in general (*generaliter nominatae*).

<sup>69</sup> *uxor.* 2, 8, 2.

<sup>70</sup> *adv. Marc.* 3, 14, 3 *hostes spiritalis nequitiae et concupiscentiae omnis*.

<sup>71</sup> *idol.* 1, 1. Waszink & van Winden 1987, 78: “The inclusion of all other sins in idolatry is a consequence drawn by Tertullian himself, an extreme consequence such as he likes to draw.”

<sup>72</sup> *apol.* 45, 3 *quid perfectius, prohibere adulterium, an etiam ab oculorum solitaria concupiscentia arcere?* See also *apol.* 46, 11, *paenit.* 3, 13, *anim.* 38, 2–3; 40, 4, *castit.* 9, 1–3; 13, 4, *idol.* 2, 3; *virg. vel.* 7, 2, *pudic.* 6. In *spect.* 2 Tertullian distinguishes between different kinds of evil acts or errors in human constitution. The eyes are accompanied with desire, and the genitals with shamefulness, *neque enim oculos ad concupiscentiam sumpsimus—et genitalia ad excessus impudicitiae*.

<sup>73</sup> *paenit.* 6, 19.

<sup>74</sup> *uxor.* 1, 4, 3.

<sup>75</sup> *uxor.* 1, 4, 5.

<sup>76</sup> *spect.* 14 *nam sicut pecuniae vel dignitatis vel gulae vel libidinis vel gloriae, ita et voluptatis concupiscentia est; species autem voluptatis etiam spectacula [...] opinor, generaliter nominatae concupiscentiae continent in se et voluptates, aequae generaliter intellectae voluptates specialiter et in spectacula disseruntur*. See *cult. fem.* 1, 9: *concupiscentia habendi*. In *anim.* 38, 3, Tertullian claims that the only created and thus good *concupiscentia* is appetite.

Elsewhere Tertullian explains *concupiscentia* to be the reason for excessive greed and ambition. In this case, *concupiscentia* is a “corrupted passion of the soul” (*vitiosa animi passio*).<sup>77</sup> This means that the philosophical connections of the word are quite familiar to Tertullian. A particularly interesting case of incorporating biblical narratives to traditional philosophical doctrines is made in *de anima*, where Tertullian quotes his Old Latin Bible translation which regularly uses *concupisco* and *concupiscentia*.<sup>78</sup> Thus, for Tertullian, Jesus says (Lk 22, 15) that “with desire I have desired to eat this passover with you” (*concupiscentia concupii pascha edere vobiscum*).<sup>79</sup> This verse is an amalgam of Semitic and Greek idioms, and the Latin translation is literal to the extreme.<sup>80</sup> The argument continues with another quotation from 1 Tim 3, 1 (*si quis episcopatum concupiscit, bonum opus concupiscit*).<sup>81</sup> Tertullian is clearly aware of the negative philosophical connotation of the *concupisc-* stem, and he takes some trouble to arrange the biblical material to form a coherent stance with the common idea of the irrational character of the emotions. Tertullian agrees with the Platonic tripartition (*indignativum, concupiscentivum*,<sup>82</sup> *rationale*) of the soul, and even claims that the same kind of tripartition may be found in the person of Christ and his actions, but only in a modified way.<sup>83</sup> Tertullian notes that in Christ the sub-rational movements of the soul occurred according to perfect rationality.

<sup>77</sup> *cult. fem.* 1, 9.

<sup>78</sup> *anim.* 16. As a rule, Tertullian’s Old Latin Bible translated Greek ἐπιθυμία with *concupiscentia*, see *adv. Marc.* 3, 14, 3; 3, 18, 5; 4, 40, 1; *anim.* 40, 2–4, *idol.* 2, 3, *pudic.* 6; 17, 2. Old Latin translations seem to have favoured full and massive nouns. Rönsch 1875, 471. Barnes conjectures (1971, 29) that *de anima* reflects knowledge of Soranus’ lost work on the same subject (Περὶ ψυχῆς).

<sup>79</sup> *adv. Marc.* 4, 40 1. In Greek, the verse runs as following: ἐπιθυμία ἐπεθύμησα τοῦτο το πάσχα φαγεῖν μεθ’ ὑμῶν.

<sup>80</sup> See also *adv. Marc.* 4, 40, 1.

<sup>81</sup> *anim.* 16, 3–6. 1 Tim 3, 1 εἰ τις ἐπισκοπῆς ὀρέγεται, καλοῦ ἔργου ἐπιθυμεῖ.

<sup>82</sup> This rare word was later used by Jerome in an identical meaning. In his explanation to Ezek. 1, 10, Jerome modifies the Platonic image of the charioteer to correspond to the creatures of the biblical text: the bull, “which is entangled with the works of earth,” means lust, licentiousness and all kinds of desire for pleasures (*concupiscentivum, ἐπιθυμητικόν*).

<sup>83</sup> In *adv. Marc.* 4, 40, 3 Tertullian takes another approach: when Christ desires to eat the passover with his disciples, he is not desiring any “alien property,” but something which already belongs to him, in other words, is part of his nature: his own body. This discussion concerns Christ’s true humanity and human emotions. *Professus itaque se concupiscentia concupisse edere pascha ut suum—indignum enim, ut quid alienum concupisceret deus—acceptum panem et distributum discipulis corpus suum illum fecit hoc est corpus meum dicendo*. See also *adv. Marc.* 1, 25, 4–5. For Tertullian’s vocabulary on emotions and divine *apatheia* in general, see Braun 1962, 62–65.

In the same way, it is perfectly justified for a Christian to feel desire, for example for the episcopate, if this happens on rational grounds and with a rational desire (*rationalem concupiscentiam ostendit*). While mostly the emotions of anger and desire are to be condemned on the basis of their irrationality, it could happen that they can be turned to good use or altered altogether into something virtuous and rational (*non semper ex inrationali censenda sunt*).

The sphere of *libido*<sup>84</sup> in Tertullian is diverse and obviously covers sexual desires (mostly connected to extramarital sexual conduct),<sup>85</sup> but the word also denotes arbitrariness and whimsical licence.<sup>86</sup> The traditional attachment to luxury is present as well.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, sometimes an emphasis on irreligiosity and impiety appears side-by-side with *libido*.<sup>88</sup> Compared to *concupisc*-stem and *libido*, *cupiditas* is rare in Tertullian's corpus.<sup>89</sup> It is largely confined to denote greed with objects such as gold, *mamona* and profit in general;<sup>90</sup> and with a verbal objective, *adquirendi*.<sup>91</sup> Tertullian also quotes 1 Tim 6, 10 twice.<sup>92</sup>

A clear majority of the few occurrences of the *concupisc*-stem in Cyprian are from Bible quotations; 1 Jn 2, 16 is quoted four times.<sup>93</sup> Thus, it is not surprising that the flesh and the world are joined with *concupiscentia* in other passages as well.<sup>94</sup> The objects of *concupiscentia* vary from food to killing people.<sup>95</sup> In *ep.* 55, 27, Cyprian mentions a desire (*concupiscentia*) to act against God.<sup>96</sup> The word *cupiditas* in Cyprian is used to denote a strong and intensive wish, sometimes in a positive context,<sup>97</sup> but more often as reproachable greed.<sup>98</sup> A Bible quotation much used later by Augustine (1 Tim

<sup>84</sup> There are about a hundred occurrences in CLCLT-5.

<sup>85</sup> E.g. *mart.* 4, 2; *nat.* 1, 16; *anim.* 27, 4; *resurr.* 61.

<sup>86</sup> E.g. *nat.* 1, 10; *spect.* 21, *bapt.* 12.

<sup>87</sup> E.g. *nat.* 1, 16; *pudic.* 14; 17.

<sup>88</sup> E.g. *apol.* 22, 6 *adspiratio daemonum*; *spect.* 10 *ista daemonia conspirata*; *anim.* 49, 2.

<sup>89</sup> Only 18 hits in CLCLT-5.

<sup>90</sup> E.g. *nat.* 2, 14; *cult. fem.* 1, 1.

<sup>91</sup> *uxor.* 1, 5, 4.

<sup>92</sup> *patient.* 7; *idolol.* 11.

<sup>93</sup> *testim.* 3, 11; *hab. virg.* 7; *domin. orat.* 14; *mortal.* 24.

<sup>94</sup> *hab. virg.* 4; 6; 22; *domin. orat.* 16.

<sup>95</sup> *testim.* 3, 60; 61; *patient.* 10.

<sup>96</sup> *epist.* 55, 27, 2 *neque enim mala facta de sancto spiritu ueniunt sed de aduersarii instinctu et de imundo spiritu natae concupiscentiae contra deum facere et diabolo seruire conpellunt.*

<sup>97</sup> *laps.* 2; *mort.* 26; *epist.* 14, 1, 2; 63, 8, 4.

<sup>98</sup> *Fort.* 7; *Demetr.* 11; *eleem.* 13; 22; *epist.* 65, 3, 1.

6, 10), occurs four times in Cyprian.<sup>99</sup> Cyprian uses *libido*, again, mostly in a sexual context and in lists of vices.<sup>100</sup> The term *libido* is also used to describe the motivation of the audience during gladiatorial shows.<sup>101</sup>

In general, Ambrose uses *concupiscentia* with negative connotations. In lists of vices, for instance, *concupiscentia* is classified as an evil disease (*languor malus*) or a fetter (*vinculum*) of the human nature.<sup>102</sup> On the other hand, Ambrose notes the ambiguity of the biblical passages that use *concupiscentia* as a translation for ἐπιθυμία: the word occurs both in positive and negative senses.<sup>103</sup> However, the preference for using concupiscence negatively is supported by the majority of cases in Ambrose himself, for he uses *concupiscentia* without further clarifications nearly always in negative contexts.<sup>104</sup>

A great part of Ambrose's notions of *concupiscentia* appear in the context of passions or emotions.<sup>105</sup> The flesh (*caro*) is the reason for the corruption of the soul, and is, in a way, the province of pleasures. Bad emotions then emerge in the flesh, and flood out everywhere.<sup>106</sup> As a consequence, the control of the mind has been conquered by the storms and winds of the passions.<sup>107</sup> In fact, *concupiscentia* may even take a leading role in introducing

<sup>99</sup> *testim.* 3, 61; *laps.* 12; 19; *elem.* 10.

<sup>100</sup> E.g. *ad Donat.* 9–10; *hab. virg.* 18–19; *epist.* 55, 26, 2; 65, 2, 3; lists of vices in *mortal.* 4; *Demetr.* 9–10; *patient.* 20.

<sup>101</sup> *ad Donat.* 7 *ut libidinem crudelium luminum sanguis oblectet.*

<sup>102</sup> *in psalm.* 118 *serm.* 8, 42 *vinculum*; *in psalm.* 1, 28, 5 *malus languor*. Both metaphors are used by Augustine.

<sup>103</sup> *in psalm.* 37, 38, 3 *iuxta hos ego versiculos concupiscentiam possumus accipere magis quam desiderium; ἐπιθυμίαν enim Graecus posuit, concupiscentia autem et desiderium ἐπιθυμία dicitur, sed concupiscentia et de bono et malo dicitur: concupivit et defecit anima mea in atria domini pro bono, in lege autem aliter: nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non concupisces, utique pro malo.* The psalm runs in LXX 37, 10 κύριε, ἐναντίον σου πάσα ἡ ἐπιθυμία μου. The original meaning is the exact opposite of Ambrose's reading. Against this distinction, cf. an example of a synonymous use of *desidero* and *concupisco*: *adhuc in hoc febrienti corpore constitutus, in hoc concupiscenti, in hoc terrena adhuc desideranti.* *in psalm.* 118 *serm.* 8, 12.

<sup>104</sup> For biblical quotations of instances of *concupiscentia*, see e.g. *in psalm.* 118 *serm.* 11, 28; *serm.* 13, 27; *serm.* 16, 12; *fid.* 3, 1.

<sup>105</sup> The philosophical sense of *concupiscentia* is often used later in Jerome, as well (e.g. in his interpretation of Rom 7). To Jerome, the noun represents all disturbing emotions of the soul (*epist.* 121, 8 *nos autem per concupiscentiam omnes perturbationes animae significatas putamus, quibus maeremus et dolemus, timemus et concupiscimus*). For Jerome's view on emotions, see Canellis 2000.

<sup>106</sup> *Noe* 5, 12: *velut a fonte prorumpunt concupiscentiarum malarumque passionum flumina lateque exundant.* See also *Noe* 10, 34.

<sup>107</sup> The image of seafaring neatly joins together the story of Noah and the traditional philosophical similes (*gubernator!*). Cf. also *Iac.* 1, 6, 24; 8, 36; 4 *Macc* 7, 1–3; 15, 31–32. Cicero uses the image in *Tusc.* 1, 49, 118.

other emotions to the human soul.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, emotions and *concupiscentia* are joined in a lengthy passage in *de Iacob*, which is heavily indebted to its source text in *Fourth Maccabees*. This treatise also includes frequent quotations from Romans 7.<sup>109</sup>

The general picture of emotions in *Iac.* 1, 1, 1–1, 2, 5 is similar to that of 4 Macc. Thus, Ambrose lists the four main emotions as desire (*concupiscentia*), joy (*gratulatio*), fear (*timor*) and sorrow (*tristitia*).<sup>110</sup> Perfectly in line with 4 Macc is also the emphasis on the irrationality of the passions in general, and of *concupiscentia* in particular. The irrationality of *concupiscentia* is exemplified by David's desire for water in 2 Sam 23, 13–17. Reason and desire are opposite factors and both resist each other. The cure for the irrational desire is *rationabiliter paratus*.<sup>111</sup> David extinguishes his desire by the consolation of the "word," that is, "reason."<sup>112</sup> In this case, Ambrose also uses the word *cupiditas* to denote this inappropriate irrational desire.<sup>113</sup>

*Concupiscentia* appears in the numerous philosophically coloured passages of *de Isaac* as well. It is seen as a form to the bodily matter of sin.<sup>114</sup> The term *concupiscentia* also appears in a modified image of the charioteer.

<sup>108</sup> *fid.* 2, 11.

<sup>109</sup> For Plotinian influences in this work see Courcelle 1950a, 106–138; 1950b and the line of research he has inspired: e.g. Solignac 1956a; Hadot 1956, Madec 1974, 61–71. Recently, Colish (2005) has taken an opposite view and has stressed the Stoic influences in Ambrose and his treatises on the patriarchs. For the influence of 4 Macc in Latin Christian authors, see Klauck 1989, 674–675.

<sup>110</sup> *Iac.* 1, 2, 5 *passionum autem velut duces sunt naturales delectatio et dolor, quas secuntur ceterae. Illae enim complectuntur universas, quarum utraque non solum corporis, sed etiam secundum animam passiones sunt. et quia diximus subesse his alias passiones, ante delectationem concupiscentia, post delectationem gratulatio est; ante dolorem autem est timor, post dolorem tristitia, commotio autem animi communis passio et delectationis et doloris est.*

<sup>111</sup> *Iac.* 1, 1, 3.

<sup>112</sup> The words *verbi consolatione* are a poor translation for 4 Macc 3, 17–18. Did Ambrose read λογισμός as *verbum*? Such is the way he reads Philo's λόγος (see Madec 1974, 57–58). Cf. however *Iac.* 1, 2, 6: *haec est igitur rectae rationis tractatio, quam Graeci λογισμὸν nuncupant, qua mens sapientiae intenta solidatur.*

<sup>113</sup> *Iac.* 1, 1, 4; 1, 2, 8 See also *parad.* 6, 34 on the subject of the four main emotions. At the moment of the Fall, Adam and Eve had these movements in their soul, and the first sin was committed by *cupiditas*, *ira* and *formido*; *primo fuerat cupiditas auctor erroris, ut ipsa ederet, sequentisque fuit causa peccati.*

<sup>114</sup> See e.g. the highly interesting *Isaac* 7, 60: *materialia autem vitia animae obumbrant gratiam. Ignorantia et concupiscentia animae sunt aegritudines, sed ad speciem quam ad materiem magis referuntur. Materia est caro, species est ignorantia et concupiscentia. Cur igitur caro accusatur, cum tantae sint in specie labes? Quia nihil species potest sine materia. Denique nihil species securis sine materia facit. Quid enim esset concupiscentia, nisi eam caro inflammaret? Friget in senibus, pueris quoque, quia in his corpus infirmum est: ardet in adolescentibus, quibus vis corporis fervet. Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt; non enim sunt mala nisi quae*



So Ambrose denotes the desiring member of the Platonic tripartition of the soul and one element of the Stoic tetrachord with all of the three nouns available.<sup>115</sup>

Ambrose's use of *libido* is strictly traditional. *Libido* appears in set phrases that stress the burning character of lust (*libido enim velut festuca est, cito accenditur, propere consumitur, ep.* 68, 13) together with *ardor*,<sup>116</sup> *flamma*,<sup>117</sup> *fervor*,<sup>118</sup> *ignis*,<sup>119</sup> or the derivatives of *urere*, *flammare*, *fervere*; practically all of these occurrences appear in sexual contexts (*concupitus* occurs as the object as well): a particularly expressive phrase connects the neighing (*adhinnire*) of horses to the *libido*.<sup>120</sup> Again, a typical and traditional trait of Ambrose's style is to connect *libido* with *luxuria*.<sup>121</sup> Idiomatic constructions of gerunds are somewhat rare, but still extant.<sup>122</sup> Last but not least, *libido* occurs in lists of distorted emotions.<sup>123</sup>

In his use of *cupiditas*, Ambrose offers no surprises. In a rather general sense, *cupiditas* represents a large spectrum of worldly desires with attributes such as *terrena*, *mundana* or *saecularis*.<sup>124</sup> The objects of *cupiditas* vary from money to food and from glory to illicit sex.<sup>125</sup> *Cupiditas* appears often together with greed (*avaritia*) and rich people (*divites*).<sup>126</sup> Like *libido*,

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*privantur bonis*. For evil as deprivation see Courcelle 1950b, 31–32, 48–49. Colish (2005, 78–79) offers a clarifying interpretation of the passage, but overlooks the Plotinian affinities and quotations (Plot. 1, 1, 4). See also e.g. Plot. *En.* 1, 8, 8, in which the “evil desires” (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς πονηράς) are mentioned, perhaps in connection with Plat. *Tim.* 86b–c. But in Plotinus, the soul is not involved with any kind of maladies, whereas in Ambrose, *concupiscentia* is a malady of the soul. Hadot 1956, 206.

<sup>115</sup> Isaac 8, 65. Cf. *bon. mort.* 5, 16. See also in *psalm* 118 *serm.* 2, 35 *ergo anima currus est dei, ut ira eius et libido et timor et omnes saeculares concupiscentiae refrenetur*. Madec 1974, 121, supposes that the Platonic image of chariots and horses has been delivered to Ambrose by Origen. Ambrose speaks only of “philosophers” (Isaac 8, 67).

<sup>116</sup> E.g. *hex.* 5, 7, 19; *Abr.* 1, 4, 24; *Hel.* 9, 30; in *psalm.* 1, 29, 2; *off.* 1, 4, 14.

<sup>117</sup> E.g. *Noe* 11, 38; *bon. mort.* 3, 9; *paenit.* 1, 14; *epist.* 7, 10.

<sup>118</sup> E.g. *hex.* 5, 7, 19.

<sup>119</sup> E.g. *Hel.* 19, 69; *paenit.* 1, 14; *epist.* 3, 8.

<sup>120</sup> *Abr.* 2, 7, 43; in *psalm.* 36, 32, 2; *exhort. virg.* 7, 48; *obit. Theod.* 51. For the word and its use in pagan and Christian authors, see Courcelle 1968.

<sup>121</sup> *epist.* 14, 26 *luxuria igitur mater libidinis est*. See also e.g. *Noe* 14, 49; *patr.* 3, 12; *off.* 1, 5, 17; *epist.* 27, 16.

<sup>122</sup> E.g. *hex.* 5, 10, 30 *generandi*; *hex.* 5, 15, 52 *dominandi*; *hex.* 6, 9, 71 *vorandi*; *Noe* 9, 28 *epulandi*.

<sup>123</sup> E.g. *hex.* 1, 8, 31; *bon. mort.* 5, 16; *off.* 1, 47, 229. *epist.* 7, 31.

<sup>124</sup> E.g. *hex.* 3, 12, 52; *Noe* 18, 64; *fug. saec.* 1, 1; *off.* 1, 50, 246.

<sup>125</sup> E.g. *hex.* 3, 12, 50 *pecunia vel potentia*; *hex.* 6, 9, 71 *cibus*; *Noe* 33, 125 *honor*; *bon. mort.* 7, 28 *lucrum*; *off.* 1, 49, 241 *aurum*; *fid.* 5, 17 *adulterandi*.

<sup>126</sup> E.g. *Abr.* 1, 3, 12; *Iob* 1, 3, 9; *Nab.* 1, 2, 12, 52; *epist.* 10, 8; *Cain et Ab.* 2, 9, 31; *Noe* 29, 113.

Ambrose uses *cupiditas* to denote one of the standard emotions;<sup>127</sup> but unlike *libido*, *cupiditas* may occasionally also denote a desire for something positive, usually *divina cognitio*.<sup>128</sup> *Cupiditas* also seems to be something hot: it is burning, flaming and blazing in people.<sup>129</sup>

## 2.3. AUGUSTINE

### 2.3.1. Some Lexical Remarks

Of the three nouns *concupiscentia*, *cupiditas* and *libido*, the first is by far the most frequent in Augustine's works.<sup>130</sup> Together with the verb *concupisco*, it may be said to be Augustine's standard word stem for evil desire.<sup>131</sup> Adjective forms (*concupiscentialis*, *concupiscibilis*) and adverbs (*concupiscentialiter*) are very rare.<sup>132</sup> In addition, there is only one occurrence of the verb *cupisco*.<sup>133</sup> It is no surprise that the distribution of *concupiscentia* is uneven in Augustine's works. This word is used more in the period 410–430 during the Pelagian crisis than in the earlier period.<sup>134</sup> Conversely, the use of *libido* seems to decrease in time.<sup>135</sup> It is difficult to tell whether the less classical word begins to take the tasks that *libido* has in the earlier works (especially in the meaning of sexual desire). Both *libido* and *cupiditas* work in verbal constructions such as *libido/cupiditas ulciscendi*, *libido/cupiditas dominandi*, *libido/cupiditas uindicandi*, and even *libido/cupiditas concumbendi* in a way that *concupiscentia* never would. On the other hand, the

<sup>127</sup> E.g. *hex.* 1, 8, 31; *parad.* 6, 34; *Noe* 15, 51; *bon. mort.* 12, 55; *Iac.* 1, 1, 3–4; *epist.* 7, 31.

<sup>128</sup> E.g. *Noe* 25, 93; *Ioseph* 4, 19 *vera scientia*; in *psalm.* 118, *serm.* 3, 33 *bona cupiditas*.

<sup>129</sup> E.g. *Noe* 10, 34; 15, 53; *Abr.* 2, 4, 13; 2, 9, 67; *Nab.* 2, 26; in *psalm* 45, 9, 1; *epist.* 57, 3.

<sup>130</sup> The frequency analysis of CAG2 gives 1760 hits for *concupiscentia*, 1180 hits for *cupiditas* and 983 hits for *libido*. These figures include Bible quotations.

<sup>131</sup> The frequency analysis of *concupisco* in CAG2 gives 1312 hits. Cf. this to the 998 hits of the standard, wide-ranging *cupio* which has not been included in the present analysis because of its more neutral connotations compared to those of the terms *concupiscentia*, *libido*, and *cupiditas*.

<sup>132</sup> Nine hits of *concupiscentialis*, four of *concupiscentialiter* and two of *concupiscibilis*.

<sup>133</sup> *mus.* 4, 5 *deum uidere qui cupiscit, bonusque uiuit, hic uidebit*.

<sup>134</sup> The highest hits/expected hits ratios are to be found in such works as *cont.*, *nupt. et conc.*, *c. Iul.*, *c. Iul. imp.* and *perf. iust.* High ratios also occur in some works written in the earlier period (e.g. *Simpl.* or *exp. prop. Rm.*) but this is due to the large number of the biblical quotations of Rom 7 or Gal 5, 17. On the other hand, the ratio is rather low in such substantial works as *ciu.* or *trin.*

<sup>135</sup> See the hits/expected hits ratios in CAG2 for *libido*, again very high in later works suiting the theme (*nupt. et conc.*, *c. Iul.*, *c. Iul. imp.*), but now also in *lib. arb.*, *c. Faust.*, *conf.* and *ciu.*

genitive object of a noun is used regularly in connection with all three words (e.g. *concupiscentia carnis*, *libido uoluptatis*, *cupiditas auri*). Again, *concupisco* is rarely used absolutely.<sup>136</sup>

Much of the favour of *concupisco* and *concupiscentia* is explained by their overwhelming prevalence in Augustine's Latin Bible translations. There are only seven Bible quotations of the four different passages that use *cupiditas*,<sup>137</sup> and three quotations of the two different passages use *libido*.<sup>138</sup> While the Bible quotations of the passages that include *concupiscentia* or *concupisco* are very common, it is difficult to define any absolute figures of these quotations, partly owing to the difficulty of determining what actually a Bible quotation is in Augustine.<sup>139</sup> The earliest quotations of the biblical occurrences of *concupiscentia* are in *mus.* and *Gn. adu. Man.*<sup>140</sup> Other, similarly crucial passages that contain either the verb or the noun are Rom 13, 14 ("put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires"),<sup>141</sup> Gal 5, 17 ("For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh"),<sup>142</sup> Rom 7, 8 ("sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, produced in me all kinds of covetousness"), and Jas 1, 14 ("one is tempted by one's own desire, being lured and enticed by it").<sup>143</sup> The more a single passage is quoted, the more its form varies: thus, for instance, Gal 5, 17 occurs at least in 15 different variations. The standard word for *concupiscentia/concupisco* in the original

<sup>136</sup> *conf.* 3, 5 *ausus sum etiam in celebritate sollempnitatum tuarum intra parietes ecclesiae tuae concupiscere.*

<sup>137</sup> 1 Tim 6, 10; 1 Thess 2, 5–7; 1 Cor 10, 6 and Num 11, 4.

<sup>138</sup> Col 3, 4–6; 1 Pet 4, 3.

<sup>139</sup> Thus, for instance, loose allusions to the Ten Commandments or Gal 5, 17 abound, both representing various forms of *concupisco*.

<sup>140</sup> *mus.* 6, 44; *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 20, 31 quoting 1 Jn 2, 16 and Gal 5, 24 respectively. The quotations of 1 Jn 2, 16 usually have *concupiscentia*, but in *ep. Io. tr.* the word is *desiderium*. Thiele 1958, 40.

<sup>141</sup> See *conf.* 8, 12.

<sup>142</sup> The first time in *c. Fort.* 21.

<sup>143</sup> A list of all quoted passages follows, roughly ordered in terms of frequency: Gal 5, 17; Rom 7, 7–8; 1 Jn 1, 15–16; Phil 1, 23; Rom 1, 28; Jas 1, 14; Gal 5, 24; Ps 45, 12; Mt 5, 28; Rom 13, 9–10; Rom 13, 14; Jn 8, 56; Gal 5, 16; Rom 1, 24; Jas 1, 15; Ps 119, 20; 1 Pet 1, 12; Acts 20, 33; Jas 4, 3; Lk 22, 15; 2 Pet 3, 3; Num 11, 4; Ps 62, 11; 1 Cor 10, 6–7; Ps 84, 3; Ps 106, 14. Yates (2001) goes the other way round and surveys the variants that are used for Greek *epithumia* (and *hedone*) in Old Latin translations. Yates's findings are a useful caveat against too straightforward generalisations of how particular biblical lexemes and their translations influenced Christian writers, such as Augustine. Yates 2001, 43: "These resources [Beuron Vetus Latina and Petrus Sabatier's Bible] revealed that in addition to *concupiscentia*, *libido* and their derived forms, the translators or the various Latin versions employed no less than 10 terms, either alone or in some form of circumlocution, to communicate the [...] concepts."

Greek seems to be ἐπιθυμία/ἐπιθυμέω.<sup>144</sup> A rather exceptional (or mistaken?) translation in Augustine's Latin Bible is Jn 8, 56 (*concupiuit* for the original ἡγαλλιάσατο).

### 2.3.2. Augustine's Semantic Reflections

Having a way with words Augustine shows an awareness of the connotations that the vocabulary of desire has. Thus, Augustine sometimes makes notions of the words he uses. While these notions may sometimes be rhetorical lipservice, owing to Augustine's interest in explaining e.g. certain passages of the Bible in a certain way, they are also valuable material in pointing out the possible subtle differences in the colouring of the words concerned. In addition, one has to pay attention to the various contexts in which Augustine uses his vocabulary of desire: a minute analysis of each context in each of the occurrences would shed light on the connotations of each word. While such an analysis falls outside the scope of this study, some general suggestions are made below.

Augustine occasionally clarifies his word usage concerning desire by noting the inherent negative connotation of the word in question. Thus, explaining Psalm 118 (119), he claims that it is crucial to reveal the object of a positive desire; otherwise, *concupiscentia* "can be understood only as evil desire." Therefore, the psalmist had to add the object 'wisdom' in using the word of a positive desire.<sup>145</sup> In fact, Augustine explains, 'good *concupiscentia*' is only a metonym for the right kind of love (*dilectio*).<sup>146</sup> Perhaps it is

<sup>144</sup> Augustine is aware of the Greek word in *nupt. et conc.* 2, 55, where different translations are compared: *quod enim Graecus habet: ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας, alii latine interpretati sunt: in morbo desiderii uel concupiscentiae, alii uero: in passione concupiscentiae, uel si quo alio modo in aliis atque aliis codicibus inuenitur.* Note Augustine's fluctuation between *desiderium* and *concupiscentia*!

<sup>145</sup> *en. Ps.* 118, 8, 3 *et multa alia reperiuntur bonae concupiscentiae testimonia. sed hoc sane interest, quod non tacetur quid concupiscatur, quando bona commemoratur concupiscentia; cum autem non additur quid concupiscatur, sed sola ponitur, non nisi mala intellegitur. sicut in hoc quod commemorauit: concupiscentia itaque sapientiae deducit ad regnum [Wis 6, 21]; si non adderet sapientiae, nullo modo diceret: concupiscentia perducit ad regnum. at uero apostolus quod posuit: concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non concupisces [Rom 7, 7]; non utique addidit cuius rei concupiscentiam, uel quid non concupisces; certum est enim non intellegi, cum ita dicitur, nisi malam, concupiscentiam.* For an analogical case concerning the word 'spiritus,' see *Simpl.* 2, 1, 5. Cf. Nygren 1953, 494, who claims that *cupiditas* and *caritas* are in principle interchangeable and need a clarifying object to point out their moral quality. Obviously, this is not the case.

<sup>146</sup> *en. Ps.* 118, 8, 4 *quid est ista concupiscentia, nisi bona dilectio?* An interesting exception to this generalisation is to be found in *ep.* 6\*, 3–5 *quis catholicus dicat diabolicae operationis esse*

useful to note also the fact that while the Bible text uses the verb *concupisco*, Augustine quickly proceeds to consider the *noun* and its negative connotations.

A similar argument can be found in *ciu.* 14, 7 where various kinds of positive desires are listed, based on different biblical passages.<sup>147</sup> Again, Augustine repeats his understanding of the connotation of the words for 'desire':

It is, however, an established usage that, when we employ the words *cupiditas* or *concupiscentia* without adding what it is that is desired, they signify 'desire' in a bad sense.<sup>148</sup> [transl. Dyson]

Accordingly, Augustine insists in *c. Iul. imp.* that *concupiscentia carnis* (or *oculorum*) in the Bible cannot have the same ambiguity as the word *mundus*, which sometimes denotes the physical composition of heaven and earth and its people, and sometimes refers to the sinful humankind disobeying God.<sup>149</sup> Later on in the same work Augustine says that *concupiscentia*, especially with a specific "fleshly" attribute, is always to be understood as evil.<sup>150</sup>

Concerning the term *libido*, Augustine makes further clarifications in *ciu.* 14, 15–16. At first, *libido* is connected to the discussion of emotional functions, where Augustine loosely mentions *libido* to be a common term for all desires (*generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis*).<sup>151</sup> Augustine continues by listing various kinds of desire according to their objects. Some of these

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*concupiscentiam nuptiarum [...] ex hoc errore concupiscentiam nuptiarum, hoc est concupiscentiam pudicitiae coniugalis, concupiscentiam legitime propagandae prolis, concupiscentiam uinculi socialis, quod uterque inter se sexus obstringitur, non discernunt a concupiscentia carnis.* For an interesting comparison in Clement of Alexandria and his terminology of various desires, see Hunter 1992, 99–100: while the word *epithumia* is reserved for negative contexts, "[Clement] defines marriage as 'the *orexis* for procreation.'"

<sup>147</sup> Phil 1, 23; Ps 119, 20; Wis 6, 21.

<sup>148</sup> *ciu.* 14, 7 *hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut, si cupiditas uel concupiscentia dicatur nec addatur cuius rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intellegi.* Cf. *nupt. et conc.* 2, 23. O'Donnell notes (1992, II, 74, 89) that *cupiditas* and *libido* never occur in *conf.* in a positive sense.

<sup>149</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 18 *sicut ergo nunc in bono, nunc in malo legitur mundus: sic lege, si potes, aliquando in bono positam concupiscentiam carnis, uel concupiscentiam oculorum: sed sic non inuenies, sicut nec superbiam uitae, quod illis duobus malis additum est tertium.*

<sup>150</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 67: *non uis eam carnis concupiscentiam nominare: nosti enim laude eius offendi eos, qui hoc nomen in scripturis sanctis non nisi in rei malae significatione legerunt.* Of course, these statements about *concupiscentia* have been made in a debate.

<sup>151</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *uoluptatem uero praecedat appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis.*

lusts have their “proper names”; thus, for example, the lust for revenge is properly called anger (*ira*) and the lust for money is greed (*auaritia*).<sup>152</sup> However, some of the various lusts do not have a proper name at all (*quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent*).<sup>153</sup> But when *libido* is mentioned without further attributes, so Augustine, one often comes to think of that particular desire by which the obscene body parts are excited.<sup>154</sup> As a technical term, *libido* can thus be applied to all imaginable desires. As a word, it has, however, a connotation of its own, namely sexual.

This semantic consideration is in line with a similar, more vague characterisation in *c. Iul.*, where Augustine holds that *calor genitalis*, *libido* and *carnis concupiscentia* denote the same thing, with an additional notion of the difference between standard Latin and the biblical language: “Holy Scripture uses the word *carnis concupiscentia* of *libido*.”<sup>155</sup>

These definitions are not, however, of permanent character when it comes to polemics, and thus not to be taken at their face value. Later in the dispute with Julian, Augustine rephrases his position on how to employ the vocabulary of desire. Julian accuses Augustine of reading the biblical phrase ‘*concupiscentia carnis*’ always in a sexual context.<sup>156</sup> But Augustine now vehemently denies this: *concupiscentia carnis* is involved in all sense perceptions, not only in sexual pleasure.<sup>157</sup> The broader meaning of lust is already stated in a similar way in *cont.*: moderation and self-control should concern not only sexual desires, but all behaviour: thus also *concupiscentia*

<sup>152</sup> See Cic. *Tusc.* 3, 5, 11; 4, 19, 44.

<sup>153</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruidacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent, quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum ualere in tyrannorum animis etiam ciuilia bella testantur?*

<sup>154</sup> *ciu.* 14, 16 *cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscae partes corporis excitantur.* Bonner 1962, 304.

<sup>155</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 8 *appellatur etiam calorem genitalem, quia pudet appellare libidinem, siue, sicut eam diuinus sermo appellare consuevit, carnis concupiscentiam. sic ergo loquere et dic: si posset carnis concupiscentia mala esse naturaliter, exstirpanda erat, non componenda. sic enim possunt, qui Latine sciunt, tardiores intellegere quid loquaris.*

<sup>156</sup> *Iulian.* *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 27–28 *hic tamen necessario exigo, quibus tibi somniis reuelatum sit, ut nomine concupiscentiae, coeuntium libidinem indicatam putares [...] hac quippe concupiscentia carnis nullum absolute genitalium tenetur indicium.* Likewise Bonner 1962, 304.

<sup>157</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 28 *ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam uoluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare. prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum concupiscit, ipsa cognoscitur: et quoniam si non aduersus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat, ad mala pertrahit, malum esse conuincitur.*

or *cupiditas* should be better understood as a desire that is not limited to sexual or bodily transgressions, but concerns e.g. “enmities, strife, jealousy, and also anger” (cf. Gal 5, 20). In this passage, Augustine uses all three words indiscriminately.<sup>158</sup>

Thus, Augustine’s own concerns appear in an ambivalent light. On the one hand, the vocabulary of desire seems to have inherent negative connotations, and in the case of *libido*, the baggage is even more detailed as being of sexual character. On the other hand, Augustine approves of such word usage, where the vocabulary of desire stays sufficiently general without being limited to bodily or sexual characterisations. One wonders whether the negative connotations reflect the standard colourings of the vocabulary, whereas more general application of these words constitutes a more conscious effort by Augustine to expand the theological sphere of the words.

Such conscious expansions can be seen particularly in Augustine’s considerations of words denoting central concepts in his thinking, e.g. in the case of ‘love’ and its relation to ‘will’:

Only if it is true love does it deserve to be called love, otherwise it is covetousness; and thus covetous people are said improperly to love, and those who love are said improperly to covet.<sup>159</sup> [transl. Hill]

According to Augustine’s theology, only a renewed will can be said to love in the proper meaning of the word (of love that is directed to God for His sake), whereas love that turns away to seek happiness from the created

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<sup>158</sup> *cont.* 28 *omnibus prorsus delectationibus concupiscentiae, quae aduersantur delectationi sapientiae, coercentis atque sanandis inuigilat officium continentiae. unde angustius eam sine dubitatione metiuntur, qui solas libidines corporis cohibere definiunt; melius profecto illi, qui non addunt corporis, sed generaliter libidinem siue cupiditatem regendam dicunt ad continentiam pertinere. quae cupiditas in uitio ponitur nec tantum est corporis, uerum et animi. etenim si corporis cupiditas est in fornicationibus et ebrietatibus, numquid inimicitiae, contentiones, aemulationes, postremo animositates in corporis uoluptatibus, ac non potius in animi motibus et perturbationibus exercentur?* The general character of *continentia* has been stressed by Hunter 1994. See also Zumkeller 1986. Cf. *ciu.* 14, 2.

<sup>159</sup> *trin.* 8, 10 *ea quippe dilectio dicenda quae uera est, alioquin cupiditas est; atque ita cupidi abusiue dicuntur diligere quemadmodum cupere abusiue dicuntur qui diligunt. Cf. trin.* 11, 5 *et si tam uiolenta est ut possit uocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis uehementer afficit.* See also the linguistic notions in *c. Faust.* 22, 18 and *ciu.* 14, 7 concerning emotions, and the word usage of *amor* and *dilectio*. See, however, *s. Lambot* 2 *cupiditatem dico amorem peccandi, quia est cupiditas nonnumquam quae appellatur in bono. item caritatem dico amorem recte uiuendi quia aliquando et caritas appellatur in malo. propterea uolui definire quid dixerim. concupiscunt regnum caelorum fideles. cari inter se dicuntur etiam latrones [...]* *sed amor mali uocatur cupiditas, amor boni caritas.* Here Augustine seems to wish to define the nature of love and lust more carefully, and to explain which words are used for which motive.

goods instead of their Creator, should properly be called 'desire.' Sometimes Augustine seems to be rather precise in his word usage, as in a sermon on Ps 141, where he distinguishes between two kinds of emotions, fear and desire, which may be used for good or for evil. While fear is straightforwardly denoted with the word *timor* in both cases, the word choice of desire is more careful. The desire that leads to eternal life is *desiderium*, whereas *cupiditas* is the one at the Devil's use.<sup>160</sup>

What seems to be typical of Augustine's approach, however, is revealed in *retr.* Here Augustine returns to some of his earlier definitions of sin, will and evil desire that he had made in *duab. an.* In retrospect, some of the statements of *duab. an.* proved to be useful tools in the hands of the Pelagian polemicists, and Augustine wants to demonstrate the coherent nature of his teachings on sin. What interests us at the moment, is the way he expresses his flexibility in what words should be used for the perverse will, or the *poena peccati* that sways human love to turn away from God.

If someone says that this covetousness (*cupiditatem*) is vitiated will, serving sin, I do not disagree. One should not argue about the words, if the things remain clear.<sup>161</sup>

Thus, although it would be erroneous to say that Augustine is not interested in making distinctions between the words he uses for desire, it is perhaps more to the point to claim that these distinctions often have an *ad hoc* character.<sup>162</sup> As for the concept of desire, Augustine does not see any point

<sup>160</sup> *en. Ps. 141, 4 quid est autem claudere ostium? hoc ostium tamquam duas habet ualuas: cupiditatis, et timoris. aut cupis aliquid terrenum, et hac intrat; aut times aliquid terrenum, et hac intrat. timoris ergo et cupiditatis ianuam claude contra diabolum, aperi ad Christum. quomodo ipsas ualuas aperis ad Christum? cupiendo regnum caelorum, timendo ignem gehennarum. per cupiditatem saeculi diabolus intrat, per desiderium uitae aeternae Christus intrat; per timorem poenarum temporalium diabolus intrat, per timorem ignis aeterni Christus intrat.*

<sup>161</sup> *retr. 1, 15, 4 itemque definitio peccati qua diximus: peccatum est uoluntas retinendi uel consequendi quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere [duab. an. 15], propterea uerum est, quia id definitum est quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. nam quando tale est ut idem sit et poena peccati, quantum est quod ualet uoluntas sub dominante cupiditate, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium? in tantum enim libera est, in quantum liberata est, et in tantum appellatur uoluntas; alioquin tota cupiditas quam uoluntas proprie nuncupanda est, quae non est, sicut Manichei desipiunt, alienae naturae additamentum, sed nostrae uitium a quo non sanatur nisi gratia saluatoris. quod si quisquam dicit etiam ipsam cupiditatem nihil esse aliud quam uoluntatem, sed uitiosam peccatoque seruientem, non resistendum est nec de uerbis, cum res constet, controuersia facienda. etiam sic enim ostenditur sine uoluntate nullum esse peccatum siue in opere siue in origine.*

<sup>162</sup> See e.g. *en. Ps. 118, 8, 4*, where Augustine discusses the difference between *desiderium* and *concupiscentia* by applying his idea of *fruitio* to the latter. *Desiderium* refers, according to Augustine, to things that one does not possess yet, whereas *concupiscentia* can also be felt



in using clear-cut terms that can be *per se* distinguished from each other, and his explicit statements on the connotations of the words seem to be more often than not defined by the situation. Put succinctly, Augustine states, “One should not argue about the words.” The potential differences in the connotations should therefore be found out through a careful analysis of a given occurrence and its near context. As this is beyond the scope of this study, a more general approach of the textual contexts is made below. Before that, however, let us turn to the issue of the synonymy of the terms in question.

### 2.3.3. Synonymy

Augustine’s own explicit claims of synonymy concerning the value of the lexemes of desire are rare. More often, presumed synonymy has to be induced from the sentence, in which, for example, applicable rhetorical devices are used (for instance, anaphora, parallelism etc.). Some simple examples are mentioned here, mainly in order to indicate that the words denoting the concept overlap in meaning, and can be used interchangeably, at least in some contexts. On each occasion, a pair of words is treated in the light of texts that attest *for* synonymy; furthermore, the documented occurrences *against* synonymy will also be presented. A more thorough and detailed analysis could presumably show instances where a term such as *cupiditas* could not be replaced with *libido*, or *concupiscentia* with *libido* without significantly altering the original meaning. The examples given in this section have been chosen from different periods in Augustine’s writings.

#### *Concupiscentia-libido*

c. Faust. 20, 6

puellas pulchras et pueros proponi dicitis, quorum formosissimis corporibus inardescant principes tenebrarum, ad feminas masculi et ad masculos feminae, ut in ipsa flagranti libidine et inhianti concupiscentia de membris eorum tamquam de taetris sordidisque conpedibus dei uestri membra soluantur.

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of things already possessed; *an aliud est concupiscere, aliud desiderare? non quod non sit concupiscentia desiderium, sed quia non omnis concupiscentia desiderium est [...]* concupiscuntur enim et quae habentur, et quae non habentur; nam concupiscendo fruitur homo rebus quas habet; desiderando autem, absentia concupiscit. This subtle trick facilitates Augustine’s task of explaining the peculiar wording in the biblical source text (*concupiuit anima mea desiderare iustificationes tuas in omni tempore*). Quite a few of Augustine’s semantic considerations on the vocabulary of desire are dictated by his exegetical exigencies, and not by disinterested linguistic curiosity.

conf. 3, 1

uenam igitur amicitiae coinquinabam sordibus concupiscentiae candorem-  
que eius obnubilabam de tartaro libidinis.

b. coniug. 3

ex malo libidinis aliquid boni faciat copulatio coniugalis, deinde quia reprim-  
itur et quodam modo uerecundius aestuat concupiscentia carnis, quam tem-  
perat parentalis affectus.

c. Iul. 4, 8

appellas etiam calorem genitalem, quia pudet appellare libidinem, siue, sicut  
eam diuinus sermo appellare consuevit, carnis concupiscentiam.

c. Iul. imp. 4, 33

et nunc quando iam concupiscentiam carnis et libidinem nominas, ne de tuae  
susceptae nomine erubescere dicaris, plus erubescere times, et errare non  
times.

All of these examples occur in the context of sexual desire. The words *concupiscentia* (*carnis*) and *libido* are constantly used in anaphoric and parallel structures. Both words carry “fiery” or “excited” attributes (*flagrans*, *inhians*, *calor*), and they are referred to as shameful or opposed to continence.<sup>163</sup> The famous passage of *conf.* is laden with emotional expressions and colourful metaphors (*tartarus libidinis*, *sordes concupiscentiae*) in order to stress the contrast between pure (“shiny”) friendship and impure, reproachable desires.<sup>164</sup>

In opposition, there are cases where the words seemingly denote different things. One is a list of vices in s. 9, 10.

sic auaritia, sic libido, sic odium, concupiscentia, luxuria, sic nugacitas spec-  
taculorum, febres sunt animae tuae. debes illas odisse cum medico.

However, the list appears here as a rhetorical device (*enumeratio*); therefore, one should perhaps be careful in trying to find from it any sophisticated differences of meaning. The following instance is more interesting:

<sup>163</sup> *Flagrans* is a traditional attribute to sexual desire.

<sup>164</sup> Cic. *Lael.* 19 pictures the ideal of Roman friendship as opposed to lowly desires: *ita vivunt ut eorum probetur fides integritas aequalitas liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constantia ut ii fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos ut habiti sunt sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem.*

et ideo apostolos, quia homines erant et corpus, quod corrumpitur et adgruat animam, in huius uitae mortalitate portabant, absit ut dicamus, sicut iste calumniatur, semper inmoderata libidine fuisse pollutos [Iulian. A. c. ep. Pel.], sed dicimus a consensione prauarum libidinum liberos, de concupiscentia tamen carnis, quam moderando frenabant, tanta humilitate et pietate gemuisse, ut optarent eam non habere potius quam domare.<sup>165</sup>

Augustine actually seems to distinguish between the “raw and immoderate lusts” and a “basic fleshly desire.” The Apostles surely were free of the first kind of desires, but Augustine admits that they were in some way susceptible to *concupiscentia carnis*. Perhaps it would not be quite out of line to point out that the “wicked lusts” (*pravae libidines*) have an overt, exclusively sexual colouring, while “fleshly concupiscence” (*concupiscentia carnis*) represents the basis of all sensual desires.<sup>166</sup>

### *Concupiscentia-cupiditas*

c. Faust. 22, 61

at illa, quae socerum fefellit, non carnis eius concupiscentia nec meretriciae mercedis cupiditate peccauit, sed ex ipso sanguine prolem requires.

pat. 17, 14

quanto ergo maior est in sanctis caritas dei, tanto magis pro eo quod diligitur, et quanto maior est in peccatoribus cupiditas mundi, tanto magis pro eo, quod concupiscitur, omnia tolerantur.

grat. Christ. 20, 21

sed cupiditas hominis, quae uitium est, hominem habet auctorem uel hominis deceptorem, non hominis creatorem; ipsa est enim concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex patre, sed ex mundo est.

<sup>165</sup> c. ep. Pel. 1, 24.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. en. Ps. 57, 19 *qui autem illam concupiscentiam, cum qua de peccati propagine natus est, contemnit uincere, et multas adhuc excitat exseritque libidines, difficulter eas superat, et aduersus se ipse diuisus, igne proprio concrematur. Concupiscentia* is a fundamental inherited desire from which the single *libidines* arise. A similar idea can be derived from s. *Mai* 12, 4 *uis calcare omnes cupiditates concupiscentiae? uitam aeternam desidera, quam promittit deus.* Note the use of *desiderare* for a positive desire. See also s. 9, 13 *est enim bellum quod secum agit homo, dimicans contra concupiscentias malas, frenans auaritiam, elidens superbiam, suffocans ambitionem, trucidans libidinem.*

In these three examples *concupiscentia* and *cupiditas* appear in near contexts to each other. In the first text passage, the behaviour of Tamar is defended in a way that points out a subtle difference in the usage of the words: while “fleshly concupiscence” (*carnis concupiscentia*) refers here to sexual desire, “lust for meretricious reward” (*mercedis cupiditas*) denotes another kind of desire, pointing rather to money or some other material goods. The second example represents a case where two opposite motivations of *caritas* and *cupiditas* are juxtaposed. The actions of the former are denoted by the verb *diligere*, while the latter motivation acts by *concupiscere*. A negatively connotated desire in this case seems to be treated on a very general level and certainly with no particular reference to sexuality. In this respect, the case is similar in the third text sample, where Augustine parallels *cupiditas* with the Johannine triple *concupiscentia* (1Jn 2, 16): *concupiscentia* along with *cupiditas* are treated as synonyms, denoting a general disability to act in accordance with God’s will and instead aiming at worldly satisfaction.

### *Cupiditas-libido*

lib. arb. 1, 9

scisne etiam istam libidinem alio nomine cupiditatem uocari?

uera rel. 78

nam cum ipsa ducit, nos autem sequimur, cupiditas illa et libido, nos uero temeritas et stultitia nuncupamur.

qu. 7, 17, 4

quod autem ait: ne multiplicentur in te bestiae ferae [Ex 23, 29], mirum si non bestiales quodam modo cupiditates et libidines intellegi uoluit, quae solent de repentino successu terrenae felicitatis existere.

c. Iul. 4, 35

quando autem male utitur homo membris bonis, nisi quando consentit eis quae in nobis habitant cupiditatibus malis? in quibus libido prae ceteris turpis est, cui nisi resistatur, horrenda immunda committit.

In the first three examples, the two words are equivalent in a straightforward manner. Evil desire here is treated in a very general way, as the basic motivation to prefer earthly goods to God. In the first example, Augustine explicitly claims that the words are synonymous. In the following two examples, the repetition of the synonym fulfils an explanatory, defining function.

The one example that rather stands apart from the others is the last sample, taken from the polemics against Julian of Aeclanum, where Augustine clearly treats the *libido* as a subcategory of evil desires (*cupiditates malae*).

*Concupiscentia-libido-cupiditas*

c. Iul. 2, 20

tu ergo melius honoras nuptias, quarum dignitatem tanquam omnino irreprehensibili uolubro carnalis concupiscentiae decoloras: an ille, qui cum dicat, non solum licitum, sed etiam bonum coniugium sanctamque copulam, tamen cessante libidinis uoluptate, tempora orandi ab apostolo praescripta commemorat; [...] omne connubii bonum pensans non cupiditate carnis, sed fide potius castitatis; non morbo passionis, sed foedere coniunctionis; non uoluptate libidinis, sed uoluntate propaginis?

cont. 28

omnibus prorsus delectationibus concupiscentiae, quae aduersantur delectationi sapientiae, coercendis atque sanandis inuigilat officium continentiae. unde angustius eam sine dubitatione metiuntur, qui solas libidines corporis cohibere definiunt; melius profecto illi, qui non addunt corporis, sed generaliter libidinem siue cupiditatem regendam dicunt ad continentiam pertinere.

Some passages contain all three nouns in near context.<sup>167</sup> In the first sample, Augustine uses the three words in the same meaning, denoting illicit sexual desire, in connection to original sin and to married sexual relations. Desire is identified with a “sickness of passion” (*morbus passionis*) and opposed to e.g. the “will to procreate” (*uoluntas propaginis*). All three words have ‘fleshly’ attributes (*carnis, carnalis, uoluptas*).<sup>168</sup> However, all three words in the second sample are synonymously used on a more general level, as being the forces against which one should fight with continence. Augustine explicitly opens the narrower concept of *libido* (*l. corporis*), and seems to explain it by adding the word *cupiditas* (*generaliter, siue*).

<sup>167</sup> See e.g. *conf.* 2, 2; *c. Iul.* 6, 41; *cont.* 6; *pat.* 4–6; *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 71; 4, 52–53; *s.* 75, 5–6. Many of these instances concern sexual desire.

<sup>168</sup> In Julian’s use (in the passages that Augustine cites), *cupiditas* is used rarely and never in an exclusively sexual context; sexual desire is denoted in Julian by *concupiscentia* and *libido*.

### 2.3.4. *Textual Contexts*

While the above samples show how generally speaking Augustine is able to use the three words for evil desire as being synonymous or nearly synonymous, it remains to be shown what kind of words are used in more detailed contexts.<sup>169</sup> In this section some examples will be given of how the three different words behave in various contexts. Does Augustine use all of them in every context? Could the relative frequencies of the particular words in particular contexts be characterised in some way?

In order to illuminate Augustine's use of different words in varying contexts, I have selected a few general categories to represent these contexts. These categories range from the more formal to those in which the actual object of desire is present. The categorisation does not imply that a word in a given context would have only one clearly determined connotation; on the contrary, the context where a given word occurs may represent features of other categories as well. Even these summary categories will efficiently illustrate Augustine's multiple and flexible use of his vocabulary of desire.

#### *Disturbed Emotions*

(a) Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31

haec est hominis uita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius rationi ueritatieque consentiunt [...] si autem non consentiunt, nihilominus dum negligenter geruntur, conscindunt et dissipant animum, et faciunt uitam miserimam; et uocantur perturbationes, et libidines, et concupiscentiae malae.

(b) an. quant. 23, 42

si enim me rogares quid pateretur aegrotans, aegritudinem responderem; quid cupiens, cupiditatem; quid metuens, metum; quid gaudens, gaudium.

(c) mend. 10

quis autem dixerit integrum animum esse mentientis? etenim libido quoque ipsa recte definitur adpetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis qualibet temporalia praeponuntur.

(d) qu. eu. 1, 47

cupiditati autem uoluptatis opponitur timor doloris.

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<sup>169</sup> By 'context' in this section I refer simply to the near textual context of two to three preceding and following sentences.

(e) Io. eu. tr. 60, 3

turbetur plane animus christianus, non miseria, sed misericordia; timeat ne pereant homines christo, contristetur cum perit aliquis christo; concupiscat adquiri homines christo, laetetur cum adquiruntur homines christo; timeat et sibi ne pereat christo, contristetur peregrinari se a christo; concupiscat regnare cum christo, laetetur dum sperat se regnaturum esse cum christo.

(f) ciu. 14, 3

omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem timorem, laetitiam tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque uitiorum uolens intellegi ex corpore accidere subiungat [...] tamen aliter se habet fides nostra.

(g) c. Iul. 2, 12

boni equi sunt quatuor, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia: mali equi, iracundia, concupiscentia, timor, iniquitas.

(h) c. Iul. 6, 53

illi philosophi locutione tropica mihi uidentur uitiosam partem animi appellassse libidinem, in qua parte est uitium quod uocatur libido, sicut appellatur domus pro eis qui sunt in domo.

When a word of desire appears in an emotional context, it is usually part of a list of other emotions, such as fear, pain, pleasure, etc., and sometimes the word is opposed to main virtues (b, d, f, g). Occasionally, the word may also denote the desiring part of the soul in the Platonic sense (h).<sup>170</sup> Some words and terms that are customarily connected with emotions appear in philosophical discourse. From the examples above, the words and terms representing such terminology are *uita tranquilla*, *consentire*, *motus animi*, *perturbationes* (a), *pati*, *adpetitus animi* (c), *turbari* (e), *pars animi* (h). Sometimes the context is determined by the author Augustine quotes, as in (f), where Augustine refers to Virgil, or (g), which is a direct quotation from Ambrose. In (h), the authority of the philosophers is appealed to, and the Neoplatonistic view of the parts of the soul (*uitiosa pars libido*) is mentioned, and in this case, with a notion of peculiar language use (tropical). In context (f), Augustine disagrees with the opinion he is referring to, and in (g), he approves it. From these examples it can be noted that all three terms can be used in this context without further qualifications: *concupiscentia* and

<sup>170</sup> Cf. *op. mon.* 40 *quod ergo est in uno homine mens et concupiscentia*.

*concupisco*, *libido* and *cupiditas* may all be used to denote the emotion, the desiring part of the soul or its action.

*The Opposite of Love*

(a) mor. 1, 41

nisi uero amatores auri, amatores laudis, amatores feminarum, amatoribus suis deus sinet esse fortiores; cum ille non amor, sed congruentius cupiditas uel libido nominetur.

(b) lib. arb. 3, 17

haec autem auaritia cupiditas est, cupiditas porro inproba uoluntas est.

(c) doct. chr. 3, 10

caritatem uoco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter deum.

(d) diu. qu. 35

est enim et turpis amor, quo animus se ipso inferiora sectatur, quae magis proprie cupiditas dicitur, omnium scilicet malorum radix.

(e) spir. et litt. 6

si quisquam multa quae scripta sunt in cantico canticorum carnaliter accipiat non ad luminosae caritatis fructum, sed ad libidinosae cupiditatis adfectum

(f) spir. et litt. 6

sed ubi sanctus non adiuvat spiritus inspirans pro concupiscentia mala concupiscentiam bonam, hoc est caritatem diffundens in cordibus nostris, profecto illa lex quamuis bona auget prohibendo desiderium malum, sicut aquae impetus, si in eam partem non cesset influere, uehementior fit obice obposito, cuius molem cum euicerit maiore cumulo praecipitatus uiolentius per prona prouoluitur.

(g) pat. 14

itaque illa terrena est, ista caelestis, illa animalis, ista spiritalis, illa diabolica, ista deifica, quoniam concupiscentia, qua fit, ut peccantes omnia pertinaciter patiantur, ex mundo est; caritas autem, qua fit, ut recte uiuentes omnia fortiter patiantur, ex deo est.

(h) en. Ps. 9, 15

pes animae recte intellegitur amor; qui cum prauus est, uocatur cupiditas aut libido; cum autem rectus, dilectio uel caritas.



To Augustine, love is a will directed to God, and *vice versa*. The opposite of love is self-centred desire. The sentences above reflect a very constant trait in Augustine's use of the words of desire. As can be seen, all of the three words *can* be used in this context (a)(f)(g), but the most usual of them is *cupiditas*. Love and will are in this context called *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas*, the latter occurring often with *cupiditas*; no doubt due to the rhythmical parallelity of the word pair.

These examples also include many defining remarks. For example, desire is a perverted version of the right love. It is *turpis*, *prava*, *improba* (b)(d)(h). Furthermore, desire is often mentioned in terms of *direction* or *relation*. Whereas the right love aims 'outside,' perverse desire returns 'inside.' The opposite of love yearns for inferior things, whereas the right will aims for higher, heavenly and divine realities (c)(d)(g).<sup>171</sup> Desire prefers corporeal or any created things or persons to God (c)(g). Thus, no clear objects of desire in the context of the opposite of love can be given, and Augustine usually provides only some examples of the goals that perverse love aims at: money, glory or one's regard of oneself (*amor sui*) (a). The context does not even exclude sexual connotations of the opposite of love, as is shown by (e).<sup>172</sup> The context also tends to attract biblical allusions, as in (d)(1 Tim 6, 10), or in (g) (1 Jn 2, 16).

### *Laudable Desire*

(a) en. Ps. 85, 8

inuoca deum tamquam deum, ama deum tamquam deum; illo melius nihil est; ipsum desidera, ipsum concupisce.

(b) en. Ps. 110, 9

pro deliciis autem omnibus huius saeculi, quales uel expertus es, uel augere ac multiplicare cogitando potes, immortalium deliciarum matrem concupisce sapientiam; sed: initium sapientiae, timor domini.

<sup>171</sup> As in en. Ps. 31, 2, 5 *amor dei, amor proximi, caritas dicitur; amor mundi, amor huius saeculi, cupiditas dicitur*. O'Donovan (1980) has analysed the images of love in Augustine's theology. See also Pétré 1948.

<sup>172</sup> Cf. s. 51,21 *et multos nouimus fratres nostros fructificantes in gratia, in nomine Christi ex consensu ab inuicem continere concupiscentiam carnis, non autem continere ab inuicem caritatem coniugalem*.

(c) en Ps. 101, 2, 10

merito sic misit deus famulum suum Moysen. quaesiuit enim nomen mittentis se; quaesiuit, et audiuit, nec desertum est desiderium concupiscentiae bonae.

(d) en. Ps. 118, 8, 3

concupiuit anima mea desiderare iustificationes tuas in omni tempore [Ps 118, 20] laudabilis est ista concupiscentia, non damnabilis. non de hac dictum est: non concupisces [Ex 20, 17], sed de illa qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum. de hac autem bona concupiscentia qua concupiscit spiritus aduersus carnem, quaere ubi scriptum sit; et inuenies: concupiscentia itaque sapientiae deducit ad regnum [Sap 6, 21]: et multa alia reperiuntur bonae concupiscentiae testimonia. sed hoc sane interest, quod non tacetur quid concupiscatur, quando bona commemoratur concupiscentia; cum autem non additur quid concupiscatur, sed sola ponitur, non nisi mala intellegitur.

(e) Io. eu. tr. 14, 12

domine, ostende nobis patrem, et sufficit nobis [Io 14, 8]. tamquam dicerent: iam nouimus te, et benedicimus te, quia nouimus te; gratias enim tibi agimus, quia ostendisti te nobis; sed patrem nondum nouimus; propterea cor nostrum ardet, satagit concupiscentia quadam sancta uidendi patris tui qui te misit; ipsum nobis ostende, et nihil amplius a te desiderabimus; sufficit enim nobis cum ille fuerit demonstratus, quo maior esse nemo potest. bona concupiscentia, bonum desiderium; sed paruus intellectus.

(f) spir. litt. 6

sed ubi sanctus non adiuuat spiritus inspirans pro concupiscentia mala concupiscentiam bonam, hoc est caritatem diffundens in cordibus nostris.

(g) c. Iul. 5, 63

nos dicimus illud esse contra uoluntatem, ut caro concupiscat aduersus spiritum; non illud, ut spiritus aduersus carnem. per quam concupiscentiam bonam fit, ut nisi causa generandi non utantur coniuges carnis libidine.

(h) c. Iul. 5, 29

non enim potest quae bona est desiderare quod malum est, aut negandum est bonae aliquod bonum. fiat itaque totum quod desiderat libido bona, ne ipse sit malus qui resistit bono.

(i) c. ep. Pel. 2, 21

proinde cupiditas boni non homini a domino esset, si bonum non esset; si autem bonum est, non nisi ab illo nobis est, qui summe atque incommutabiliter bonus est. quid est enim boni cupiditas nisi caritas.

Augustine's notions of a positive or a 'laudable desire' have received considerable attention. As Bonner points out, this context seems to be mainly dictated by Augustine's Latin Bible translation, and Augustine often backs his considerations concerning positive desire with a Bible quotation.<sup>173</sup> Thus, it is no coincidence that many of the above samples are derived from biblical interpretations. Tellingly, Augustine usually explains his exceptional use of a given word of desire by adding a clarifying object; otherwise, as he notes, desire has to be read as evil (d). While unquestionably the most usual word of the three in Bible is *concupiscentia*, it is more than natural that the word for 'laudable desire' usually is *concupiscentia* (d)(e)(g). Occasionally, however, *cupiditas* is also mentioned (i); but in this sample, the phrase is taken from a Pelagian text.<sup>174</sup> Again, the only instance, of *libido bona* is strongly ironic, referring sarcastically to Julian's views. In addition, there seems to be a tendency to use *concupisco* in a more neutral, or even in an appreciative sense, than the noun, as is done in (a)(b).

'Laudable desire' is always connected to the right 'love' (*caritas, dilectio*): it aims at God, God's wisdom and his presence. To desire in a laudable manner, is to yearn for God and his will.

### *Sexual Desire*

(a) c. Faust. 20, 6

in ipsa flagranti libidine et inhianti concupiscentia de membris eorum tamquam de taetris sordidisque conpedibus dei uestri membra soluantur.

(b) c. Iul. imp. 6, 22

concupiscentia porro carnis, per quam iactus carnalium seminum prouocatur, aut nulla in Adam fuit ante peccatum, aut in illo uitata est per peccatum.

(c) ciu. 14, 16

atque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi uoluntati, uerum etiam lasciuendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti aduersetur, nonnumquam et aduersus se ipsa diuiditur commotoque animo in commouendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.

<sup>173</sup> See e.g. *en. Ps.* 118, 8, 3; *ciu.* 14, 7, where Wis 6, 21 and Gal 5, 17 are quoted.

<sup>174</sup> *Iulian. A. c. ep. Pel.* 2, 17.

(d) en. Ps. 136, 9

si libido scortantium et meretricantium haberet quietem et securitatem, si non timeret famem in domo sua qui clamat ut pantomimi uestiantur; si haec omnia sine labe, sine perturbatione aliqua fluerent [...] felicia essent tempora.

(e) b. uid. 10

unde et sanctae mulieres accendebantur non cupiditate concumbendi, sed pietate pariendi.

(f) ciu. 1, 19

intuens enim in duorum corporum commixtione unius inquinatissimam cupiditatem, alterius castissimam uoluntatem, et non quid coniunctione membrorum, sed quid animorum diuersitate ageretur.

There is no disputing the fact that both *libido* and *concupiscentia* denote sexual desire in Augustine's vocabulary.<sup>175</sup> They usually appear with the attributes of *carnis* or *carnalis* (b). In this denotation, the most colourful attributes are commonly used, ranging from verbs and participial constructions (*flagrare*, *inhiare*, *adhinnire*) to strong adjectives (*turpis*, *inquinata*) (a)(c)(f) and to characterising genitives, for example *scortantium* (d). Though somewhat rarer in this context, *cupiditas* occurs as well (e)(f). None of the words appear in this context with a positive evaluation.

### *Greed—Food, Money and Property*

(a) s. 278, 5

imperat fidem, imperat continentiam, temperantiam, sobrietatem; refrenat concupiscentiam auaritia.

(b) s. 207, 2

uideas enim quosdam pro usitato uino, inusitados liquores exquirere, et aliorum expressione pomorum, quod ex uua sibi denegant, multo suauius compensare; cibos extra carnes multiplici uarietate ac iucunditate conquirere; et suauitates quas alio tempore consecrari pudet, huic tempori quasi opportune colligere: ut uidelicet observatio quadragesimae non sit ueterum concupiscentiarum repressio, sed nouarum deliciarum occasio.

<sup>175</sup> For an interesting case of *concupisco* used intransitively in a sexual context, see *conf.* 3, 5.

(c) s. Wilm. 13, 6

non concupiscas: noli transire ante uillam alienam, et suspirare, quia bona est. rem proximi tui non concupiscas.

(d) mor. 2, 51

quae igitur ratio est uel potius amentia, de numero electorum hominem pellere, qui forte carnem ualetudinis causa, nulla cupiditate gustauerit, si autem piperata tubera uoraciter edere concupierit, immodestiae tantum sit forte deprehendere, non autem ut corruptorem damnare signaculi?

(e) s. 32, 14

promittit deus fraudem non facientibus sempiterna regna caelorum. uincit te cupiditas ad pecuniam.

(f) s. Lambot. 4

mendici enim cupiditatem satiant pauci nummi, auari hominis cupiditatem nec totus mundus.

(g) ciu. 14, 6

est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent.

(h) c. Iul. 4, 66

sicut auri decus aliter laudat religiosus, aliter auarus: iste, cum pietate uenerandi creatorem, ille, cum libidine possidendi creaturam.

(i) c. Iul. 4, 67

cum ergo natura quodam modo poscit supplementa quae desunt, non uocatur libido, sed fames aut sitis: cum uero suppleta necessitate amor edendi animum sollicitat, iam libido est, iam malum est, cui cedendum non est, sed resistendum.

The vocabulary of desire in this context covers a wide range of attitudes aiming at material satisfaction through the possession of riches (*diuitiae, aurum, argentum, pecunia, possidere*), food (*cibus, edere, gustare*), or some other kind of property. Again, the words denoting ‘greed’ (*auarus, auaritia*) are usually found in this context.<sup>176</sup> While *cupiditas* seems to be the most tradi-

<sup>176</sup> Note that many of the text samples are derived from sermons. See Schindler 1986, 496–497.

tional choice to denote the 'greedy' connotations of desire,<sup>177</sup> *concupiscentia* and *concupisco* also appear in this context.<sup>178</sup> The appearance of *libido*, on the other hand, seems to be most forced in this context, as can be seen from the text samples above: these rare occurrences of *libido* denoting desire or greed for food or money either show Augustine composing artificial lists of various kinds of *libidines* (g), or him trying to find analogies of the other immodest *libidines* than the sexual one (h)(i).

### *Power and Credit*

(a) *ciu.* 5, 12

ueteres igitur primique romani, quantum eorum docet et commendat historia, quamuis ut aliae gentes excepta una populi hebraeorum deos falsos colerent et non deo uictimas, sed daemoniis immolarent, tamen 'laudis audi, pecuniae liberales erant, gloriam ingentem, diuitias honestas uolebant'; hanc ardentissime dilexerunt, propter hanc uiuere uoluerunt, pro hac emori non dubitauerunt; ceteras cupiditates huius unius ingenti cupiditate presserunt.

(b) *ciu.* 5, 19

quisquis autem sine cupiditate gloriae, qua ueretur homo bene iudicantibus displicere, dominari atque imperare desiderat, etiam per apertissima scelera quaerit plerumque obtinere quod diligit. proinde qui gloriam concupiscit, aut uera uia nititur aut certe, dolis atque fallaciis contendit [Sall. Catil. 11, 3], uolens bonus uideri esse, quod non est.

(c) *ep.* 185, 42

in huius ergo compagem corporis ueniant et labores suos non dominandi cupiditate sed bene utendi pietate possideant.

(d) *en.* Ps. 102, 6

si uelles esse in aliquo sublimi honore in hac terra; ducatum, proconsulatum, praefecturam si concupisceres, numquid continuo posses ut uelles?

(e) *ciu.* 3, 14

libido ista dominandi magnis malis agitat et conterit humanum genus.

The theme of fame and earthly power is extensively treated in *ciu.* Therefore, it is not surprising that the vocabulary of desire concerning glory and power is employed there. Both *cupiditas* and *libido* appear in the gerund phrases

<sup>177</sup> Cf. TLL s.v. *cupiditas*.

<sup>178</sup> Also *qu. eu.* 2, 18 *generale ieiunium non a concupiscentia ciborum tantum, sed ab omni laetitia temporalium delectationum*.

(c)(e).<sup>179</sup> However, *concupiscentia* seems not to appear as a noun in this context. On the other hand, there are occurrences of *concupisco* that refer to the will to power (d), or to fame (b).

### *Triple Desire*

(a) uera rel. 38

uerumtamen quamquam in hac rerum extremitate miseri iaceant, ut uitia sua sibi dominari patiantur uel libidine uel superbia uel curiositate damnati uel duobus horum uel omnibus, quamdiu sunt in hoc stadio uitae humanae, licet eis congregi et uincere, si prius credant, quod intellegere nondum ualent, et non diligant mundum, quoniam omne, quod in mundo est, sicut diuinitus dictum est, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi [...] hoc modo tria illa notata sunt, nam concupiscentia carnis uoluptatis infimae amatores significat, concupiscentia oculorum curiosos, ambitio saeculi superbos.

(b) qu. eu. 1, 47

sicut temptatio cupiditatis trina est, ita et temptatio timoris trina est. cupiditati quae in curiositate est opponitur timor mortis; sicut enim in illa cognoscendarum rerum est auditas, ita in ista metus amittendae talis notitiae [...] cupiditati uero honorum uel laudis opponitur timor ignominiae et contumeliarum.

(c) conf. 10, 35

praeter enim concupiscentiam carnis, quae inest in delectatione omnium sensuum et uoluptatum, cui seruientes depereunt qui longe se faciunt a te, inest animae per eosdem sensus corporis quaedam non se oblectandi in carne, sed experiendi per carnem uana et curiosa cupiditas nomine cognitionis et scientiae palliata [...] quae quoniam in appetitu noscendi est, oculi autem sunt ad noscendum in sensibus principes, concupiscentia oculorum eloquio diuino appellata est.

(d) ep. lo. tr. 2, 14

tria sunt ista, et nihil inuenis unde temptetur cupiditas humana nisi aut desiderium carnis aut desiderium oculorum aut ambitionem saeculi.

(e) grat. Christ. 20, 21

sed cupiditas hominis, quae uitium est, hominem habet auctorem uel hominis deceptorem, non hominis creatorem; ipsa est enim concupiscentia carnis

<sup>179</sup> Most of the *libido dominandi*-phrases derive from *ciu.*; the phrase occurs in a quotation of Sallust (*Catil.* 2, 2) in *ciu.* 3, 14.

et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex patre, sed ex mundo est.

Augustine uses the scheme of the tripartite desire more often in his earlier works. It is based on his reading of 1Jn 2, 16; sometimes this passage is explicitly quoted in this connection. While it is clear that in this context, the vocabulary of desire does not have any distinct profile in its contents, the clearcut form of the category serves as an example of Augustine's flexible manner in using varying words even in a rather schematic context.<sup>180</sup> Again, triple concupiscence is not just a routine biblical quotation or allusion to bolster an argument, but a more profound way to treat human sinful action. In *conf.* this scheme even plays a crucial role in the structure of the entire work.<sup>181</sup>

Text sample (a) offers an interesting example of word choice. The biblical text has *concupiscentia-concupiscentia-ambitio*. Augustine refers to this chain as *divinitus dictum*, but uses *libido-curiositas-superbia*. In other passages, *cupiditas* is also present, often referred to as *triplex* or *trina*, as in (b). In this context, the word of the source text (*concupiscentia*), and Augustine's interpretative term (*cupiditas*) seem to have a near identical value. Whereas *libido* and *desiderium* occur marginally, *libido* is never the inclusive term for all three desires but only denotes the fleshly part of the threefold desire.

## 2.4. CONCLUSION

Based on the above observations, some general conclusions can be drawn. While *libido* and *cupiditas* arise from the Latin classical literature, denoting reproachable sexual lust or greed for material welfare (*luxuria*), the verb *concupisco* has its roots in the Latin prose tradition as well. This verb occurs in the philosophical context, denoting the excessive emotion of desire; or more generally, it refers to a strong, intensive wish. The senses are somewhat constant in Latin Christian literature, where the traditional phrases and contexts for *libido* and *cupiditas* are preserved, added with the biblical neologism of the noun *concupiscentia*. The new noun seems to share many features with its more classical counterparts; especially the discourse of emotions is prone to have *concupisco/concupiscentia* in Tertullian and Ambrose.

<sup>180</sup> There have been conflicting opinions on the question of the origins of the scheme. See Chapter 4 in this study.

<sup>181</sup> See Chapter 4.



Concerning Augustine, it may be concluded that he uses the three standard nouns for evil desire flexibly with no static, fixed and detailed differences in the meaning. In many instances, all of the three nouns could be used, and strict limitations are rare; however, in some instances, Augustine clearly prefers one noun to the others. Thus, *libido* is never used in those cases where Augustine wants to note the existence of a 'positive desire.' However, none of the words seem to have a single primary sense, and none of the words can be reduced to represent a single context, e.g. a sexual one.

Though no detailed analysis has been possible in the scope of this study, the case seems sufficient enough: it would not be reasonable to conduct an analysis of Augustine's concept of evil desire by limiting the study to occurrences of one term only.<sup>182</sup> Therefore, *concupiscentia* would run the risk of appearing in a distorted image if *libido* and *cupiditas* were completely left out of the picture. It is natural, however, that while Augustine clearly used *concupiscentia* more and more towards the end of his career, this word will have a primary place in the analyses of the following chapters. The linguistic basis for the present analysis has thus been established and it is now time to move on to a more theological approach.

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<sup>182</sup> The remark of Pollmann (1996, 58 n. 99) concerning *ratio* = *regula* and *clementia* = *miser cordia* is quite relevant here: "Ähnliches findet sich generell in der Antike, der eine einheitliche Nomenklatur über weite Strecken fremd war."

## CHAPTER THREE

### PARADISE AND PUNISHMENT

haec est namque poena inoboedienti homini reddita in semetipso, ut ei uicissim non oboediatur nec a semetipso.

c. adu. leg. 1, 18

ipse iudicat occultissimo quidem iudicio, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimo. nam inuenimus aliqua peccata etiam poenas esse aliorum peccatorum

gr. et lib. arb. 41

Augustine's vision of divine grace, fully exposed in *Simpl.*, had corollaries in his way of conceiving how the human will should be seen as being morally responsible. As early as from 390s onwards, Augustine felt dissatisfaction with a simply individualistic solution to the questions concerning evil, human will and moral responsibility. As we will see, Augustine expanded the individual human will to be somehow responsible for a communal, hereditary strain of will that finds its origin in the properly freely willed decisions of Adam and Eve. This solution, of course, raised yet other difficulties. For instance, how is it conceivable that another individual causes such a strong and invincible perversion of the will for the whole of humankind? If we are held responsible, and therefore punishable, for the actions of our ancestors in Paradise, what are the implications for the concept of divine justice?

This chapter presents Augustine's argumentation on *concupiscentia* as a divine punishment which God gave to humankind for the first sin of Adam and Eve. It is Augustine's deeply held conviction that our bodily and emotional disorder in the form of *concupiscentia* has deep roots in the history of humankind and in the choices of its first representatives. The basic elements for a neatly balanced and reciprocal view of an original 'theological' disobedience corresponding to a present 'psychological' and bodily disorder were already established in Augustine's earlier expositions on Paradise, the human will and divine retribution. A full-blown description of this reciprocity was given during the early years of the fifth century, to be finally challenged by Augustine's sharpest theological critic, Julian of Aeclanum. This development is traced in this chapter.

Why focus on *concupiscentia* particularly as a punishment (*poena*)? It would be sufficient to point out that this is what Augustine seems to claim again and again. Corrupt sexual (and other bodily) desires are not an isolated phenomenon in the present state of the human constitution: they have meaning and reference in a larger context. For Augustine, this context is anchored in Paradise, Adam and Eve, in obedience to God the Creator, and indeed in divine justice and divine nature themselves. While the last decades of scholarship on Augustine's views on *concupiscentia* have shed considerable light on his notions of human sexuality, it seems that certain sides of Augustine's own concerns have been overlooked.<sup>1</sup> For Augustine fre-

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<sup>1</sup> Augustine's views on sex and sexual desire have inspired a multitude of scholarly contributions in the past decades. A mere sample of these contributions also shows the diversity of angles and attitudes that can be taken to this issue. Gross (1954, 778) acknowledges Augustine's theological construction concerning the origins of *concupiscentia*, but stresses forcefully Augustine's morally flawed outcome: "In diesem Mythos von der Entstehung der Konkupiszenz ist ausschliesslich vom Geschlechtstreib die Rede." See also *ibid.*, 787, "Die Verketzerung des Geschlechtstriebes als einer verdammenswerten Erbschuld ist vielleicht das verhängnisvollste Vermächtnis, das Augustin der Kirche gemacht hat." Cipriani (1974) ponders on the philosophical preconditions of Augustine's sexual ethics, emphasising the influence of Neoplatonism (see also Alexander 1975, 207, who ends with a broader claim: "Augustine's interpretation of sexuality was an attempt to satisfy both the biblical doctrine of creation and platonic philosophy"). Miles (1979, 41–77) provides a developmental account of Augustine's views on the body, sex and sexual desire, stressing the social dimensions of his discussions of *libido* and *concupiscentia carnis*, and then ending with a rather positive judgment of Augustine's theology of asceticism. Kelly's (1983) longish article starts with a wish to distill a "human" essence in Augustine's theology from the "taint" of concupiscence (see *ibid.*, p. 82) but ends with a moral condemnation: "Augustine attacks the sexual goodness of creation itself" (p. 110). Clark 1986a is an influential study of possible Manichaean influences in Augustine's explanations of how sin is transmitted through biological reproduction (Schepard 1996 is a thin contribution to the same theme). Clark (1986b) charts two distinct lines of thought in Augustine's works concerning the "essence" of marriage and the role of sex: a line that Clark (1986b, 140, 162) calls "companionate," and a line that she labels "physical." Clark endorses the first view, lamenting the fact that the second overshadowed it in the subsequent Catholic teaching. Brown's (1988) comprehensive study on Christian ascetic movement in the Early Church has been influential as well. Brown takes Augustine to represent a moderate position compared with certain other Christian authors, and notes the social and theological dimensions of *concupiscentia* (1988, 404). Twelve years later, in the second edition to his epoch-making biography of Augustine, Brown emphasises perhaps even more strongly Augustine's rich, moderate and considered views on sexuality even in the debate with Julian of Aeclanum, in contrast to "widespread modern notions on the topic" (Brown 2000, 500–502, here Brown refers to the popular exposition of Uta Ranke-Heinemann, *Eunuchs for Heaven: the Catholic Church and Sexuality*, London 1990, calling it a "travesty," Brown 2000, 518n69). Markus (1990, 60–62) takes a similar direction in locating Augustine's views on sexuality into the larger context of his views on "man's estrangement from God" (p. 61). Instead of moderation, however, Markus uses the term "Christian mediocrity" of Augustine's sexual and marital ethics as contrasted to the more radical ideas of e.g. Jerome and Ambrose. Hunter

quently treats *concupiscentia* as being a result of certain causes, revealed in the Christian Scripture. Furthermore, what seems for a modern eye to be a severe or even odd prejudice against sexual behaviour and pleasure should be seen as an inseparable part of Augustine's more general theological insights into original sin, disobedience to God and divine justice.<sup>2</sup> In

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(1994) also emphasises Augustine's moderation in the question, and stresses sexual desire as only a subcategory of Augustine's general and complex doctrine of sin. O'Connell (1994) is an essay following the outline of *conf.*, and commenting loosely on various themes of sexuality in Augustine, ending in a conviction that Augustine's thinking on sex was mainly influenced by the philosophical source texts mentioned in *conf.* (i.e. Cicero and Plotinus). Rist (1994, 321–327) compares Augustine's and Julian's arguments about sexual desire. Rist argues that both represent some kind of a failure in their positions: Augustine in his inability to explain how a quality of the soul (*concupiscentia carnis* and/or original sin) is transmitted biologically to the next generation, and Julian in his emphasis of *libido* being an issue concerning only the body. Schneider (2000) can, again, be taken as a representative of the *Schuldfrage*-tradition (cf. Brown 2000, 502): his general treatise on Ambrose, Augustine and a lesser-known elegiac poet Maximianus acknowledges Augustine's affirmations of the body as part of the good created order, but ends up in characterizing the Christian authors as considering bodily beauty as "dämonisch." Many of the above-mentioned scholars mention Pagels (1988a) as an influential misrepresentation of Augustine's views of sexuality. So does also Lamberigts (2000), whose article is a richly documented call for balanced and realistic evaluation of Augustine's theologically rooted descriptions of sex and sexual desire. He prefers (somewhat sarcastically, it seems) Julian's intellectual courage to criticize Augustine's views of *concupiscentia* to the modern criticisms (Lamberigts 2000, 176–177), and then offers pertaining observations on Augustine's actual arguments during the anti-Julian debate: First, Augustine did not invent his suspicion towards sinful desire from thin air, but he had a firm biblical and Christian tradition to back such a suspicion (p. 180). Secondly, Augustine's views of *concupiscentia carnis* were ultimately a result from highly theological concerns, and not limited to a persecutory attitude towards bodily sexual needs (p. 181). Lamberigts (2000, 184–185) also emphasises important qualifications in Augustine's views on sexual desire. That is, Augustine consistently attached the question of rational (or irrational) purpose to sexual intercourse. According to Lamberigts (2000, 184), this emphasis proves "incorrect [...] to suggest that, for Augustine, the very experience of a sexual impulse was already a sin." Yet another important observation made by Lamberigts (2000, 185) is Augustine's conviction of the resistibility of *concupiscentia* and its correct role in the Christian progress. This conviction should, according to Lamberigts, teach us that "we ought to situate the *concupiscentia carnis* in a theological-ethical context." Finally, Lamberigts (2000, 186–188) points out the evident fact that, for Augustine, sexual intercourse in a legitimate context (i.e. marriage) was a created good, and even in situations in which its rational purpose was not sought after, it was only seen as a daily, trifle sin, not "something terrible." Some of Lamberigts' (2000) points are elaborated and developed further in this study, particularly in Chapter 3 (the theological context of *concupiscentia*) and in Chapter 6 (the resistibility of *concupiscentia* during Christian progress).

<sup>2</sup> Appeals to Augustine's personal experiences in this area are more or less discarded in this study. Cf. Miles 1994, 17: "A's sexual experience led to his despair over the possibility of a sexuality that did not inevitably entail compulsiveness and exploitation"; similarly, although in a cruder form, Miethe (1982, 198–199) appeals to Augustine's personal experi-

other words, Augustine's suspicion towards sexual desire appears to be have been a result of more general, theological and scriptural factors (be they persuasive or not).<sup>3</sup> To Augustine, *concupiscentia* was very much connected to central theological themes such as the will, human suffering and evil in general, divine punishment, divine justice, and rationality of obedience.<sup>4</sup>

The deliberate approach followed in this chapter concerning Augustine's ideas on sex is, instead of speculating on Augustine's personal experiences, or the possible or even probable influences from various (and as the guesswork goes, usually Manichaeen) sources, to focus on the theological contexts in which he constantly situated *concupiscentia* and the conceptual connections he makes between *concupiscentia*, obedience, justice and Paradise.

Such an approach offers us a set of important questions. For example, how exactly has Augustine described the reciprocity of *concupiscentia* in relation to a primal act of disobedience in Paradise? Furthermore, what kind of obedience did God demand from Adam and Eve? Another important question is: in what kind of disobedience did their fall result? And finally, why was the corresponding divine punishment just and good, i.e., what kinds of reasons does Augustine offer for divine justice in connection with *concupiscentia*, conceived as God's punishment?

This chapter proceeds in a loose chronological order. We will first look at Augustine's initial attempts to sketch the way the actions in Paradise may have affected the present condition of humanity. It is suggested that the elements of obedience, disobedience and punishment are present in Augustine's thoughts as early as in the 390s. The second part contains an outline of Augustine's mature and complete picture of *concupiscentia* as pointing

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ences in explaining his "great pessimism about the nature of man" and sexual desire. See also Weidenaar 1995, 71 ("he was merely describing reality as he understood it from his own experience, as he was wont to do") and Lancel 2002, 422–423: "Against Julian's naturalism and optimism he [sc. Augustine] set the daily findings of his experience as a man and pastor [...] Because he had lived nearly fifteen years with Adeodatus' mother in a sexual relationship [...] Augustine knew what he was talking about when he attacked sexuality." Chadwick (2009, 161) represents Julian's criticism deriving from Augustine's person as well.

<sup>3</sup> Solignac 1956, 374–375.

<sup>4</sup> Wilpert (1954) locates Augustine into the traditions of biblical and "Greek" influences. Augustine's suspicion against sexual desire should be seen as a "hostility towards the body" that was inspired by "Hellenismus" (Wilpert 1954, 76–77). Cf. Hendrikx 1954, who claims that the very connection between *concupiscentia* and original sin is a result of Augustine's "biblisch-altkirchlichen Denkart" as opposed to Platonistic inclinations. See Markus 1990a, 61, for a concise and correct sketch of *concupiscentia carnis* and its theological connections.

to the first act of proud disobedience in Paradise: the disorder of the soul and the body in the form of *concupiscentia* in our present state thus represents for Augustine the primal idolatry carved in flesh. In the third part we will encounter Augustine in defence of his view of reciprocal, punitive *concupiscentia*. In the debate with Julian, Augustine was challenged to account for the way he had connected *concupiscentia* with divine justice and obedience. Is *concupiscentia*, in fact, a reasonable and just punishment?

### 3.1. PROBING FOR THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DIVINE PUNISHMENT AND *CONCUPISCENTIA*

Augustine composed his first concise commentary on Genesis, *de Genesi aduersus Manicheos*, after his return from Italy in 388. In that work, Augustine encountered the same Manichaean Bible criticism he had previously shared by the instrument of allegorical interpretation.<sup>5</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 1 treats the creation of the natural world verse by verse and deals with the various points of Manichaean criticism. In *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, Augustine turns to more anthropological themes, as the creation stories focus on the creation of man (2, 1, 1 *incipit de homine diligentius narrari*). Augustine's approach is thoroughly figurative: the present human condition, as he understands it, is used to explain what happened in the Creation and the Fall of the first human beings.<sup>6</sup> Augustine's message is clear: earthly desires are to be avoided, and one should seek to rise above the earth in "spiritual joy."<sup>7</sup> The soul's place is "in the middle" (*in medio [...] rerum*), just as the tree of life was in the middle of Paradise.<sup>8</sup> Corporeal matters are below the soul, and the only thing above the immaterial soul is God (*natura dei*).<sup>9</sup> In this ideal state, the soul

<sup>5</sup> The influence of Ambrose in the use of allegorical reading seems here to be indisputable. Lancel 2002, 134.

<sup>6</sup> Happiness (*beatitudo*), signified by the "name of Paradise," consists of spiritual and intellectual wisdom (*sapientia*). Human happiness is located east of Eden, which Augustine interprets as a figure of immortal and intellectual delights. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 9, 12. All the trees and foods of Paradise are for Augustine "spiritual" and "food of the soul." See Teske 1992, 182.

<sup>7</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 9, 12 *non inuolui atque obrui terrenarum cupiditatum implicamentis*.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Plot. *En.* 3, 2, 8 ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ θηρῶν.

<sup>9</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 9, 12 *Et ideo lignum dinoscentiae boni et mali dicitur, quia si anima, quae debet in ea quae anteriora sunt se intendere, id est in deum, et ea quae posteriora sunt obliuisci, id est corporeas uoluptates, ad seipsam deserto deo conuersa fuerit et sua potentia tamquam sine deo frui uoluerit, intumescet superbia, "quod est initium omnis peccati." Et cum hoc eius peccatum poena fuerit consecuta, experiendo discet, quid intersit inter bonum quod deseruit et malum quo cecidit. Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 9, 12 *"ligno" autem "scientiae boni et mali"*

looks upon God and overlooks bodily pleasures. This state of affairs can be described by the concept of ‘middleness.’ The tree of good and evil knowledge symbolizes the soul’s position in the ordered universe. By remaining in its created position, the soul remains whole (*integer*).

But in the Fall, the soul turned away from God, and fell in love with its own power. All sin originates in pride (*superbia*) that manifests itself both in falling away from God, and in the illusory desire to have a self-sustained being.<sup>10</sup> The evil lies in the breaking of the ideal integrity of the soul, and to shock this state of unity by division is the primal, greatest evil imaginable, here projected into the biblical Paradise in Augustine’s exegesis. What is worth mentioning is that Augustine does think that such an evil deserved a subsequent punishment (*poena consecuta*), somehow relating to the lost unity of the soul. At first, Augustine does not elaborate on the quality of this punishment, but shortly thereafter, in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 19, 29, *poena* is discussed in connection with the curse that God lays on Eve. Human mortality seems to be too evident and simple a solution to cover the whole range of divine punishments, and Augustine therefore considers *poena* to be also the painstaking effort which every soul is going to make when turning away from “fleshly pleasures” to “better ways of life” (*nulla abstinentia fit a voluptate carnali, quae non habet in exordio dolorem, donec in meliorem partem consuetudo flectatur*). To be exact, Augustine does not pinpoint evil desire as representing a divine punishment for the cardinal sin of Adam and Eve; in fact, *concupiscentia* does not here have any explicit role as a consequence of the Fall.<sup>11</sup> The original punishment seems to be conceived on a general level as consisting of mortality and death: this is represented, for instance by the clothes which God gives to Adam and Eve after their Fall. They signify the bodily and mortal constitution of our present bodies, in opposition to the original spiritual and “simple bodies” (*Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 21, 32).<sup>12</sup>

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*ipsa item medietas animae et ordinata integritas significatur.* For the Neoplatonic concept of ontological *medietas*, see Theiler 1970, 555; O’Daly 1987, 38–40.

<sup>10</sup> The Plotinian affinities of the concept ‘pride’ are clear, as shown by numerous scholars. Plot. *En.* 5, 1, 1: ἀρχή [...] τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ τόλμα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἐτερότης καὶ τὸ βουληθῆναι δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. τῷ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἐπειδὴ περ ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσθαι. See also *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 15, 22; 2, 21, 32; 2, 25, 38; 2, 26, 39. For the Neoplatonic themes of Augustine and pride, see Schaffner 1959, 227–228; O’Connell 1968, 173–174; Torchia 1987; Procopé 1987, 316–317. Pride plays an essential role also in the motif of *triplex cupiditas*. See Chapter 4.

<sup>11</sup> See Verschoren 2002, 219: “Augustine does not go so far as to say that we inherit sin (or any form of concupiscence).”

<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of supralapsarian corporeality and Gnostic influences, see Sfameni Gasparro 1985.

This first commentary on Genesis by Augustine also touches upon the subject of *obedience*. However, the soul's obedience refers here, as a rule, to the ordered human constitution: the lower part of the soul should obey the higher, rational part of the soul. Moreover, disobedience to God's absolute authority and commandment *as such* does not play a significant role in Augustine's rudimentary attempts to sketch the Genesis narrative.<sup>13</sup> It is true that God's prohibition, having a very particular form, is mentioned in a fleeting remark, but this prohibition is depicted entirely in the service of illuminating the soul's position towards the intellectual and bodily entities, the soul being "in the middle" and striving for intelligible happiness while rejecting "earthly pleasures." Augustine strongly rejects the Manichaean interpretation of an envious (*invidus*) God along with the typically Gnostic tradition of inverted roles, in which Christ is seen as the figure of the serpent (*Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 26, 40), but not a word is said of why God gave His prohibition of to not touch the tree of good and evil knowledge, and why the first human beings (i.e. the soul) were not able in the end to act according to that prohibition.<sup>14</sup> As we will see in Chapter 5, Adam and Eve's fall is explained in psychological terms, and no theological connotations of disobedience are made with *concupiscentia*, as leading to, affecting, or following as a punishment for Adam and Eve's act of contempt against God's commandment.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Torchia (1987, 72) interprets *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 15, 22 as representing "a refusal to submit oneself to Divine authority." This submission is, however, less of an authoritative character than of the soul's realizing its *medietas*, i.e. its correct state in the universal order of being. *hoc est ergo quod persuasum est, ut suam potestatem nimis amarent, et cum esse deo pares uolunt, illa medietate, per quam deo subiecti erant et corpora subiecta habebant, tamquam fructu arboris constitutae in medio paradisi male uterentur, id est contra legem dei, atque ita quod acceperant amitterent, dum id quod non acceperant usurpare uoluerunt. non enim accepit hominis natura, ut per suam potestatem deo non regente beata sit, quia nullo regente per suam potestatem beatus esse solus deus potest.*

<sup>14</sup> Unless it is supposed that the created soul had a defect in some way from the beginning, but this is not, of course, an option for Augustine. Rist 1994, 104–108. For the tradition of "envious God," see Raveaux 1987, 64–65.

<sup>15</sup> In *mor.*, preceding the composing of *Gn. adu. Man.*, Augustine had already mentioned *cupiditas* as a force preventing the soul's participation in happy life (*beata uita*). Such a sin of the soul, that is, *cupiditas*, is "signified quite plainly in the Old Testament—in the transgression of the first man in paradise." The force and direction of the argument here starts from the immanent state of the soul, and the Genesis story "signifies," or works as a helpful mirror for the present soul now struggling against its evil inclinations. *mor.* 1, 36 *munus enim eius est in coercendis sedandisque cupiditatibus, quibus inhiamus in ea quae nos auertunt a legibus dei et a fructu bonitatis eius, quod est, ut breui explicem, beata uita. ibi enim est fides ueri, cuius contemplatione perfruentes eique penitus adhaerentes procul dubio*



During the first half of the 390s Augustine was still occupied with developing his notions of a just divine punishment originating from Paradise. While the connection of *concupiscentia* into these insights was, if not non-existent, at least very thinly conceived, it is useful to examine two central works of 390s, *de uera religione* and *de libero arbitrio*, and their way of sketching the punitive state of the soul and the will as resulting from actions taken in the Garden of Eden. These works were written at approximately the same time; that is, shortly before and shortly after Augustine's ordination.

Just before his ordination, towards end of 390, Augustine composed a concise, systematic work, *de uera religione*, which he assigned to his still Manichaean friend Romanianus. The first part of this work is an outline of Christian doctrine, and the second part is a more philosophically oriented discussion of the truths of faith.<sup>16</sup> In *uera rel.* 38, Augustine once more situates the events that took place in Paradise into his newly-found frame of Neoplatonic ontology: the Fall of "the first human beings" (*primi homines*, Augustine does not use the proper names of Adam and Eve in *uera rel.*) is to be thought of as a fall from eternal goods to temporal goods, from plenitude to deficiency, and from security to infirmity.<sup>17</sup> Such a fall is also defined as the first evil of the rational soul, and Augustine then says this evil to be a "will to do things that are forbidden by the highest and innermost truth."<sup>18</sup> The idea of obedience is thus present in Augustine's mind as he depicts the events of Paradise, or the ideal state of the soul. He even formulates, albeit in all brevity, an idea which will receive more importance in his future works:

[F]rom the tree which was touched contrary to the prohibition came the power to distinguish between good and evil. When the soul has become involved in its sin, it learns, by paying the penalty, the difference between

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*beati sumus; inde autem decedentes magnis erroribus doloribusque implicantur. namque, ut ait apostolus, radix est omnium malorum cupiditas, quam quidam sequentes, naufragauerunt a fide et inseruerunt se doloribus multis. quod peccatum animae in ueteri testamento satis aperte bene intelligentibus, in ipsius hominis qui erat in paradiso praeuaricatione signatur.*

<sup>16</sup> For the work in general, see van Fleteren 1976; 1994; 1999; Fuhrer 2007. For the relation of faith and reason in *uera rel.*, see Lössl 1993.

<sup>17</sup> *uera rel.* 38: *ab aeternis ad temporalia, a copiosis ad egena, a firmitate ad infirma*. See also *uera rel.* 23, in which the events of Paradise are implicitly present, although Augustine's interpretation moves on a very general level, *et propter ipsum peccatum, quod amatur, fit corruptibile, ut fluendo deserat amatorem suum, quia et ille hoc amando deseruit deum. praecepta enim eius neglexit dicentis: hoc manduca et hoc noli. trahitur ergo ad poenas, quia diligendo inferiora in egestate uoluptatum suarum et in doloribus apud inferos ordinatur.*

<sup>18</sup> *uera rel.* 38 *uitium primum animae rationalis uoluntas ea faciendi, quae uetat summa et intima ueritas.*

the precept it refused to obey and the sin which it committed. In this way it learns by suffering to know the evil it did not learn to know by avoiding it. By making comparison between its former and its present state it loves more earnestly the good which it loved too little, as is seen from its failure to obey.<sup>19</sup>  
[transl. Burleigh]

Once the soul was bound to its sin by breaking the divine commandment, it learned the difference between good and evil by way of immediately experiencing the (divine) punishments: the evil knowledge (*dinoscentia*) which the name of the tree had predicted, in fact indicated the punishments (*poenae*) of the transgression. Thus, Augustine concludes, all evil in the world consists either of the soul's own actions (*quod fecit*) or of the punishment of 'difficulty' (*difficultas*), which the soul deserved by the Fall.<sup>20</sup> This is illustrated by a convenient picture of a fact and a consequence, in which a man throws himself into water and will consequently drown in it.<sup>21</sup>

Augustine's explicit anti-Manichaean stance in *uera rel.* can be seen in the way he emphasises sin as being a voluntary event. One important corollary of the voluntary character of sin is clearly visible in this work, and it is the emphasis of *just punishment*. If sin is, in its core and origins a properly voluntary action, it must be punished by a divine and just judgment. The two, sin (*peccatum*) and punishment (*poena*), go hand in hand if and only if sin is conceived as a voluntary act.<sup>22</sup>

But in *uera rel.*, as in *Gn adu. Man.*, the punishment or punishments deserved by sin are considered to be a variety of different and manifold distresses on humankind. Augustine sees this punishment revealed in both bodily (e.g. bodily weaknesses, *imbecillosum corpus*) and mental pains (e.g. anguish, *dolor*), and ultimately in bodily death (*mors*).<sup>23</sup> These human sufferings, Augustine insists upon pointing out, are not arbitrary events, but

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<sup>19</sup> *uera rel.* 38 *contingit ex illa arbore, quae contra uetitum tacta est, dinoscentia boni et mali, quia cum suo peccato anima fuerit implicata, luendo poenas discit, quid intersit inter praeceptum quod custodire noluit, et peccatum quod fecit, atque hoc modo malum quod cauendo non didicit, discit sentiendo et bonum quod obtemperando minus diligebat, ardentius diligit comparando.*

<sup>20</sup> *uera rel.* 39.

<sup>21</sup> The series of images Augustine presents here is also designed to show the non-substantiality of evil.

<sup>22</sup> After hinting at the events of Paradise and the punishments deserved by the actions taken there in *uera rel.* 23, Augustine crystallizes his maxim: *Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, id est peccatum et poena peccati*. See also *uera rel.* 25 on the process of the restitution of mental and bodily stability. In this process, the two go hand in hand, as well: *ablato ergo peccato auferetur poena peccati*. See also *uera rel.* 44.

<sup>23</sup> *uera rel.* 29. See also *uera rel.* 48 *peccato mortalitatem meruerunt*.

the just and meaningful penalties for a misguided and evil use of one's autonomous will. Opposing the Manichaean, radically dualistic and materialistic view of evil, Augustine stresses that sin is not an involuntary event that could only be said to occur or happen in us without our own doing, as for instance, in being induced by fever.<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, sin is a result of the free choice of the will, and therefore it is appropriate that it should be punished.<sup>25</sup> The first, spontaneous defect of the will was that of the Devil. Then He persuaded the first humans to give their free, voluntary consent (*uoluntate consensit*) to sin. Augustine insists on the difference between necessity and free voluntary action based on a free choice of the will. For if we sin by necessity, there cannot be something called sin, and all reproach and admonition would be useless, and consequently, "all religious order and Christian law" would be void. As its starting point, this argument takes Augustine's notion of punishment: if sin were not voluntary, the punishments of humankind would be *unjust* (*recte iniusta poena uideretur, uera rel. 27–28*).<sup>26</sup> Later on in *uera rel.*, however, Augustine wishes for some reason to qualify the difference between sin and the punishment of sin by discerning between them as a voluntary (*uoluntarius*) defective movement from the "highest being" and an "involuntary (*non uoluntarius*) pain" as following this defect.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> *uera rel. 27 tamquam febris inuitum occuparet. Inuitus* here clearly refers to purely involuntary circumstances, as in 'not willed' or 'without the contribution of the will.' For an analysis of Augustine's use of the term with the connotation of 'reluctant' or 'half-willed,' see Saarinen 1994, 20–43.

<sup>25</sup> *uera rel. 27 nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit uoluntarium.*

<sup>26</sup> *uera rel. 27 si non uoluntate male faciamus, nemo obiurgandus omnino aut monendus est.* In the course of argument, Augustine stresses the voluntariness of sin to the extent that his later Pelagian adversaries could appeal to this text for their support. Thus, when writing a *retractatio* (*retr. 1, 13, 5*) to this passage, Augustine is in trouble to explain what exactly he did mean by 'voluntary' sins. According to Augustine in the time of *retr.*, voluntariness refers strictly and exclusively to the first humans, who used their will wrongly. In a strained way, one could call the sin with which human babies are born voluntary as well, because their sin is inherited from Adam and Eve. *et illud quod in paruulis dicitur originale peccatum, cum adhuc non utantur arbitrio uoluntatis, non absurde uocatur etiam uoluntarium, quia ex prima hominis mala uoluntate contractum factum est quodammodo hereditarium.* Augustine thinks that sins (*peccata*) that are said to be committed involuntarily (*non uoluntaria*), because they are done in ignorance or by coercion are, to be exact, not done completely without one's willing. Of these kinds of involuntary sins Augustine mentions, by way of an example, *concupiscentia*.

<sup>27</sup> *uera rel. 76 non sit malum nisi peccatum et poena peccati, hoc est defectus uoluntarius a summa essentia et labor in ultima non uoluntarius, quod alio modo sic dici potest: Libertas a iustitia et seruitus sub peccato.* See also *dñ. qu. 24*.

It is noteworthy that in *uera rel.* Augustine wishes to characterise the quality of these justly deserved punishments. Despite being a sign of God's justice, they are also designed to direct man's attention to immutable goods. According to Augustine God has so ordained it that even the hardships of this life, as signs of divine punishments (*diuina supplicia*), are not unbearable or immoderately severe. Instead, they may work as incitements to cardinal virtues. While God thus punishes justly, he is not a merciless judge.<sup>28</sup> This concern, already present in *uera rel.*, demonstrates how Augustine wishes to support his view of human sufferings and the invalid state of the will as being divine punishments with arguments which explain the reasons and usefulness of *poenae*. *Ergo*, God is not a cold-hearted judge, and even his punishments are clement and useful.<sup>29</sup>

Similar positions are taken in the equally explicitly anti-Manichaean *contra Fortunatum*. All evil is either sin or punishment.<sup>30</sup> The free choice of the will is a precondition of sin (*c. Fort.* 15–16, 20), and eventually goes back to God's nature, who creates goodness and distributes justice. Augustine's example of an evil act committed by necessity, or compulsion, introduces the question of justice in the form of a human judge (*iudex*), who cannot consider something to be a crime when it is committed under compulsion.<sup>31</sup>

In *de libero arbitrio* 3 Augustine once more turns to the concept of punishment.<sup>32</sup> Previously, in *lib. arb.* 1, 22, Evodius and Augustine had agreed that if the rational mind of the sage would abandon virtuous life, it would really deserve a punishment in the form of disturbed emotions.<sup>33</sup> In *lib. arb.*

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<sup>28</sup> *uera rel.* 29 *quamquam iusta uindicta peccati sit, plus tamen clementiae domini quam seueritatis ostendit. est iustitiae pulchritudo cum benignitatis gratia concordans, ut, quoniam bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti sumus, amaritudine poenarum erudiamur.*

<sup>29</sup> See also *exp. Gal.* 50.

<sup>30</sup> *c. Fort.* 15 *duo sint genera malorum, peccatum et poena peccati.*

<sup>31</sup> *c. Fort.* 20 *peccata, ut dixi, nisi libera uoluntas esset in nobis, peccata non essent. Si uis enim uerbi causa ligaretur ab aliquo ceteris membris et de manu eius falsum scriberetur sine eius propria uoluntate, quaero, si hoc iudici patefieret, possit hunc hominem falsitatis crimine condemnare?*

<sup>32</sup> For a clear and concise overview of the tangled argumentation in the three books of *lib. arb.*, see Lössl 1995. Lössl, along with the majority of scholars, assumes a strong developing tendency in the progress of the work. Simon Harrison (2006) and Carol Harrison (2006) have argued for a much more consistent and uniform content. *Lib. arb.* has given rise to various scholarly discussions on the status of the will, sin and human condition in the fallen state. See O'Connell 1970; Alflatt 1974, 1975; Babcock 1988, 1993; Wetzel 1992, 86–88; Djuth 1993; Madec 1994. Robert O'Connell (1991) reacted against Malcolm Alflatt's interpretations of involuntary sin in *lib. arb.* rather late; his vitriolic response to Alflatt's theses shows, if not anything else, at least the pivotal position of *lib. arb.* in Augustine's oeuvre.

<sup>33</sup> See Chapter 5. Babcock (1988, 39) links the descriptions of punitive desire in *lib. arb.* 1 and *lib. arb.* 3 tightly together.

3, while still maintaining the properly voluntary status of sin, Augustine refers repeatedly to the first voluntary defect of the first human beings that affected a permanent punitive state on humankind. This punitive state may also be said to be 'voluntary,' although in a restricted meaning. The original moral agency of Adam and Eve was free and genuinely voluntary, because the first human beings were able to will good, or to will to act according to God's commandments.<sup>34</sup> When their will turned into temporal goods, it immediately caused a permanent flaw in human moral capabilities, causing all human wills to be habitually bound with a weakness and proneness to act according to base and temporal desires. The consequence was, as it were, an amputation of the original, genuinely free will.

Despite all this, Augustine still allows himself to refer to the sins of fallen humankind as being 'voluntary' as well. To stretch the concept *uoluntarius* this way naturally causes troubles for a sharply drawn difference between cause and effect, or between voluntary sin and involuntary punishment. In *lib. arb.* 3, Augustine painstakingly attempts to explain why it is possible to maintain that fallen human beings sin voluntarily in conditions that are clearly involuntary.<sup>35</sup> In *lib. arb.* 3, Augustine develops his views on 'difficulty,' which he also incorporates in other works from the same period. By *difficultas*, Augustine means the slowness and weakness of the will in doing good, and in juxtaposition to *ignorantia*, which represents the intellectual confusion of finding out and knowing what is good. In shedding light on what he means by *difficultas*, Augustine uses the biblical evidence of Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17, and their remarks on *concupiscentia*. The present punitive state of humankind for the actions taken in Paradise has thus found its connection to *concupiscentia* in Augustine's mind. In addition, whatever the exact nature of our state of will now, after the Fall, by the end of *lib. arb.*, it has become clear to Augustine that the chances of human autonomy in achieving the highest good have become almost nonexistent.

Let us now turn to examine more closely Augustine's arguments for the just character of *poena*. The first of these arguments may be referred to as the argument of *beauty*. In *lib. arb.* 3, 26, Augustine ponders on the difference between sin and its punishment. First of all, they are, of course,

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<sup>34</sup> In the end of *lib. arb.* 3, Augustine qualifies the primeval state of will by claiming that Adam and Eve's will was an intermediate good, "rational" but not yet "wise." *lib. arb.* 3, 71–73.

<sup>35</sup> One of the options is to speak of people voluntarily persisting in their perversity instead of accepting divine aid for their helpless state. Thus, the will is able to regain its high position that it had before the Fall by "humble repentance" (*lib. arb.* 3, 15 *penitendi humilitate altitudinem suam recipit*).

not substances (*naturae*), but ‘states’ in substance (*adfectiones naturarum*), one being voluntary, and the other being punitive. A sinful voluntary act is something shameful, or deformed (*turpis*) that makes ugly the order of the universe. Accordingly, it deserves a punishment that gives its order back—the shameful of sin is refurbished by the punishment.<sup>36</sup> Even the punitive conditions that seem to us to diminish the realms of good are, in fact, contributing to the universal beauty of the cosmos. The (aesthetically conceived) order of the universe thus serves now as a justification for the divine punishments that the present humankind is suffering from.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, in *lib. arb.* 3, Augustine is rather preoccupied with arguments that can be mustered for God punishing the sinners in a just manner. The human condition is rendered as that of a debtor to God. This means that human beings owe to God either good deeds or a just punishment (3, 43–44). The original debt consists of God’s gift, which is free will and its ability to do good. If the will commits good deeds, it pays God back His gift. But if it fails to use His gift correctly, it nonetheless pays Him back by suffering the just punishment that God has inflicted. Once more, Augustine here stresses that the beautiful order of the universe works as a guarantee for each evil act to be punished. “The beauty of the universe may not be disfigured even for an instant by having the ugliness of sin without the beauty of a just punishment.”<sup>38</sup>

As mentioned above, another important emphasis in Augustine’s objective to argue for the just character of the present human state of punishments is to hold out the *voluntariness* of sin, and hence responsibility for it.

What then is the relation of God’s just punishment to man’s voluntary sinning? If Augustine were to limit himself to personal responsibility for sin, it would perhaps be fair enough to admit that whatever we suffer against our wills from our own wrongdoings that have been committed freely and voluntarily, can be described as ‘voluntary.’ In *lib. arb.* 3, 46, Augustine responds in a way that actually seems close to his later reading of his own text in *retractationes*: that the just character of an involuntary punishment lies in the sin that was originally committed voluntarily.

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<sup>36</sup> In the following lines, Augustine seems to think that the soul’s bodily existence represents its punishment. *lib. arb.* 3, 27 *quid [...] tam infimum in rebus quam corpus omne terrenum? hanc tamen corruptibilem carnem etiam peccatrix anima sic ornat ut ei speciem decentissimam praebeat motumque uitalem.*

<sup>37</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 26. For *ordo* and its aesthetic connotations, see Harrison C. 1992, 104–110.

<sup>38</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 44 *ne uel puncto temporis uniuersalis pulchritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore uindictae.*

If he suffers justly, his sin is not in suffering against his will, but in his having sinned by such wilful action that he now suffers a just punishment against his will.<sup>39</sup> [transl. Russell]

There is a tension, however, more and more present with this account, for Augustine is increasingly tending to narrow down the space for a properly voluntary sin. This process of narrowing down our chances to commit a voluntary sin is carried on by Augustine's extended analysis of human punitive conditions. This analysis is rather suddenly introduced in *lib. arb.* 3, 51. In the preceding lines, Augustine has strongly stressed that the will is the sole and ultimate cause for sin, and therefore sin can occur only under conditions that may be characterised as voluntary. Again, to suffer a punishment for one's voluntary sins does not bear the mark of necessity or compulsion. We suffer, in a way, in a voluntarily manner.<sup>40</sup> At this point, Augustine feels he needs to make certain clarifications of the character of the human punitive state. He proceeds by introducing a twofold classification of the divine punishment for the Fall, namely 'ignorance' (*ignorantia*) and 'difficulty' (*difficultas*). 'Ignorance' is an intellectual or cognitive failure to discern between true and false, especially in morals (3, 53 *quid nobis esset faciendum*).<sup>41</sup> 'Difficulty' is the akratic feature of not having the powers to resist "lustful deeds" (*libidinis operibus*). This can be called *concupiscentia* (or *libido*) as well (3, 53).<sup>42</sup> Augustine seems to attach these terminological variants (especially *concupiscentia*) to the biblical source text in Paul (Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17).<sup>43</sup>

And yet there are things done even from ignorance which are condemned and judged as deserving of correction, as we read on the authority of the Sacred Writers [...] Actions performed of necessity are blameworthy when a man has

<sup>39</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 46 *nam si iuste patitur, non in eo peccat quod patitur inuitus, sed in eo peccauit quod ita fecit uolens ut quod nollet iure pateretur.*

<sup>40</sup> Evodius agrees (*lib. arb.* 3, 46): "it is altogether impossible to impute our sins rightly to our Creator."

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *carnis prudentia* in Augustine's interpretation of Rom in *diu. qu.* 66, 6 and *exp. prop. Rm.* 48–49.

<sup>42</sup> Strictly speaking, in *lib. arb.* 3, 53, Augustine plays the role of his imaginary adversary and puts these words into his mouth: *carnalis concupiscentiae nescio qua necessitate non ualeremus*. The previous biblical quotations (Rom 7, Gal 5, 17) show, however, that the actual wording is not at stake here, but the question of necessity (*necessitas*) and the possibility to resist sin (*non ualeremus*). For *ignorantia*, see Fuhrer 2006, 491–495. For *difficultas*, see Kienzler 1996–2002, 425–428. According to Kienzler (*ibid.*, 426) the word pair appears in other works only "sporadically."

<sup>43</sup> The Pauline passages appear here for the first time in *lib. arb.*, coinciding with, or following, Augustine's exegetical interest in Paul. See Chapter 6 on Augustine's way of using Rom 7 in connection with *concupiscentia*.

the will to do right and cannot do so. Hence the words of the Apostle: "For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, I do"; and, "To will is present with me, but to accomplish that which is good, I find not"; and, "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these things are contrary one to another, so that you do not what things you will." But these things are all the lot of men who spring from the time of man's condemnation to death; for if this is not a punishment for man, but is something natural, then there is no sin.<sup>44</sup> [transl. Russell]

The presence of punitive ignorance on the one hand, or the disability to discern what is true and morally commendable, and the weakness of the will on the other hand, that causes us to not obtain what we may partly discern to be right, has made Augustine to limit the human possibilities to achieve virtue in a drastic way. The possibility to sin voluntarily has been narrowed down to Adam and Eve (3, 53).<sup>45</sup> This single properly voluntary sin and its consequences have been stretched to cover all humankind. Thus, from *lib. arb.* 3, 53 onwards, Augustine gathers more arguments to show that, in a way, we can be said to be justly answerable for our punitive state and for all sins committed in this state. First, we can easily be blamed personally for not seeking God's aid for our plight.<sup>46</sup> If the soul stubbornly rejects healing, it can be said to sin voluntarily, i.e. to remain voluntarily in its involuntary state of sinning.<sup>47</sup> Yet, Augustine adds that one can also consider the punishments as an extended kind of voluntariness. In brief, punitive states can be seen as sins in a transferred meaning, for their *origin* is in the free choice of the will:

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<sup>44</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 51 *et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam improbantur et corrigenda iudicantur, sicut in diuinis auctoritatibus legimus [...] sunt etiam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi uult homo recte facere et non potest. nam unde sunt illae uoces: non enim, quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago; et illud: uelle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio; et illud: caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem; haec enim inuicem aduersantur, ut non ea quae uultis faciatis? sed haec omnia hominum sunt ex illa mortis damnatione uenientium; nam si non est ista poena hominis sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt.*

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Rist 1967, 133–134, on Plot. *En.* 3, 2, 7: "[I]t is evident that it is not a pre-natal choice which is in question. The choice is one made by a man with a moral problem in the course of his natural life." See also Rist 1967, 135.

<sup>46</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 53 *non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod inuitus ignoras, sed quod neglegis quare quod ignoras, neque illud quod uulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod uolentem sanare contemnitis; ista tua propria peccata sunt.* See also the fault of the pre-existent souls in *lib. arb.* 3, 58.

<sup>47</sup> This stubborn attitude can be called pride. *lib. arb.* 3, 29 *superbiam, cuius persuasione deiectus est et quo uno uitio misericordia medicina respuitur.*



Wrong actions done by anyone from ignorance and the inability to perform good acts that he wants to, are called sins for the very reason that they have their origin in the first sin, which was voluntary, and it is this previous sin which has merited these consequent ones.<sup>48</sup> [transl. Russell]

With these claims Augustine is able to conclude that there is a great qualitative difference between the will in Paradise and the will in the present state of humankind. Only in Adam and Eve was the will properly free, and therefore capable of making free choices between good and evil:

When we speak of the will's freedom to do what is right, we are speaking, of course, of that freedom with which man was created.<sup>49</sup> [transl. Russell]

Augustine's analysis of the origins and cure for the punitive states of *ignorantia* and *difficultas* proceeds further with two convictions: first, people are to be held responsible for these states, if not for any other reasons, at least for the fact that they are capable of seeking or rejecting divine aid for their plight. Second, the twofold punitive states form the basic reason for Augustine's query of the origin for individual souls. In presenting his famous four optional models (*lib. arb.* 3, 56–59), Augustine is in the end rather pragmatic: there is no point in finding out one's origin, if one's destination remains unclear (*lib. arb.* 3, 61). So sin is there to be reconciled and healed, whatever its origin and character.<sup>50</sup> If there is no outcome from the punitive conditions of ignorance and difficulty, they are analysed in vain.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, the

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<sup>48</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 54 *dicuntur peccata quia de peccato illo liberae uoluntatis originem ducuntur; illud enim praecedens meruit ista sequentia*. Cf. the statements made in *diu. qu.* 67, 3. To illustrate this point Augustine construes an analogy: it is a legitimate way to name various languages as 'tongues' for they are a product of the homonymous muscle moving in our mouths.

<sup>49</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 52 *cum autem de libera uoluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimus*. Adam was originally destined to a gradual perfection of rational wisdom. A will that was able to choose between both good and evil was a sign for a "middle" position of the first humans. See Lössl 1995, 352–353.

<sup>50</sup> Lössl 1995, 350: "Er denkt pragmatisch: Solange er sein Ziel (das Heil der Seele) kenne, sei es ihm egal, auf welchen Grundlagen er es erreiche, wenn er es nur erreiche. Die philosophischen Grundlagenfragen verlieren dabei ihre Schärfe. Der Übergang zu den theologischen Lösungsversuchen ist nahtlos." There is no need to represent the four models in detail here. For a debate on the hypothesis of soul's pre-existence, see O'Connell 1963; 1980; O'Daly 1974; 1983; 1987, 199–202.

<sup>51</sup> See e.g. the allusions (*labor, error*) to both in *lib. arb.* 3, 61 *nec prodesset aliquid illa siue memoria siue coniectura inchoatae uitae si de ipso deo qui unus laborum animae finis est aliter quam dignum est opinatus in scopulos erroris inruerem*. For a moment, Augustine also plays with the idea of ignorance and difficulty being natural states of the human condition, but soon rejects such an approach, ending with the option that they are punishments and debts meted out by God (*lib. arb.* 3, 70).

punishments as such spur the human body-soul composite to search and plead for God's effective aid in order to be finally relieved of these punishments. Consider, for example, the following passage:

One part of it [i.e. the soul], the higher, has gone ahead to perceive the good of a righteous act, but another part, the more sluggish and carnal element, is not brought into conformity with this view. Hence the soul is prompted by this very difficulty to beg Him for help in making progress, from whom it sees it owes its start.<sup>52</sup> [transl. Russell]

In the final pages of *lib. arb.* 3, Augustine concludes that the "souls suffer punishment for their sins and do so without detriment to the majesty of God's nature [...] these sins must be imputed to the will alone and we need look no further for the cause of sin."<sup>53</sup> Augustine has effectively affirmed that Adam was responsible for the first voluntary sin and was the one who caused the punitive conditions of *ignorantia* and *difficultas* for humankind. The person of Adam and his radically extended identity, touching all individual souls, therefore enables Augustine to move on to suggest that our punishments (*concupiscentia*, *ignorantia*, *difficultas*) involve some kind of a personal commitment, although in a transferred sense, and can thus be called sins.<sup>54</sup>

The architecture of arguments in *lib. arb.* 3 is designed to show how all sins are *voluntary* and *thus punishable* from the divine point of view. Hand-in-hand with this occupation goes Augustine's concern to show how the punishments are fully and unquestionably *just*.

<sup>52</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 65.

<sup>53</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 63 *appareat integerrima [...] maiestate et substantia creatoris supplicia peccatorum suorum animas luere. quae peccata [...] non nisi propriae uoluntati earum tribuenda sunt nec ulla ulterior peccatorum causa quaerenda.*

<sup>54</sup> Such trails of thought had already been suggested in *c. Fort.*, on which the focus of scholarship has, in this respect, been. *C. Fort.* precedes *lib. arb.* 3 but seems to offer a similar picture of involuntary sins as the one depicted here. See Alflatt 1974, 118–134. Babcock (1988) remains uninterested in the exact consequences that the limitation of "proper" (i.e. voluntary) sin has for the concept of sin in the present human state. Instead, he proceeds in the frame of the original moral agency; what caused Adam and Eve to sin? However, Babcock rightly criticizes (1988, 39–40, 51112) Alflatt's excessively punctual view on the crucial shift in diffusing the boundary between the purely voluntary sins and involuntary consequences of original sin. Wetzel (1992, 98) suggests that by excluding voluntary sin from the fallen world, Augustine refocuses "his attention on involuntary sin" and begins "to elaborate his psychology of fallenness." In Wetzel's view, this elaboration finds its culmination in *civ.* 9 and 14, that is, very much later than the failed attempts in the 390s to explain human motivational conflict.

In addition to the aesthetic order of the universe and the voluntary character of sin, *God's own nature* as indisputable justice also guarantees the justice of the punitive states of the humankind. Because God is just, His punishments are consequently also just. In an interesting passage that anticipates future debates with Julian, Augustine builds up a chain of argument, starting with two axiomatic claims about God (God is omnipotent and just, *dubitare dementis est*) and punishment (humankind is suffering from one, *poenam esse nemo ambigit*). The only other possibility Augustine is playing with seems to resemble the Manichaean suggestion of an inferior evil deity, torturing humankind with unjust punishments (*iniusta poena cruciaret*). This possibility is ruled out by a variation of the argument of Nebridius: God's omnipotence cannot suffer from loss or ignorance so that an inferior force could *secretly* or *violently* take hold of what belongs to God only. Therefore, the punishment is justly inflicted upon humankind.<sup>55</sup>

In a short overview on Augustine's works from the 390s, we have seen how he establishes the fundamentals for a later detailed view of concupiscence being a sharply reciprocate punishment for the original act of Adam and Eve's disobedience in Paradise. In these early works, Augustine already suggests that obedience and disobedience played an essential role in the life of the first human beings; however, these concepts, seen as attitudes towards God, seem to be, above all, formed by Augustine's general insights concerning the universal order and the soul's place in the middle of creation, below God and above bodily creation. Augustine is clearly convinced of the dire consequences earned by the ancestors in Paradise, and is equally keen to stress that God, as a just creator, had to punish their actions. The detailed form of this punishment, however, is under development in Augustine's thoughts. It involves mortality, bodily suffering, intellectual deterioration, above all in a moral context. And as we have seen in *lib. arb.* 3, Augustine draws a connection between the original Fall and the confused present state of the will as being reluctant, or even unable to act according to God's good will. Furthermore, Augustine is concerned already in these works with the just character of divine punitive measures; the question of justice is never

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<sup>55</sup> *lib. arb.* 3, 51 *omnis autem poena si iusta est peccati poena est et supplicium nominatur; si autem iniusta poena est, quoniam poenam esse nemo ambigit, iniusto aliquo dominante homini imposita est; porro quia de omnipotentia dei et iustitia dubitare dementis est, iusta haec poena est et pro peccato aliquo penditur. non enim quisquam iniustus dominator aut subripere hominem potuit uelut ignoranti deo aut extorquere inuito tamquam inualidiori uel terrendo uel confligendo, ut hominem iniusta poena cruciaret. relinquitur ergo ut haec poena iusta de damnatione hominis ueniat*

far from his soundings on the Fall, punishment and the involuntary states of the soul.

In the early period of Augustine's works, the basic framework was thus laid for *concupiscentia* as a punishment of primal sin. The idea of an involuntary evil being connected to the will and voluntary actions of Adam comes to the fore in these interpretations. In the following years, Augustine tried to develop this claim further, sharpening the image of the reciprocal punishment of the original evil turn of the will.

### 3.2. STABILIZING RECIPROCAL PUNISHMENT

As we have seen, Augustine began to formulate his view of a divine punishment already in his early works. Thus, the anti-Manichaean emphasis of the voluntary character of all sins was gradually joined by another concern. This concern was Augustine's growing awareness of a sin that had been committed by the ancestors of the present humankind in a distant past; this sin had been punished with certain involuntary states of the soul and was still affecting the human condition. Augustine limited the properly free and unhindered choice of will into Paradise and the first created human beings; after their Fall, all humankind was punished, and owing to the original state of free will, according to Augustine, the punishment may be characterised as mirroring divine justice. According to this line of thought, all human beings can be justly said to have a part in Adam and Eve's disobedient act against God and His commandment, and thus a divinely ordered punishment is equally just in its afflictions upon humankind.

The concept of divine *justice* seems to move in similar lines both in Augustine's way of interpreting how the human personhood in its present state can be responsible, and thus liable to be punished, for another individual's sin, and in his developing understanding of divine grace.<sup>56</sup> In the texts from the middle period of Augustine's career, he works at stabilizing the idea of primal disobedience that received a *just* punishment of

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<sup>56</sup> Note e.g. the way in which Augustine refers to the hereditary original sin as *naturale peccatum*, as opposed to the voluntary sins that result from earthly *cupiditas*, in *adn. lob. 16 terra ne operiat super sanguinem carnis meae* [*lob 16,18*]: *id est, ne, si immunda fuerit oratio mea optando terrena, accedat cumulus terrae super uinculum mortalitatis: quod significauit nomine sanguinis, id est, ne cupiditate terrena maioribus calamitatibus uoluntarii peccati operiar, quod est illud naturale peccatum de condicione mortali*. For the careless connection between *natura* and *peccatum*, see e.g. *retr.* 1, 15, 6.

*concupiscentia*. We will also witness how the causes and order of this punishment ultimately remain hidden in God; while in *Simpl.* Augustine reached his final uncompromising view of divine grace as a hidden and unquestionable force in its operations and choices for who will be saved and who will not, his view of the exact ways of divine punishment, originating from the Fall and reaching all present human beings, reflects an equally hidden process by human standards. This can be seen in a choice of brief remarks made in the works Augustine composed around the end of the 4th century.

By the time Augustine came to write *de diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, he had already made crucial modifications to his view of the free choice of the will, as noted above.<sup>57</sup> This relatively short work, written as a response to Simplicianus of Milan on problems concerning Rom 7 and Rom 9, has commonly been acknowledged to represent a “veritable revolution in his theology.”<sup>58</sup> In the course of composing *Simpl.*, Augustine depicts the criteria of grace and election in a radically theocentric way.<sup>59</sup> This work ends with the well-known praise to God whose decisions remain unfathomable to the human standards of reason and justice:

[E]lection is verily hidden, and cannot be known by us who must regard all men as parts of one lump. If, however, some are able to know it, I confess my own weakness. [...] “Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid.” [...] Only let us believe if we cannot grasp it, that he who made and fashioned the whole creation, spiritual and corporeal, disposes of all things by number, weight and measure. But his judgments are inscrutable and his ways past

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<sup>57</sup> Neatly put in *Simpl.* 1, 2, 21: *liberum uoluntatis arbitrium plurimum ualet, immo uero est quidem, sed in uenundatis sub peccato quid ualet?* To assure the reader of the mere existence of *liberum arbitrium* in this way is a telling sign of its weakened status.

<sup>58</sup> Wetzl 1999, 798.

<sup>59</sup> A larger scale hostile interpretation has been Flasch 1990 (1995<sup>2</sup>), preceded by Flasch 1980. While Flasch’s work has, directly or indirectly, inspired continuing research in Augustine’s theology of grace, its more far-reaching suggestions have rightly been corrected. See already Flasch 1980, 203–207: “Gott [...] wird ein Ungeheuer [...] ‘Gerechtigkeit’ ist Grausamkeit, diese ‘Gnade’ Willkür.” For reviews of Flasch 1990, see e.g. Ring 1991; 1994; Lössl 1997, 90–94, who also aims his criticism at Ring 1994; Drecoll 1999, 240–250; Harrison C. 2006, and finally Löhr 2008, a critical and partly appreciative evaluation of Flasch’s enterprise. Löhr accepts Flasch’s challenge to view Augustine’s doctrine of original sin and grace from a “historical” context (as opposed to a “theological” or “dogmatic” context), but remains skeptical of Flasch’s premises about Augustine’s influence in his own times. What is more, Löhr emphasises Augustine’s doctrine of grace as a legitimate continuation of ancient philosophical therapies, and not as a revolutionary break from ancient philosophical discourses of happy life. See Chapters 5 and 6.

finding out. Let us say Halleluia and praise him together in song; and let us not say, What is this? or, Why is that? All things have been created each in its own time.<sup>60</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

Concupiscence as a punishment for a primeval sin appears in a brief notion in *Simpl.*<sup>61</sup> In a kind of postscript to the question of the election of Jacob and Esau in Romans 9, Augustine shortly treats six verses from Sirach (*Simpl.* 1, 2, 20), where the theme of clay and the potter appears in a similarly deterministic context as in Paul's letter to Romans. The "lump" of sinners consists of humankind, which is bound to *tradux peccati* and *poena mortalitatis*. Here the original constitution of man as soul and body is contrasted with the fallen human condition in which the punishment of *concupiscentia carnalis*, resulting from the first sin of Adam and Eve, rules over humankind.

But carnal concupiscence now reigns as a result of the penalty of sin, and has thrown the whole human race into confusion, making of it one lump in which the original guilt remains throughout.<sup>62</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

In the previous question on Romans 7, Augustine had loosely connected *concupiscentia* to the fallen state of the will in the stage of *sub lege*, and discerned this state from the original nature of humanity. Instead, the inability to achieve perfection in a virtuous life is now due to the "punishment for

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<sup>60</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 2, 22 *certe ita occulta est haec electio, ut in eadem conspersione nobis prorsus apparere non possit. aut si apparet quibusdam, ego in hac re infirmitatem meam fateor [...]* numquid iniquitas est apud deum? absit [Rom 9,14]. [...] credamus tantum, et si capere non ualeamus, quoniam qui uniuersam creaturam et spiritalem et corporalem fecit et condidit, omnia in numero et pondere et mensura disponit. sed inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius et inuestigabiles uiae eius. dicamus alleluia et conlaudemus canticum et non dicamus: quid hoc aut quid hoc? Fredriksen 1995 has pointed out that the notion of the *inscrutability of God's justice* in both his election of the saved and his judgment upon those who will be damned appear in full force in *Simpl.*, and remain an important part of Augustine's thought thereafter. But as we will see, the ultimate inscrutability of divine justice does not hinder Augustine from backing it by diverse arguments.

<sup>61</sup> Note also *Simpl.* 2, 6, where Augustine says that evil spirits have a "weakness of their evil desires and punishments." They cannot participate into God's wisdom *intrinsecus* due to this fallen condition, but they can make notions of God acting in his creatures *forinsecus*, and thus they have a possibility for e.g. predicting future events. The devil thus has a "weakness of evil desires" (*infirmitas concupiscentiarum et poenarum suarum*) that has a direct effect on his intellectual capabilities.

<sup>62</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 2, 20 *sed concupiscentia carnalis de peccati poena iam regnans uniuersum genus humanum tamquam totam et unam conspersionem originali reatu in omnia permanente confuderat*. Guilt (*reatus*) is here for the first time explicitly connected with *concupiscentia*: evil desire accounts for a universal guilt that will plunge all humankind into the same lump of the damned. Baptism does not yet, however, play any part in this report. For the effects of grace and baptism on *concupiscentia*, see Chapter 6.

the crime" (*delicti poena*). This punishment is characterised as "mortality," which in turn has come to resemble a "second nature" in present humanity. The "chain of mortality" and the "weight of habit" thus strengthen concupiscence, so that a person living *sub lege* is not able to reach perfection in doing good.<sup>63</sup>

In the works composed shortly after *Simpl.*, Augustine holds fast to the ideas of the deserved and just nature of punishment for the original sin committed by Adam, and its concrete effects on human will. However, the features of harmony and reciprocity and the exact form of this punishment are still described in rather vague and impressionistic turns of phrases.

In writing his *confessiones*, Augustine recalls his liberation from the Manichaean concept of sin and evil, while at the same time he was at loss to explain in which way his sin was voluntary and in which way it was not. This recollection of a baffled mind is linked to the time briefly preceding his conversion (ca. 385/6), but Augustine had not abandoned these themes at the time of writing *conf.*:<sup>64</sup>

I directed my mind to understand what I was being told, namely that the free choice of the will is the reason why we do wrong and suffer your just judgment, but I could not get a clear grasp of it [...] when I willed or did not will something, I was utterly certain that none other than myself was willing or not willing. That there lay the cause of my sin I was now coming to recognize. I saw that when I acted against my wishes, I was passive rather than active; and this condition I judged to be not guilt but a punishment (*non culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam*) [...] since I conceived you to be just, it was not unjust that I was chastised. But again I said: [...] Why then have I the power to will evil and to reject good? Is it to provide a reason why it is just for me to undergo punishments (*ut esset, cur iuste poenas luerem*)?<sup>65</sup>

[transl. Chadwick]

<sup>63</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 11. For the interpretation of Rom 7 and *concupiscentia*, see Chapter 6.

<sup>64</sup> Thus, a description of wavering Augustine in *conf.*, does not, of course, infer a wavering writer; however, the question of *poena* and its ways in the soul seem to be for Augustine a region yet to be charted at the turn of the century. O'Donnell 1992, II, 391–392: "The middle time is the time of paradox, and many of the perplexities to which A. gives voice, and to which he does not give satisfactory monovalent solutions (e.g. the dilemma of grace versus freedom: by 'satisfactory' I mean a solution that would remove an issue from further debate among his heirs) are themselves reflections of this time of paradox in which Augustine saw himself living. [...] Where at the outset (e.g. at the time of which he writes here), satisfactory monovalent solutions were certainly what he sought, by the time at which he writes here a fruitful 'disenchantment' has supervened."

<sup>65</sup> *conf.* 7, 5 *liberum voluntatis arbitrium causam esse ut male faceremus et rectum iudicium tuum ut pateremur et eam liquidam cernere non ualebam* [...] *cum aliquid uellem aut nollem, non alium quam me uelle ac nolle certissimus eram et ibi esse causa peccati mei* [...]

In this representation of his youthful attempts to draw the demarcation line between personal responsibility and passive, punitive states, all efforts end in aporia (*his cogitationibus deprimebar iterum et suffocabar*). It is noteworthy, however, that the question of punishment and justice is once more an essential part of Augustine's (recollected and reconstructed) memories of how he tried to conceive of sin, free will and of his abilities to do good.

*Conf.* does not explore the relation between *concupiscentia* and Adam and Eve's fall in any profound way as such, and there are only a few suggestive comments on *poena* and its form as *concupiscentia* to be found in this work.<sup>66</sup> Yet, in *conf.* 8, Augustine reflects on his insuperable difficulties in overcoming his "old will," which is entangled in *concupiscentia* and *consuetudo*.<sup>67</sup> Augustine first seems to think of voluntariness in terms of his own responsibility by consenting to create the habit of sexual desire. Thus, the punishment of his traumatised will is also perfectly just (*peccantem iusta poena sequeretur*).<sup>68</sup>

However, Augustine's previous work on the obstacles of a morally free will characterises his recollections in *conf.* 8. Therefore, for Augustine, a straightforwardly immanent solution of *consuetudo* as explaining the force of bad inclinations remains inadequate in its explanatory force.<sup>69</sup> As a result, he inevitably links the "half-wounded" state of his will to a primeval fall of his ancestors. Questioning himself on the problem of the divided will, Augustine alludes to the punishment (*poena*) that was due to the freely willed sin of Adam:

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*quod autem inuitus facerem, pati me potius quam facere uidebam et id non culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam.* The passive character of *poena* is also mentioned in *c. Adim.* 26, where the distinction between *peccatum* and *poena* appears as well.

<sup>66</sup> See e.g. *conf.* 2, 2, where Augustine reprehends his youthful years driven by erotic desires, and then concludes such a state to be a life in "chains of mortality." These chains have been deserved by Augustine's own proud soul (*obsurdueram stridore catenae mortalitatis meae, poena superbiae animae meae*).

<sup>67</sup> Much of what Augustine has to say about *concupiscentia* in *conf.* concerns its function in Christian renewal, for which see Chapter 6; the presence and interpretation of Rom 7, and the classification to an 'old will' and 'new will' seem to govern Augustine's thoughts in connection with *concupiscentia* in this work. For *consuetudo* in Augustine, see Prendiville 1972; Zumkeller 1986b; Wetzel 2000.

<sup>68</sup> *conf.* 8, 11 *sed tamen consuetudo aduersus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam uolens quo nollem perueneram. et quis iure contradiceret, cum peccantem iusta poena sequeretur?*

<sup>69</sup> For *consuetudo* and its role in Augustine's works in 390s, see Zumkeller 1986b, 1255–1256; Wetzel 2000.



What is the cause of this monstrous situation? Why is it the case? May your mercy illuminate me as I ask if perhaps an answer can be found in the hidden punishments (*latebrae poenarum*) and the secret tribulations (*tenebrosissimae contritiones*) that befall the sons of Adam?<sup>70</sup>

[transl. Chadwick]

Once again, Augustine forcefully emphasises the occult character of the divine punishment upon humanity. The overall context of these famous pages of *conf.* is contrived to create an effect of puzzlement and confusion; perhaps this is partly due to the simple reason that Augustine had not yet fully formulated his views on the subject, and partly due to the analogy that Augustine uses in post-Simplician works between the workings of grace and the workings of the debt of sin.<sup>71</sup> In *conf.* 8, these ways of sin are described as causing a serious division of the will. The cause of his inability to will wholeheartedly is partly himself, and partly the “sin which dwells in” him:

[T]he self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwilling. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came about against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of an alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind (*poenam meae*). And so it was “not I” that brought this about “but sin which dwelt in me,” sin resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin (*supplicio liberioris peccati*), because I was a son of Adam.<sup>72</sup>

[transl. Chadwick]

Being *sub lege*, Augustine is bound by the punitive sin that inhabits him: for his “new will,” he may say that this happens against his will (*inuitus*) but from the viewpoint of his full identity as a sinful human being, he has to confess a responsibility in his “own mind” for a sin chosen “more freely” by Adam.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *conf.* 8, 21 *unde hoc monstrum? et quare istuc? luceat misericordia tua, et interrogem, si forte mihi respondere possint latebrae poenarum hominum et tenebrosissimae contritiones filiorum Adam.*

<sup>71</sup> O'Donnell (1992, III, 48) opts for the first explanation: “the words of the text are both those that A. might have uttered at the time (in his interior monologue) and those that A. at the time of *conf.* utters in perplexity.”

<sup>72</sup> *conf.* 8, 22 *ego eram, qui uolebam, ego, qui nolebam; ego eram. nec plene uolebam nec plene nolebam. ideo mecum contendebar et dissipabar a me ipso, et ipsa dissipatio me inuito quidem fiebat, nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae. et ideo non iam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum [Rom 7,17] de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius Adam.*

<sup>73</sup> The emphasis on responsibility is, of course, also due to the Manichaean explanation of the phenomenon of ‘two wills’ to which Augustine devotes some time refuting in *conf.* 8, 23–24. Despite the divisions and all the talk of numerous wills (by Paul and Augustine himself,

While *Contra Faustum*, Augustine's major anti-Manichaean work seems equally to have few specified considerations of *concupiscentia* as a divine punishment, Augustine here affirms many of his previous positions in his general remarks on punishment for Adam and Eve's first evil volition.<sup>74</sup> Thus, Augustine repeats his stance of sin and responsibility: the concept of sin implies both that sin is by definition voluntary and that it deserves punishment. Augustine also takes up the twofold plight he had described in *lib. arb.*, namely that of ignorance and difficulty (for which Augustine uses here the word *infirmitas*), which should be conceived of as divine punishments. Again, Augustine is keen to point out that it is impossible to trace the exact "order" of these punishments. In other words, human intellectual capacities fail when confronted by the task of giving a satisfactory account of how an individual movement of the will in Paradise has managed to contaminate all humanity to affect all human moral understanding and motivation. The allusion to *Simpl.* and its positions of unfathomable grace and election, hidden in God's decisions in this remark of *c. Faust.* is quite clear:

Now both justice and injustice, to be acts at all, must be voluntary; otherwise, there can be no just rewards or punishments [...] The ignorance and infirmity which prevent a man from knowing his duty, or from doing all he wishes to do, belong to God's secret penal arrangement (*ex occulto poenarum ordine uenit*), and to His unfathomable judgments (*inscrutabilibus iudiciis dei*), for with Him there is no iniquity.<sup>75</sup> [transl. Stothert]

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*conf.* 8, 21, *ideo sunt duae uoluntates*), the will remains a single entity expressing its conflicting volitions under a single identity, *ego eram qui uolebam, ego qui nolebam, ego eram*. For the role of will in *conf.* 8, see O'Donnell 1992, III, 30–31.

<sup>74</sup> For the date of the work and identity of Faustus, see Decret 1970, 51–70. See also Wurst 2001; 2007. Some of the points made already in the debate against Fortunatus (in 392) are meticulously recycled in *c. Faust.* Thus, the relation between the first sin and death as its punishment is clarified by the example of the transferred meanings of the words 'tongue' (*lingua*) and 'hand' (*manus*). *c. Faust.* 14, 3–4 *mors hominis ex poena peccati est; unde et ipsa peccatum dicitur, non quia peccat homo, dum moritur, sed quia ex peccato factum est, ut moriatur; sicut alio modo dicitur lingua proprie caro, quae intra dentes sub palato mouetur, et alio modo dicitur lingua, quod per linguam fit; secundum quem modum dicitur alia lingua graeca, alia latina. et manus alio modo dicitur ipsum proprie corporis membrum [...] et alio modo manus dicitur scriptura, quae fit per manum [...] sic et peccatum non tantum ipsum opus malum, quod poena dignum est, sed etiam mors, quae peccato facta est, peccatum appellatum est. illud itaque peccatum, quo reus esset mortis, non commisit Christus; illud autem alterum, id est mortem, quae peccato inflicta est humanae naturae, suscepit pro nobis [...] maledictum est omne peccatum, siue ipsum, quod fit, ut sequatur subplicium, siue ipsum subplicium, quod alio modo uocatur peccatum, quia fit ex peccato.*

<sup>75</sup> *c. Faust.* 22, 78 *siue autem iniquitas siue iustitia, nisi esset in uoluntate, non esset in potestate. porro si in potestate non esset, nullum praemium, nulla poena iusta esset [...] ignorantia*

The mystery of divine election is then paralleled with another: how and to whom will the heritage of Adam, the punitive mortality of the body (*ex hac poena corpus corrumpitur*) and the movements of the soul in the present state of humanity, be either a constructive challenge to temperance or a source of corruption to evil?<sup>76</sup> Just as the workings of grace lie hidden in God's thoughts so is the ultimate basis for the justice of divine punishment to the offspring of Adam hidden from human intellect. The causes for divine election are *occultae*, and likewise the chain of punishment is *occultus*.<sup>77</sup> What is clearly known and sure (*certum*), is that only divine grace is able to free those who suffer from divine punishment. Moreover, the distribution of grace and judgment, i.e. God's choice between who shall be saved and who shall not, happens by hidden, but perfectly just causes (*occultis fit causis, iustis tamen*). Augustine concludes that due to God's hidden influence, similar movements of the human soul may be conceived as both corrupting others and as benefiting others.

That Augustine conceived divine grace and divine punishment as analogical in their hiddenness also becomes clear from *de natura boni*. The post-Simplician awe in face of God's hidden decision in the already familiar form of Rom 11, 33 is connected, once more, both to divine election and divine punishment.<sup>78</sup>

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*uero et infirmitas, ut uel nesciat homo, quid uelle debeat, uel non omne, quod uoluerit, possit, ex occulto poenarum ordine uenit et illis inscrutabilibus iudiciis dei, apud quem non est iniquitas.* See also c. *Faust.* 13, 11.

<sup>76</sup> c. *Faust.* 22, 78 *proditum est enim nobis peccatum Adam fideli eloquio dei; et quia in illo omnes moriuntur, et quia per illum peccatum intrauit in hunc mundum et per peccatum mors, ueraciter scriptum est. et quia ex hac poena corpus corrumpitur et adgrauat animam et deprimit terrena habitatio sensum multa cogitantem, uerissimum nobisque notissimum est, et quia de hac iusta poena non liberat nisi misericors gratia, certum est. et hinc apostolus gemebundus exclamat: infelix ego homo! quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum [Rom 7, 24]. sed quae sit distributio iudicantis et miserantis dei, cur alius sic, alius autem sic, occultis fit causis, iustis tamen. non tamen ideo nescimus omnia ista iudicio aut misericordia dei fieri, licet in abdito positus mensuris et numeris et ponderibus, quibus omnia disponuntur a deo creatore omnium, quae naturaliter sunt, nec auctore, sed tamen ordinatore etiam peccatorum, ut ea, quae peccata non essent, nisi contra naturam essent, sic iudicentur et ordinentur, ne uniuersitatis naturam turbare uel turpare permittantur, meritum suorum locis et condicionibus deputata. quae cum ita sint et cum per hoc secretum iudiciorum dei motusque humanarum uoluntatum eisdem prosperitatibus alii corrumpantur, alii temperanter utantur, et eisdem aduersitatibus alii deficiant, alii proficiant.*

<sup>77</sup> "Hidden justice" (*occulta iustitia*) is, of course, not limited to the sense of inferiorated moral capacities in Augustine. Cf. c. *Faust.* 12, 44 on Jews and their *excaecatio*.

<sup>78</sup> *nat. b.* 31 *item quia cuique culpae qualis et quanta poena debeatur, diuini iudicii est, non humani, sic scriptum est: o altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae dei! quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius et inuestigabiles uiae eius! item quia bonitate dei donantur peccata conuersis.*

The critical role of obedience and disobedience in picturing the drama of Adam and Eve in Paradise reappears in *nat. b.*, witnessing to Augustine's continuing fascination with the themes he had previously found to be essential, albeit in germinal mode, in his first expositions on Genesis. The disobedient volition of Adam and Eve (*uolentes in peccatis*) deserved a just punishment, manifesting itself in involuntary conditions (*nolentes in poenis*). A permanent state of *ordered obedience* to God (*sub domino deo*) would have ended in incorruptible beauty, claims Augustine, again accentuating the aesthetic, ordered nature of obedience. However, the punishment given by God also discloses order, and thereby justice as well.<sup>79</sup> As in previous works, Augustine is prone to emphasise the close connection of *poena* to *obedience*, *order* and *justice*. But once more, he does not elaborate in detail when depicting a punishment that would fit neatly with these pregnant theological concepts: what is clear once again about *poena*, nonetheless, is its debilitating effect on the will.<sup>80</sup>

These motifs found a more comprehensive appearance in Augustine's larger interpretations of Genesis of the early fifth century. The central concepts of obedience, justice and order, or harmony, maintained their place in Augustine's thoughts of the events that took place in Paradise. However, yet another piece found its way forcefully into this puzzle. The presence of *concupiscentia* as a fitting, just and reciprocal punishment permeates Augustine's later depictions of the Fall in such a systematic and ubiquitous way that it clearly fulfilled a role it seemed destined to have. Even Augustine's musings about the occult and mysterious ways of the deserved

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<sup>79</sup> *nat. b. 7 creaturis autem praestantissimis, hoc est rationalibus spiritibus, hoc praestitit deus, ut si nolint, corrumpi non possint, id est, si oboedientiam conseruauerint sub domino deo suo ac sic incorruptibili pulchritudini eius adhaeserint; si autem oboedientiam conseruare noluerint, quoniam uolentes corrumpuntur in peccatis, nolentes corrumpantur in poenis. tale quippe bonum est deus, ut nemini eum deserenti bene sit; et in rebus a deo factis tam magnum bonum est natura rationalis, ut nullum sit bonum, quo beata sit, nisi deus. peccantes igitur in suppliciis ordinantur: quae ordinatio quia eorum naturae non competit, ideo poena est; sed quia culpae competit, ideo iustitia est; nat. b. 35 ad hoc enim et prohibuerat, ut ostenderet animae rationalis naturam non in sua potestate, sed deo subditam esse debere et ordinem suae salutis per oboedientiam custodire, per inoboedientiam corrumpere. hinc et arborem, quam tangi uetuit, sic appellauit dinoscentiae boni et mali [Gn 2,9], quia cum eam contra uetitum tetigisset, experiretur poenam peccati et eo modo dinosceret, quid interesset inter oboedientiae bonum et inoboedientiae malum. See also nat. b. 37.*

<sup>80</sup> Cf. the concise and chrystallised expression in c. Sec. 19 *cum uero eum contumaci inoboedientia deserit, per suum liberum arbitrium peccatis se inuoluit, per illius autem iustum iudicium subplicio misera efficitur; et hoc est totum malum, partim quod iniuste facit, partim quod iuste patitur.*

punishments upon humanity seem to be somewhat overshadowed by this new invention.

Augustine was left dissatisfied with his exegesis on Genesis 1–3. During the 390s he had tried a literal approach to the text, but this attempt had failed.<sup>81</sup> A full literal interpretation had to wait for a prolonged effort that he initiated in the early years of 400s and extended to 415.<sup>82</sup> This work is known as *de Genesi ad litteram*. Books 1–5 describe the six days of creation. Books 6–11 focus on the creation of Adam and Eve, their state of happiness, the Devil and the serpent, and the Fall. The last book presents Apostle Paul's vision of Paradise (2 Cor 12, 2–4). According to Augustine's own announcement, his approach in the interpretation is now emphatically literal (8, 1, 1–2, 5), as opposed to his earlier work against the Manichaeans.<sup>83</sup>

In *Gn. litt.* 8, 3, 6–13, 30, Augustine discusses the disobedience of Adam and Eve in Paradise. God planted two real trees in Paradise: the tree of life, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (*lignum scientiae dinoscendi bonum et malum*).<sup>84</sup> This being stated, the connection of the latter tree to virtuous life and to the emergence of evil is made straightaway. For the first human beings, the tree of good and evil knowledge was a practice

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<sup>81</sup> The work is known as *de Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus*. Augustine started writing it in 393. See *retr.* 1, 18 in *scripturis exponendis tirocinium meum sub tanta sarcina mole succubuit*. The work came unexpectedly into Augustine's hands when he was writing *retr.* As the commentary interrupts in Gen 1, 26, nothing is said of the trees of Paradise and the Fall. For a brief introduction to Augustine's progress with the Creation accounts, see Teske 1999b.

<sup>82</sup> Augustine composed his work in varying intervals, and the flow of the argument is somewhat repetitious; e.g. the literal approach and its usefulness is repeatedly argued in the beginning of several books, see e.g. 8, 1, 2–4; 11, 1, 2. The work was in all probability finished in 415. The first nine books, however, were very likely finished by 412, or even 410, the remaining books *Gn. litt.* 10–12 date from 412–415, before *ciu.* 14, on which see O'Daly 1999, 34–35. Agaësse & Solignac 1972, 25–31; Teske 1999c, 376. This traditional dating is followed here. Cf. however, the view advocated by Hombert (2000, 137–188) that a large part of the work was written only after the Pelagian debate had commenced. Hombert (2000, 187 n. 374) thinks that, among many other things, the similar ideas on *libido* between *Gn. litt.* 9 and *gr. et pecc. or.* 2, 39 point to a later date of composition than is usually thought.

<sup>83</sup> In *Gn. litt.* 8, 2, 5 Augustine claims that even at the time that he wrote *Gn. adu. Man.*, he had not “despaired of the possibility” that all the events could be explained as literal as well. For the fluctuating lines between ‘literal’ and ‘allegorical,’ see now Lössl 2004.

<sup>84</sup> Their physical reality, however, does not exclude “deeper” meanings. God wanted to put “mysteries of spiritual things in a bodily form” into Paradise. The tree of life is thus a *sacramentum* to Adam and Eve, signifying God's Wisdom (*sapientia*). *Gn. litt.* 8, 4, 8. In its “sacramental” reality, the tree of life provided Adam and Eve with special nutrition that gave them constant physical health. *Gn. litt.* 8, 5, 9–11. Despite the new emphasis on the concrete quality of the trees, Augustine has no interest in speculating which kind of fruit grew from the *lignum scientiae*. Leder 1961, 180–182.

in virtuous living. It is important to note that the tree of good and evil knowledge had incessantly bothered Augustine, and he thought of it “again and again” (*mihi etiam atque etiam consideranti*).<sup>85</sup>

It was proper that man, placed in a state of dependence upon the Lord God, should be given *some* prohibition, so that *obedience* would be the virtue by which he would please his Lord. I can truthfully say that this is the only virtue of every rational creature who lives his life under God’s rule, and that the fundamental and greatest vice is the overweening pride by which one wishes to have independence to his own ruin, and the name of this vice is *disobedience*. There would not, therefore, be any way for a man to realize and feel that he was subject to the Lord unless he was given some command.<sup>86</sup>

[transl. Taylor, italics mine]

There are some interesting implications in this passage. The most acute of these is the stress on *obedience* and *disobedience*. Augustine claims that in order to be in God’s dominion, man *had* (*oportebat*) to be prohibited from *something*. The somewhat random character of the prohibition is clearly pointed out by Augustine’s language (*alicunde, aliquid iuberetur*).<sup>87</sup> There

<sup>85</sup> *Gn. litt.* 8, 6, 12.

<sup>86</sup> *Gn. litt.* 8, 6, 12 *oportebat autem, ut homo sub domino deo positus alicunde prohiberetur, ut ei promerendi dominum suum uirtus esset ipsa oboedientia, quam possum uerissime dicere solam esse uirtutem omni creaturae rationali agenti sub dei potestate, primumque esse et maximum uitium tumoris ad ruinam sua potestate uelle uti, cuius uitii nomen est inoboedientia. non esset ergo, unde se homo dominum habere cogitaret atque sentiret, nisi ei aliquid iuberetur.*

<sup>87</sup> Obedience had already appeared in such a light e.g. in *s. Dolbeau* 2. The sermon dates very probably from January in 404 (*Dolbeau* 1996, 55–60), thus very likely preceding the passages on *oboedientia* in *Gn. litt.* 8. Augustine had been speaking to the Carthaginian congregation attending to the service on the eve of St. Vincent’s Day. People had behaved in a disorderly manner, not complying with the preacher’s wishes. Although not a riot, the disturbance had aggrieved Augustine so much that he had left the pulpit and his parish standing. The next morning, Augustine gave a solemn sermon on the subject of obedience, beginning from the very trees of Paradise. God had to give *some* prohibition, to show domination (*alicunde, aliquid*). But God’s domination is different from what we think: He does not need anything nor does our subservience add to His power, *ille nec nobis contemnuntibus minor est, nec nobis seruientibus maior est*, *s. Dolbeau* 2, 7. His domination and prohibition teach us obedience; therefore, they are useful (*cui dominatur, est utilis*). What is more, Christ also showed obedience, and not only to the Father, but even to sinful men as well, showing thus an example which all Christians should follow, for “obedience is the daughter of love,” *filia caritatis oboedientia est* (*s. Dolbeau* 2, 12). Cf. also *b. coniug.* 32 *oboedientia: quam uirtutem tamquam radicalem atque, ut dici solet, matricem et plane generalem. uirg. 42 quid tam generaliter maximeque praecipitur quam oboedientia, qua custodiuntur mandata dei?* In *s. Dolbeau* 2, Augustine takes for granted that not all coercive social power structures result from sin, but love. Cf. Markus 1988, 197–210; Ruokanen 1993, 107–108 on *ciu*. In this respect, I do not find it anachronistic to refer to some of Augustine’s narrations on obedience as emphasizing the arbitrariness of God’s will: it is the view, albeit useful, or perhaps even intelligible, of

was no obvious *reason* for this prohibition other than that of teaching *obedience* to Adam and Eve.<sup>88</sup> “Adam was prohibited from the tree, which in itself was not harmful. His good was to keep that decree intact, and his evil was the transgression of the command.”<sup>89</sup> As a consequence, the tree and the prohibition mark God’s dominion over men. By thinking and seeing the tree, Adam and Eve thought and felt *God’s superiority*. The ideal of unconditional obedience seems to permeate Augustine’s account even to the detail and is repeated in every turn. Thus, the instruction to “till and keep” entails obedience to God. The first human beings had to obey God in whatever He commanded, so that they would not lose that lovely place.<sup>90</sup> They “kept” or guarded (*custodire*) themselves like the fields of Paradise; in parallel to their domination of the earth, Adam and Eve were in God’s dominion. To till and keep was to adhere to God in every instant; indeed, it was God that was the ultimate one to guarantee human happiness, for even Adam and Eve were not able to be righteous or eternally happy (*iustus beatusque*) by themselves owing to their mutable nature. Man simply could not be secure (*tutus*) “on his own.” Again, God is called *dominus* only after He gives the commandment to Adam and Eve: from this it can be induced that it is *necessary* for the human beings to have a *dominus* and to live in subordination so that they may achieve and conserve their final, ideal existence in God.

*From a divine point of view*, therefore, obedience seems after all to be neither blind nor arbitrary.<sup>91</sup> Domination or subordination is emphasised, not because God would be in need of servile puppets, but for the reason that He is thinking of the best interest of Adam and Eve. To obey is useful (*utilis*)—but only as an afterthought. If one only “obeys and serves” Gods commandments, there is a *possibility* of finally understanding them (*tunc forte uidendum*, *Gn. litt.* 8, 13, 30). However, the utility of absolute obedience

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the Superior one that is to be obeyed, *whatever* He tells one to do. For a different generalizing view, based on material from *conf.*, see Schlabach 1994, 304–305. See also Garnsey (1998, 474–476) for the metaphor of slavery and its theological potential in s. *Dolbeau* 2.

<sup>88</sup> This may have sounded odd to the ear of a non-Christian hearer. Frank 1974, 398: “im Raum der griech.-röm. Antike der Gehorsam als in sich ethisch wertvolle Tat (als Unterwerfung des eigenen Willens unter einen fordernde Autorität, unabhängig von der Einsichtigkeit der Forderung) nicht eigentlich gekannt ist.”

<sup>89</sup> *Gn. litt.* 8, 13, 28 *ab eo ligno, quod malum non erat, prohibitus est, ut ipsa per se praecepti conseruatio bonum illi esset et transgressio malum*. The fruit as such (*natura*) were not poisonous. *Gn. litt.* 8, 13, 29.

<sup>90</sup> *Gn. litt.* 8, 10, 23.

<sup>91</sup> *Gn. litt.* 8, 11, 24.

cannot be calculated at the precise moment of facing the commandment. So no reasons can be expected from God for having prohibited the fruit from the tree of good and evil knowledge. Mere disobedience (*sola inoboedientia*) earns the guilt of sin. Augustine thus eventually rejects all suggestions that would offer an evident reason for this prohibition. The only possibility is that God wanted to show the absolute value of obedience, as opposed to the absolute harmfulness of disobedience, detached from all understandable arguments.<sup>92</sup> The ways of God in His decrees and judgments are still unfathomable and beyond human scrutiny. In this emphasis, Augustine seems to be coherent to his earlier, briefer notions of the hidden ways of election and punishment.

The name of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil also indicated what God had in mind when planting it into Paradise: it stresses the crucial virtue of obedience. The first human beings simply *had* to be obedient; otherwise, they would indeed come to know the difference between good and evil. The good would be the stable realization of not breaking God's absolute prohibition (and as a result, a constant life in happiness). In opposition, the knowledge of evil would be realized in bearing the consequences of God's threatening words of prohibition.<sup>93</sup> The name of the tree works thus as a

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<sup>92</sup> *Gn. litt.* 8, 13, 30. *quare prohibitum est, nisi ut ipsius per se bonum oboedientiae et ipsius per se malum inoboedientiae monstraretur? [...] quid aliud quam dei uoluntas adtenderetur? quid aliud quam dei uoluntas amaretur? quid aliud quam dei uoluntas humanae uoluntati praeponeretur? dominus quidem cur iusserit, uiderit; faciendum est a seruiente quod iussit et tunc forte uidendum est a promerente, cur iusserit. sed tamen, ut causam iussionis huius non diutius requiramus, si haec ipsa magna est utilitas homini, quod deo seruit, iubendo deus utile facit quidquid iubere uoluerit, de quo metuendum non est, ne iubere quod inutile est possit.* The voluntaristic strain in this passage is strong. According to Chappell (1995, 154–175), Augustine's view of the will seems in general to have a rationalistic preference. For obedience and voluntarism in Judeo-Christian tradition in general, and in Augustine in particular, see Bourke 1970; Frank 1974; Dihle 1982, 1–19, 123–132; O'Daly 1987, 6. Dihle has been criticised for emphasising Augustine's 'voluntarism' too much. Kahn 1988, 236–238; Saarinen 1994, 21–23; Chappell 1995, 199–201; Schlabach 1998. See also Knuuttila 1999, 206–207. Lössl 2003 is an argument for Augustine's intellectualism (p. 54 "fundamentally an intellectualist"). Cf. Müller 2009, 365, see especially his remarks on the first evil volitions in angels and human beings in Paradise (ibid., 370, 378): although Müller is cautious in subscribing Augustine to later divisions in this respect, he notes that a thoroughly 'intellectualistic' approach would fall short in explaining how a perfectly informed and intact soul would choose to do evil. I think that this may also be one of the reasons why the relationship between God and Adam is depicted in terms of obedience and subordination; the first sin is a failure in obedience, not of intellect. See also the remarks of Colish (1990, 163) on natural laws.

<sup>93</sup> In *Gn. litt.* 8, 14, 31 *malum* is said to be known or felt (*sentiremus*) only by experience, for there would, of course, be no evil unless we committed it. Before the Fall, Adam and Eve knew (*intellegere*) evil only indirectly, or "theoretically" (8, 16, 34–35).



kind of a trap, or better, as a prophecy indicating God's foreknowledge of what will be the outcome of the prohibition (*ex ipsa re nomen impositum est, quae illo contra uetitum tacto fuerat secutura*).<sup>94</sup>

In addition to these strongly theological considerations of obedience as the first virtue and disobedience as the primary sin, Augustine proceeds to chart the events that took place at the moment of the Fall and after the Fall. In *Gn. litt.* 9, he deals with Gen 2, 18–24 and the ways of procreation before and after the Fall. In the first case, Augustine sketches a picture where Adam and Eve, serving God “in justice and obedience” (*iuste [...] oboedienter [...] si iuste omnes oboedienterque uiuerent*) would have had biological children in a bodily way, but without the “restless heat of sexual desire and pain of the birth pangs” (*sine ardore libidinis, sine labore ac dolore pariendi*).<sup>95</sup> However, a change into an entirely spiritual reality after a certain number of people would have been born this way did not take place. Instead, Adam and Eve's disobedience turned this vision into mere speculation, and humanity received the punishment of—death (*potuit hoc fieri, si non praecepti transgressio mortis supplicium mereretur*).<sup>96</sup> While the context here would be most appropriate for Augustine to apply the idea of the reciprocal disobedience of *concupiscentia*, he does not do so.<sup>97</sup> Instead, the account in *Gn. litt.* 9, 10, 16–11, 19, based on Rom 7, 22–25, is focused on death (*mors*) as the deserved punishment for the first transgression. This account shares many things in common with Augustine's later depictions of *concupiscentia*, which he composed after *Gn. litt.* 9. When Adam and Eve broke God's prohibition, they were infected with a ‘lethal virus’ that ‘mutated’ their ability to have command over their bodies, for instance, in the moment of conception and giving birth. However, this deadly and poisonous force in our bodies can be resisted first, by God's grace, and second, by obedience and submission to God.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Cf. *Gn. litt.* 8, 15, 33.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. his earlier view in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 19, 30.

<sup>96</sup> *Gn. litt.* 9, 3, 6. An earlier parallel for this account is *Gn. litt.* 3, 21, 33, where even *concupiscentia* is mentioned, but the weight of punishment is there, too, on death (*mors*).

<sup>97</sup> A similar case of *argumentum e silentio* can also be made of s. *Dolbeau* 2 (ca. 404). While the sermon treats the themes of obedience, disobedience and Adam's role in showing first the former, then the latter, the consequent punishment is only said to be death. s. *Dolbeau* 2, 7 *illa arbore experiretur quid interesset inter oboedientiae bonum et inoboedientiae malum. ex illa enim arbore, contempto praecepto, mors consecuta est; seruato praecepto, immortalitas sequeretur. uidetis ergo quantum malum sit inoboedientia, fratres mei: prima ruina hominis ipsa fuit; 2, 23 inoboedientia est uenenum, ipsa primum hominem occidit.*

<sup>98</sup> *Gn. litt.* 9, 11, 19 *cum anima pietate deo subdita legem istam peccati, quae est in membris corporis mortis huius, quam primus homo accepit in poenam, uicerit ipsa per gratiam,*

In the start of his account of the sexual conduct before and after the Fall in *Gn. litt.* 9, Augustine does not seem particularly keen to point out the analogies between Adam and Eve's spiritual disobedience towards God and their subsequent disobedience of their bodies in the form of *concupiscentia*. It is to be noted, however, that Augustine here loosely connects man's relation to God with the fallen stimuli of sexual desire, as he notes that before the Fall, while there was no 'concupiscence, or incitation of disobedient flesh' (*ubi nulla concupiscentia tamquam stimulus inobedientis carnis*), the couple had to wait for "divine authorisation" for their act of procreation (*ad hanc rem diuina exspectaretur auctoritas*).<sup>99</sup> Moving on to comment on the present state of human procreation, Augustine clearly considers death to be the primal punishment for Adam and Eve's transgression: death resides in every human body from the start, much like a genetic illness (this analogy is drawn in *Gn. litt.* 9, 10, 17), and is the main reason for Paul to speak of a "body of death" (*corpus mortis huius*). After having named death as the fundamental *poena peccati*, Augustine sets out to suggest, perhaps something as a secondary corollary (*quae cum ita sint*), that in the Paradise, the body was more in control of the mind (*imperare potuisse*) so that the act of procreation was very much unlike to what it is now (*neque cum ardore seminaretur, neque cum dolore pareretur*).<sup>100</sup> However, as Augustine proceeds, this notion gains more impetus. The mortal human body began to carry a "law of sin," and it is the "movement" of this law that is also meted out as a punishment (*supplicium*) for humanity.<sup>101</sup> In the following dense passage

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*praemium caeleste percipiat maiore gloria, demonstrans, quanta sit laus oboedientiae, quae alienae inoboedientiae poenam potuit uirtute superare.* Cf. Rist 1994, 324, taking here *concupiscentia* to represent a "harbinger of death." This is a strained reading of a passage where *concupiscentia* only appears in a supporting role, behind the protagonist of death. For death as a divine punishment in *Gn. litt.* see e.g. *Gn. litt.* 9, 10, 18; 11, 1, 3; 11, 35, 47; 11, 37, 50. In *cat. rud.* 29 (written ca. 400), mortality and sexual *concupiscentia* were also taken as being connected. *cat. rud.* 29 *fecit illi etiam adiutorium feminam: non ad carnalem concupiscentiam, quando quidem nec corruptibilia corpora tunc habebant, antequam eos mortalitas inuaderet poena peccati.* Note that in this remark, *mortalitas* represents the fundamental punishment, of which a corrupted use of sexuality (*concupiscentia*) is seen as a corollary. Of course, there are also other concrete applications for *poena peccati* in *Gn. litt.*, e.g. the deteriorated intellectual abilities (*Gn. litt.* 11, 34, 46 *stulti facti sunt*). For discussions of punishment, see Rist 1994, 135–145, 272–276.

<sup>99</sup> *Gn. litt.* 9, 4, 8. A search with CAG2 reveals that the combination of *caro* and *inoboediens* (or *inoboedientia*) appears here for the first time in the Augustinian corpus.

<sup>100</sup> *Gn. litt.* 9, 10, 18. Here, Augustine is still considerate enough to mention the consequences on both sexes. Later, the perspective is more on the male sexual organs.

<sup>101</sup> *Gn. litt.* 9, 10, 18.

Augustine draws an outline of the bodily punishment that reflects the original disobedience against God in Paradise:

Consequently, when someone asks what help the woman was intended to give the man, as I carefully consider to the best of my ability all that we are told, I can think of no other purpose than the procreation of children in order to fill the earth with their descendants. But the begetting of children by the first man and woman was not to have been as it is today, when there is the law of sin in the members at war with the law of mind, even though virtue overcomes it by the grace of God. For we must believe that this condition could not have existed except in this body of death, a body that is dead because of sin. What punishment could have been more deserved than that the body, made serve the soul, should not be willing to obey every command of the soul, just as the soul herself refused to serve her Lord?

It is possible that God creates both body and soul from the parents: the body from their bodies, the soul from their souls. Or could it be that He creates souls some other way? But whatever is the case, it is not for some impossible task nor for any trifling reward that He creates the soul. And when it [the soul] is devout and faithful to God, it conquers with the help of His grace the law of sin in the members of this body of death, which the first man received as a punishment; and thus it gains a heavenly reward with greater glory, showing how praiseworthy is that obedience which by virtue was able to triumph over the punishment deserved by another's disobedience.<sup>102</sup> [transl. Taylor]

While through this description Augustine holds to the idea of death as defining the present bodily state of humanity, he also takes note of the justice of a punishment that underlines the rightly ordered hierarchy of God, the soul and the body in Paradise. On the other hand, Augustine notes that such a punishment can be annulled by Christian submission to God and His grace. In this way, obedience even in the fallen state is able to conquer the dire punishment deserved by Adam and Eve's disobedience.

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<sup>102</sup> Gn. litt. 9, 11, 19 *cum ergo quaeritur, ad quod adiutorium factus sit ille sexus uiro, diligenter, quantum ualeo, cuncta consideranti nonnisi causa prolis occurrit, ut per eorum stirpem terra inpleretur, et non eo modo procreata, quo nunc procreantur homines, cum inest peccati lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, etiamsi per dei gratiam uirtute superatur; hoc enim esse non potuisse credendum est nisi in corpore mortis huius, quod corpus mortuum est propter peccatum. et quid hac poena iustius, quam ut non ad omnem nutum seruiat corpus, id est suus famulus animae, sicut domino suo detrectauit ipsa seruire, siue utrumque ex parentibus creet deus, corpus ex corpore, animam ex anima, siue alio modo faciat animas, non utique ad opus impossibile nec mercede parua, ut cum anima pietate deo subdita legem istam peccati, quae est in membris corporis mortis huius, quam primus homo accepit in poenam, uicerit ipsa per gratiam, praemium caeleste percipiat maiore gloria, demonstrans, quanta sit laus oboedientiae, quae alienae inoboedientiae poenam potuit uirtute superare?*

*Gn. litt.* was written over a long period of time, and a shorter work against certain teachings by Pelagius and his disciples intervened in producing this large exegetical work. In *de peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum*, written in 411–412, Augustine uses once again the account of Adam and Eve's Fall for the purposes of a theological debate, this time against what he briefly later grew accustomed to call the 'Pelagians'.<sup>103</sup> It will here be helpful to follow the chronology of Augustine's works rather closely to see the ways in which Augustine expanded his ideas about the punitive *concupiscentia* reflecting the circumstances of Paradise.

The work consists of three books. The first book presents Augustine's opposition to the position of the Pelagius' circle toward Adam as an *example* of sinning. However, Augustine discerns between each person's voluntary acts which indeed imitate Adam's example and between the involuntary, inborn evil inheritance resulting from Adam's first act of disobedience.<sup>104</sup> Imitating Adam's act is not the only way to take part in his sin, for the punishment of his sin has also spread from generation to generation "in the flesh."<sup>105</sup> In the first book, Augustine draws a parallel between Adam and Christ in discerning between an outward and voluntary example, on the one hand, and an inward, "most secret" influence of Adam and Christ on the other hand. This secret (*occultissima*) influence of Adam is *carnalis concupiscentia*, which is contrasted with *occultissima gratia*, once again reflecting the analogical way in which Augustine treats divine punishment for sin and divine grace to rescue us from that sin.<sup>106</sup>

However, a more extensive discussion on *concupiscentia* can be found in *pecc. mer.* 2, 35–36.<sup>107</sup> By providing an account of Adam's sin and its

<sup>103</sup> In this work, however, Augustine still avoids openly hostile criticism of Pelagius. For a recent overview of the Pelagian movement, see now Lamberigts 2008b. For *pecc. mer.*, see Delaroche 1996.

<sup>104</sup> See e.g. *pecc. mer.* 1, 10.

<sup>105</sup> *pecc. mer.* 1, 19 *Adam unus est in quo omnes peccauerunt, quia non sola eius imitatio peccatores facit, sed per carnem generans poena.*

<sup>106</sup> *pecc. mer.* 1, 10 *sicut ergo ille, in quo omnes uiuificantur, praeter quod se ad iustitiam exemplum imitantibus prae-buit, dat etiam sui spiritus occultissimam fidelibus gratiam, quam latenter infundit et paruulis; sic et ille, in quo omnes moriuntur, praeter quod eis qui praeceptum Domini uoluntate transgrediuntur imitationis exemplum est, occulta etiam tabe carnalis concupiscentiae suae tabificauit in se omnes de sua stirpe uenturos. Concupiscentia* is here called "decay" (*tabes*), a rare word in Augustine, appearing also in Manichaean contexts. See *c. Faust.* 5, 7 *qui nihil suo uitio peccauerunt, sed hostili tabe, quo eos pater misit, inexpiabiliter infecti sunt, insuper triumphare?* The comparison between Adam and Christ and their disobedience viz. obedience is recalled in *pecc. mer.* 2, 48.

<sup>107</sup> Shorter remarks on obedience and *concupiscentia* precede in *pecc. mer.* 1. In *pecc. mer.* 1, 21 Augustine notes how in the Fall Adam's body lost its grace, by which it obeyed the mind in

punishment, Augustine wishes to answer whether there has lived anyone who has not been bound by sin.<sup>108</sup> He has already stated in a previous section how pride and concupiscence are interconnected: a desire to have possession of one's own power leads to a "just punishment" under which it is difficult to obey justice.<sup>109</sup> Now Augustine proceeds to a more thorough narration of such of a chain of events.

The setting is described in accord with the one in *Gn. litt.* Thus, many details of Adam and Eve's life in Paradise are only repeated to correspond to Augustine's exegesis of Genesis (Augustine, too, is "recalling" here, *pauca repetere*). Adam and Eve ate every other fruit of Paradise but the one grown from the tree of good and evil knowledge. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was as such nothing bad or harmful. On the contrary, it was a part of God's good creation. This already familiar emphasis mirrors Augustine's insistence that God's commandment only served the purpose of *obedience*. So the "piety of obedience" (*sibi commendata pietate oboedientiae*) was the only way to serve God, and it was "sufficient in helping a rational creature to live under the creator."<sup>110</sup> God even pointed to the inherent and axiomatic value of obedience by forbidding Adam and Eve to touch a tree that was essentially harmless.<sup>111</sup> The name of the tree was proleptic: it showed what would happen if God's commandment was kept or broken (*quo nomine significaretur experientiae consequentia*). Augustine repeats several times, from various angles, the simplicity and usefulness of obedience to God's command over His servants (*famulus*). Adam and Eve's

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every respect. This happened because Adam did not obey God. In *pecc. mer.* 1, 57 Augustine describes how the present corrupt sexual desire "moves in a disobedient way" (*inobedienter*), and contrasts with it the way Christian spouses use *concupiscentia* to procreate "in an orderly fashion" (*ordinate*) to have children "in an orderly companionship" (*ordinata societate*). Again, Augustine here compares Christ's birth, which happened by the "obedient mind of a virgin," to standard reproduction by *concupiscentia carnis*.

<sup>108</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 35 *non itaque ab re est, quantum praesenti causae sufficere uidetur, ab ipso exordio generis humani pauca repetere*. Thus, Augustine's account of Genesis is motivated by his wish to answer what he saw as a Pelagian doctrine of *impeccantia* (Zumkeller 1971, 633–634), but the close date of composition of *pecc. mer.* with the later books of *Gn. litt.* also provided some useful benefit of synergy for the writer.

<sup>109</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 33 *praecedat ergo in uoluntate hominis appetitus quidam propriae potestatis, ut fiat inoboediens per superbiam. hic autem appetitus etiam si non esset, nihil molestum esset, et cum hoc uoluit homo, sine difficultate nolisset. secutum est autem ex debita iusta poena tale uitium, ut iam molestum esset oboedire iustitiae*.

<sup>110</sup> The central position of obedience in the Paradise was anticipated in a remark in the previous book, *pecc. mer.* 1, 5 *quam mortalitatem fuerat absumptura mutatio in aeternam in corruptionem, si in homine iustitia, id est oboedientia, permaneret*.

<sup>111</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 35.

observance was “most useful” (*utilissima servitus*), nothing but obedience was expected (*sola oboedientia*), and this obedience only served the good of Adam and Eve, not that of God.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, Augustine stresses that the essence of Adam and Eve’s transgression lay in disobedience, for God did not expect anything else than obedience (*solam*) from his creatures. The following events, or the “just and deserved punishment” (*iusta ac debita poena*) clearly demonstrate (*satis ostenderetur*) that the fruit as such was not poisonous by nature; the actual damage was rather the breach of obedience.<sup>113</sup> So far, Augustine has only varied and repeated ideas and material he had been previously using. Hereafter, however, he proceeds into something new in constructing the analogies of an obedient life in Paradise and the punishment of disobedience in the present state of humanity.

In the state of the original “order of justice” (*ordo iustitiae*), the bodies of Adam and Eve obeyed their soul, corresponding to the obedience their souls showed to God. Just as their souls were positioned in servitude to God, so were their bodies given by God to “show subservience (*famulatum*) to the soul without any resistance.”<sup>114</sup> That circumstances now are very different is documented by a weakness (*nescio qua infirmitate*) that has disturbed the servitude of the body to the soul so that certain bodily members now move against one’s will. This, notes Augustine, is the reason why these members are called *pudenda*, for the broken servitude of the body causes natural shame in the soul. These members may now be excited “as if they had an independent will” (*quasi suae sint potestatis*). Augustine then compares the nature of the punishment to the relationship between the soul and God in Paradise:

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<sup>112</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 35. See also *s. Dolbeau* 2, 7 *tamen quia inter omnia bona quae posita erant in paradiso melior erat oboedientia, prohibuit deus alicunde, ne nihil prohibendo non dominaretur. et quid? forte aliquis putat quia deus pro suo fastu uoluit dominari. dominatio dei non deo, sed cui dominatur, est utilis. ille nec nobis contemnentibus minor est, nec nobis seruientibus maior est. sub tali domino esse nobis expedit, non illi. qui dominari nobis uult, ad utilitatem nostram uult, non ad suam. ille nullo bono nostro eget, nos omnium bonorum eius indigemus, et ipso deo nostro summo bono. summum enim bonum nostrum et optimum, quo nihil melius sit, ipse deus est.*

<sup>113</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 35.

<sup>114</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 36 *faciebat quippe hoc ordo iustitiae, ut, quia eorum anima famulum corpus a domino acceperat, sicut ipsa eidem domino suo ita illi corpus eius oboediret atque exhiberet uitae illi congruum sine ulla resistentia famulatum.* This is why punitive *concupiscentia* can be perceived as *inordinatus*. Cf. van Oort’s (1987, 146–149, and recently 2010, 544) influential suggestion of the Manichaean provenance of concupiscence as “random movement.” The “servitude” of the body is already noted in *Simpl.* 1, 2, 20 (*omnisque natura hominis dominatu animae et famulatu corporis conditione mirabili temperata*) but it is not connected to the idea of punitive *concupiscentia*, even though *concupiscentia* is mentioned in the same context.

Such disobedience of the flesh as this, which lies in the very excitement (*motu*), even when it is not allowed to take effect, did not exist in the first man and woman whilst they were naked and not ashamed. For not yet had the rational soul, which rules the flesh, developed such a disobedience to its Lord, as by a reciprocity of punishment to bring on itself the rebellion of its own servant the flesh, along with that feeling of confusion and trouble to itself which it certainly failed to inflict upon God by its own disobedience to Him [...] As soon, indeed, as that transgression was effected, and the disobedient soul turned away from the law of its Lord, then its servant, the body, began to cherish a law of disobedience against it; and then the man and the woman grew ashamed of their nakedness, when they perceived the rebellious motion of the flesh, which they had not felt before.<sup>115</sup> [transl. Holmes]

Adam and Eve received a “corresponding punishment” (*poena reciproca*, the attribute is here used for the first time in connection with *concupiscentia*) for their disobedience against God: their flesh began to have disobedient movements against their will and soul. As far as the soul honoured God as its Lord (*dominus*), it had the body under its domination (*anima rationalis domina carnis*). When this obedience was ended, so also was the servitude of the flesh lost (*caro famula sua*). Again, when the soul turned away from “the law of the Lord” (*a lege sui domini*), it was opposed by its former slave, and by the “law of disobedience” (*lex inoboedientiae*). That Augustine is here particularly sensitive to apt analogies is reflected by a notable exception: whereas the body now affects the soul with a “feeling of confusion and discomfort,” no such thing is obviously caused to God. “It is not shameful nor uncomfortable to God, if we do not obey Him, for we cannot diminish his great power over us.”<sup>116</sup>

Augustine connects this reciprocal divine punishment with Paul’s turns of phrases in Romans 7. Thus, the “law of disobedience” equals the “law of sin” (*lex peccati*), or “the sin living in our members” (*peccatum habitans in membris nostris*, Augustine here corrects Paul’s careless words by noting that this means, of course, only “the punishment of sin”).<sup>117</sup> Augustine had

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<sup>115</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 36 *haec igitur carnis inoboedientia, quae in ipso motu est, etiamsi habere non permittatur effectum, non erat in illis tunc primis hominibus, quando nudi erant et non confundebantur. nondum quippe anima rationalis domina carnis inoboediens extiterat domino suo, ut poena reciproca inoboedientem experiretur carnem famulam suam cum sensu quodam confusionis et molestiae suae, quem sensum certe ipsa per inoboedientiam suam non intulit deo [...] denique posteaquam est illa facta transgressio et anima inoboediens a lege sui domini auersa est, habere coepit contra eam seruius eius, hoc est corpus eius, legem inoboedientiae et puduit illos homines nuditatis suae animaduerso in se motu, quem ante non senserant.*

<sup>116</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 36.

<sup>117</sup> For Augustine’s Pauline exegesis on Rom 7, see Chapter 6.

used the phrase *corpus mortis huius* in *Gn. litt.* to designate the punishment of death, but now the phrase also appears here: mortal bodies, or “these bodies of death” are born by and with *lex peccati*, and there is no other way to escape these powers than “God’s grace in Jesus Christ, our Lord” (Rom 7, 25).<sup>118</sup> The account of Adam and Eve is finished with remarks on the universal influence of the first sin (*in omnibus uidemus*) and on the cure for this punishment, or *lex concupiscentiae*, which is to turn back to the original obedience to God, and to accept the grace of Jesus Christ. This results, in turn, in disobedience to the “wishes of said concupiscence” (*desideriis eiusdem concupiscentiae non oboedire*).

The account of *pecc. mer.* 2, 35–37 has thus taken another step forward in linking concupiscence to strongly theological origins: the involuntary, or reflexive movements and the excitement of procreative organs reflect the sinister past of fallen humanity. In *concupiscentia carnis*, Augustine sees a nicely fitting analogy in reverse of the human obedience to God, and of the original coherence of the soul and body. In Augustine’s universe, justice is equal to order, order requires obedience, and the end result is aesthetic harmony. But even in disharmony, in broken order and in disobedience, God and His justice direct all things: the present disordered state *in itself* creates a harmonious analogy, corresponding in minute details to the lost state of integrity. For God only is able, as Augustine never tires to point out, to bring good out of evil, and harmony even from disorder.<sup>119</sup>

Augustine depicted *poena* in *Gn. litt.* 1–9 primarily in terms of mortality. To Augustine, humanity in its present state is affected with a lethal illness due to our ancestors in Paradise. Indeed, the moment Adam and Eve chose to violate God’s commandment, their bodies were changed into mortal ones. Simultaneously, however, Augustine had noted, their sexual constitution also suffered from a change for the worse. Does the view presented in *pecc. mer.* on the correspondence of disobedient concupiscence to the disobedience of human ancestors affect how Augustine works through the remaining books of *de Genesi ad litteram* 10–12?

*Concupiscentia* appears in *Gn. litt.* 10, 12, 20–14, 25, where Augustine first discerns between the purely spiritual desires and carnal desires, and then moves on to ponder in which way the damaging inheritance of Adam is

<sup>118</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 37.

<sup>119</sup> It is perhaps a sign of Augustine’s disposition that seldom if ever are the comical sides of such a punishment noted. That Augustine had a satirical eye for penile institutions, see, however, *ciu.* 6, 9.



passed from generation to generation.<sup>120</sup> Augustine briefly notes that when the soul has lusts “according to flesh” (*secundum carnem concupiscit*), it shows symptoms of the punishment that was imposed in Paradise (*ueniens de uindicta illius peccati*).<sup>121</sup> Again, Augustine remarks that while living in “this body of death,” nobody is able to be without such corrupted desires.<sup>122</sup>

However, a correspondence between the bodily disobedience of *concupiscentia* with the disobedience of Adam and Eve, similar to that of *pecc. mer.*, can be found in the following book, *Gn. litt.* 11. In the first pages of the book, Augustine rehearses the events of Paradise, noting that something has already been said about the subject (*quemadmodum propagaturi [...] iam antea disputatum est*). At this point, Augustine adds to the question of postlapsarian sexual behaviour what he has learned in composing *pecc. mer.*:

Why would they be ashamed, since they did not perceive in their members any law at war with the law of their mind? That law was rather the penalty for sin, inflicted on them after their transgression, when disobedience violated the command and justice punished the deed. But before this happened they were naked, as has been said, and they were not embarrassed. They experienced no motion of the flesh of which they would be ashamed. They did not think that anything had to be covered, because they did not feel that anything had to be restrained. How they would have begotten children has already been discussed. It must not be thought that the manner of begetting would have been the same as after the punishment which followed their sin; for before they would die, death entering the body of disobedient men by a just retribution would stir up the revolt of their disobedient members.<sup>123</sup>

[transl. Taylor]

<sup>120</sup> Naturally, *concupiscentia* already appears in the earlier books of *Gn. litt.* in the remarks relating to sexual propagation. There were no corrupted sexual desires (*corruptionis concupiscentia*) in Paradise before the Fall: children would have been born solely by “true parental affection,” *Gn. litt.* 3, 21, 33 *solo pietatis adfectu nulla corruptionis concupiscentia filii nascerentur, nec mortuis parentibus successuri nec ipsi morituri, donec terra immortalibus hominibus inpleretur, ac sic instituto iusto et sancto populo, qualem post resurrectionem futurum credimus, nascendi etiam modus fieret.*

<sup>121</sup> *Gn. litt.* 10, 12, 21 *quanto congruentius dicitur caro concupiscere, quando anima non solum carni animalem uitam praebet, uerum etiam secundum ipsam carnem aliquid concupiscit, quod in potestate non est, ne concupiscat, quamdiu inest peccatum in membris, id est uiolenta quaedam carnis inlecebra in corpore mortis huius, ueniens de uindicta illius peccati, unde propaginem ducimus, secundum quam omnes ante gratiam filii sunt irae.*

<sup>122</sup> For this emphasis, see Chapter 6.

<sup>123</sup> *Gn. litt.* 11, 1, 3 *quid enim puderet, quando nullam legem senserant in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae? quae illos poena peccati post perpetrationem praeuaricationis secuta est usurpante inobedientia prohibitum et iustitia puniente commissum. quod antequam fieret, nudi erant, ut dictum est, et non confundebantur; nullus erat motus in corpore, cui uerecundia deberetur; nihil putabant uelandum, quia nihil senserant refrenandum. quemadmodum propa-*

For their disobedience, the first couple was “justly punished.” Another “law” (as in *Gn. litt.* 9 and *pecc. mer.* 2) began to rebel in their bodily members as a punishment for their sin. Whereas death would be the ultimate punishment, it would be anticipated by yet another one: a confusion of the members would be a reminder of *mors*, reciprocating “most justly” to their original disobedience. Whereas death was the primary punishment for Adam and Eve in *Gn. litt.* 9, it is now giving space to *inoboedientia carnis*, or concupiscence. In an almost ironic way, the sources and beginnings for human bodily existence bear the stain of mortality.<sup>124</sup>

Following this lead, *Gn. litt.* 11 is scattered with remarks on *concupiscentia* as a consequent punishment for Adam and Eve’s disobedience. In *Gn. litt.* 11, 11, 15, where Augustine praises God for His remarkably just ways of retribution and forgiveness, the correspondence of punishment to the sin is emphasised to the degree of becoming interchangeable: the first couple was tempted with a “desire of pride and lust for their own power” (*superba concupiscentia propriae potestatis*), which then led to *iustum subplicium*.<sup>125</sup>

Again, when the soul followed the serpent’s temptation, the soul felt a “proud presumption” concerning its status in relation to God, and love

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*gaturi filios, iam antea disputatum est; non tamen eo modo credendum est, quo propagauerunt, posteaquam crimen admissi praedicta ultio consecuta est, cum, priusquam morerentur, iam in corpore inoboedientium hominum iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedientium membrorum tumultum mors concepta uersaret.*

<sup>124</sup> For death intertwining with sexual desire, see also *Gn. litt.* 11, 31, 40 *ergo ederunt. et aperti sunt oculi amborum* [*Gn* 3,7]. *quo nisi ad inuicem concupiscendum, ad peccati poenam carnis ipsius morte conceptam, ut iam esset corpus non animale tantum, quod poterat, si oboedientiam conseruarent, in meliorem spiritalemque habitum sine morte mutari, sed iam corpus mortis, in quo lex in membris repugnaret legi mentis?*

<sup>125</sup> Even this chain of events is turned into something good by God, says Augustine, for it works as a warning for pride and disobedience for the future generations. *Gn. litt.* 11, 11, 15 *magna opera domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius! praeuidet bonos futuros et creat, praeuidet malos futuros et creat, se ipsum ad fruendum praebens bonis, multa munerum suorum largiens et malis, misericorditer ignoscens, iuste ulciscens, itemque misericorditer ulciscens, iuste ignoscens, nihil metuens de cuiusquam malitia, nihil indigens de cuiusquam iustitia, nihil sibi consulens nec de operibus bonorum et bonis consulens etiam de poenis malorum. cur ergo non permitteret temptari hominem illa temptatione prodendum, conuincendum, puniendum, cum superba concupiscentia propriae potestatis quod conceperat pareret suoque fetu confunderetur iustoque subplio a superbiae atque inoboedientiae malo posteros deterreret, quibus ea conscribenda et adnuntianda parabantur? Propria potestas should be taken literally, entailing a notion of the unsocial character of sin as a *peruersus sui amor*. Falling into the serpent’s temptation did not join Adam and Eve together, but separated them from each other. This aspect is illuminated by a wordplay on *priuatum* and *priuatio*: the more you want to possess only yourself, the less you actually have. See Markus 1990; Ruokanen 1993, 79.*

(*amor*) for its “own power.”<sup>126</sup> This proud desire was instantly (*mox*) reflected in the sensual and bodily state of Adam and Eve. In sum, their high-aiming attempt to achieve an ontological status independent from God had ridiculously failed: instead of *potestas*, they received a punishment carved in flesh, a sign of which they immediately felt in their lowest levels of being.<sup>127</sup> This bodily punishment also became a source of shame (*pudor*), not only because it consisted of a movement (*motus*) not felt before, but also because it originated from the transgression against God and His commandment.<sup>128</sup> The involuntary erection of Adam might thus be compared to a brand of a slave, testifying for a failed attempt to escape from his rightful Master.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>126</sup> *Gn. litt.* 11, 13, 17 *malam uero uoluntatem inordinate moueri bona inferiora superioribus praeponendo, atque ita factum esse, ut rationalis creaturae spiritus sua potestate propter excellentiam delectatus tumesceret superbia; Gn. litt.* 11, 30, 39 *quando his uerbis crederet mulier a bona atque utili re diuinitus se fuisse prohibitos, nisi iam inesset menti amor ille propriae potestatis et quaedam de se superba praesumptio, quae per illam temptationem fuerat conuincenda et humilianda?* This theme is also used in *trin.* 12, 16, where Augustine is not, however, wishing to add anything to his historical considerations of *Gn. litt.*, but approaches the subject from a distinctly psychological point of view. Thus, the concrete prohibition of Paradise, for instance, is not mentioned. On the contrary, the *leges* that Augustine seems to refer to are those by which “all universe is administered.” The Fall begins with a wish to be like God (*peruersus appetitus*), ending in a punitive existence that is much similar to that of irrational beasts (*trin.* 12, 16). Because man wished to “experiment on his own power” and to be like God, having no other authority than himself (*sub nullo*), he was cast into a punishment of a life comparable to that of beasts. The Fall appears as radical self-centredness, a “nod towards the middle.” Once the soul stops to reach out to God, it begins to lean and focus on itself. The image of God is then immediately distorted as the human person turns away from looking God’s face, and the original love of God’s wisdom (*neglecta caritate sapientia*) is changed into a desire of earthly knowledge (*concupiscitur scientia*). This rearrangement of the soul’s focus results in a disastrous “heaviness” in the soul, and the soul learns to its own detriment the true effect of its experiment in the will to power. Nevertheless, Augustine links these psychological considerations to the same verse of Rom 7, 24–25 as the ones in *Gn. litt.* and *pecc. mer.* Note also that the few remarks on the punishment for sin in *trin.* involve death; *trin.* 4, 5; 4, 15; 7, 5. Not until *trin.* 13, 23 does *concupiscentia* appear in connection with Paradise, in a discussion on the birth of Christ: 1) no *concupiscentia carnalis* was present in Paradise, at least in the present form, 2) *concupiscentia* appears now as the “involuntary movements” of the genitals 3) in allusion to Rom 7, *concupiscentia* goes against the law of mind (*lex mentis*). No further analogies to the disobedience of Adam and Eve are made in *trin.*

<sup>127</sup> *Gn. litt.* 11, 31, 41 *mox ergo ut praeceptum transgressi sunt intrinsecus gratia deserente omnino nudati, quam typho quodam et superbo amore suae potestatis offenderant, in sua membra oculos iniecerunt eaque motu eo, quem non nouerant, concupuerunt.* It would be tempting to suggest that Augustine expresses here an elaborate kind of *Schadenfreude*.

<sup>128</sup> *Gn. litt.* 11, 32, 42 *bestialem motum in membris suae carnis erubuit eique incussit pudorem non solum, quia hoc ibi sentiebat, ubi numquam antea tale aliquid senserat, uerum etiam quod ille pudendus motus de praecepti transgressionem ueniebat.*

<sup>129</sup> The metaphor is not altogether un-Augustinian, see *exp. Gal.* 64 on Gal 6, 17: *stigmata*

Due to their primary disobedience, Adam and Eve were punished by a secondary, bodily disobedience; because they were tempted to desire what was not theirs to desire, they were inflicted with a base, sensual movement of fleshly concupiscence. The original ('theological') fall of pride is reflected in human ('psychological') distress.

*Concupiscentia* as an ancient punitive heritage from the Fall of Paradise became a tool in Augustine's set of arguments in the gradually heightening Pelagian crisis towards the end of the 410s. The idea of a 'theologically' preconditioned sin being reflected in the human 'psychological' condition became a fortunate invention for Augustine during the 410s and was used to oppose the Pelagian claim of the intrinsic innocence of infants. In many works of the Pelagian period, some features of this idea are focused on at the expense of others; thus, for example, when Augustine is forcefully underlining the disorderly features of sexuality, it may be easy to forget his underlying theological inventions about the history of this punishment.<sup>130</sup>

The development of *concupiscentia* as a *poena peccati* finds its culmination in *de ciuitate dei* where Augustine discusses the circumstances of Paradise, the Fall and its consequences, with extensive argumentation and for good.<sup>131</sup> We will therefore conclude this section by examining Book 14 of Augustine's *opus magnum*.<sup>132</sup> His observations on *concupiscentia carnis* revolve around the disobedience of the body, the parallel and reciprocal nature of punitive *concupiscentia* and the harmoniously just form of this punishment.

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*enim dicuntur notae quaedam poenarum seruiliū, ut si quis, uerbi gratia, seruus in compedibus fuerit propter noxam, id est propter culpam, uel huiusmodi aliquid passus fuerit, stigmata habere dicatur.* For the practice, see Jones 1987.

<sup>130</sup> Solignac (1956, 375) rightly notes that the view of *concupiscentia* being a punishment was resulted from Augustine's literal exegesis on Genesis.

<sup>131</sup> In 420, Augustine discusses the topic again in *c. adu. leg.* 1, 18–26, only about two years after writing *ciu.* 14, but nothing substantially new is said there. Obedience has, again, a strong emphasis. By its nature, human will is necessarily situated under domination (*necesse sit uiuere sub potestate melioris*). Both the prohibition and the punishment were designed for useful purposes, *instituit [deus] quod prodesset, quia homo non sine bona mercede oboedientiam custodisset et non sine utili exemplo, ut eam sancti eius posterī custodirent, poenas inoboedientiae persoluisset* (*c. adu. leg.* 1, 21). For the date of the work, see Raveaux 1987, 7; for theories of provenance, see Coyle 2009, 297–306.

<sup>132</sup> In about 418, Augustine sent *ep.* 184A as a reply to inquiries about sin, sex and babies. In the letter, Augustine advises his recipients to read his books (perhaps with a hint to stop sending him any more letters); and tells that *ciu.* 14 was about to be finished at this time. Little later, ca. 420, in *c. adu. leg.* 1, 18, Augustine seems to think of *ciu.* 14 as the best expression of his thoughts in the matter.

3.2.1. *Disobedience*

Many of Augustine's previous ideas on punitive concupiscence are repeated on the pages of *ciu.*, even in detail.<sup>133</sup> Thus, the central role of obedience in Paradise is emphasised thoroughly. In fact, the division between obedience and disobedience is stressed in *ciu.* 14 to the extent that it characterizes the two opposite cities of *ciuitas dei* and *ciuitas terrena*.<sup>134</sup> In Paradise, obedience was the only virtue that rational human creatures, subordinated under God's dominion, were able to show to Him. Indeed, obedience was, and still is, the mother of all virtues.<sup>135</sup> By giving the commandment, God told Adam and Eve that He is the Lord.<sup>136</sup>

The parallelism between the two kinds of disobedience is strongly emphasised. Primal disobedience manifested itself in man's desire to be free on his own (*libertas quam concupiuit*), that is, in his pride. The secondary disobedience appears in the self-contradictory body-soul composition of the present state of humanity. Here Augustine makes use of a phrase already familiar from previous works: *inoboedientia retributa* (or *reddita*). On a larger scale, it could even be said that the human weakness of the will is due to Adam and Eve's unwillingness to subdue under divine domination.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>133</sup> Here, as elsewhere, the tree and fruit of good and evil knowledge were good by nature, although prohibited (*ciu.* 13, 20); it also was a sign for "the experience that comes with transgression of a commandment" (*ciu.* 13, 21).

<sup>134</sup> O'Daly 1999, 159: "The themes of obedience and self-assertion point to the polarization of the two cities, with their defining kinds of love (14.28). The polarity is expressed in political terms, in anticipation of the political themes of later books. The city of God is a community where consensus and recognition of authority prevail." See *ciu.* 14, 13 *pia humilitas facit subditum superiori; nihil est autem superius Deo; et ideo exaltat humilitas, quae facit subditum Deo* [...] *quapropter quod nunc in ciuitate Dei et ciuitati Dei in hoc peregrinanti saeculo maxime commendatur humilitas et in eius rege, qui est Christus, maxime praedicatur contrariumque huic uirtuti elationis uitium in eius aduersario, qui est diabolus, maxime dominari sacris litteris edocetur: profecto ista est magna differentia, qua ciuitas, unde loquimur, utraque discernitur.*

<sup>135</sup> *ciu.* 14, 12; see also *c. adu. leg.* 1, 19. Cf. Colish 1990, 227: "[Augustine's] nomination of obedience as the mother of the virtues in the City of God (14.12), rather than Stoic prudence, Aristotelian justice, or Ambrosian temperance, reflects the deep misgivings of the later Augustine about man's ability to function as a moral agent *sui iuris*." The idea of obedience as the matrix of all virtues is, of course, earlier than *ciu.* 14, appearing already in *b. coniug.* 32 and *s. Dolbeau* 2, 12, and thus perhaps not something that Augustine would subscribe to only in his "later" years.

<sup>136</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 [*praecepto*] *quo* [...] *se esse Dominum commonebat.*

<sup>137</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inobodientia retributa est? nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi aduersus eum ipsum inoboedientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest uelit?* For *reddita* see *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 15, 31; *c. adu. leg.* 1, 18; *nupt. et conc.* 2, 22. For *akrasia*, see Saarinen 1994, 20–43; especially pp. 30, 42–43; 1997.

The punishment thus received was reciprocal and is reflected now in our bodies:

They became aware, therefore, of a new stirring of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them as a punishment, in requital of their own disobedience to God. For the soul, now taking delight in its own freedom to do wickedness, and disdaining to serve God, was itself deprived of the erstwhile subjection of the body to it. Because it had of its own free will forsaken its superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant in obedience to its will. Nor could it in any way keep the flesh in subjection, as it would always have been able to do if it had itself remained subject to God. Then began the flesh to lust against the Spirit.<sup>138</sup> [transl. Dyson]

The close connection of the two kinds of disobediences is implicitly present in an interesting way in *ciu.* 13, 15, where God calls for Adam, who is hiding behind the trees. According to Augustine, this is an admonition to reflect one's disobedient identity in order to draw particular theological conclusions.

For in the disobedient stirring which arose in the flesh of the disobedient soul, by reason of which Adam and Eve covered their shameful parts, one death was indeed experienced: namely, that which occurs when God forsakes the soul. This was signified by the words which God spoke when man [...] had hidden himself [...] For God certainly did not ask this in ignorance of Adam's whereabouts, but to admonish him to reflect upon where he was, now that God was no longer with him.<sup>139</sup> [transl. Dyson]

The disobedient act of the first human beings had caused God to interrupt His presence in his human creation. In turn, God acts *per iustitiam* and abandons the souls of Adam and Eve. This abandonment Augustine now calls a kind of death (*mors*). Adam's bodily disorder reflects his crumbling ontological status and his broken relationship with God (*ubi esset, in quo deus*

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<sup>138</sup> *ciu.* 13, 13 *senserunt ergo nouum motum inoboedientis carnis suae, tamquam reciprocam poenam inoboedientiae suae. iam quippe anima libertate in peruersum propria delectata et deo dedignata seruire pristino corporis seruitio destituebatur, et quia superiorem dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat, nec omni modo habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si deo subdita ipsa mansisset. tunc ergo coepit caro concupiscere aduersus spiritum.*

<sup>139</sup> *ciu.* 13, 15 *tamquam diceret: qua die me deserueritis per inoboedientiam, deseram uos per iustitiam: profecto in ea morte etiam ceterae denuntiatae sunt, quae procul dubio fuerant securaturae. nam in eo, quod inoboediens motus in carne animae inoboedientis exortus est, propter quem pudenda texerunt, sensa est mors una, in qua deseruit animam deus. ea significata est uerbis eius, quando timore dementi sese abscondenti homini dixit: Adam, ubi es? non utique ignorando quaerens, sed increpando admonens, ut adtenderet ubi esset, in quo deus non esset.*

*non esset*). In the following book (*ciu.* 14), the state of punitive disobedience is explicitly connected to the corruption of the flesh (*ciu.* 14, 3), and documented by human emotions.<sup>140</sup> The secondary disobedience is clearly visible in the soul's unwillingness to yield to its own volitions and, even worse, in the body's reluctance to obey the soul's commandments.<sup>141</sup> In this disobedience, the disorder shown by the procreative members holds the pride of place. So the "punitive disobedience" of *libido* is resulted from a "culpable disobedience" in Paradise.<sup>142</sup>

The range of divine punishments for Adam and Eve's sin in *de ciuitate dei* varies, including very generally death and corruption.<sup>143</sup> The distinct emphasis of the Genesis-narratives in *ciu.* 14 is, however, on the very special sign of disobedience, which can be discerned in human procreation. Admitting that all kinds of emotions entail something of the involuntary disobedience to the mind's control, Augustine takes sexual desire to represent divine punishment in its most acute form, and this is fitting (*maxime oportuit*), for in the genitals *libido* takes entirely over all kind of mental control, and "in that part of the body the generation of the very nature is brought about."<sup>144</sup>

### 3.2.2. Justice

Augustine's insistence, as always, is also in *ciu.* 14 on the deeply *just* character of God's punishment. While Augustine acknowledges in *ciu.* 14, 12 the strange and unique nature of Adam and Eve's transgression in that it "mutated the very being of humanity" (*natura [...] praeuaricatione mutata est*), he points out the unique and aggravating circumstances in the first sin of disobedience that earned the punishments endured presently by humanity.

<sup>140</sup> Emotions are treated in length in *ciu.* 14, 6–10. See Chapter 5 for discussion and literature.

<sup>141</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest uelit, dum sibi ipse, id est uoluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat?* See also *ciu.* 14, 23.

<sup>142</sup> *ciu.* 14, 23 *hanc repugnantiam, hanc uoluntatis et libidinis rixam uel certe ad uoluntatis sufficientiam libidinis indigentiam procul dubio, nisi culpabilis inoboedientia poenali inoboedientia plecteretur, in paradiso nuptiae non haberent.*

<sup>143</sup> This is all neatly summarized in *ciu.* 14, 1 *id inoboedientia meruissent, a quibus admissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteris obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa.* For punishments, see Macqueen 1973, 260–265.

<sup>144</sup> *ciu.* 14, 20.

Augustine points out several factors that formed these aggravating circumstances and justify the severe punishment that followed the primal disobedience. First, there were outward factors, involving the commandment as such and the living conditions in Eden. This means that God's commandment was quite easy to observe, for it was simple and small, and there was only one of them. Hence, it was also rather easy to remember. In addition, Augustine notes that there was such an abundance of food in Eden that there was no real need to touch the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil.<sup>145</sup>

[God] had not burdened him with a large number of oppressive and difficult precepts, but had given him one very brief and easy commandment to keep him in wholesome obedience.<sup>146</sup> [transl. Dyson]

Second, Augustine lists interior factors that underscore the need for an exceptional punishment. One of these factors is the original state of will: with no evil desire (*cupiditas*) opposing the intact will of Adam and Eve, the commandment was extremely simple to follow. Another factor, as Augustine notes, is that human nature was created in such a way that it was "to [Adam's] advantage to be subject to God, and harmful to him to act according to his own will rather than that of his Creator."<sup>147</sup>

While Adam's task was so easy, the crime was therefore all the more terrible.<sup>148</sup> Adam and Eve fell out of their own free will.<sup>149</sup> There is no excuse for their sin, and there is hence no question about the just nature of the divinely ordered psychological disobedience, or *concupiscentia carnis*. Augustine is very careful to defend God's judgment in this matter, and forcefully denies it to be "excessive or unjust" (*uel nimia uel iniusta*), for Adam and Eve had such an easy time in not sinning.<sup>150</sup> Augustine is led to defend God's single

<sup>145</sup> *ciu.* 14, 12.

<sup>146</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat, sed uno breuissimo atque leuissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculauerat*. The prohibition is an *adminiculum*; a support, not a hindrance.

<sup>147</sup> *ciu.* 14, 12 *oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae uirtus in creatura rationali mater quodam modo est omnium custosque uirtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei subditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere uoluntatem*. Augustine had mentioned the "usefulness" (*utile*) of being submitted to a commandment in *Gn. litt.* 8, 13, 30; and in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 15, 22.

<sup>148</sup> *ciu.* 14, 12 *tanto maiore iniustitia uiolatum est, quanto faciliore posset obseruantia custodiri*.

<sup>149</sup> *ciu.* 12, 22 *libera uoluntate*. Cf. 13, 13.

<sup>150</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *quisquis huius modi damnationem uel nimiam uel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas*.



and easy command by contrasting it to the more difficult test of obedience of Abraham, and to that of Christ, who obeyed Father “until death.”

There are, again, three discernible factors, which make Adam’s crime “detestable”: first, the commandment was simple and easy to obey, second, God’s authority was highest imaginable (*tanta potestas*), and third, the threat of punishment was known beforehand.<sup>151</sup> With such justifications, Augustine has created a defence for divine punishment. This is not to say that no difficulties remain, as Augustine himself admits. For it is not perfectly clear *how* the reciprocal punishment of Adam’s disobedience is converted into our empirical disobedience: one has, however, to concede that this happens “through the justice of Lord God, Whom we refused to serve as his subjects.” While a case can be made for God’s justice and His punishments, it does not in the end matter (*quid interest unde*) how well the arguments are formed or understood, for God’s justice cannot be questioned. The problem of how an ethical choice was turned into a hereditary quality resurfaces, as we shall soon see, with a vengeance during the debate with Julian of Aeclanum.<sup>152</sup>

In justifying divine punishment, Augustine is therefore keen to point out factors that make *concupiscentia* seem as a perfectly deserved and reasonable consequence for the evil choice that Adam and Eve made in Paradise. *Concupiscentia*, as a divine punishment, has an intellectual form and use in the fallen humanity. With other punitive sufferings, *concupiscentia teaches* the fallen humankind of its glorious past and inglorious fall, and *makes understandable* the miseries of the present life. In addition, it turns the Christian intellect to gaze at the life that lies in the future. Augustine thereby invites his readers to acknowledge the intellectual contents of *concupiscentia*: as a divine punishment, it has a reflective value, which may be given certain intellectual significance, so that it can be seen to refer both to the history of humankind, and to its future hope alike:

Thus, “An heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam, from the day that they return to the mother of all things.” Yet even this evil is found to be marvellous; for it teaches us to live soberly and to understand (*intellegamus*) that, by reason of

<sup>151</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15.

<sup>152</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15 *quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis dei, cui subditi servire nolumus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non serviendo molesta sit.* Note that *concupiscentia* is not the only form of divine punishment that is entirely just but not entirely understandable. God’s judgments (*iudicia*) cannot be followed in this life, *ciu.* 20, 1–2. Be that as it may, God’s justice cannot be questionable: *iustitiam uindicantis iuste nemo reprehenderet, ciu.* 21, 17.

that first and most grievous sin which was committed in Paradise, this life has been made penal to us, and that all the promises of the new covenant refer only to our new inheritance in the world to come.<sup>153</sup> [transl. Dyson]

### 3.2.3. *Rhetorical Aesthetics of Punitive Concupiscence*

In *ciu.* 14, Augustine paints the aesthetic correspondence between the original state of beatitude and the present state of punishments in strong and impressive colours. An extensive sequence in *ciu.* 14, 15 is assigned to a rhetorically impressive picture on the subject of disobedience and punishments, preceding Augustine's treatise of *concupiscentia* as *inoboedientia carnis*.

A heuristic arrangement of these lines reveals how Augustine here works with the ideas of analogy and parallel and is fascinated by the invention of the correspondence of punishments:

(1) quia ergo contemptus est deus iubens,  
qui creauerat,  
qui ad suam imaginem fecerat,  
qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat,  
qui in paradiso constituerat,  
qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat,  
qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat [...]:

(2) iusta damnatio subsecuta est [...]

(3) ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum  
futurus fuerat etiam *carne spiritalis*,  
fieret etiam *mente carnalis*

(4) qui  
sua *superbia* sibi placuerat,  
dei *iustitia* sibi donaretur;

(5) nec sic,  
ut *in sua* esset omnimodis potestate,  
sed *a se ipse* quoque *dissentiens*  
*sub illo*, cui peccando *consensit*,

(6) pro *libertate*, quam concupiuit,  
duram miseramque ageret *seruitutem*,

<sup>153</sup> *ciu.* 21, 15 *uerum tamen in graui iugo, quod positum est super filios Adam a die exitus de uentre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium, etiam hoc malum mirabile reperitur, ut sobrii simus atque intellegamus hanc uitam de peccato illo nimis nefario, quod in paradiso perpetratum est, factam nobis esse poenalem totumque, quod nobiscum agitur per testamentum nouum, non pertinere nisi ad noui saeculi hereditatem nouam.*

(7) mortuus spiritu uolens  
 et corpore moriturus inuitus,  
 desertor aeternae uitae  
 etiam aeterna [...] morte damnatus.<sup>154</sup>

Augustine first (1) compiles all the good things that God had given to Adam and Eve; this is evidence of the immensity of the evil that Adam and Eve committed by abandoning such goods. Such *enumeratio* also speaks for the just and equal punishment, which God subsequently distributed (2) to humanity. Along with divine punishment, the destiny that was intended for Adam and Eve was turned upside down (3): the body that was meant to be changed into a spiritual entity was now corrupted. It also infected the mind with the corruption of the flesh. Human pride and divine justice are then opposed (4) to each other; the desire for independence led to the disintegration of mind and body (5). The desire for freedom ended in slavery (of disturbed desires) (6). The mirror image of the spiritual death of Adam's own will is the future bodily death against his will (7).

These rhetorical parallels depict well Augustine's view of distributive justice as a force creating harmony and balance even from disorder and damage. The result is that in the pages of *ciu.* 14, the idea of *concupiscentia carnis* as a divine punishment is given an aesthetic silver lining: there lies, in Augustine's mind, a certain kind of beauty and harmony in the beastly state of bodily corruption.<sup>155</sup>

The view of *concupiscentia carnis* as a psychological disorder corresponding to the theological disobedience of Adam and Eve remained in Augustine's use as a commonplace argument during the later phases of the Pelagian debate.<sup>156</sup> Thus, in *de gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, a work written in 418 in order to refute Pelagius' and Caelestius' theological core convictions, Augustine takes up the problem of *concupiscentia*, or *libido*, while discussing the goods and evils of marriage. To Augustine, Christian married life and propagation entails both *natura* and *naturae uitium*. The former

<sup>154</sup> *ciu.* 14, 15.

<sup>155</sup> The beauty of justice is different in Heaven, see. *ciu.* 19, 27 *hic itaque in unoquoque iustitia est, ut oboedienti deus homini, animus corpori, ratio autem uitii etiam repugnantibus imperet, uel subigendo uel resistendo [...]. in illa uero pace finali, quo referenda et cuius adipiscendae causa habenda est ista iustitia, quoniam sanata immortalitate atque incorruptione natura uitia non habebit nec unicuique nostrum uel ab alio uel a se ipso quippiam repugnabit, non opus erit ut ratio uitii, quae nulla erunt, imperet; sed imperabit deus homini, animus corpori, tantaque ibi erit oboediendi suauitas et facilitas, quanta uiuendi regnandique felicitas.*

<sup>156</sup> In a concise form, see e.g. *cont.* 21.

indicates God as the Creator, but the latter points (*indicat*) to God as a “punisher of disobedience.”<sup>157</sup> The same applies to sexual shame, which in the present life is connected to the first disobedient act and its divine punishment in Paradise; shame therefore carries a theological message, reminding humanity of God and His justice.<sup>158</sup>

### 3.3. DEFENDING DIVINE PUNISHMENT AND DIVINE JUSTICE

So far, we have seen how Augustine as a rule emphasises divine justice (*iustitia*) in punishing the fallen humanity with a set of varying punishments, and, concerning especially our case, with *concupiscentia carnis*. The justice of the retributive side of *concupiscentia* is underlined by depictions that focus on the harmoniously reciprocal correspondence between Adam and Eve’s primal disobedience and the involuntary movements of the body and soul in sexual desire. Augustine has also pointed out God’s own nature as the ultimate guarantee for the just character of *concupiscentia* as a punishment. During the last decade of his life, Augustine was confronted by the acute and detailed criticism of Julian of Aeclanum. While all of Julian’s philosophical and theological criticism against Augustine’s hamartiological and anthropological convictions lies beyond the scope of this study, we will, however, focus on those parts of Julian’s and Augustine’s debate that concern *concupiscentia* as a *poena*, and how the justice of such a punishment can be argued (or denied) and understood.<sup>159</sup>

<sup>157</sup> Nature and corruption, in this case, thus work as signs pointing to God. *gr. et pecc. or. 2, 38 simul autem utrumque propagatur, et natura et naturae uitium, quorum est unum bonum, alterum malum. illud de conditoris largitate sumitur, hoc de origine damnationis attrahitur; illi est causa bona uoluntas dei summi, huic mala uoluntas hominis primi; illud indicat deum creaturae institutorem, hoc indicat deum inoboedientiae punitorem.*

<sup>158</sup> *gr. et pecc. or. 2, 39 quicquid est pudendum in membrorum illa inoboedientia, de qua erubuerunt qui post peccatum foliis ficulneis eadem membra texerunt [...] inputatur peccato inoboedientiae, cuius haec poena est consecuta, ut homo inoboediens deo sua quoque sibi inoboedientia membra sentiret, de quibus erubescens, quod non ad arbitrium uoluntatis eius, sed ad libidinis incentiuum uelut arbitrio proprio mouerentur, quae pudenda iudicauit, operienda curauit. non enim confundi debuit homo de opere dei aut ullo modo fuerant creato erubescenda, quae instituenda uisa sunt creatori. itaque nec deo nec homini illa simplex nuditas displicebat, quando nihil erat pudendum, quia nihil praecesserat puniendum.* See also *gr. et pecc. or. 2, 41 quia nisi praeisset facinus, quod inoboedientia est ausa committere, non sequeretur dedecus, quod uerecundia uellet abscondere.*

<sup>159</sup> For Julian in general, Lössl (2001) is now the standard work. For Julian’s views on central theological topics such as creation, sin, and man, Christology and *concupiscentia*, see also Lamberigts 1988, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2008a.

The question of justice and God's retribution has also been discussed, from slightly various angles, from time to time during the last three decades.<sup>160</sup> Four examples are given here:

Alistair McGrath (1983) has made the point that Augustine seems to have followed a classical notion of justice in the works prior to *Simpl.* In *Simpl.*, however, the concept of justice underwent a significant change in that its source in divine nature was now claimed to be hidden from human reflection, and Augustine starts to make a clear difference between human and divine justice.<sup>161</sup> In McGrath's description, Julian of Aeclanum followed a Ciceronian model in defining justice (*restituens suum unicuique*), and theologically based this claim on God's equity towards all individuals according to their merits.<sup>162</sup> In opposition, Augustine justifies his basic views on original sin and grace by the notion of justice that he had already presented in *Simpl.*: this notion entails that God indeed acts justly but in a way that does not lend itself to "some commonsense *quid pro quo* morality." Instead, according to McGrath, Augustine ties justice to "divine nature itself" and the "divine promises of mercy."<sup>163</sup> In McGrath's view, Augustine's notion of justice was likewise opposite to Julian's in that it did not consider people "purely as individuals, but as members of the fallen race."<sup>164</sup> In sum, McGrath emphasises the way Augustine's and Julian's debate showed how "divine justice and human justice may be related," but not "identical."<sup>165</sup>

John Rist (1994) offers an important discussion on the topic of the inscrutable divine justice in the debate of Augustine and Julian. Rist proposes that, for Augustine, justice was "primarily, if not exclusively, as the setting aright of what has become disordered, the restoring of a proper balance." Rist is also convinced that Augustine "rejects arbitrariness."<sup>166</sup> But in general, Rist thinks that Julian eventually held the upper hand in the question of justice

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<sup>160</sup> For the concept of justice in general, see Dihle 1978; and particularly in Augustine, see Dodaro 2009.

<sup>161</sup> Fredriksen (1995) iterates the same point of the role of *Simpl.* in conceiving of justice, but in somewhat sharper terms. Thus, in Fredriksen's (1995, 308) view, "Augustine, in short, abandoned *any thought* of God as an exemplar of justice" (*italics mine*). Again, "post-396, this God's ways, to time-bound humans, were unknowable in principle, opaque" (p. 311).

<sup>162</sup> McGrath 1983, 314. Cf., however, Lamberigts's (2002, 191n88) criticism in this respect: "this study devotes too little systematic attention to the biblical basis upon which Julian founded his vision of justice."

<sup>163</sup> McGrath 1983, 316.

<sup>164</sup> McGrath 1983, 317.

<sup>165</sup> McGrath 1983, 318.

<sup>166</sup> Rist 1994, 273.

(and divine punishment). Like Paula Fredriksen (1995), Rist sees Augustine's notion of justice as being hidden in God's inscrutable nature leading to very problematic positions, and acknowledges Julian for having pointed this out:

Julian's underlying point is that the justice of Augustine's God appears *totally unlike* [italics mine] human ideas of justice. If that were the case, then on purely Platonic grounds we could form no notion of justice at all [...] Augustine's difficulty lies not in his insistence that God's justice is vastly superior to our own, or to anything we can imagine, but in that it seems (to Julian) to be *a different kind of thing altogether* [italics mine], merely being given the same name.<sup>167</sup>

Again, "there is no reason why justice should be uniquely incomprehensible, and Julian's attack is more serious than Augustine would allow."<sup>168</sup>

Josef Lössl (2001, 2002) has also made similar observations on the difference between Augustine and Julian in this respect. Lössl, and Rist, seem to admit the legitimacy of Julian's critique in pointing out that if the notion of justice is severed from all human analogies it becomes unsustainable.<sup>169</sup> Lössl notes that even negative statements of God's nature become impossible if the analogy between divine and human justice is completely denied:

Augustine's case [was] that human and divine justice are incomparable because of the fundamental difference between divine and human nature. Taking Julian's query a step further one might ask how, if that is the case, Augustine, as a creature, should be able to make a judgment about God's nature of the kind: "We cannot make a judgment about God's nature?" At the level of creation, as Julian already points out, divine justice can only be measured by the standards of human justice.<sup>170</sup>

Robert Dodaro (2004) has studied Augustine's theological notions of justice and their manifestation in his political thought and practice. Dodaro acknowledges and evaluates carefully Augustine's insights into the hiddenness of divine justice, and relates them to Augustine's doctrine of grace and

<sup>167</sup> Rist 1994, 276.

<sup>168</sup> Rist 1994, 276.

<sup>169</sup> So Lössl (2001, 132) paraphrasing Julian's lines of thought in *c. Iul. imp* 4, 136: "Denken und Sein Gottes und der Menschen entsprechen sich. Ein menschlichen Begriffen und menschlicher Vernunft *völlig entzogener* [italics mine] göttlicher Gerechtigkeitsbegriff, wie er von Augustinus vertreten wird, ist in sich widersprüchlich. Vielmehr ist Gott und das Prinzip seines Handelns der menschlichen Vernunft zugänglich."

<sup>170</sup> Lössl 2002, 224n62, criticizing here McGrath's defence of the Augustinian notion of justice. McGrath, however, seems to me to advocate a more modest claim than Lössl thinks he is: all depends on the qualifications applied to the difference on human and divine justice. Are they "incomparable," and "totally unlike," or "related," although not "identical"?

incarnation. In a chapter entitled “Wisdom’s hidden reasons,” Dodaro charts Augustine’s way of joining divine justice to divine mercy and the mystery of Christ’s humility: The cross of Christ symbolizes in its form the hiddenness of God’s grace and mercy as well as justice. So to know divine justice is to love God, and this love is only acquired by receiving the sacrament of Christ and following him.<sup>171</sup> The form of divine justice can only be adequately known by love, not by knowing and practicing the classical definition of justice, ‘to render to each his due.’<sup>172</sup> “[A]ccording to Augustine it is only through faith in Christ’s sacrament that the example of Paul’s justice spurs the soul on to deeper love of God, in whom the form of justice resides.”<sup>173</sup> Dodaro also points out how Augustine connects the knowledge of justice to the confession of sins; in other words, the correct form of speech in explaining divine justice is that of a confessor.<sup>174</sup> In placing oneself to the role of a repentant, such as King David, the perspective to divine justice becomes corrected, as it becomes dependent of divine grace. In brief, an insistent and autonomous attitude, relying on human reasoning and knowledge, cannot comprehend or submit to the hiddenness of divine mercy, and thereby divine justice. In this way, Dodaro emphasises the correct self-knowledge of the human observer in relation to God in Augustine’s insights into mysterious divine justice.<sup>175</sup>

We will now turn to the debate between Julian and Augustine and see how the notion of hidden divine justice is applied to the punishment of *concupiscentia carnis*. As Julian’s criticism was aimed at Augustine’s insistence on both God’s justice and at his notion of seemingly involuntary sin, Augustine had to formulate these views once more and yet more sharply. In short, *concupiscentia* as a reciprocal punishment for the properly voluntary act of Adam and Eve, and its origin in God’s ultimate justice are unquestionable points for Augustine and his defence. How did Julian criticize this? What kinds of arguments did Augustine shape in defending his position? Was Augustine merely satisfied in pointing out the inscrutable justice of God in afflicting humanity with the punishment of *concupiscentia carnis*?

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<sup>171</sup> Dodaro 2004, 159, 162.

<sup>172</sup> Dodaro 2004, 158. See also *ibid.*, 169, “since knowledge of God and knowledge of justice are commensurate with each other, and knowledge and love of God are similarly interrelated, then knowledge of justice and love of God are likewise commensurate with each other.”

<sup>173</sup> Dodaro 2004, 159.

<sup>174</sup> Dodaro 2004, 173.

<sup>175</sup> Dodaro 2004, 178–181.

3.3.1. *Starting the Defence*—nupt. et conc. and c. ep. Pel.

Augustine's debate with Julian was marred by unfavourable practical circumstances; these are now well charted.<sup>176</sup> In the first stages of this debate, Augustine is satisfied with mostly repeating his previous ideas concerning *concupiscentia* and its punitive character. In the course of their prolonged discussion, Augustine is, however, compelled to adopt a defensive position.

The first book of *de nuptiis et concupiscentia* was written in 418/419 as a reaction to Julian's initial critique of Augustine's views on original sin. Arguing for his view on sexual desire being corrupted by sin, Augustine returns to Gen 3 in *nupt. et conc.* 1, 6–7. First, Augustine states that to touch the fruit of the tree of good and evil knowledge was indeed a critical moment in relation to sexual behaviour, for this afflicted Adam and Eve's souls with shame (or, as Augustine sees it, "their eyes were opened"). Then he presents his already standard model in which the primal act of disobedience and the bodily disobedience, manifested by the involuntary movements of their members, are matched together. The consequences of the theological offence against God was immediately "felt" (*sensit*) and "found" (*inuenit*) in their body after the first transgression of divine law. The "other law," as it was referred to by Pauline authority, is a "most honourable retribution of disobedience" (*dignissime retributa inoboedientia*) for the disobedience of Adam and Eve against God. This retributive disobedience thus served immediately as a means of acknowledging and realizing the primal, theological disobedience; *concupiscentia* was a link that made the first disobedience concrete and empirical (*tunc in se quippe sensit homo quod fecit*). There is also another point to be considered, for as Augustine reminds us, it would be quite unjust (*iniustum*), if the human body would serve such a mind that did not originally serve God as its Lord. Injustice here refers obviously to the hierarchical order of authority. Just as humans are placed below God as their Lord (*dominus*), so should their bodies serve them as their slaves (*seruus*). The broken relationship to God as one's unquestionable ruler was reflected in the broken rule over one's bodily functions.<sup>177</sup>

<sup>176</sup> For a good and quick overview of the chain of events and of who responded to whom, and to which text, see Lamberigts 2008c, 837–840.

<sup>177</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 7 *ibi homo primitus dei lege transgressa aliam legem repugnantem suae menti habere coepit in membris et inoboedientiae suae malum sensit, quando sibi dignissime retributam inoboedientiam suae carnis inuenit. talem quippe etiam serpens oculorum apertionem seducendo promiserat, ad aliquid uidelicet sciendum, quod melius nesciretur. tunc in se quippe sensit homo quod fecit, tunc a bono malum non carendo, sed perpetiando discreuit.*



However, God chose one particular bodily function as a carrier for the punitive disobedience. What is left of the free will cannot but blush over the fact that it is not able to control the act of reproduction but is bound to the irrational and involuntary impulses of the genitals; these produce new “natures,” and were thus most fitting (*ubi conuenientius*) to be the objects of God’s distributive justice.<sup>178</sup> Clearly Augustine is here convinced of the harmony and persuasiveness of his own argument. The involuntary discontinuity of the body and soul in using the genitals, their purpose in producing offspring and their concealment by Adam and Eve in Gen 3, all argue neatly, in Augustine’s view for his case: the first disobedience, and its effects on human nature, is *demonstrated* (*monstraretur*) best in these parts of the body.<sup>179</sup> Since Adam and Eve despised their creator and His command (*imperantem deum*) by their free choice of will, God meted out a parallel punishment in their mind-body constitution, so that their command (*imperium*) over their own bodily movements was lost.<sup>180</sup>

As in previous texts, Augustine’s notion of sexual shame in *nupt. et conc.* is closely connected to the punitive side of *concupiscentia*. In other words, shame arises from the fact that one cannot control one’s bodily members. *Concupiscentia* was named as law of sin by Paul, for it has a quasi-dominant, subordinating quality, thereby perversely reflecting the pristine, genuine dominion of God over humanity. Such disorder and disjunction of the right order is bound to create shame.<sup>181</sup> Furthermore, what should be a “servant of

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*iniustum enim erat, ut obtemperaretur a seruo suo, id est a corpore suo ei qui non obtemperarat domino suo.*

<sup>178</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 7 *ubi autem conuenientius monstraretur inoboedientiae merito humanam deprauatam esse naturam quam in his inoboedientibus locis, unde per successionem subsistit ipsa natura? nam ideo proprie istae corporis partes naturae nomine nuncupantur.* In *nupt. et conc.* 2, 53 Augustine mentions the original control over all bodily functions taking examples from some organs which are controlled in present state as well (e.g. bladder). But because they do not take part in procreation they were left under voluntary control.

<sup>179</sup> Augustine does not here discern between the sexes: both male and female genitals are included.

<sup>180</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 7. Augustine plays here deliberately with the notion of *libertas arbitrii*, a highly regarded concept in the Pelagian view of sin. See also *nupt. et conc.* 1, 9 where Augustine claims that *concupiscentia* is now adjoined to human propagation as a “necessity,” overriding and replacing the original control of the rational will, thus adding to the embarrassment, *iste concubitus, qui nihil morbidae libidinis haberet adiunctum, si non praecedente peccato in eo perisset libertatis arbitrium, quod nunc id habet adiunctum, non sit uoluntatis, sed necessitatis, sine qua tamen in procreandis filiis ad fructum perueniri non potest ipsius uoluntatis.*

<sup>181</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 24. Augustine here mentions the Cynic philosophers as an exception to the rule; elsewhere (*ciu.* 14, 20) he thinks that even Cynics only fake their unashamed attitude to public presentation of sex.

the superior" is now discerned as a punishment of a disobedient will. Once more, sexual embarrassment, shame and disorderly impulses "indicate" (*indicat*) to the fact that *concupiscentia* is a punishment for an original, disobedient will.<sup>182</sup>

In the remarks of *nupt. et conc.* on *concupiscentia* as a parallel punishment for Adam and Eve's disobedience, there is an interesting undertone of the importance of recognizing *concupiscentia* as a sign of, or evidence for, what took place in the ancient history of humanity. The corruption of sexual desire is a concrete, sensed, and obvious sign, which demonstrates, shows, and indicates. To Augustine, its evil disorderly character refutes the mistaken opposite view, according to which *concupiscentia* is a created good, promoting the good goal of marriage. But it is equally important to note how Augustine places emphasis on what could be said to be the non-sensual side of *concupiscentia*: for *concupiscentia* is unlike any other reoccurring emotion or temptation in that it signifies and points, with interpretable cognitive contents, to the relationship of God and humanity in its ideal and fallen state. Due to its growing importance in mirroring divine retributive justice, *concupiscentia* had achieved a role as natural theological evidence; *concupiscentia* is theology carved in flesh, so to speak.<sup>183</sup>

Two years later in 420/421, Augustine was urged to respond to Julian's reactions against *nupt. et conc.* (*ad Turbantium*, written in 419). Augustine based his answer on an epitome made of Julian's work, and attached it as a second book to *nupt. et conc.* In *de nuptiis et concupiscentia* 2, Augustine repeats his standard formulations of *concupiscentia* being a parallel punishment for the sin of disobedience in Paradise.<sup>184</sup> He also returns to the topic of sexual shame and cites it again as evidence for the punitive character

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<sup>182</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 27 *non tamen nisi ipse quodam quasi suo imperio mouet membra, quae moueri uoluntate non possunt, atque ita se indicat non imperantis famulum, sed inoboedientis supplicium uoluntatis.*

<sup>183</sup> Note also Augustine's remark of a need to think and observe human sexual behaviour in its fallen state in *nupt. et conc.* 1, 8: *quia ergo nec isto adiuncto malo perire potuit nuptiarum bonum, putant imprudentes hoc non esse malum, sed pertinere ad illud bonum. discernitur autem non solum ratione subtili, uerum etiam uulgatissimo iudicio naturali, quod et in illis apparuit hominibus primis et hodieque tenetur ab hominibus coniugatis.* Only "stupid" people cannot draw the right conclusions from the evidence given by Adam and Eve, and the present humanity alike, that the good of marriage should be separated from *malum concupiscentiae*. Such a discernment only requires "rudimentary common sense." It is perhaps useful to recall that Augustine detests an intellectually mistaken description of *concupiscentia* as much as he is repelled by the "bestial" and sensual confusion of sexual desire.

<sup>184</sup> For these standard formulations, see e.g. *nupt. et conc.* 2, 53–54.

of *concupiscentia* (called also “wound” or “the tinder of sin” here).<sup>185</sup> Adam and Eve’s punishment is shared by the present humanity alike. This highly just, reciprocal disobedience (*inoboedientia iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedientibus reddita*) causes shame, which indicates that *concupiscentia* cannot be of God’s doing, for who would be so “ungrateful” or “impious” as to feel shame for God’s good work?<sup>186</sup> Later in the same book, Augustine again emphasises what he thinks to be crucial in deciding on the quality of *concupiscentia*: its disobedience to the control of the will. This is a disobedience that was earned by much greater disobedience, and was hence transferred (in which way, is not considered here) to future generations. Augustine is here even prepared to allow *concupiscentia* a place in the original human constitution in Paradise, given that it was there an obedient servant of man’s will and reason, and “moved in an obedient and orderly fashion.” In the present state, such a version of *concupiscentia carnis* is no longer an option, for it was made faulty (*uitiata*) by God’s just decree, and was then transferred to future generations.<sup>187</sup>

<sup>185</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 2, 22. This is the only instance of *fomes* occurring as a metaphor for *concupiscentia* in Augustine. Cf. however *ep.* 167, 10; a letter to Hieronymus on marital chastity.

<sup>186</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 2, 22 *sed profecto illud nos pudet, quod puduit primos illos homines, quando pudenda texerunt. illa est poena peccati, illa plaga uestigiumque peccati, illa inlecebra fomesque peccati, illa lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, illa ex nobis ipsis aduersus nos ipsos inoboedientia iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedientibus reddita. huius nos pudet et merito pudet. nam si hoc non esset, quid nobis esset ingratus, quid inreligiosus, si in membris nostris non de uitio uel de poena nostra, sed de dei confunderemur operibus?* See also *nupt. et conc.* 2, 26.

<sup>187</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 2, 59 *et si non uult concedere uitium esse libidinem, dicat saltem per illorum hominum inoboedientiam etiam ipsam uitiatam esse carnis concupiscentiam, ut illa, quae oboedienter et ordinate moueretur, nunc inoboedienter inordinateque moueatur, ita ut ipsis quoque pudicis ad nutum non obtemperet coniugatis, sed et quando non est necessaria moueatur et, quando necessaria est, aliquando citius, aliquando tardius, eorum sequatur nutus, sed suos exerat motus. hanc ergo eius inoboedientiam inoboedientes illi tunc homines receperunt et in nos propagine transfuderunt. neque enim ad eorum nutum, sed utique inordinate mouebatur, quando membra prius glorianda, tunc iam pudenda texerunt.* The outline of this suggestion can be seen in a letter from the same period to Atticus, in which Augustine suggests two possible options: either there was no *concupiscentia* in Paradise, or it was of the kind that is now unavailable to us. Augustine describes the second option in the following way: *haec ergo concupiscentia carnis si fuit in paradiso, ut per illam filii generarentur ad implendam benedictionem nuptiarum multiplicatione hominum, non utique talis qualis nunc est fuit cuius motus et ad licita et ad illicita indifferenter inhiaret; auferretur in multa turpissima, si quocumque moueretur peruenire sineretur, contra quam pugnandum esset, ut castitas seruaretur; sed talis esset—si tamen ulla ibi esset—qua numquam caro aduersus spiritum concupisceret, sed uoluntatis nunc pace mirabili non excederet, ut numquam adesset, nisi cum opus esset, numquam delectatione inordinata uel illicita se animo cogitantis ingereret, nihil haberet improbandum quod habenis temperantiae frenaretur aut expugnaretur labore uirtutis, sed utentis uolun-*

While Augustine had written *nupt. et conc.* 1 in response to Julian's letters to Valerius and Zosimus, he felt it necessary to react to two other documents composed by Julian in the wake of the events of 418, namely Julian's *epistula ad Romanos* and *epistula ad Rufum Thessalonicensem*. This reaction is known as *contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*, written at the same time as *nupt. et conc.* 2, in 420/421. The basic propositions on the punitive *concupiscentia* are quite similar to what we have already seen.<sup>188</sup>

Augustine once more admits that sexual behaviour as such (*motus genitalium, uirilitas*) was part of God's good creation, but, as in *nupt. et conc.* discerns as separate the punitive, disobedient element of *concupiscentia*, which resulted from Adam and Eve's disobedience to God.<sup>189</sup> Augustine sketches four options for the sexual behaviour in Paradise, of which he could approve of two: either *libido* was completely at the service of voluntary control, so that it did not precede, nor did it slow down, nor did it exceed the command of will; or, there was no particular sexual pleasure in Paradise at all.<sup>190</sup> Whatever the state of sexual conduct in Paradise was, one matter is clear: such a state is not found anywhere in present humanity, due to the divine punishment which has been imprinted on human sexual behaviour. Even Christian spouses suffer from these divine punitive measures. Augustine again insists that the importune and disobedient element of *concupiscentia* "testifies" (*testetur*) to the ancient crime of theological disobedience. This involuntary, restless, and disordered fashion of sexual conduct points to Paradise, where Adam and Eve abandoned God's commandment and took all future generations with them in this act of disobedience.<sup>191</sup>

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*tatem, quando necessaria fuisset, facili atque concordī oboedientia sequeretur. nunc ergo quoniam talis non est eiusque aduersitatem oportet ut castitas eluctetur, fateantur eam peccato esse uitiatam. ep. 6\*, 8.* In this description, obedience to will's control is also stressed. This lengthy and admittedly fantastic description serves at least one purpose: it is very easy for Augustine to make the final conclusion (*haec ergo*): look, it is obvious we do not have this kind of *concupiscentia*!

<sup>188</sup> Thus, the formulations between *nupt. et conc.* 2, 53 *hominibus illis inoboedientibus membrorum istorum inoboedientia iusto supplicio redderetur* and *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 31 *inoboedientia membrorum supplicio iusto primis hominibus inoboedientibus reddita est*, show, if not anything else, at least the settled way Augustine was by now approaching the topic.

<sup>189</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 31.

<sup>190</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 34–35. The other two options were not acceptable: 1) *aut quotienscumque libuisset, totiens concubuissent*; 2) *aut frenarent libidinem, quando concubitus necessarius non fuisset*.

<sup>191</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 35 *castos etiam nolentes eamque temperantia castigantes inquietudine inordinata inopportunaque sollicitat et plerumque sese uolentibus subtrahit, nolentibus ingerit, ut nihil aliud inoboedientia sua quam illius priscæ inoboedientiae poenam se esse testetur*.

3.3.2. *An Escalating Conflict*—c. *Iul.* and c. *Iul. imp.*

After he got hold of Julian's complete *ad Turbantium*, and realised the need for a more comprehensive answer to this work, Augustine composed the six books of *contra Iulianum* (in 421/422). Meanwhile, Julian had read Augustine's *nupt. et conc.* 2, and composed a response, known as *ad Florum*. This response found its way to Augustine after its completion in 426/427. For the first time during the dispute, the two adversaries were now responding at the same pace to the correct versions of the opponent's text, and during the years 428–430 Augustine was writing yet another work against his unrelenting critic, *contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*. This work was left unfinished due to Augustine's death in August, 430. Together, c. *Iul.* and c. *Iul. imp.* represent a veritable explosion of arguments concerning God, creation, sin, moral responsibility, Adam's sin and its consequences to the present humanity, tradition of the Church, marriage and sex, hermeneutics, logic, etc. Augustine's basic insights into the central role of obedience in Paradise, and the fatal consequences of Adam and Eve's disobedience as the disobedient punishment of *concupiscentia* remain present during the entire dispute. Thus, for instance, *concupiscentia carnis* is seen, *passim* throughout the works, as due to Adam's disobedience: it is "born" and "transmitted" owing to that disobedience, being healed by the obedience of Christ.<sup>192</sup>

A perfectly standard account of punitive *concupiscentia* and its relation to the first disobedient volition of Adam and Eve can be found e.g. in c. *Iul. imp.* 6, 14:

But we say that the first human being was so happy before the sin and had such free will that, while observing the commandment of God by the great strength of his mind, he did not suffer the flesh resisting him in any conflict, and he did not experience anything at all from any desire that he did not will, but that his will was first damaged by the poisonous enticement of the serpent so that desire came into being which would rather have followed upon the will than resisted it; but once sin had been committed, concupiscence fought back against the weakened mind as a punishment. And for this reason, if

<sup>192</sup> c. *Iul.* 4, 1 *malum tamen esse concupiscentiam carnis qua concupiscit aduersus spiritum, eoque malo bene uti pudicitiam coniugalem, meliusque non uti continentiam sanctiorem: quod malum non ex alia substantia quam deus non condidit, sicut Manichaeus insanit, nobis esse permixtum; sed per inoboedientiam unius hominis exortum atque traductum, et per oboedientiam unius hominis expiandum atque sanandum; cuius obligatione implicat debita poena nascentem, soluit indebita gratia renascentem.* Cf. also c. *Iul.* 6, 48.

Adam did not first do what he willed by sinning, he would not have suffered what he did not will by desiring.<sup>193</sup> [transl. Teske]

This account is followed by a familiar assertion concerning obedience, and its “single or special” value as a virtue. In a previous book of the same work, Augustine had already returned to his common phrase on the topic: disobedient human beings received retribution in the disobedience of their own flesh (*inoboedienti homini suae carnis inoboedientia retributa*). This was done by the “just judgment of God” (*iusto iudicio dei*).<sup>194</sup>

Again, as an answer to Julian’s consistent use of *peccatum naturale* in describing Augustine’s position, Augustine admits that *concupiscentia carnis* may be called a “natural defect,” but only in the sense that it is now adherent to each individual born, not as being part of the original human nature. This defect has its origin in the “evil will of the first human.”<sup>195</sup> During the debate, Augustine also remarks on the specific character of this divinely decreed punishment; it is, for instance, by nature a force which acknowledges no rational limits of virtues (so Julian), but craves for its objects with a brutish force. Indeed, what is even now “appropriate for the nature of an animal” is for human nature a punishment.<sup>196</sup>

A complete and thorough analysis of the arguments of both adversaries that would pay attention to all theologically relevant topics related to and connected with punitive *concupiscentia* obviously lies outside the scope of this study: therefore, we will here highlight some important trajectories of those insights during the debate that were presented into topics that Augustine had considered to be of importance in connection with *concupiscentia* as a punishment. These were also the topics against which Julian posed serious critical questions, and with unprecedented force. These topics and questions include: why does Augustine insist on his claim that all of humanity

<sup>193</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 6, 14 *nos autem dicimus tam beatum fuisse illum hominem ante peccatum, tamque liberae uoluntatis, ut dei praeceptum magnis uiribus mentis obseruans, resistentem sibi carnem nullo certamine pateretur, nec aliquid omnino ex aliqua cupiditate sentiret, quod nollet; uoluntatemque eius prius fuisse uitiatam uenenosa persuasione serpentis, ut oriretur cupiditas quae sequeretur potius uoluntatem, quam resisteret uoluntati; perpetratoque peccato iam poena infirmatae menti etiam carnis concupiscentia repugnaret. ac per hoc, nisi prius homo faceret peccando quod uellet, non pateretur concupiscendo quod nollet.*

<sup>194</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 44. The scriptural background (Rom 5, 18–19) for Augustine’s emphasis on Adam’s disobedience and its consequences for future generations is tested and disputed by Julian in c. *Iul. imp.* 2, 215.

<sup>195</sup> c. *Iul.* 4, 54. See also c. *Iul.* 4, 56 where punitive *concupiscentia* is conceived as an inborn disease (*morbis*).

<sup>196</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 41; 4, 43.

in its present state, newborn infants included, are suffering from the punitive consequences of Adam's fall? In other words, is the concept of *poena peccati*, as concerning the entire humanity, at all necessary? Second, Julian recognised easily the importance of Augustine's emphasis of God's punishment being *just*. How does Julian then criticise Augustine's views on *iusta poena* and its source, divine justice? In other words, if *concupiscentia carnis* is a divinely insituted punishment, how could such a God conceived to be just when punishing sins by increasing them? The notion of the punitive *concupiscentia* also gives rise to an extensive debate on the "third kind of sin," which is seen by Augustine to be both a sin and a punishment, thus creating conditions that necessitate sinning. Finally, Julian poses the difficult question of how exactly an ethical choice made by Adam and Eve had been turned into a "biological," or "genetical" necessity.<sup>197</sup>

#### *Punishment Induced from Suffering*

Julian thought that sexual desire was a bodily function created by God. It was to be used for virtuous purposes and not allowed immoderate excess, rather like food, or sleep. Julian argued that *libido* did not entail any notion of corruption (*uitium*) or punishment (*poena*). Thus, one of the major objections Julian made to Augustine's general approach of original sin and *concupiscentia carnis* was a rather simple one: why should *concupiscentia* or other sensual, and emotional responses be thought of as punishments?

Augustine's own, similarly general answer admittedly partly presupposes what it tries to prove: *concupiscentia carnis* is a punishment because it is by nature an evil, indifferent force—and therefore can only be a punishment. But in describing the palette of various punishments in fallen humanity, Augustine also aims at a weak spot in Julian's critique: because God is not "weak" or "cruel," *concupiscentia carnis*, along with all other miseries of life, must be a punishment.<sup>198</sup> If all human beings are born good and innocent, does Julian think that all the pains, illnesses and mental deficiencies of infants should be seen as something good as well?<sup>199</sup> According to Augustine, all pain and every instance of suffering is due to the just decisions of God. Indeed, the miserable state of infants is for Augustine a distressing and alarming piece of evidence for God's punishments for humanity. In *c. Iul. imp.*, several passages list the sufferings of children, who from Augustine's

<sup>197</sup> See Rist 1994, 321–327, and Sorabji 2000, 416.

<sup>198</sup> Rist 1994, 262.

<sup>199</sup> Lamberigts 1988, 23.

point of view are in fact born innocent *as what comes to their own personal and voluntary choices* (for there are none without the use of reason, which the infants do not yet possess).<sup>200</sup> Because God is not unjust (*iniustus*) or powerless (*impotens*), the “heavy yoke” of Adam on humanity cannot but be a punishment. This yoke is shared by infants and adults alike, and it is construed of a long list of miseries of life:

If this is not clear from what has been recalled, look at infants: see how many and how great are the evils they endure; in what vanities, torments, errors, and terrors they grow up. Error tempts adults, even those who serve God, to deceive them; labor and pain tempt them, to crush them; lust tempts them, to inflame them; grief tempts them, to prostrate them; pride tempts them, to make them vain. Who can easily explain all the ways in which the heavy yoke presses down upon the children of Adam? [...] We must, then, hold that the reason for these evils must be either the injustice or impotence of God, or the punishment for the first and ancient sin. Since God is neither unjust nor impotent, there is only [...] that the heavy yoke upon children of Adam [...] would not have existed if the offense by way of origin had not come first to deserve it.<sup>201</sup>

[transl. Schumacher]

A similar induction from the diverse sufferings of infants and adults can be found elsewhere in these two works;<sup>202</sup> in *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 154, such a list is again clearly composed in order to both back up Augustine’s claim of punitive conditions (*libido* included) and to criticise Julian’s creationistic account of the souls’ innocent origin. These lists also contain a constant appeal to divine justice (*hoc dogma catholicum et iustitiam Dei defendit, quia non immerito uitam mortalium uoluisset esse poenalem*) as a guarantee

<sup>200</sup> See e.g. *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 198 for a description that is both touching and fanciful, reflecting under all its polemical rhetoric Augustine’s sensitivity to address the problems of evil that were left untouched by Julian’s individualistic solutions.

<sup>201</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 83 *sed in iis quae meminisse iam non potes, paruulos intueri, quot et quanta mala patiantur, in quibus uanitatibus, cruciatibus, erroribus, terroribus crescant. deinde iam grandes, etiam deo seruientes tentat error, ut decipiat; tentat labor aut dolor, ut frangat; tentat libido, ut accendat; tentat moeror, ut sternat; tentat typhus, ut extollat. et quis explicet omnia festinanter, quibus grauatur iugum super filios Adam? [...] quid igitur restat, nisi ut causa istorum malorum sit aut iniquitas uel impotentia dei, aut poena primi ueterisque peccati? sed quia nec iniustus, nec impotens est deus; restat [...] quod graue iugum super filios Adam [...] non fuisset, nisi delicti originalis meritum praecessisset.* Similarly in *c. Iul.* 5, 8 in the case of *caecitas cordis*: *istam caecitatem si poenam fuisse negaueris, similem te perpeti etiam non confitens indicabis. si autem poenam quidem fuisse, sed peccati poenam non fuisse contendis; interim fateris quod unum aliquid et peccatum esse possit et poena: si autem non est haec poena peccati, profecto iniqua poena est, et iniustum facis deum, quo iubente uel sinente; aut infirmum, quo non auertente, infligitur innocentibus.*

<sup>202</sup> E.g. *c. Iul.* 3, 9–10; 5, 4; 5, 44; 6, 2; 6, 30–32; *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 29; 1, 35; 3, 5; 6, 23.



for their ultimate meaningfulness. Augustine also makes clear, by way of scriptural evidence (Jn 9, 1–3) and by experience in his own circles (a man named Acatius was born blind), that people suffering from innate diseases or defects should not be held morally responsible for these punishments; rather, such *poenae* are a general or communal sign of God’s just judgment of humanity (*iustum iudicium dei*).<sup>203</sup> Into these conditions, due to punitive *concupiscentia*, and due to being implicated by Adam’s evil will, infants are born, into the “depths of the miseries with which we are familiar.”<sup>204</sup>

### *A Third Kind of Sin*

An extensive discussion of the punishment for Adam and Eve’s sin can be found in *c. Iul.* 5, 3–16. Augustine starts by asserting that his view on divine justice is not based on merely nothing (*uana, frustra*) but lies firmly in the fact that there was a preceding sin for which humanity is now punished. Therefore, his teaching also does not “ascribe injustice to God,” for there is thus a reason for all the miserable sufferings of even little children.<sup>205</sup>

In his *ad Florum*, Julian had commented directly on Augustine’s standard formulation of punitive *concupiscentia* (*nupt. et conc.* 1, 7). Julian had pointed out that if *concupiscentia* should be conceived as a divine punishment, should it not be taken as something good because of its origin?<sup>206</sup> Second, a more serious remark was that a punishment could not be simultaneously something that would also be seen as a sin, for this would strain the concept of divine justice too much: sin should not be punished in a way that would produce more sins. However, this is exactly what Augustine wishes to say about *concupiscentia*: it works as a just punishment for Adam and Eve’s sin, and is simultaneously to be conceived of as some kind of sin, as it entails as such a “disobedience against the control of the mind.”<sup>207</sup> The discussion

<sup>203</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 162. Cf. 3, 161 *deum iustum [...] miserae mortalium, quae iustissime inflicta est.*

<sup>204</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 15 *paruuli [...] quos non uultis credere meritis malae uoluntatis alienae, sed tamen eius in cuius lumbis ratione seminis fuerunt, ad profunda miseriarum quas nouimus, fuisse deiectos.* On *concupiscentia* in particular, see *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 120 *per primi hominis tamen praeuaricatricem uoluntatem factum esse concupiscentiae uitium, unde per commixtionem sexuum nascentes trahunt originale peccatum.*

<sup>205</sup> *c. Iul.* 5, 3.

<sup>206</sup> *c. Iul.* 5, 8. Julian had called the *libido ultrix peccati, dei ministra*. See also *c. Iul.* 5, 16.

<sup>207</sup> *c. Iul.* 5, 8 *et sicut caecitas cordis, quam solus remouet illuminator deus, et peccatum est, quo in deum non creditur; et poena peccati, qua cor superbum digna animaduersione punitur; et causa peccati, cum mali aliquid caeci cordis errore committitur: ita concupiscentia carnis, aduersus quam bonus concupiscit spiritus, et peccatum est, quia inest illi inoboedientia contra*

moves to citing a scriptural example of the sins that work simultaneously as punishments for sins. Julian had attempted to show that Augustine had misunderstood the verses of Rom 1, 25–28 on homosexual desires, which in a previous work Augustine had interpreted as both sins and divine punishments.<sup>208</sup> But Augustine still insists that in those cases mentioned in Romans 1, the punishment actually produces guilt in the same way a sin would (*nec solum de praeteritis reos propter quae damnatos, sed inde etiam reos unde damnatos*). In this case, idolatry works as the first sin, for which a punishment of degrading passions is given. Augustine admits that this punishment is received in a way that does not necessarily open itself to human scrutiny, but he is adamant to claim that the punishment ensued from the first sin in Paul's example is also actually a sin in itself.<sup>209</sup> What follows is a host of scriptural examples in which divine punishments are considered as sins (*c. Iul.* 5, 12–13). However, it seems that Augustine would not wish to make a too straightforward analogy between *concupiscentia* as a punishment and the example of Rom 1, 25–28, for he remarks that there is a difference between having (*habere*) evil desires and being abandoned to them (*tradi*): the former represents the common state of affairs of a Christian, the latter represents a severe case of divine punishment in which one is abandoned by God into a state of habitual and continual consent to evil desires.<sup>210</sup> While an analogy between punitive *concupiscentia* and the special case of Rom 1, 25–28 is thus problematic, Augustine, however, has attempted to form an argument on a more general level by which he would demonstrate that sin indeed can work as a punishment and *vice versa*. The discussion then moves to Augustine frequently pointing out the “hidden” and often inexplicable

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*dominatum mentis; et poena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inoboedientis; et causa peccati est, defectione consentientis uel contagione nascentis.*

<sup>208</sup> Julian had picked this example in *nat. et grat.* 24. and reads the verses as a rhetorical hyperbole, intended to persuade readers of the horrific nature of such sins as are described in Rom 1.

<sup>209</sup> *c. Iul.* 5, 10 *ista damnatio etiam reatus est, quo grauius implicantur. ita et peccata sunt iam et poenae praecedentium peccatorum.*

<sup>210</sup> *c. Iul.* 5, 11–12 *numquid autem consequens est, ut si habet aliquis cordis desideria mala, iam etiam consentiat eis ad committenda eadem mala? ac per hoc aliud est habere mala desideria cordis, aliud tradi eis; utique ut consentiendo eis possideatur ab eis, quod fit cum diuino iudicio traditur eis. alioquin frustra dictum est, post concupiscentias tuas non eas [Ecl. 18,30]; si iam quisque reus est, quod tumultuantes et ad mala trahere nitentes sentit eas, nec eas sequitur, si non eis traditur; exercens aduersus eas gloriosa certamina, si uiuit in gratia. [...] cum ergo dicitur homo tradi desideriis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a deo cedit eis atque consentit; uincitur, capitur, trahitur, possidetur.* For the state of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal, see Chapter 6.

way divine judgment works in handing out punishments that are also sins. *Occultum iudicium dei* may thus result in perverse obstinacy, blindness to understand God's works, erroneous judgments in taking false as right and so on. Thus divine punishments and their exact way of working is rooted in God's unfathomable being, *analogically to divine election of grace*. Because these judgments arise from His justice, they cannot be unjust, although they can be inexplicable:

It is not in vain that the Apostle exclaims: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How inscrutable are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord; or who has been his counsellor? or who has first given to him that recompense should be made him?" None He chooses is worthy; but, choosing, He makes them worthy. Yet He punishes none who does not deserve it.<sup>211</sup>

[transl. Schumacher]

Julian's critical question of how a punishment can possibly be a sin without damaging consequences to divine justice, has led Augustine to assert that this can indeed be possible but in a way that is as concealed from the horizon of human reason and justice as is God's mercy.<sup>212</sup> This question had arisen from Augustine's picture of *concupiscentia* being a just and reciprocal punishment of Adam and Eve's sin. Again, this picture was criticised by

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<sup>211</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 13 *non frustra exclamat apostolus, o altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae dei! quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius, et inuestigabiles viae eius! quis enim cognouit sensum domini? aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? aut quis prior dedit illi, ut retribuatur ei? [Rom 11,33 sq.] nullum eligit dignum, sed eligendo efficit dignum; nullum tamen punit indignum. Cf. c. Iul. 5, 15 tradit ergo deus in passionem ignominiae, ut fiant quae non conueniunt; sed ipse conuenienter tradit: et fiunt eadem peccata, et peccatorum supplicia praeteritorum, et suppliciorum merita futurorum: sicut tradidit Achab in pseudoprophetarum mendacium; sicut tradidit Roboam in falsum consilium. facit haec miris et ineffabilibus modis, qui nouit iusta iudicia sua, non solum in corporibus hominum, sed et in ipsis cordibus operari.*

<sup>212</sup> There is a parallel and even more clearer line of argument in *gr. et lib. arb.* 41–43. God works in hidden ways in order to convert some people into salvation, and some to suffer from punishments that are also sins: *scriptura diuina si diligenter inspicatur, ostendit non solum bonas hominum uoluntates quas ipse facit ex malis, et a se factas bonas in actus bonos et in aeternam dirigit uitam, uerum etiam illas quae conseruant saeculi creaturam, ita esse in dei potestate, ut eas quo uoluerit, quando uoluerit, faciat inclinari, uel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, uel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse iudicat, occultissimo quidem iudicio, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimo. nam inuenimus aliqua peccata etiam poenas esse aliorum peccatorum: sicut sunt uasa irae, quae perfecta dicit apostolus in perditionem: sicut est induratio Pharaonis.* This work ends with unmistakable echoes of *Simpl.*: *operari deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum uoluntates quocumque uoluerit, siue ad bona pro sua misericordia, siue ad mala pro meritis eorum, iudicio utique suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper tamen iusto. fixum enim debet esse et immobile in corde uestro, quia non est iniquitas apud deum.*

Julian on theological grounds and is likewise defended by Augustine on theological grounds.

In *c. Iul. imp.*, the adversaries frequently remark on the classification of *concupiscentia* and other punitive states. In *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 44–47, this question is once more at stake, as Julian has attempted to demonstrate that Augustine contradicts his own definition of sin in an earlier work (*duab. anim.*). Augustine evades this allegation by stating that the definition of sin in *duab. anim.* simply concerns the individual, voluntary sin of Adam. In addition to that, and to a thoroughly passive form of a punishment, there is also a third class (*genus tertium*), which consists of sins that work simultaneously as punishments. This class of punitive sins includes actions and states from which an individual has not the “freedom to hold back,” but which is not a purely passive state, either (as in evil “which one in no sense does, but only suffers”). The plight of Paul’s *ego* in Romans 7 is mentioned as an example of this third class of evils.<sup>213</sup> Augustine holds fast to the need for this distinction all along *c. Iul. imp.* as essential for a correct understanding of the punitive character of *concupiscentia*. He points out again and again that Julian’s view of sin as a purely individual, voluntary action is not adequate in covering all instances of evil human behaviour. Therefore, Augustine insists that there are simple sins, but that there are punishments that also count as sins; *concupiscentia carnis* being the most important. What Julian thinks as an unjust and unreasonable mode of punishment, leading to an untenable conception of God as a producer and guardian for sins, is in Augustine’s opinion simply one of the biblical cases of just divine punishments that also work as sins:

JUL. For, since he [sc. Augustine] invented the idea that the punishment that is sexual desire was justly imposed and teaches that this justice is in accord with the divine sentence, but does not deny that God’s action is found in pronouncing the sentence from which he says sexual desire has arisen [...] he, of course, has restored to the work of God the shame [...] To this, nonetheless, he added as a corollary of particular impiety his statement that God inflicted a punishment of the sort which would be an enticement and incentive toward sin, a punishment which as the unconquerable law in the members would not resist the law of our mind. With that sort of vengeance God would multiply, not punish sins [...] this judge whom Augustine dreamed up pretends that he is horrified at sin, but clings to sins with such great affection that they could not find a more diligent guardian.

<sup>213</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 47 *tertium uero genus, ubi peccatum ipsum et poena peccati, potest intellegi in eo qui dicit: quod nolo malum hoc ago [Rom 7,19].*

AUG. Read what scripture says: because *they did not want to keep God in mind, God handed them over to an evil frame of mind so that they did what was not right* (Rom 1:28), and see that certain sins are also the punishment of sins. In order to understand how God does this, reread what I warned you about in connection with King Ahab. His sin was, of course, to believe the false prophets, and yet this sin was also, under the vengeance of God, the punishment of the sinner.<sup>214</sup> [transl. Teske]

This other kind of sin, punitive in character, Augustine every now and then is ready to even call a necessity.<sup>215</sup> Julian had denied that there can be no other kind of sin than that which is committed by an individual's will, and claims that a voluntary concept of sin is mutually exclusive with a notion of sin that is based on necessity, being natural, or "non-voluntary" (*non uoluntarium*) in character. Logically, sins cannot be committed both voluntarily and by necessity by the same person. Augustine, on the other hand, maintains that based on the connection with, and collective share to, Adam's sin, one is in fact entitled to speak of involuntary sins, though perhaps in a specific, restricted meaning.<sup>216</sup> Based on Romans 7, Augustine argues that a punitive state of a habitual sin remains from Adam's free choice of the will; moreover, it is indeed possible for this punitive state to co-exist simultaneously (*simul*) with a renewed Christian will.<sup>217</sup> During a long

<sup>214</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 34–35 IUL. *cum enim confinxerit iuste redditam libidinis poenam, et hanc iustitiam diuinae inculcat conuenire sententiae, in prolatione autem sententiae opus dei esse non denegat, ex qua libidinem euenisse dicit [...] in operam nimirum dei [...] reduxit pudorem [...] ad quod tamen quasi corollarium peculiaris sceleris adiunxit, ut talem poenam a deo illatam diceret, quae esset illecebra et fomes peccati, quae lex in membris inuicta repugnaret legi mentis nostrae: quo genere ultionis multiplicaret deus flagitia, non puniret; [...] hic iudex qui ab Augustino fingitur, simularit se horrere peccatum, ceterum tanto eis adhaeret affectu, ut diligentiores nutritum inuenire non possint. AUG. lege quod scriptum est, quoniam non probauerunt deum habere in notitia, tradidit illos deus in reprobam mentem, ut faciant quae non conueniunt [Rom 1,28]; et uide quaedam peccata etiam poenas esse peccantium. quomodo autem id faciat deus ut intellegas, relege quod te admonui superius de rege Achab: cuius utique peccatum fuit credere pseudoprophetis; et tamen hoc peccatum, deo uindicante, fuit etiam poena peccantis. See also c. *Iul. imp.* 2, 38 and c. *Iul. imp.* 6, 17, where *concupiscentia* is both sin and punishment for sin (*caecitas* and *concupiscentia* here stand for *ignorantia* and *difficultas*): *caecitas igitur cordis, qua nescitur quid iustitia uetet, et uiolentia concupiscentiae, qua uiuncitur etiam qui scit unde debeat abstinere, non tantum peccata, sed poenae sunt etiam peccatorum. [...] porro si etiam peccata ideo ista non essent, quia non ab eis liberum est abstinere, non diceretur, delicta iuuentutis meae et ignorantiae meae ne memineris [Ps 24,7]: non diceretur, signasti peccata mea in sacco, et adnotasti si quid inuitus admisi [Job 14,17 LXX].**

<sup>215</sup> Already in c. *Iul. imp.* 1, 105. It seems that Augustine uses the word more as meaning inevitability than compulsion: "there is a necessity to die," c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 103.

<sup>216</sup> For Rom 7 in the debate against Julian, see also Chapter 6.

<sup>217</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 103 *tale aliquid in natura humana factum esse non creditis, ut ex uoluntate*

debate (c. *Iul.* 5, 26–64) on the reiterating questions on voluntariness or on the possibility of sin versus the necessity of sin, and on the implications of a ‘natural’ conception of sin to the notion of divine justice, Augustine holds onto the core conviction that we are, indeed, suffering from a punishment that is simultaneously a sin, and that Adam’s free choice of will resulted in a punitive state in the present humanity, which then was transmitted and manifested by *concupiscentia carnis*, and eventually documented by Paul’s anguished cry in Romans 7.<sup>218</sup>

*How and Why Was an Individual Ethical Choice Turned into a Biological Necessity?*

A crucial juncture in Augustine’s depiction of the punitive *concupiscentia* was the question of how Adam’s ethical choice of will was turned into a biologically reproduced, or ‘genetic,’ inevitability.<sup>219</sup> Julian poses this critical question in c. *Iul. imp.* 6, 9 (“it is completely insane to suppose that an act of choice is mixed in with the seeds [...] to believe that what you admit is voluntary has been turned into our nature”) as a specific form of the truth that acquired qualities are not inherited.<sup>220</sup>

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*primi hominis, de quo est origo humani generis, fieret necessitas peccati originalis in posteris [...] in homine mole consuetudinis presso simul esse possunt et iustitiae uoluntas et peccati necessitas. quoniam, uelle adiacet mihi [Rom 7,15], professio est uoluntatis; perficere autem bonum, non inuenio [Rom 7,18], confessio est necessitatis. tu uero dixisti uoluntatem et necessitatem simul esse non posse; cum cernas simuleas esse cum concordant, simul esse cum pugnant.*

<sup>218</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 5, 28 *aliter ergo natura humana peccauit, quando ei liberum fuit abstinere a peccato: aliter nunc peccat perdita libertate, quando eget liberatoris auxilio. et illud tantummodo peccatum erat: hoc autem etiam est poena peccati. c. Iul. imp. 5, 59 nec attendere uultis, quod in unoquoque agitur per uiolentiam consuetudinis—quam quidam docti dixerunt esse secundam naturam—, hoc actum esse per uiolentiam poenalem summi illius maximique peccati primi hominis in omnibus qui erant in lumbis eius, per eius concupiscentiam exorturi, cum propagaretur humanum genus, quam concupiscentiam peccantium pudor operuit in regione lumborum.* See also c. *Iul. imp.* 5, 40; 5, 51; 5, 64.

<sup>219</sup> See Sorabji 2000, 416. This change was already alluded to in biological terms in *nupt. et conc.* 1, 37 *Adam ex olea tali, in qua nec semen erat eius modi, unde amaritudo nasceretur oleastri, in oleastrum peccando conuersus est, quia tam magnum peccatum fuit, ubi magna fieret in deterius mutatio naturae, totum genus humanum fecit oleastrum, ita ut—quemadmodum nunc in ipsis uidemus arboribus—si quid inde in oleam gratia diuina conuertit, ibi uitium primae natiuitatis, quod erat originale peccatum de carnali concupiscentia traductum et adtractum, remittatur, tegatur, non inputetur, unde tamen oleaster nascatur, nisi et ipse in oleam eadem gratia renascatur.* See also c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 10, where Augustine uses Ambrose’s (in *Luc.* 7, 141) turn of phrase: *concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, sine qua nullus hominum nascitur, et hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus [...] per praeuocationem primi hominis in nostram uertisse naturam.*

<sup>220</sup> Or, how disobedience committed in the soul was followed by disobedience of the body,

Not limiting himself to the subject of *concupiscentia*, Augustine had for long maintained that the “order of punishments” remains hidden from human reason, and thus there perhaps is no satisfying answer to Julian’s question of how such an anomaly would take place. However, the discussion in *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 20–23 on the magnitude of Adam and Eve’s disobedience shows why Augustine thought such exceptional punishment possible. Julian had mocked Augustine’s idea of punitive sin by stressing the minor, even petty character of Adam’s disobedience. How could Augustine claim that a mere theft of a single fruit should deserve punishments of such incredible magnitude?<sup>221</sup> Again, Julian points to Augustine’s weakness of supposing the circumstances in Paradise as being entirely unlike those with which present humanity is familiar. Thus also with the concept of disobedience: the primal disobedience by which Augustine has argued for the fitting punishment of *concupiscentia carnis* seems to be qualitatively different from the acts of disobedience and sin in this life (*ostendis, illam inoboedientiam non te eiusdem generis arbitrari, cuius etiam ceterae sunt*).<sup>222</sup> If this is the case, how can we know anything about the conditions of that primal sin; in other words, if Augustine presumes that the disobedience of Adam and Eve in Paradise was of such a singular character, how can he know anything about it or compare it to anything, if it is in no way analogical to the sins committed in the present state of humanity?<sup>223</sup>

Augustine partly concedes this point. Indeed, Adam’s spiritual capacities were much greater than ours and therefore “his nature fell more seriously to the extent that it stood more sublimely.”<sup>224</sup> For Augustine, then, the

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as in *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 68: *inoboedientiam persuaserat animo humano, quam poenalis et pudenda carnis inoboedientia sequeretur.*

<sup>221</sup> However, Julian agrees with Augustine in saying that the fruit as such was not important: Adam’s sin was in breaking God’s commandment (6, 23). See *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 7; 6, 20, especially 6, 23 *iussum fuerat ut edulio unius arboris abstinere: rudis, imperitus, incautus, sine experimento timoris, sine exemplo iustitiae, suggestu mulieris usurpauit escam, cuius illexerat et suauitas, et uenustas. uide hic transgressionem fuisse mandati.* Augustine notes here a discrepancy in Julian’s polemical tactic: *tu quoque in huius operis tui libro secundo, in Adam peccati formam, quia prior peccauit Eua, non primam dixisti esse, sed maximam.*

<sup>222</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 21.

<sup>223</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 21.

<sup>224</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 21 *frustra ergo peccato illius peccata filiorum eius quamlibet magna et horrenda, uel aequare, uel etiam praeferre conaris. illius natura quanto magis sublimiter stabat, tanto magis grauiter concidit. natura illa talis fuit, ut nec mori posset, si peccare noluisset: natura illa talis fuit, ut in se discordiam carnis, et spiritus non haberet: natura illa talis fuit, ut contra uitia sua nulla certaret; non quod ei cedebat, sed quod in eo nulla erant. tunc ergo debes peccata posterorum eius peccato eius aequare, si talem; tunc uero et maiora ea dicere, si*

punishment is incredibly severe (a transgression of the will is turned into a biologically inherited defect) because the first sin was also incredibly grave. Adam's disobedience was so serious, that its consequences are nothing short of unbelievable: the anomaly of our present state is due to an even more serious anomaly in the ideal state of Paradise.

What Augustine does, however, in replying to Julian's question on the knowability of Adam's disobedience, is to induce the magnitude of the crime from the punishments received (*c. Iul. imp. 6, 23*).<sup>225</sup> While human reason cannot estimate Adam's disobedience nor can it be compared to any known crimes of this world, the punishments are, nevertheless, known to all, and from these one can easily see that something horrific was done in Paradise, something "greater than we can judge."<sup>226</sup> Once more, Augustine admits that if human judgment were to compare Adam's crime to that of his son's, Cain, "the comparison would be judged ridiculous." This also applies to the divine punishments that these actions received. That Adam took an apple from the tree of good and evil knowledge was punished by an extraordinary set of varying punishments; but Cain, on the other hand, after murdering his own brother, was handled rather leniently.

The ultimate reason for this is, once again, the inadequacy of human judgment as compared to the divine point of view:

The sin [of Cain] was again great, and the punishment light, but this seems so in the judgments of human beings who do not know these mysteries and who cannot measure the sins of human beings with as clear and complete a judgment as God.<sup>227</sup> [transl. Teske]

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*meliores naturam potueris inuenire. natura quippe rationalis quanto est ipsa superior, tanto ruina eius peior, et peccatum eius quanto incredibilius, tanto est damnabilius.*

<sup>225</sup> *c. Iul. imp. 6, 23* *pomum quippe lege dei uetitum manducare, leue uideretur esse peccatum: sed quanti hoc aestimauerit qui non potest falli, satis apparet granditate supplicii. [...] quam magna poena est, tam magnum debemus intellegere peccatum, quod ea poena dignum fuerat uindicari. quid igitur agis, obsecro te, cum peccatum Adae tanta extenuare conaris instantia, nisi deum arguis immanis horrendaeque saeuitiae, qui hoc tanta, non dico seueritate, sed crudelitate puniuit? quod de deo, si nefas est sentire, cur non quantitatem culpae, de qua homines iudicare non possunt, iudicante iudice incomparabiliter iusto, de poenae granditate metiris, et tuam linguam a sacrilega loquacitate compescis?* Ultimately, Augustine depends on God's justice in that the punishment corresponds to the crime: only a cruel and unjust judge measures disproportionately excessive punishments.

<sup>226</sup> *c. Iul. imp. 6, 23, (quoting nupt. et conc. 2, 58)* *multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus.*

<sup>227</sup> *c. Iul. imp. 6, 23* *hic rursus ingens culpa, et leuis poena: sed hominum iudiciis hoc uidetur, qui nec mysteria ista cognoscunt, et hominum culpas tam liquido atque integro examine, quam deus pensare non possunt.*



There is thus one factor in common between Adam and Eve's singular act of disobedience and the 'ordinary' sins of disobedience on the one hand, and between human judgments and divine justice, on the other: the great distance between these pairs of concepts.

*Whose God? Which Justice?*

On what could be called the most general theological level, Augustine's position of just punishment for collective humanity is challenged by Julian's remarks on the divergence between his and Augustine's conceptions of justice and God. As Julian does not acknowledge any other consequences of Adam's fall than its bad example, he finds untenable Augustine's notions of the justice of God who punishes people who are unable to commit any sins (that is, infants who cannot will, or make judgments, as having no reason).

Indeed, Julian concludes, Augustine's views of divine justice lead him to confess a different god who is an evil criminal and not the just God of the Christians.<sup>228</sup> For God would not be God, if He were not to act according to justice.<sup>229</sup> In response to these allegations, Augustine again appeals to a more communal view of Adam's figure than Julian is ready to admit: "all who were going to be born from Adam through concupiscence of the flesh were present in his loins."<sup>230</sup> In other words, *concupiscentia carnis* transmits the sin of Adam and links all humanity to the fate of Adam. To perceive Adam's crucial role in the divine punishments for humanity calls for a "Christian eye" by which Julian could see "by faith, if he cannot by intelligence." It is clear that Augustine takes Julian's critique to be a result of a mistaken understanding of how God acts in His mercy and in His justice. To Augustine, humanity's state of affairs has obvious relevance to the concept of justice:

You complain in the same way that stupid and ignorant people like you complain about him when they say: Why does he create those whom he foreknows will be sinners and will be condemned? [...] If someone says to them, *Who are you, a human being, to answer back to God?* (Rom 9:20) and *His judgments are inscrutable* (Rom 11:33), they become angry rather than calm down [...] In those, then, whom he sets free we embrace his mercy, but

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<sup>228</sup> Julian emphasises his different conception of God by using phrases such as *deus tuus, deus meus, noster deus, ecclesiae catholicae deus, pro hoc igitur deo meo*. c. Iul. imp. 1, 50–51.

<sup>229</sup> See Lössl 2001, 130–134.

<sup>230</sup> c. Iul. imp. 1, 48 *in lumbis Adam fuisse omnes, qui ex illo fuerant per concupiscentiam carnis orturi*.

in those whom he does not set free we acknowledge his judgment which is indeed most hidden, but undoubtedly most just.<sup>231</sup> [transl. Teske]

Nowhere is the difference more acute between the debaters than in *c. Iul. imp.* 3. Julian returns to his statement on God's being and justice that he had made in *c. Iul. imp.* 1: God is the "genus of justice," and divine justice is known from divine laws; furthermore, according to Julian, justice does not entail a notion of favouritism or fraud (*sine fraude, sine gratia*), but gives "to everyone what is due" (*suum cuique tribuens*). Divine justice also acts "according to reason."<sup>232</sup> For his part, Augustine agrees with Julian's statement of justice equalling to God's being, but denies Julian's other premise of justice working *sine gratia*. Furthermore, Augustine acknowledges the classical notion of justice in giving each his or her due by noting that all divine punishments are certainly duly merited, and then finds entire humanity suffering from just and divine punishments because of Adam, concupiscence and original sin, while Julian cannot conceive of just punishment "except for those sins which it is clear were committed by free will."<sup>233</sup>

The gist of the argument of God's justice in *c. Iul. imp.* 3 lies in the diverging views both sides take on the following question: is it just to punish the descendants of Adam and Eve for a sin these two had committed? Julian's answer is clear enough:

[T]he true God can do nothing in judgment that is opposed to justice, and for this reason none can be held guilty for the sins of others [...] it would be unjust that guilt is passed on in the seeds.<sup>234</sup> [transl. Teske]

This stance is defended with an array of biblical laws. While Augustine takes for granted the just nature of God's laws, he is equally convinced of the fact God is not bound to his own laws about justice: *aliter ergo iudicat deus, aliter homini praecipit ut iudicet, cum deus homine sine ulla dubitatione sit iustior*.<sup>235</sup>

<sup>231</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 48 *gravius conquerantur stulti et indocti similes tui qui dicunt: utquid creat, quos impios futuros et damnandos esse praesciuit? [...] quibus si dicatur: o homo, tu quis es qui respondeas deo [Rom 9,20]? inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius [Rom 11,33], irascuntur potius quam mitescunt [...] in eis ergo quos liberat amplectamur misericordiam, in eis autem quos non liberat agnoscamus iudicium occultissimum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimum*. See also *c. Iul.* 4, 45–46: if God bestows grace, he is merciful; if he punishes, he is just; *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 129–130. See Lössl 2001, 118, with literature.

<sup>232</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 6.

<sup>233</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 3.

<sup>234</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 11.

<sup>235</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 12.

The problem is personified in the form of a fictitious human judge.<sup>236</sup> Both adversaries agree that if such a judge would act in the way God judges human beings for the sins of their parents, he would be unjust (*iniustus*). Thus, concludes Julian, even God cannot act likewise. On the contrary, Augustine claims:

[I]f a human judge says, "I shall punish the children for the sins of their parents," he says something most unjust and contradicts God's order, but God is neither a liar nor unjust when he says this.<sup>237</sup> [transl. Teske]

As has been noted by many, Julian takes divine and human justice to be equal enough to allow the conclusions of the kind he makes. Augustine, on the other hand, is able to hide the grounds for seemingly unjust judgments in the 'higher' state that divine justice has compared to that of human one. Augustine's language here is paradoxical. On the one hand, he denies the comparison (*incomparabiliter, noli comparare*) between human judges and divine justice: *ab humana iustitia discerne diuinam*.<sup>238</sup> On the other hand, he constantly uses comparatives in stating the way divine justice is related to its human version (*excelsior, distantior, iustior, maior*): divine judgments only seem (*uidetur*) unjust, even though they are, in fact, undoubtedly just.<sup>239</sup> In sum, Julian *knows* that divine justice cannot diverge from what we know to be justice, and divine justice can be scrutinised in light of reason.<sup>240</sup> More-

<sup>236</sup> See also *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 28.

<sup>237</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 17 *si homo iudicans dicat: reddam peccata patrum in filios, iniustissime dicit et diuino imperio contradicit, nec ideo tamen deus aut mendax aut iniustus est, cum hoc dicit*. Augustine himself followed this rule in ecclesial jurisdiction. See the highly satirical and caustic remarks to Auxilius, who had excommunicated an entire household for the shortcomings of the *paterfamilias*, *ep.* 250. Augustine inquires whether Auxilius had thought that he could take a divine standpoint and punish the children for the sin of their father, as in the case of Adam and future generations? Of course, this was not the case: the excommunication had to be cancelled.

<sup>238</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 24–27.

<sup>239</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 24 *quid est quod dicis, homo, qui multum desipis? quanto excelsior, tanto inscrutabilius diuina quam humana iustitia tantoque ab hac illa distantior. quis enim homo iustus sinit perpetrari scelus, quod habet in potestate non sinere? et tamen sinit haec deus incomparabiliter iustus omnibus iustior et cuius potestas est incomparabiliter omnibus potestatibus maior. haec cogita et noli iudicem deum iudicibus hominibus comparare, quem non dubitandum est esse iustum, etiam quando facit, quod hominibus uidetur iniustum et quod homo si faceret esset iniustus*. Cf. Bourke 1970, 14: "So God has his own unique justice and it is quite different from the other justice which He provides as a basis for human judgment."

<sup>240</sup> This equivalency can also be seen in Julian's logical argument in *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 31. Augustine answers by pointing out, not the completely unequivocal nature of human and divine justice, but God's incomparably better view of justice, so to speak, and the immensely limited scope of humans on justice, especially on the matter of original sin and grace. Hence,

over, Augustine *knows* that human knowledge of divine justice is incomplete and literally inferior to God's justice, and therefore allows a special plea for the inscrutable and hidden nature of justice in divine punishments. Adam's sin and its punishment override the human horizon of justice, and therefore cannot be searched for with human standards of reason and justice. Thus, they have to be left under divine, inscrutable jurisdiction:

This sin, then, belongs to God's judgment, not to that of human beings, just like many other things about which human beings are completely unable to judge [...] this was something God did not want a human judge to be permitted to do, because he himself knows why he does this justly when he does it, but human weakness does not know it.<sup>241</sup> [transl. Teske]

The debate with Julian brought to light Augustine's crucial convictions of God, justice and humanity, and the way these were related to his position on *concupiscentia carnis* as being a divine punishment for Adam and Eve's sin. We have seen that all four assessments that were presented in the beginning of this section have each covered some part of Augustine's defensive tactics against Julian's acute criticism. Lössl and Rist have pointed out the problems that ensued from Augustine's emphasis on the great difference between divine and human justice. It is true that Augustine frequently refers to God's obscure nature and justice in defending his picture of *concupiscentia*. To Augustine, God acts in a different way than a just human judge would act. Therefore one indeed has to "discern between human and divine justice." The character of Adam's disobedience remains inscrutable, as does the exact manner by which the secondary disobedience of *concupiscentia carnis* is turned into an inseparable weakness of the human nature. On the other hand, Augustine emphasises more the difference in *degree* than in *quality* when defending divine justice. This means that God's justice is "higher," "clearer," and "more complete," and therefore he is "more just" (*iustior*). While Augustine declines to treat divine and human justice as simply comparable and straightforwardly analogical to each other, he is still able to argue for divine justice and induce theological truths from what he conceives to be punishments. Augustine maintains that the magnitude and depth of sufferings and punishments of humanity point both to a justice high above human reasoning and to an ancient crime that was duly punished.

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as Augustine emphasises to Julian, "distinguish the persons of God and of the human judge."  
c. *Iul. imp.* 3, 34.

<sup>241</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 3, 33.

However, the insights offered by McGrath and Dodaro are corroborated by the obvious similarities in Augustine's way of treating both divine mercy and divine punishment as arising from the hidden and unfathomable judgments of God. The traditional notion of justice as giving each his or her due, is indeed inadequate from the Augustinian point of view: the mystery of the divine justice in the punishment of *concupiscentia* is similar to the mystery of divine justice in the merciful gift of grace. Furthermore, while Julian focused on the voluntary decisions of each individual soul in determining moral responsibility, Augustine held fast to his idea of the solidarity of sin in the figure of Adam: every member of humanity is implicated with the voluntary choice of Adam, and is thereby justly punished.

### 3.4. CONCLUSION

How was the notion of *concupiscentia* as a divine punishment developed in Augustine's theology?

From early on, Augustine was interested in investigating the causality of sin and punishment, the circumstances of Paradise, the possible consequences of Adam and Eve's choices for future generations, and the role of desire. However, these investigations were at first conducted somewhat separately, and with conflicting results: the causality of sin and punishment emphasised the role of the individual (*lib. arb.* 1), the circumstances of Paradise were read as figures for psychological and spiritual realities on a general level and the possible consequences of Adam and Eve's sin were described on a varied and tentative scale and certainly not with the later emphasis on sexual desire.

What happens in the early 410s is a certain conglomeration of all these elements, added to an invention concerning sexual desire (*concupiscentia carnis*). As Augustine was writing his extensive commentary on Genesis, and simultaneously involving himself with the ascetic teachings of Pelagius and his circle, he did not randomly create the depravity of sexual desire from thin air, and then arbitrarily advance it as a vehicle for original evil. Instead, he invented, or discovered, *concupiscentia carnis* as perfectly fitting to his views on punishment, justice, obedience, and the inability of humanity to deliver itself from the servitude of Adam's heritage. As the secondary disobedience, *concupiscentia carnis* worked as evidence for the major sin of Adam and Eve, and pointed not only to the ideal state of Paradise, but also to the damaging influence that Adam and Eve's choice of free will had had on the human constitution. In essence, the reciprocity of

*concupiscentia* as a bodily disobedience for a theological disobedience of Adam and Eve was a piece that fit too well Augustine's puzzle of hidden grace, of the occult ways of divine punishment, and of justice and obedience to be abandoned as a mere piecemeal ammunition for what became a serious doctrinal debate. Augustine also seems to have been convinced of the rhetorical and persuasive force of his construction of the punitive *concupiscentia*, as can be seen from its extensive and eloquent description in *ciu.* 14.

However, Augustine's invention was just that: an invention. It was not an inevitable conclusion, drawn from undisputable arguments, but rather an interesting suggestion, and was therefore prone to attract heavy criticism from the part of his latter day nemesis, Julian of Aeclanum. Julian's attacks were astute for he was acute to perceive what was *behind* Augustine's emphasis on the corrupt and evil character of sexual desire. The result of Julian's critique, in hindsight, was that Augustine did not manage to retain the harmonious, aesthetically satisfying account of two, reciprocal disobediences, reflecting man's position before God and God's justice towards humanity. Instead, the construction was submitted to analytical and deconstructive, albeit openly hostile, criticism.

We have seen in this chapter how Augustine was extremely concerned with connecting corrupt sexual desire (*concupiscentia carnis*) to a larger theological context. This context was provided by the relationship of God with Adam and Eve (both as historical individuals and symbolical, communal figures of the human soul) in the ideal state of Paradise, and their consequent Fall from this relationship. The notion of *concupiscentia carnis* as a divine punishment was for Augustine a psychological tip of a theological iceberg, being inseparably connected to his views on God, God's justice, and God's mercy. It is perhaps to Augustine's merit as a theological thinker that his insights into the hidden ways of divine punishments, justice, grace, and their interrelation always remain constant and coherent. On the other hand, the success of Julian as Augustine's relentless critic lay exactly in Julian's ability to correctly identify the theological corollaries behind Augustine's invention of *concupiscentia* as a divine punishment, even if one would not be willing to admit Julian's superiority in forming competing accounts on sin, moral responsibility and grace.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE ROOT AND MATRIX OF SIN

uenam inspice, radicem unde procedant quaere.

ep. Io. tr. 10, 7

in concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas est, in ambitione saeculi superbia est. qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix.

s. Denis 14, 2

A constant feature in Augustine's work is the antagonism of two kinds of basic attitudes (or wills, or loves) that are directed either to temporal and sensual satisfaction or to eternal and intellectual things, and ultimately to God.<sup>1</sup> These two loves define, for example the true nature of the two

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<sup>1</sup> A concise overview is Bonner 1996, 166–172. The opposite of *caritas* and *cupiditas* provided the subject for the classic studies of Nygren 1938 (the references below are to the revised English translation [1953]) and Burnaby 1938, the latter being partly a reaction to the former's thesis on two competing motifs of love (*agape, eros*). To Nygren, these were brought into a synthesis by Augustine as what Nygren refers to as the *caritas*-ideal. Nygren treats *cupiditas* (1953, 482–503) as the other possible kind of one basic desirous love, *caritas* being the opposite one. A substrate of desirous love is thus detached and induced from Augustine's concepts of *cupiditas* and *caritas*, as an "elemental drive." There is no actual difference in the quality of these two loves; the difference lies only in their objects. Nygren argues that *cupiditas* can simply be seen as a "downward" movement to temporal things; this movement contradicts man's original destiny and turns man to "bend" towards earthly things. The falsity of *cupiditas*-love lies in its striving for objects that are of less worth than the human soul (1953, 490). As one becomes what one loves, so a person will be "of the world" if he or she loves temporal objects. But, adds Nygren (1953, 496), even sins refer to God, for the acts made by *cupiditas*, mirror a desire for God's rest (*quies*). Unknowingly, man thus loves God, even if his love is aimed at other things. On this point of his reconstruction, Nygren admits that such definitions of *caritas* and *cupiditas* become inevitably incoherent ("very vague," 1953, 497): the original dualistic difference is watered down. The common substrate of both *caritas* and *cupiditas* represents for Nygren an example of the eros-motif, *caritas* representing "heavenly Eros" and *cupiditas* playing the part of "vulgar Eros": both finally lead to the same form of desiring love, not having much to do with the agape-motif. Nygren concludes by claiming that Augustine represents the ancient eudaimonistic tradition in a Christian frame. Augustine's *caritas* is an anthropocentric concept that seeks after its "own" (1953, 502–503, "the Christian commandment of love to God—naturally cast in quite a new mould—is made the answer to man's inevitable desire"). In recent times, Burnaby 1938 has been considered



opposing cities in *ciu.*; they define the ultimate quality of an individual act, that is, according to its provenance an act may be either good or bad regardless of its outer appearance (hence, all virtues can be reduced to either *cupiditas* or *caritas*, depending on whether they are practised by Christians or not);<sup>2</sup> they are related to each other in a zero-sum equation during the Christian renewal, that is, as divine *caritas* takes more and more place in the life of a Christian, the less does *cupiditas* have hold of his or her heart. An idea of two opposite loves is, obviously, formally dualistic, attracting dualistic rhetoric and figures of speech.<sup>3</sup>

Augustine has several names for both of these attitudes, and he also remarks on the terminology himself.<sup>4</sup> The evil form of love is usually, but not always, denoted with *cupiditas*, whereas the good form of love is usually, but not always, denoted with *caritas*. Other words used are *libido* or *concupiscentia*; and *amor* or *dilectio*, respectively.<sup>5</sup>

On innumerable occasions the contrast between the two opposite loves occurs as a stylistic, rhetorical device that is used, for example, in sermons, or in letters: Augustine simply briefly appeals to the polarity between the two as one of his own theological commonplaces.<sup>6</sup>

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a better guide to Augustine's doctrine of love (cf. Oliver O'Donovan's preface in Burnaby 1991, v–vii, and O'Daly 1987, 6 n. 24). For Burnaby's criticism of Nygren's central thesis, see Burnaby 1938, 15–21. Burnaby finds fault with Nygren's "unnecessary and quite unjustified claim to historical objectivity," with Nygren's artificial way of antithetically opposing and isolating agape and eros as religious motives, and especially with Nygren's way of picturing agape as a purely self-giving and thus finally self-contradictory value: "For it belongs to the nature of Agape never to be evoked in response to a present value, but to create value in the person upon whom it is freely bestowed. And this is the point at which Nygren's whole scheme is left hanging in the air [...] Nygren may speak constantly of the 'new way of fellowship with God' which the Gospel opens. But he is forbidden by his premisses to find in this fellowship itself any value which man may rightly desire." See also Holte 1958, 207–210; Burnaby 1970 and Rist 1970 for continued criticism of Nygren's division. Other more recent studies concerning the opposition of *cupiditas* and *caritas* are Babcock 1991; 1995. See also O'Donovan 1980, especially on the aspect of self-love and *cupiditas*. For a more speculative attempt, see Schlabach 1998.

<sup>2</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 83.

<sup>3</sup> Augustine is, of course, often very careful to note that the duality in concepts and terms does not imply an ontological dualism. Cf. *c. Faust.* 20, 3–4, where Faustus, Augustine's opponent, acknowledges the difference between Manichaean dualism and Augustine's monism. For different versions of 'dualism,' see Armstrong 1984; van Oort 1991, 225–226, who contrasts the Manichaean "absolute" or "radical dualism" with Augustine's "religious dualism."

<sup>4</sup> Most famously in *ciu.* 14, 7.

<sup>5</sup> See above, Chapter 2.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. *conf.* 8, 12 *ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere; sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uinciebat; c. ep. Parm.* 3, 10 *desinant calumniari bonis non operantibus mala per morbidam cupiditatem, sed tolerantibus*

While a thorough analysis of Augustine's concept of love and its interconnections with *cupiditas* lies beyond the scope of this study, let us take a brief look on three larger discussions on the two forms of love. This serves as an introduction to the two subsequent sections, which survey the function of *cupiditas* as the common inner source for the large variety of external evil actions through two, striking literary images.

#### 4.1. CUPIDITAS AND CARITAS—AN OVERVIEW

The series of questions in *de diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 33–36 deals with fear and love.<sup>7</sup> The main line of the somewhat tangled argument is conventional: one should love eternal things over temporal ones (*diu. qu.* 35, 1).

Accordingly love ought not to be sought for itself, should it, when unmistakably misery follows on the loss of what is loved [...] when we seek what ought to be loved we are lookinh for something to which this motion ought to direct us. For this reason, if love ought to be loved, surely not every kind of love ought to be. For there is a base love by means of which the soul chases after things inferior to itself, and this love is more properly called covetousness (*cupiditas*), that is to say, “the root of all evils.”<sup>8</sup> [transl. Mosher]

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*propter pacificam caritatem; spir. et litt.* 6 *non ad luminosae caritatis fructum, sed ad libidinosae cupiditatis adfectum; spir. et litt.* 65 *aliud est enim totam nondum adsequi caritatem, aliud nullam sequi cupiditatem; ep.* 209, 9 *cui quanto magis sinceram habeo caritatem, tanto magis prauae cupiditati eius obsisto; ep.* 228, 7 *ubi dei caritas flagrat, non mundi cupiditas fumat; ep.* 2\*, 11 *caritas enim qua es id facturus ex deo est, concupiscentia uero, qua id ut nondum facias detineris non est ex deo; lo. eu. tr.* 38, 5 *quantum inter pietatem et impietatem, quantum inter spem et desperationem, quantum inter caritatem et cupiditatem; multum ergo intererat; en. Ps.* 31, 2, 5 *amate, sed quid ametis uidete. amor dei, amor proximi, caritas dicitur; amor mundi, amor huius saeculi, cupiditas dicitur. cupiditas refrenetur, caritas excitetur; s.* 164, 6 *male te subiugauerat cupiditas, salubriter te subiuguet caritas; s.* 265, 11 *cupiditas enim cupit diuidere, sicut caritas colligere; s.* 311, 13 *euome cupiditatem, bibe caritatem; s. Lambot* 2 *proponite autem uobis ante oculos duas quasdam personas: unam cupiditatis, unam caritatis. cupiditatem dico amorem peccandi, quia est cupiditas nonnumquam quae appellatur in bono. item caritatem dico amorem recte uiuendi quia aliquando et caritas appellatur in malo; s. Mai* 14, 1 *caritas enim innouat hominem: nam sicut cupiditas facit hominem ueterem, sic caritas nouum.*

<sup>7</sup> As individual questions are difficult to date certainly, the dates of *diu. qu.* 34–36 remain unascertainable. Mosher 1982, 20 suggests the year 391. The antithesis between the good and evil forms of love was part of Augustine's thought from the start, and had appeared already in *mor.* 1, 21: *quanto ergo magis longe discedit a deo non loco sed affectione atque cupiditate ad inferiora quam est ipse, tanto stultitia miseriaque completur. dilectione igitur redit in deum, qua se illi non componere, sed supponere affectat.*

<sup>8</sup> *diu. qu.* 35, 1 *num igitur propter se ipsum amor appetendus est, cum quando desit quod amatur ea sit indubitata miseria [...] cum quaerimus quid amandum sit, quid sit illud ad quod*

The concept of *cupiditas* represents a shameful (*turpis*) kind of love that seeks *inferior*, temporal things instead of eternal ones (*quae non potest deesse*); it truly is the “root of all evil.” Augustine points out that in determining the quality of love, one has to evaluate its object; that is, the direction of its movement (*ad quod moueri*). In the case of “shameful love,” the objects are perishable, and always entail the possibility of being taken away from the one who loves or enjoys them. In contrast, the right kind of love immediately possesses the imperishable objects of its knowledge (*cognoscendo habere* 35, 2). Augustine attempts to define *caritas* as a “kind of movement” or “a kind of desire” with intellectual contents. While *mens* is the only part of the soul that can know the eternal matters, the lower part of the soul can also be said to love the right object. “The soul ought to love with its other parts as well this magnificent object which must be known by the mind.”<sup>9</sup>

Especially in *diu. qu.* 36, the opposite character of *caritas* and *cupiditas* is emphasised. Augustine analyses them in the context of the progress of the soul, or through Christian renewal; Augustine claims that there is a zero-sum equation between *caritas* and *cupiditas* both before and after baptism. Together with fear (*timor*), *cupiditas* is a force inhibiting the progress of love in the soul, and these forces should therefore be dispelled by the opposing force of love.<sup>10</sup> A gradual change into a *homo nouus* (*diu. qu.* 36, 2) proceeds by diminishing evil desire and its effects on the soul. Accordingly, *cupiditas* should be first expelled by invoking a healthful fear of God.<sup>11</sup> Augustine compares this process to the taming of animals, although the task is more difficult, as *cupiditas* is able to corrupt even human reasoning into its service (*ratio, quae cum seruit cupiditati peruersione miserabili*). Next, a fear of God should then be replaced by *caritatis libertas*. Finally, one should receive baptism. As for Christian life following the baptism, what remains is determining how one’s life is divided between *homo uetus* and *homo nouus*. The former constantly tries to find its enjoyment in temporal and carnal goods by way of *cupiditas*, whereas the “new man” pursues the spiritual

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*moueri oporteat quaerimus. quare si amandus est amor, non utique omnis amandus est. est enim et turpis amor, quo animus se ipso inferiora sectatur, quae magis proprie cupiditas dicitur, omnium scilicet malorum radix. et ideo non amandum est quod amanti et fruenti auferri potest.*

<sup>9</sup> *diu. qu.* 35, 2 [transl. Mosher]. Note that Augustine later rejected the idea of immediate possession through knowledge. *retr.* 1, 26.

<sup>10</sup> Augustine has found *timor* and *cupiditas* from two Scriptural verses respectively, 1Jn 4, 18 and 1Tim 6, 10.

<sup>11</sup> Persuasion to fear God should not be based on reasoned arguments, but on scriptural examples (*diu. qu.* 36, 1).

and eternal goods. In progress, the different and subtle forms of *cupiditas* may constitute serious obstacles to right love (*cupiditas uoluptatis*, *cupiditas placendi hominibus*, *superbia*). Pride (*superbia*) is the ultimate challenge for the “wise man” who has already overcome his carnal pleasures and his desire to please other people. Augustine advises to check pride by fear of God. Thus, the circle in the progress of virtue is completed.<sup>12</sup>

These questions in *diu. qu.* demonstrate that Augustine was, from his early works onwards, convinced of the explanatory force of the search for a common denominator of sinful human behaviour, one that could be reduced to one single concept, *cupiditas*. In contrast to this force, Augustine posited love as the fundamental motivation to virtuous action. Moreover, Augustine is able to evaluate the forms of love by inquiring about their objects; again, this occurs in a reduced and dualistic form in distinguishing between temporal and eternal, perishable and imperishable, external and immediately internal objects. Finally, *diu. qu.* 33–36 indicates how Augustine approaches the division of two loves explicitly from the angle of renewal, so that the contrast between *cupiditas* and *caritas* immediately invites him to consider how and by which methods one could conquer *cupiditas* and grow in *caritas*.

The role of *cupiditas* as antithetical to love (*caritas*) in *de doctrina christiana* has crucial significance. On a general level, Augustine knows of love that has fallen from the truth. Despite this fall, there remains a certain amount of love for oneself (*dilectio sui*) and one's body (*corporis sui*).<sup>13</sup> The fallen element in such a love consists of a wish to rule over one's equals, and to strive for a similar position to that of God. This, says Augustine, is no longer love, but hatred (*odium*). To strive for such power results from a perverse order in the hierarchy of loves. The “most intolerable” aspect of such love that has turned upside down is pride (*superbia*), particularly in its social dimensions.<sup>14</sup>

In *doctr. chr.*, *cupiditas* is referred to as the wrongly aimed, egotistic form of love; it is a perversion of the good form of love.<sup>15</sup> Augustine first defines

<sup>12</sup> *diu. qu.* 36, 4 *dei timor non solum inchoat, sed etiam perficit sapientiam.*

<sup>13</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 22.

<sup>14</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 23 *qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est hominibus, dominari affectat.*

<sup>15</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 12: *sed quoniam cupiditate fruendi pro ipso creatore creatura, homines configurati huic mundo et mundi nomine congruentissime uocati, non eam cognouerunt, propterea dixit euangelista: et mundus eam non cognouit.* While Augustine introduces his distinction between *uti* and *frui* (1, 3, 3–5, 5) in *doctr. chr.*, it has been shown that the distinction does not play a particularly significant role in Augustine's oeuvre as a whole, despite its deep

*cupiditas* in terms of *goals* in the following way: *motus animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter deum*.<sup>16</sup> He then proceeds by proposing a generalising theory for the emergence of sin against oneself and other people. According to this theory, an inadequate or missing relation to God also distorts the relations to other persons. If one's *fruitio* is ordered mistakenly, and has as its goal the created things instead of the creator, it results in two kinds of evils that are tightly interconnected. In both cases, the opposite of well-ordered love, that is, "unbridled lust" works as the main agent (*cupiditas* [...] *agit*) in causing two kinds (*genera*) of sins:

What unbridled lust does to corrupt a person's own mind and body is called wickedness; what it does to harm another person is called wrongdoing. All sins can be divided into these two kinds, but wickedness comes first. Once it has depleted the mind and as it were bankrupted it, it rushes on to commit wrongdoing in order to remove the obstacles to wickedness or to find assistance for it.<sup>17</sup> [transl. Green]

The purpose of *cupiditas* and its two corollaries here is to give a general classification for "all sins" (*omnium peccatorum*). Augustine's depiction of the two kinds of *cupiditas*-driven sins entails a consumerist notion of a force that first exhausts one's own soul (by *flagitium*), and then turns to other persons in its thirst for satisfaction and fulfilment through "injurious acts," or "wrongdoing" (*facinora*). Being opposed to *caritas*, evil desire diminishes and exploits the value of human soul, destroying both the individual soul and its neighbours.<sup>18</sup> The "movement" of *cupiditas* is in polar opposition to

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influence on the later history of theology. A concise definition of the distinction is *doctr. chr.* 1, 4 *frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam. uti autem, quod in usum uenerit, ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est*. The most recent extensive study is Pollmann 1996, who gives *cupiditas* less attention and concentrates more on *caritas*. See, however, Pollmann 1996, 137.

<sup>16</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 16. For *motus*, see Pollmann 1996, 137.

<sup>17</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 16 *quod autem agit indomita cupiditas ad corrumpendum animum et corpus suum, flagitium uocatur; quod autem agit, ut alteri noceat, facinus dicitur. Et haec sunt duo genera omnium peccatorum, sed flagitia priora sunt. Quae cum exinanierint animum et ad quandam egestatem perduxerint, in facinora prosilitur, quibus remoueantur impedimenta flagitiorum aut adiumenta quaerantur*. The word pair *facinus*—*flagitium* is standard distinction in Augustine, and appears e.g. in *conf.* 3, 15–17 in connection with Mt 22, 39. For the classical uses of the words, see O'Donnell 1992, II, 191.

<sup>18</sup> Quite unlike *cupiditas*, *caritas* aims at usefulness and wellbeing of oneself and benevolence towards one's neighbour. For a colourful description of the benevolent aspect of *caritas*, cf. *ep. Io. tr.* 8, 5 *non sic debemus amare homines, quomodo audimus gulosos dicere, amo tudos. quaeris quare? ut occidat, et consumat. et amare se dicit, et ad hoc illos amat ut non sint, ad hoc amat ut perimat. et quidquid ad cibandum amamus, ad hoc amamus, ut illud consumatur, et nos reficiamur. numquid sic amandi sunt homines, tanquam consumendi? sed*

love. However, both forms of love seem to proceed from an evaluation of oneself, being either misguided or correct.<sup>19</sup> Augustine again mentions the zero-sum situation between *caritas* and *cupiditas*: the more the realm of evil desire is destroyed, the more the realm of love increases.<sup>20</sup>

A rather unique feature of *cupiditas* in *de doctrina christiana* is its role in Augustine's hermeneutical approach, which is centred and preconditioned by love.<sup>21</sup> From *doctr. chr.* 3, 14 on, Augustine takes up the notion of *caritas* as a hermeneutical key. While doing this, he also pays attention to the opposite side of *cupiditas*. In general, his application of the figurative interpretation is restricted to those passages that do not relate to moral conduct (*morum honestas*) or to doctrinal truths (*fidei ueritas*).<sup>22</sup> Both *mores* and *fides* refer to God and one's neighbour, by love and by knowledge. Furthermore, neither of these norms should be taken as defined by any human standards or conventions (*consuetudines*), as these conventions suffer from local and temporal limitations (that is, they vary depending on time and place). Human moral conventions are also always open to erroneous intellectual judgments.<sup>23</sup> A

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*amicitia quaedam benevolentiae est, ut aliquando praestemus eis quos amamus. quid, si non sit quod praestemus? sola benevolentia sufficit amanti. non enim optare debemus esse miseros, ut possimus exercere opera misericordiae.* For a contemporary application of this theme, see Jenson 1999, II, 141.

<sup>19</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 16 *item quod agit caritas quo sibi prosit, utilitas est; quod autem agit ut prosit proximo, beneficentia nominatur. et hic praecedat utilitas, quia nemo potest ex eo quod non habet prodesse alteri.*

<sup>20</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 16 *quanto autem magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto caritatis augeatur.*

<sup>21</sup> The standard study by Karla Pollmann (1996) on *doctr. chr.* emphasises and analyses the role of *caritas* in Augustine's hermeneutics. Pollmann (1996, 135–136) remarks that *doctr. chr.* is in fact the first and only systematic presentation of the concept of *caritas* in Augustine. In this work, love (*caritas*) of God and neighbour in the form of the twin commandments grows to a primary hermeneutical key in understanding the Scripture. Pollmann 1996, 121–147. This hermeneutical frame is set in *doctr. chr.* 1, penetrating the following books, and surfacing especially in *doctr. chr.* 3. See e.g. *doctr. chr.* 2, 10 *nam in eo se exercet omnis diuinarum scripturarum studiosus, nihil in eis aliud inuenturus quam diligendum esse deum propter deum et proximum propter deum, et illum quidem ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, proximum uero tamquam se ipsum, id est, ut tota proximi, sicut etiam nostri, dilectio referatur in deum.* In *doctr. chr.* 3 the distinction appears mainly in the parts written in the first stage of editing *doctr. chr.* (396/397). Pollmann also notes (1996, 128, 146) that the connection between the concept of *caritas* and *uti-frui*-division is made for the first time in *doctr. chr.* For the importance of *doctr. chr.* in Augustine's view of love, see also Burnaby 1938, 105; Babcock 1988, 53.

<sup>22</sup> See Pollmann 1996, 136–137. For the development of these criteria, see Teske 1995.

<sup>23</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 15 *sed quoniam proclue est humanum genus non ex momentis ipsius libidinis sed potius suae consuetudinis aestimare peccata, fit plerumque ut quisque hominum ea tantum culpanda arbitretur, quae suae regionis et temporis homines uituperare atque damnare*

divinely authorised vicious circle therefore becomes unavoidable: First, the passages that do not relate to *mores* or *fides* are to be interpreted figuratively. Second, however, due to the customs of the time (*consuetudo*) or to misguided opinions (*erroris opinio*) one is unable to discern which passages relate to *mores* or *fides*. Therefore, *whatever* the scripture commands in the field of *mores*, relates to *caritas* and *cupiditas*; again, *whatever* the scripture prescribes in the field of *fides*, relates to *caritas* and *cupiditas* as well (*doctr. chr.* 3, 15).<sup>24</sup>

That the inevitable temporal perspective causes problems for the scriptural interpretation is illuminated by way of yet another example which emphasises the corruptive force of *cupiditas* in the hermeneutical process. Accordingly, one should not regard the seemingly morally reproachable narrations about the Old Testament figures (e.g. polygamy) in terms of the standards of one's own time, for times may have changed for the worse, and what could be done previously without lust, may now no longer be possible.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, even passages that seem to commend immoral action from the present view of point should be related to love.

In the same vein, Augustine is concerned with another way *cupiditas* may lead biblical interpretation astray. Such an error is committed if the

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*consuerunt, et ea tantum probanda atque laudanda, quae consuetudo eorum cum quibus uiuit admittit, eoque contingit ut, si quid scriptura uel praeceperit quod abhorret a consuetudine audientium uel quod non abhorret culpauerit, si animum eorum iam uerbi uinxit auctoritas, figuratam locutionem putent [...] item, si animum praeoccupauit alicuius erroris opinio, quidquid aliter adseruerit scriptura, figuratum homines arbitrantur.* For the role of human conventions in *doctr. chr.*, see Babcock 1995.

<sup>24</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 15 *non autem praecipit scriptura nisi caritatem nec culpat nisi cupiditatem et eo modo informat mores hominum [...] non autem adserit nisi catholicam fidem rebus praeteritis et futuris et praesentibus. praeteritorum narratio est, futurorum praenuntiatio, praesentium demonstratio: sed omnia haec ad eandem caritatem nutriendam atque roborandam et cupiditatem uincendam atque exstinguendam ualent.* Pollmann (1996, 136) formulates clearly the intrinsic flaw of Augustine's hermeneutical approach: "Die Ethik ist nach dem Willen Augustins also die Teleologie der Hermeneutik, d.h. der Ausleger muss auf sie hingerichtet auslegen und das Auslegungsergebnis muss mit ihr übereinstimmen. Anders formuliert: Die *caritas*-Ethik Augustins bildet den hermeneutischen Normenhorizont für die *tractatio scripturarum*, d.h. sie ist sowohl deren Ziel als auch deren Voraussetzung." See also Pollmann 1996, 138–139 and 142–143: "Dadurch, dass Augustin die *caritas* zur eigentlichen *res* der Bibel macht, die als *signum* bzw. als *signa*-haltiger Text auf diese verweist, reduziert er die Bibel inhaltlich radikal auf einen Teilelement dieser *caritas*."

<sup>25</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 20 *in huiusmodi moribus quicquid illorum temporum sancti non libidinose faciebant, quamuis ea facerent, quae hoc tempore nisi per libidinem fieri non possunt, non culpat scriptura. Libido* is prone to be concealed under the customs of the time. *doctr. chr.* 3, 20 *libidinem [...] quae inter claustra morum sollemnium latitabat.* For the effects of changed customs and evil desires, see further the cases made in *doctr. chr.* 3, 30–31.

interpreter is driven by his or her own approach of interpretation to seek licence for sin in the Old Testament narratives. In Augustine's example, this happens by claiming that it would be morally irreprehensible to live in polygamous relationships now in the same way as the patriarchs did, without taking into consideration the contemporary state of *caritas* and *cupiditas*. In other words, what was possible for the patriarchs to do without evil desire, it is not possible for us anymore.<sup>26</sup> Evil desire appears here as a flawed moral precondition in the hermeneutical process, resulting in something that could be called the hermeneutics of *cupiditas*; accordingly, Augustine finds fault with interpreters who would turn biblical material into the service of selfish needs, thus obscuring the core and norm of the Bible, i.e. *caritas*.<sup>27</sup>

While Augustine admits that different times and varying conventions affect the way in which *caritas* may be applied to moral action, he bluntly rejects a relativistic approach to moral questions (*doctr. chr.* 3, 22). For instance, Augustine mentions the Golden Rule as an invincible example of a commandment that is universal and unchangeable. When the Golden rule is practised with the only two objects worthy of love, that is, God

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<sup>26</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 26 *item cauendum est ne forte, quod in scripturis ueteribus pro illorum temporum condicione, etiamsi non figurate sed proprie intellegatur, non est flagitium neque facinus, ad ista etiam tempora quis putet in usum uitae posse transferri. quod nisi dominante cupiditate et ipsarum quoque scripturarum, quibus euertenda est, satellitium quaerente, non faciet; nec intellegit miser ad hanc utilitatem illa esse sic posita, ut spei bonae homines salubriter uideant et consuetudinem, quam aspernantur, posse habere usum bonum et eam, quam amplexantur, esse posse damnabilem, si et ibi caritas utentium et hic cupiditas adtendatur.*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Evans 1982, 163, who fails to notice the corruptive effect of *cupiditas* on the hermeneutical process. Moral complaints on sexual behaviour of the OT patriarchs were common in the Manichaean Bible criticism. Augustine often answered these complaints by deducing moral flaws in his opponents from their mistaken biblical interpretation. Augustine's first anti-Manichaean work, *mor.*, is based on this assumption, which then appears later e.g. in *c. Faust.* See *c. Faust.* 16, 14, where Faustus' intellectual disability to find Christ in Torah is said to be due to his moral failure (*tumida adrogantia*). On a more general level, Augustine points out that there is something sinister in the way the Manichaeans describe cosmogony in terms of *concupiscentia* (*c. Faust.* 15, 7). See also *c. Faust.* 19, 24; *c. Faust.* 19, 26 *non ad matrimonii fidem, sed ad concupiscentiae crimen habendam esse censetis. matrimonium quippe ex hoc appellatum est, quod non ob aliud debeat femina nubere, quam ut mater fiat: quod uobis odiosum est. c. Faust.* 20, 6 *puellas pulchras et pueros proponi dicitis, quorum formosissimis corporibus inardescant principes tenebrarum, ad feminas masculi et ad masculos feminae, ut in ipsa flagranti libidine et inhianti concupiscentia de membris eorum tamquam de taetris sordidisque compedibus dei uestri membra soluantur.* Sexual *concupiscentia*, exorcised by the Manichaeans in their ethical teaching on continence, became a weapon of propaganda in Augustine's hands. For the most vehement attack, see *c. Faust.* 22, 98.



and one's neighbour, (*doctr. chr.* 3, 22), the two genera of sins (*flagitium, facinus*) that were caused by *cupiditas* in the first place, eventually and gradually die out. Augustine considered natural self-regard to be universal, and if it is accompanied with *dilectio dei*, it works as evidence against all relativistic claims. To Augustine, an interpreter of the Bible has a clear moral duty: he or she has to search for an interpretation that will find love (*caritas*) towards God and his or her neighbour even in the most difficult and unpleasant passages of the Bible, and thereby to invert the "tyranny" of evil desire (*cupiditas*).<sup>28</sup> The seemingly simplistic and reduced division between the two opposite moral principles of *caritas* and *cupiditas* in biblical interpretation shows thus how Augustine was able to apply his central theological convictions to matters of surprising complexity.

The opposition between *caritas* and *cupiditas* appears in *confessiones* as well, written shortly after *doctr. chr.* In the critical moments preceding the conversion of his will, Augustine finds himself lingering on the threshold of divine *caritas* and his own selfish *cupiditas*.<sup>29</sup> The divine love that Augustine sees right before his eyes means a rejection of his own wishes and his own will. So, evil desire impedes Augustine's dedication to love, for it is essentially "his own" (*meae*), whereas the origin of love is God ( *tuae*). Later in *conf.* 13, the opposition of *caritas* and *cupiditas* is described with the imagery of weight and lightness. The directions of these loves are determined by their objects. Whereas the downward movement of *cupiditas* is caused by "love of anxieties" (*amor curarum*), the upward lift is due to the love of a freedom from anxieties (*amor securitatis*). With the help of the Holy Spirit, who is the giver of *caritas*, a person drawn by his or her *cupiditas* is therefore able to rise to heavenly rest (*requies*) from the turbulent waters of sins.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 23 sic eversa tyrannide cupiditatis caritas regnat iustissimis legibus dilectionis dei propter deum, sui et proximi propter deum. servabitur ergo in locutionibus figuratis regula huiusmodi, ut tam diu versetur diligenti consideratione quod legitur, donec ad regnum caritatis interpretatio perducatur.

<sup>29</sup> *conf.* 8, 12. certum me habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere, sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uincebat.

<sup>30</sup> *conf.* 13, 8 cui dicam, quomodo dicam de pondere cupiditatis in abruptam abyssum et de subleuatione caritatis per spiritum tuum, qui superferebatur super aquas [Gn 1,2]? cui dicam? quomodo dicam? neque enim loca sunt, quibus mergimur et emergimus. quid similium et quid dissimilium? affectus sunt, amores sunt, immunditia spiritus nostri defluens inferius amore curarum et sanctitas tui attollens nos superius amore securitatis, ut sursum cor habeamus ad te. See *conf.* 13, 10 pondus meum amor meus. Cf. *cat. rud.* 31, where evil desire is also depicted as a "weight" that will finally precipitate all evil angels and men into eternal damnation: omnes enim homines amantes superbiam et temporalem dominationem cum uano typho et pompa arrogantiae, omnesque spiritus qui talia diligunt, et gloriam suam subiectione hominum

*Cupiditas* as a privative and self-destructing love, as opposed to *caritas*, surfaces again in *de trinitate*.<sup>31</sup> In *trin.* 10, 7, Augustine reflects on the Delphic maxim and the self-knowledge of the mind. The evil version of love is a privative force, not satisfied with a peaceful vision of God, but striving for something more. When the mind acts out its evil desire (*cupiditas praua*), it abandons the calm admiration of divine beauty, and starts to desire for a private appropriation of divinity and beauty. The mind now cherishes an idolatrous position: for it seeks to change its status as *imago dei*, and to possess a state similar to God's own nature. Because of such a wish, the soul does not, of course, achieve its goal, but paradoxically suffers from diminution. While the soul formerly knew itself better, and was intent upon God, it now thinks of itself less, and is intent upon the "lower things," trying to gain security for itself in those things. By striving for a freedom outside God, the mind is bound to a gradually deepening servitude of bodily reality. As a result, what the mind thinks as "more and more" becomes progressively less.<sup>32</sup>

An account of the movements in the soul highlights the activities of greed (*cupiditas* is here changed with the variant *auaritia*) as the corrupt form of love; as the root of all evils and as appearing in form of three temptations or sins of pride, curiosity and lust of the flesh.

What happens is that the soul, loving its own power, slides away from the whole which is common to all into the part which is its own private property.

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*quaerunt, simul una societate deuincti sunt; et si saepe aduersum se pro his rebus dimicant, pari tamen pondere cupiditatis in eandem profunditatem praecipitantur.*

<sup>31</sup> For a definition of love see *trin.* 8, 10–14, with the usual terminological division: *ea quippe dilectio dicenda quae uera est, alioquin cupiditas est; atque ita cupidi abusiue dicuntur diligere quemadmodum cupere abusiue dicuntur qui diligunt.* *Ordo amoris* appears in clear form in *trin.* 9, 4, as well as in 9, 13, where the antithesis is again referred either to God or creature: *ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate, non quo non sit amanda creatura, sed si ad creatorem refertur ille amor, non iam cupiditas sed caritas erit.*

<sup>32</sup> *trin.* 10, 7 *utquid ergo ei praeceptum est ut se ipsa cognoscat? credo ut se cogitet et secundum naturam suam uiuat, id est ut secundum suam naturam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet. multa enim per cupiditatem prauam tamquam sui sit oblita sic agit. uidet enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra in praestantiore natura quae deus est. et cum stare debeat ut eis fruatur, uolens ea sibi tribuere et non ex illo similis illius sed ex se ipsa esse quod ille est auertitur ab eo, moueturque et labitur in minus et minus quod putatur amplius et amplius quia nec ipsa sibi nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit. ideoque per egestatem ac difficultatem fit nimis intenta in actiones suas et inquietas delectationes quas per eas colligit; atque ita cupiditate adquirendi notitias ex his quae foris sunt, quorum cognitum genus amat et sentit amitti posse nisi impensa cura teneantur, perdit securitatem, tantoque se ipsam minus cogitat quanto magis secunda est quod se non possit amittere.*

By following God's directions and being perfectly governed by his laws it could enjoy the whole universe of creation; but by the apostasy of pride which is called the beginning of sin it strives to grab something more than the whole and to govern it by its own laws; and because there is nothing more than the whole it is thrust back into anxiety over a part, and so by being greedy for more it gets less. That is why greed is called the root of all evils. Thus all that it tries to do in its own against the laws that govern the universe it does by its own body, which is the only part it has a part-ownership in. And so it finds delight in bodily shapes and movements, and because it has not got them inside, it wraps itself in their images which it has fixed in the memory. In this way it defiles itself foully with a fanciful sort of fornication by referring all its business to one or other of the following ends: curiosity, searching for bodily and temporal experience through the senses; swollen conceit, affecting to be above other souls which are given over to their senses; or carnal pleasure, plunging itself in this muddy whirlpool.<sup>33</sup> [transl. Hill]

Several images of the source of evil merge in this text. Augustine combines the image of 'root' (*radix*) of pride (*superbia*) and greed (*avaritia*); the topos of wrongly ordered love, referring its enjoyment to temporal things instead of divine truths;<sup>34</sup> the three concupiscences as the goals of this perverted love (*curiose quaerit, tumidus fastus, carnalis uoluptas*);<sup>35</sup> and finally, the original fallen will is being characterised as a privative paradox: the soul falls in love with its own power and wants to have "more than the whole" and by this desire of having more, it eventually gets less. Adam and Eve would have

<sup>33</sup> *trin.* 12, 14 *potestatem quippe suam diligens anima, a communi uniuerso ad priuatam partem prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia, quod initium peccati dicitur, cum in uniuersitate creaturae Deum rectorem secuta, legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid uniuerso appetens, atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius uniuersitate, in curam partilem truditur, et sic aliquid amplius concupiscendo minuitur, unde et avaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum; totumque illud ubi aliquid proprium contra leges, quibus uniuersitas administratur, agere nititur, per corpus proprium gerit, quod partiliter possidet; atque ita formis et motibus corporalibus delectata, quia intus ea secum non habet, cum eorum imaginibus, quas memoriae fixit, inuoluitur, et phantastica fornicatione turpiter inquinatur, omnia officia sua ad eos fines referens, quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia per corporis sensus quaerit, aut tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat excelsior, aut coenoso gurgite carnalis uoluptatis immergitur.*

<sup>34</sup> The images of temporal goods are "sucked" into the soul (*introrsus rapiens*), and the soul gets hopelessly entangled with these images. The possession of temporal things obviously distorts the soul's relation with God, so that the one and only *finis* is changed into bodily things that are wished either as experiences, as means to high position, or as sensual objects. *trin.* 12, 15 *cum uero propter adipiscenda ea quae per corpus sentiuntur, propter experiendi uel excellendi uel contrectandi cupiditatem, ut in his finem boni sui ponat, aliquid agit, quidquid agit, turpiter agit; et fornicatur in corpus proprium peccans.*

<sup>35</sup> Pride thus plays a double role in this passage: *initium* and *finis*. For arrogance towards other souls, see *doctr. chr.* 1, 23.

preserved the image of God (*custoditur*) by loving God, the source of their divine image, instead of loving their *proprium*.<sup>36</sup>

While *diu. qu.* reflects Augustine's early interest in treating *cupiditas*, as opposed to *caritas*, as the most general source for morally reprehensible actions, *doct. chr.* may be taken as a serious systematization of the pair of these concepts. In turn, *trin.* is an attempt to define *cupiditas* as an antisocial, consumerist and privative counter-love. Finally, in *ciu.* Augustine joined his view of two opposite loves to his great vision of the two opposing cities:

Two cities, then, have been created by two loves: that is, the earthly city by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love of God extending to contempt of self.<sup>37</sup> [transl. Dyson]

The aforementioned examples obviously do not exhaust the wealth of material in Augustine concerning the antithesis of *caritas* and *cupiditas*. These examples show, however, that Augustine was capable of applying this very simple tool into various contexts throughout his career. As we have already seen, an important role of *cupiditas* (with variants) in opposition to *caritas* (with variants) was to name a common inner source for the great variety of external evil actions. A particularly illustrating way to represent this function was to speak of *cupiditas* as the 'root' (*radix*) of all evils. Another type of this function was the formula of *triplex cupiditas*, occurring especially in the works of 390s as a schematized attempt to cover all sinful behaviour. This is a structural element of Augustine's views on sin in two important works, *uera rel.* and *conf.*, and, similar to the image of root, reduces the source for sinful actions into some kind of a trinitarian matrix of sin. Both of these images are linked to a single verse of the Bible. Accordingly, the image of 'root' is based on the Pauline verse of 1 Tim 6, 10 *radix omnium malorum cupiditas est*,<sup>38</sup> while the formula of *triplex cupiditas* is based on 1 Jn 2, 16 *quia omnia quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi*.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *trin.* 12, 16 *honor enim hominis uerus est imago et similitudo Dei, quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur. Tanto magis itaque inhaeretur Deo, quanto minus diligitur proprium.*

<sup>37</sup> *ciu.* 14, 28 *fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum dei, caelestem uero amor dei usque ad contemptum sui.* Van Oort (1991, 142–145) speaks rather of a division into *uti* and *frui*.

<sup>38</sup> The earliest securely datable occurrence of the verse is *mor.* 1, 35. Augustine also uses the variant *radix omnium malorum auaritia est*, for the first time in *lib. arb.* 3, 48.

<sup>39</sup> Already in *mus.* 6, 44. Notable variants are *quae enim in mundo sunt, desiderium carnis est, et desiderium oculorum, et ambitio saeculi* (*ep. Io. tr.* 2, 11) and the one used by Julian in

In the following two sections let us examine the way in which Augustine uses these two images, how and why they vary in time, and in which contexts they seem to appear.

#### 4.2. CUPIDITAS AS THE ROOT OF ALL SIN

Manichaean cosmology offered a clear, materialistic solution to the question of the source of evil. Augustine's early uses of the image of the 'root' of sinful acts appear in a context where he needed to solve the problem in such a way that would avoid the radically dualistic Manichaean approach.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, the first occurrence of 1 Tim 6, 10 can be found in Augustine's earliest anti-Manichaean work, in *mor.* 1, 36, where it is said to have led to Adam's Fall: "Paul, then, says that covetousness is the root of all evil, and the Old Law indicates that it was through this sin that the first man fell."<sup>41</sup>

*c. Iul. imp.* 4, 18–22 *concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, uel, sicut ipse posuisti, superbia uitae.*

<sup>40</sup> See especially *conf.* 7, 7 *bonus bona creauit: et ecce quomodo ambit atque implet ea: ubi ergo malum et unde et qua huc inrepsit? quae radix eius et quod semen eius? an omnino non est?* Admittedly, the phrase of the 'root of evil' was common good, and not limited to Christian authors, who were obviously inspired by 1 Tim 6, 10. For the background of the Pauline verse (1 Tim 6, 10), see Renahan 1973, 18–19, who points to e.g. Dinarchus *oratio* 1, 22; Arist. *frag.* 544 Rose; Hippocr. *Ep.* 16, 15, and concludes: "The evidence is fairly clear that this kind of statement is proverbial commonplace, which had long been current in the classical world." Similarly Stein (1998, 30 n. 2): "wird verschiedentlich Demokrit, Diogenes oder Bion zugeschrieben, ist aber darüber hinaus alter Zeit weit verbreitet." For the occurrence of the phrase, see also Cic. *Tusc.* 4, 38, 83 *hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitis philosophia se extracturam pollicetur*; Greg. Nys. *Vit. Moys.* 2, 256 φθόνος [...] ἡ τῆς κακίας ῥίζα; cf. Plot. *En.* 3, 6, 4. Donatist Petilian also speaks about the 'root' or the original cause as necessary in defining things. Petil. A. c. *litt. Pet.* 1, 5 *omnis enim res origine et radice consistit, et si caput non habet aliquid, nihil est.* For Manichaean uses of the image of the 'root,' see Decret 1995, 148; Lee 1996, 133 n. 193; Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 143–145. Considering the Jewish-Christian background of Manichaeism, it is no surprise that the Pauline verse was quoted, for instance, in *epistula ad Menoch* (*c. Iul. imp.* 3, 175): *radix enim ait scriptura omnium malorum concupiscentia.* Coyle (2009, 78–79) points out to a Manichaean text (*Acta Archelai*), in which Mani combines together Christ's parable of the good and evil tree (Mt 7, 16) and the image of the root: "Manes said: 'The root is indeed evil, and the tree very bad [...] and its fruits of fornication, adulteries, murders, avarice and all evil deeds come from that evil root.'" (transl. M. Vermes) The Latin text runs: *Manes dixit: Radix quidem mala, arbor autem pessima [...] fructus autem fornicationes, adulteria, homicidia, auaritia et omnes mali actus malae illius radices.*

<sup>41</sup> *mor.* 1, 35–36 *namque, ut ait apostolus, radix est omnium malorum cupiditas [...] dicit ergo Paulus radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem, per quam etiam lex uetus primum hominem lapsum significat.*

Augustine challenged the Manichaean concept of the source of sin and evil by appealing to the moral responsibility of the will.<sup>42</sup> In *de libero arbitrio* 1, Augustine and Evodius discuss the topic of love. They agree that evil acts emerge from a flawed love of such things that could be lost unwillingly (*inuitus amittere*). They also agree that this love, or *libido*, is the source for all evil acts (*lib. arb.* 1, 10). *Libido* as a form of love for temporal goods is thus sin, and the exact opposite of happiness.<sup>43</sup> It is, however, only after one freely gives up his or her position of rational control over wrongly ordered and irrational movements, that is, one abandons the “citadel of virtue,” that such a perverse situation becomes possible (*lib. arb.* 1, 20–22). From then on, *libido*, or *cupiditas*, is to be counted for causing all evil acts:

For we agree that all wrongdoing becomes such only by passion (*libidine*), namely, by a desire (*cupiditate*) that is blameworthy.<sup>44</sup> [transl. Russell]

This remark on the fundamental role of evil love is made towards the end of the question. It is concluded that good people as well as those who are evil desire a life without fear (*cupere sine metu uiuere*): but the good ones do not desire things which they are in constant risk of losing; in contrast, evil people try to enjoy (*his fruendis*) and secure insecure things for themselves and thus live a life that consists of faults and crimes.

[Evodius:] [I] am very glad to have a clear understanding of the nature of that blameworthy desire (*cupiditas*) called passion (*libido*). I now see that it is the love of things which each one can lose against his will.<sup>45</sup> [transl. Russell]

The unfortunate trade of the free choice of the will into a tyranny of *libido* is, in turn, divinely punished by a disturbed and emotional life under temporal circumstances. The antagonism of the two loves is now developed further. Augustine defines what it is to love temporal things instead of eternal. According to the eternal divine law, man should turn one’s love away from all temporal goods towards eternal things. Despite this law, people

<sup>42</sup> In the Manichaean view, the ultimate origo was, of course, the King of Darkness. *immanis princeps omnium et dux habens circa se innumerabiles principes, quorum omnium ipse erat mens atque origo. haeque fuerunt naturae quinque terrae pestiferae* [Manich. *ep. fund.* frg. 2, 9 Stein].

<sup>43</sup> See Wetzel 1992, 67–68.

<sup>44</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 10 *conuenit enim inter nos omnia malefacta non ob aliud mala esse nisi quod libidine, id est improbanda cupiditate, fiunt.*

<sup>45</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 10 *gaudeo tam me plane cognouisse, quid sit etiam illa culpabilis cupiditas, quae libido nominatur. quam esse iam apparet earum rerum amorem, quas potest quisque inuitus amittere.* This idea is an echo from Stoic evaluation (*ta eph’ hemin—ta ouk eph’ hemin*). See O’Connell 1970, 55; De Capitani 1987, 476.

still adhere to temporal things in their evil desire (*cupiditas*). They attach their life to mutable things: their body, their freedom, their parents, their relatives, their spouses, their community, their worldly achievements, and their money (*lib. arb.* 1, 32). In fact, all sin could be easily determined as “turning away from divine things to temporal and insecure ones” (*uereque manentibus et ad mutabilia atque incerta conuertitur, lib. arb.* 1, 35).<sup>46</sup> Thus, the antithesis of *cupiditas* and *caritas* is strongly present in the *lib. arb.* 1. This will recur in the later phases of Augustine’s edition of this work, in the form of the topic of *radix*. However, the image appeared before the sequels of *lib. arb.* 2 and 3 more directly in *contra Fortunatum*. In 392, a disputation took place in Hippo between the representatives of the Catholic Christians and the Manichaeans. Augustine represented the Catholic Christians, and a prominent Manichaean *presbyter*, Fortunatus, represented the latter.<sup>47</sup> The discussion was put into books in form of forensic acts. This disputation concentrated (by Augustine’s initiative) on the question of the origin of evil. During their conversation, an interesting notion of the root of the evil is mentioned.<sup>48</sup> Fortunatus and Augustine take different stands on this notion.

Fortunatus claims that all personal sins must have a common origin. Otherwise, we would not sin. Thus, Fortunatus is not satisfied in analysing some particular sins, but wishes to find a general explanation for their occurrence. For this reason, an evil substance (*substantia*) has to be supposed. Due to this substance, people indeed sin involuntarily (*inuiti peccamus*), that is, an alien nature compels humans to sin, until they gain the “knowledge of things” (*scientia rerum*), by which the origin of the good part of the soul is confirmed, and a process of repair (*emendatio*) is begun. Fortunatus takes his opponent’s position to represent what he calls a “spontaneous fall” in a body created by God, and Fortunatus fails to find a satisfying rational explanation for such position. By “spontaneous,” Fortunatus here refers to the inexplicable, completely arbitrary character of the fall that Augustine, in his view, has suggested.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Later, in Book 2, Augustine divides this turning away (*auersio*) into three different types (2, 19, 53) of *triplex cupiditas*. Cf. *uera rel.* 6 where *cupiditas bonorum temporalium atque affluentium* is opposed to *spes uitae aeternae et bona spiritalia*.

<sup>47</sup> For the circumstances and the protagonists, see now Decret & van Oort 2004.

<sup>48</sup> During the debate, Augustine shows expert and intimate familiarity with Manichaean texts (especially *Epistula Fundamenti* and *Thesaurus*) and concepts. For an overview, see van Oort 2008a and his extensive index of Manichaean terms and concepts in Decret & van Oort 2004, 91–112.

<sup>49</sup> c. *Fort.* 20.

Augustine answers by appealing again to responsibility: one cannot be properly responsible for one's actions unless they are undertaken without compulsion and freely (*propria uoluntate*). Augustine approaches the question on the origin of evil by quoting 1 Tim 6, 10 (*radix omnium malorum est cupiditas*).<sup>50</sup> Sin, or *cupiditas*, cannot be explained or unravelled any further:

For if you seek the root of all evils, you have the apostle saying that covetousness (*cupiditas*) is the root of all evils. But the root of a root I cannot seek [...] if it is true that covetousness is the root of all evils, in vain do we seek some other kind of evil.<sup>51</sup> [transl. Newman]

Fortunatus objects to Augustine's explanation by stating that even our *cupiditas* (*quod in nobis malum*) has its origin in a cosmological principle: it would be absurd to think that human sin is responsible for all adversary and for all evil things in the whole world. Thus, each one's own *cupiditas* is only a small part (*portiuuncula*)<sup>52</sup> of the universal, cosmological evil.<sup>53</sup> It is an alien representative of evil in our human constitution, and all sin should indeed be imputed to this adversary nature (*contraria natura, c.*

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<sup>50</sup> Perhaps this particular verse was chosen deliberately by Augustine. Harrison & BeDuhn (2001, 144–145) argue that Fortunatus used a standard Manichaean set of Pauline passages in speaking of the 'root' (Gal 5, 17 and 1 Tim 6, 10). The verse is used together with Gal 5, 17, as Harrison & BeDuhn (2001, 144) point out, in *epistula ad Menoch*, quoted by Julian (in *c. Iul. imp.*) to label Augustine as a follower of Mani. Manich. *ep. Men.* 2, 4: *tolle denique malignae huius stirpis radicem, et statim te ipsam spiritalem contemplaris. radix enim, ait scriptura, omnium malorum concupiscentia*. Cf. 5, 2 *uidesne concupiscentiam mali esse originem*. See Stein 1998, 28–43, 67, for the provenance and the form of the Bible quotation. The authenticity of the letter has been disputed; even Pelagian forgery has been suggested. Aalders (1960, 245) calls the letter a "pseudépigraphé." Lieu (1992, 210) also regards the letter as being spurious. Harrison & BeDuhn (2001) defend the letter's authenticity. See also Van Oort 2010a, 515, but cf. Gardner & Lieu 2004, 172–174. Gardner (2001, 104) adopts a minimalistic approach to the canon of Mani's letters, and does not mention *ep. Men.* In van Oort's view, Augustine's skeptical reaction to the letter merely reflected his deep knowledge of the Manichaean source material that was available in Latin (2010a, 515 "genuine surprise"). Although the provenance of this letter is sometimes disputed, it has been used to argue for the Manichaean influences in Augustine's thought. Clark 1986a, 315. Cf. O'Donnell 1992, III, 202–203.

<sup>51</sup> *c. Fort.* 21 *si enim radicem omnium malorum quaeris, habes apostolum dicentem radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem. radicem radice quaerere non possum [...] si autem uerum est omnium malorum radicem esse cupiditatem, frustra aliud aliquod mali genus quaerimus.*

<sup>52</sup> This rare word in the Augustinian corpus (seven occurrences altogether) appears e.g. in *en. Ps.* 140, 10, designating 'part of divinity' in reference to Manichaean mythology.

<sup>53</sup> For an analysis of how Augustine's Manichaean opponents may have perceived the macrocosmic salvation event in their inner struggle between two opposing forces, see Scibona 2011, 396–401.



Fort. 21).<sup>54</sup> Fortunatus concludes by stating that our sins are not committed by our soul (*anima*) and not by an arbitrary and inexplicable decision (*sua sponte*), but by the evil element of the cosmological evil. Fortunatus identifies his *portiuncula* with Augustine's *cupiditas*, in an evidently bodily and substantial tone (*quae in corporibus habemus*).<sup>55</sup> Fortunatus seems to interpret Augustine's image of 'root' as being a reference to the *body*:

[Y]our Reverence said that this covetousness, which is found in our bodies is the root of evil. [transl. Teske]

Fortunatus claims, however, that Augustine's view is distorted. In each person, *cupiditas* is part of the bigger picture, namely that of the totality of evil substance. This is the real root and the evil tree, of which Jesus had spoken (Mt 15, 13).<sup>56</sup> Fortunatus bases his conception of the 'root' by also

<sup>54</sup> According to Fortunatus, there is, however, one sin that can be reckoned as committed by the soul (*anima*), namely, to hear from purification, and then to alienate itself from this "wholesome instruction." See Lieu 1992, 24–26.

<sup>55</sup> c. Fort. 21 *haec nos dicimus, quod a contraria natura anima cogatur delinquere: cui non uis esse radicem nisi hoc tantum, quod in nobis malum uersatur, cum constet exceptis nostris corporibus mala in omni mundo uersari. non ista, quae in corporibus solum habemus sed quae in toto mundo uersantur et nominibus ualent bona, mala radix habet. nam dixit dignatio tua, quod haec sit radix malorum, cupiditas, quae in nostris corporibus uersatur, cum quando non est cupiditas mali ex nostris corporibus, ex principali illa contraria natura uersatur in toto mundo.* Cf. Coyle (2009, 83) for a suggestion to read *cordibus* instead of *corporibus*, but this seems to apply only to a single sentence in Fortunatus' reply. Decret (1970, 238–239) has noted that in c. Fort. there are practically no references to the mythical *gens tenebrarum* from Fortunatus' part; instead, the origin of evil is explained in evasively abstract terms. Such avoidance of mythological explanations seems to have been common in several Manichaean texts in the West. See van Oort 2010b, 1125. Decret (1986, 57–58) has also noted how few references Augustine has to the Devil in the debates with the Manichaeans. In *agon*. 1, however, the 'root' is an instrument used by the Devil: *cupiditas* is a handle through which the Devil holds the hearts of humans. In *s. dom. m.* 2, 9, 32 the Devil is depicted as being blindfolded by his *cupiditas*: if he can perceive something right, it is only due to the divine illumination. *Cupiditas* is even said to have "given name to the Devil." In other words, *cupiditas* counts for all that is false in the Devil, while all that he can perceive or think in a clear manner is tributed to God. *s. dom. m.* 2, 9, 32: *quapropter si omnis anima rationalis etiam cupiditate caecata tamen cum cogitat et ratiocinatur, quidquid in ea ratiocinatione uerum est non ei tribuendum est sed ipsi lumini ueritatis, a quo uel tenuiter pro sui capacitate inlustratur, ut uerum aliquid in ratiocinando sentiat, quid mirum si diaboli anima praua cupiditate peruersa quidquid tamen uerum de iusto uiro cogitauit, cum eum temptare uellet, ipsius dei uoce, id est ipsius ueritatis uoce audisse perhibetur, quidquid autem falsum, illi cupiditati tribuitur qua diaboli nomen accipit?*

<sup>56</sup> Decret 1970, 157–158, 196–197. For Manichaean texts on the evil matter and/or desire in human beings, see Epiph. *Panarion* 30, 6 and especially Manich. *ep. Men.* 2, 3–4, translated in: Gardner & Lieu 2004, 172–174, 186. On the image of good and bad tree in Manichaean texts, see Decret & van Oort 2004, 8; Coyle 2009, 65–88.

referring to Romans 7. Even the apostle Paul knew that the evil desire that inhabits the body is part (*portiuncula*) of the cosmic evil principle.<sup>57</sup>

The Manichaean Fortunatus thus bases on Paul for his viewpoint on *cupiditas*. He quotes both Gal 5, 17 and Rom 7, 23–25 as affirming his position: there is an alien, evil element working in the human constitution, and because of it, people sin out of necessity. The Pauline saying of the ‘root’ of all evil has been linked to the idea of two opposite elements, or two men, the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ in a distinctly Manichaean way.<sup>58</sup>

Augustine picks up Fortunatus’ thread of necessity. In the previous chapter we have seen how Augustine was forced to resort to the figure of Adam and Eve in order to explain the punitive and compulsory character of the limitations that the human will has in moral actions. As it is, Augustine turns to Adam for help. Indeed, the first human person was equipped with full freedom of choice. Nothing resisted his will. But when he committed sin by his own will (*libera uoluntate*), he plunged us, Adam’s descendants, into a necessity of sin (*in necessitatem praecipitati sumus*).<sup>59</sup> Playing with Fortunatus’ own words, Augustine shows that the necessity and servitude, which Paul had described in Romans 7 and which the Manichaeans have claimed to be originating from the “evil stem” (or *stirps*),<sup>60</sup> is actually a heritage of sinful “habit” (or *consuetudo*). A good example of this kind of *consuetudo* is swearing, which in fact is the attitude fighting against the soul, the “fleshly prudence” in Paul’s words.<sup>61</sup> The crucial point of Augustine is to deny all *substantiality* for *cupiditas*, in line with his Platonist conception of the

<sup>57</sup> *Radix* is used in other sources besides Paul as well. Decret (1970, 196) points to the oriental Manichaean texts and concludes: “cette terminologie commune est une preuve de plus des liens étroits qui devaient exister entre le manichéisme africain et son berceau oriental.” See also Decret 1995, 86–88.

<sup>58</sup> Fortunatus’ Manichaeism thus appears rather similar to the Catholic teachings in its concepts. For North-African Manichaeism and the use of New Testament and Paul, see Decret 1970, 151–152, 167; 1995, 55–106; Bammel 1993, 7; Stark 1989, 346. For the evil bodily element in individuals according Manichaean teaching, see Gardner & Lieu 2004, 16–17; for the division between the old and the new man in the Manichaean *Kephalaia*, see Gardner & Lieu 2004, 208–218.

<sup>59</sup> Alflatt 1974, 129–130. Djuth (1993, 1999) attempts to discern between “absolute necessity” and a “necessity of moral condition.”

<sup>60</sup> See also c. *Fel.* 1, 19 (= Manich. *ep. fund.* frg. 3 Stein) *stirpem tenebrarum*. For the term *stirps*, see Decret 1970, 241–242, who sees an implicit connection between the Manichaean cosmogony of evil nature and Augustine’s concept of original sin later in *nupt. et conc.* 1, 26 *hic est fructus eius* [sc. diaboli] *ex antiqua imunditiae stirpe, quam plantauit in homine*. For such accusations by Julian, see pp. 165–168.

<sup>61</sup> See also s. *dom. m.* 1, 17, 51.

cosmos.<sup>62</sup> Yet this is not an element that is independent of the soul, as it ceases to exist when the soul is illuminated.<sup>63</sup> Augustine's interpretation of Romans 7, as compared to the one Fortunatus had offered, is thus clear enough: merely due to the fleshly habit, there appears to be a limited necessity in the "old man." In the end, Augustine thus admits that sins sometimes are committed against one's will:<sup>64</sup>

[A]s long as we live according to the flesh, which is also called the old man, we have the necessity of our habit, so that we may not do what we will.<sup>65</sup>

[transl. Newman]

On a general level, *c. Fort.* reveals that a common Pauline background took different forms in Fortunatus' and Augustine's interpretation. Despite their differences, they both consider 1 Tim 6, 10 as teaching of a universal basis for sins.<sup>66</sup> To be exact, it is Augustine himself, however, who introduces Paul's teaching of the 'root' in *c. Fort.*, and Augustine is in pain to show how his conception of evil deviates crucially from the Manichaean one, so that *cupiditas* is not a 'root' in any material, contagious sense, but should be understood more as a posture, or as a perverse attitude; hence Augustine's depictions of habit (*consuetudo*), in which the essential point is the immaterial char-

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<sup>62</sup> O'Donovan (1980, 94): "Plotinus had to account for disruption and disunity in a way that would impute no fault to the totality of things."

<sup>63</sup> Augustine offers a concrete example. Snow cannot be warm, and when it melts into water by warmth, it is no longer cold or snow but gives heat in itself, as well. The point is: the nature of water remains the same despite its different status; there is no separate element in water that would make it either cold or warm. Cf. *s. dom. m. 2*, 24, 79.

<sup>64</sup> Despite this, much remains of Augustine's trust in the free choice of the will, i.e. one is free to choose what one wishes to will: *si ergo imperatum est nobis, ut faciamus arborem aut bonam aut malam, nostrum est eligere, quid uelimus. c. Fort. 22*. In essence, the same points are made in his less ambitious debate with Felix in 404, including the quotation from Rom 7. *c. Fel. 2*, 8 *manifestum est hoc uenisse de traduce primi peccati Adam et de consuetudine mala. nam hodieque libera uoluntate faciunt homines consuetudinem, quam cum fecerint, facile superare non possunt; ipsi ergo sibi de se ipsis fecerunt, quod contra eos lex habitat in membris eorum. sed qui concipiunt timorem dei et per liberum arbitrium subdunt se sanandos optimo medico et sicut bono curatori, ita et misericordii creatori, per humilitatem confessionis et paenitentiae sanantur*. For the date, see Decret 1970, 77–78.

<sup>65</sup> *c. Fort. 22 quamdiu secundum carnem uiuimus, qui uetus etiam homo nominatur, habemus necessitatem consuetudinis nostrae, ut non quod uolumus faciamus*.

<sup>66</sup> The concentration on Pauline texts in 390s shows how Augustine responded to his previous Manichaean understanding on certain central texts, e.g. Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17. On Manichaeism and Paul, see Decret 1995, 55–106; Drecoll 2010, 1144–1145. BeDuhn (2011, 475–479) seems to me to overdo the case by claiming that by Fortunatus' arguments Augustine is compelled to read Paul anew, and that "it was from the lips of Fortunatus that Augustine first heard a reading of Paul that emphasised grace over free will" (BeDuhn 2011, 475).

acter of sin.<sup>67</sup> This is all about how one's will is ordered, not about different natures.<sup>68</sup> At the same time, Augustine's observations on habit and necessity in *c. Fort.*, clearly result from his efforts to describe the urgent iron grip of sin; as such, they naturally run parallel to the Manichaean position.<sup>69</sup>

Augustine returns to the image of root in *de libero arbitrio* 3, repeating the results of *c. Fort.*: as the root of all evil, *cupiditas* represents the ultimate source for all sins, and there is no other source for a will that turns away from the right order of creation.<sup>70</sup> Evodius presents the same question that was also made by Fortunatus: what is the cause for a will to sin (*lib. arb.* 3, 47)? Again, Augustine declines to give any further causes. Since the ultimate reason for all evil is *cupiditas* or *improba uoluntas*, it is not possible to inquire any of its causes. This means that between the pure and good will and the improper, perverse will, there is a 'qualitative leap' that cannot be explained by any further causalities.<sup>71</sup> *Cupiditas*, or the perverse will, is the singularity of the 'Big Bang'-theory of sin:

Beware of supposing that anything could possibly be truer than the saying that 'avarice (*auaritia*) is the root of all evil' (1 Tim 6, 10), namely the desire for

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<sup>67</sup> When one has received God's aid in order to cure the symptoms of *cupiditas* and *consuetudo cum carne*, these simply cease their influence on the soul, and a good *consuetudo* is evolved in exchange, *inluminata anima desinit illa esse carnis prudentia [...] consuetudo facta cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra inluminata et ad arbitrium diuinae legis totum hominem sibi deus subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam. c. Fort.* 22.

<sup>68</sup> *c. Fort.* 22 *non naturas esse istas duas arbores, sed uoluntates nostras.*

<sup>69</sup> Alflatt (1974, 134) concludes by noting Augustine's similar "pessimism" to that of Manichaean anthropology; Wetzel (1992, 88–98) charts the nuanced changes in Augustine's arguments against his Manichaean opponents. Cf. also O'Donnell's (1992, III, 203) remark on *ep. Menoch*: "coincidence of opinion does not demonstrate influence or allegiance, and not every proposition to which a Manichee could subscribe must be therefore forever declared anathema, even by ourselves." Similarly Drecoll 2010, 1152–1153: "Dabei ist einerseits zu berücksichtigen, daß solche Linien immer mit anderen Einflüssen konvergieren, andererseits, daß A. an wesentlichen Punkten Veränderungen vornimmt und sich mit seiner eigenen Vergangenheit kritisch auseinandersetzt."

<sup>70</sup> The only way sin can exist is that its origin is voluntary. Hence, nobody commits sin because of his or her own created nature (*lib. arb.* 3, 46); furthermore, there is no other (*aliena*) nature in us, either, that would be held responsible for sinning. Augustine thereby concludes that it remains that all commit sin by their own will.

<sup>71</sup> See, however, MacDonald's (1999) interesting discussion of this issue. MacDonald attempts to reconstruct an Augustinian account of primal sin, in which the cause for the first "inexplicable" movement of the will appears to be negligence of practical reason. In other words, just before the Fall, Adam and Eve were not fully applying all relevant reasons for not to make the sinful choice of disobeying God. But it seems that Augustine thinks of Adam and Eve as beings whose rational capabilities exceed those of ours: the limitations and difficulties of moral practical reasoning (*ignorantia*) were something Adam should not have experienced.

more than is sufficient. Sufficiency is measured by what each nature requires for its preservation according to its class. Avarice [...] must be understood in regard to everything that is desired immoderately whenever anyone simply wants more than is sufficient. Such avarice is cupidity (*cupiditas*), and cupidity is a perverse will. A perverse will, therefore, is the cause of all evil [...] But if you are looking for the cause of this root, how will it be the root of all evil? For there will be a cause of this cause and, as I said, when you find it, you will look for what caused it and there will be no end to our inquiry.<sup>72</sup> [transl. Russell]

Note that *auaritia*, or *cupiditas*,<sup>73</sup> is now defined as “to want something more than is enough” (*plus uelle quam sat est*). Here “more” defines quantity in the universal order; the case in which the subject strives after more than is appropriate for one’s standing in the *ordo rerum*. This is said to be the hallmark of *inproba uoluntas*. The point about *cupiditas* as being the ‘root’ insists that there has to be *something* to be counted as the fundamental sin, for otherwise one would be tied to an infinite chain of causes. This argument is practical as well: to find the root of all evil means that the search for causes will come to an end.

*Confessiones* is deliberately rich in Manichaean images and themes.<sup>74</sup> Especially the problem of the origin and cause of evil became a particular source of confusion in the mind of the young rhetor.<sup>75</sup> Recalling the time

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<sup>72</sup> lib. arb. 3, 48. *caue enim putes quicquam potuisse dici uerius quam id quod dictum est, radicem omnium malorum esse auaritiam, hoc est plus uelle quam sat est. tantum autem sat est quantum sibi exigit naturae in suo genere conseruandae modus. auaritia enim [...] in omnibus rebus quae immoderate cupiuntur intellegenda est, ubicumque omnino plus uult quisque quam sat est. haec autem auaritia cupiditas est, cupiditas porro inproba uoluntas est. ergo inproba uoluntas omnium malorum causa est [...] tu autem si huius radice causam requiris, quo modo erit ista radix omnium malorum? illa enim erit quae huius est causa. quam cum inueneris, ut dixi, etiam ipsius causam quaesiturus es et quaerendi nullum habebis modum.*

<sup>73</sup> Both words translate the biblical φιλάργυρία in 1Tim 6 and both variants of the verse are attested by previous Christian authors. Cyprian and Tertullian both have *cupiditas* in quotations of 1Tim 6, 10. Ambrose and Jerome use *auaritia*. See Schindler 1986, 494.

<sup>74</sup> The presence of Manichaean terms and concepts at Augustine’s deliberate use in *conf.* has been stressed by Johannes van Oort. See e.g. van Oort 1994, 1997. Van Oort has also consistently argued for Augustine’s expert and detailed knowledge of Manichaean texts and doctrines, see e.g. 2008b, 2010a. Kotzé (2004) continues this line of research in systematically exploring Augustine’s communicative strategies and efforts to persuade his former Manichaean colleagues of Catholic truth. See also Joubert 1992. See e.g. *conf.* 13, 15 for a relevant description for our purposes, in which Augustine is toying rather closely with Manichaean ideas. *spera et perseuera, donec transeat nox, mater iniquorum, donec transeat ira domini, cuius filii et nos fuimus aliquando tenebrae, quarum residua trahimus in corpore propter peccatum mortuo.*

<sup>75</sup> Some aspects of evil remain unsolved even in the mind of the bishop. Augustine is completely puzzled by the youthful incident of the theft of pears: it is not the pettiness of this crime but the inexplicability of “loving a theft for its own sake” that baffles him. There

he spent in Rome with the Manichaean *electi*, Augustine notes how at that time he was proud enough to think that the sins he committed were of some alien nature.<sup>76</sup> In the interval between rejecting the Manichaean conceptions of evil and his coming to comprehend the Christian doctrine of incarnation, the problem of *unde malum* aggravates him, as he recounts it in *conf.* 7, 7:

I searched for the origin of evil, but I searched in a flawed way [...] Here is God and see what God has created [...] being good God created good creatures. See how God surrounds and fills them. Then where and whence is evil? How did it creep in? What is its root and what is its seed? Or does it not have any being?<sup>77</sup> [transl. Chadwick]

The appearance of the image of 'root' in this context is not accidental. Augustine had been challenged in disputations against the Manichaeans to interpret the biblical source material in a way that suited the Neoplatonic monistic view of the universe. Can there be any root or *radix* for evil in the substantial sense of 'being' (*omnino non est*)? In *confessiones*, as is well known, Augustine construes his answer to the question of the source of evil around the formula of *triplex concupiscentia*, to which we shall soon return.

The image of root sometimes also covered the notion of rightly ordered *caritas* in Augustine's theology. A central work in this respect is a collection of sermons on 1 John, in *epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem*. The opposition of *caritas* and *cupiditas* is in those sermons related to a fundamentally concealed and inner character of love. The argument is that the quality of moral action should not be based on our outer actions, but on our ultimate inner motivation for these actions. As a paradoxical example

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is no cause for the spontaneous evil he committed with his comrades. *conf.* 2, 9–18. *essem gratis malus et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi malitia. foeda erat, et amaui eam. [...] pulchra erant illa poma, sed non ipsa concupiuit anima mea miserabilis.* See O'Donnell 1992, II, 126–128, for considerations of *concupiscentia* and the analogy of the tree of good and evil knowledge.

<sup>76</sup> *conf.* 5, 18 *adhuc enim mihi uidebatur non esse nos qui peccamus, sed nescio quid aliam in nobis peccare naturam, et delectabat superbiam meam extra culpam esse et, cum aliquid mali fecissem, [...] excusare me amabam et accusare nescio quid aliud quod mecum esset et ego non essem.* On this passage and Augustine's picture of Manichaean teaching on moral responsibility, see van Oort 2011, 555: "[this] is a distortion of the Manichaean doctrine and, in all probability, a conscious misrepresentation by Augustine."

<sup>77</sup> *conf.* 7, 7 *et quaerebam unde malum, et male quaerebam [...] "ecce deus et ecce quae creauit deus [...] bonus bona creauit, et ecce quomodo ambit atque implet ea. ubi ergo malum et unde et qua huc inrepsit? quae radix eius et quod semen eius? an omnino non est?"*

to illuminate his stance, Augustine here sees *cupiditas* as producing outwardly blameless deeds, while the inner motivation remains depraved and egotistic.<sup>78</sup> In *ep. Io. tr.* 5, 2, Augustine comments on the failure of obeying Christ's commandment of love (Jn 13, 34) by depicting it as a basic failure; as a "grave sin, the root of all sins."<sup>79</sup> These sermons contain an insistence on the interiority of the criteria in judging the value of good or morally insufficient acts to the extreme and in a rather rhetorical manner. Whereas the quest for the 'root' of evil in the anti-Manichaean works was mainly motivated by the need to answer problems related to theodicy (why and whence the evil, if God is good), the emphasis in pointing out the basic, *hidden quality* or the 'root' of individual good actions is due to Augustine's strengthened tendency to *separate* the divinely originating effects of grace from what he regards as being the superficial criteria of just action. In short, one may act roughly and ugly, but these acts may still fulfil divine criteria for what is to be considered as good, that is, they may count as acts of love. On the other hand, one may act with the appearance of virtue, but if these acts are not rooted nor originated in love, they are and must simply be evil.

This is clearly Augustine's position in *ep. Io. tr.* 8, 6–9, where he elaborates on the biblical passages condemning pride (*superbia*) and greed (*avaritia*). Alongside *cupiditas* there was another fault, which could be taken to represent the "beginning" (*initium*) or "head" (*caput*) of all sins. Based on a rather literal reading of yet another single verse of the Bible (Sir 10, 13 *initium omnis peccati superbia*), Augustine was able to treat both *cupiditas* and *superbia* as

<sup>78</sup> A parallel emphasis is Augustine's idea that the workings of *cupiditas* resemble and imitate the acts of *caritas*. In *c. Sec.* 10, Augustine asserts that wisdom is imitated by foolishness and error, and virtue is imitated by power. While *caritas* is the gift of the Holy Spirit, it is therefore also imitated by greed and evil desire (*cupiditas*). This is due to the parasitic quality of sin that cannot abandon the form of God even in utmost depravity. *ipsum etiam deum patrem peccantes imitantur in pia superbia, iusti pia liberalitate. spiritum denique sanctum iniquorum cupiditas, rectorum caritas imitatur: utrique tamen ab imitatione dei, a quo et per quem et in quo naturae ipsae factae sunt, recedere, sed illi uitiosae, illi laudabili.*

<sup>79</sup> *ep. Io. tr.* 5, 2 *hoc mandatum Christi dilectio uocatur: per hanc dilectionem peccata soluuntur. haec si non teneatur, et graue peccatum est, et radix omnium peccatorum.* The image of the 'root of love' is frequent in *ep. Io. tr.* See e.g. 2, 9; 3, 12; 6, 2; 6, 6; 7, 8 ("*dilige et quod uis fac*"). While the ethical stance of dissecting the outer actions from an inner motivation was clearly inspired by Augustine's problems with the Donatian party at the time of *ep. Io. tr.*, it seems that the image of the 'root' was meaningful to the Donatists at the ecclesiological level. They had grown from the good root (*s. Denis* 19, 7 *sicut in parte Africae constituta est pars Donati, dicant nos praecisos, et dicant se esse radicatos*) and they insisted on pointing out the 'root' of every Christian, in the sense of a correct ecclesial tradition: *omnis res enim origine et radice consistit, et si caput non habet aliquid, nihil est, c. litt. Pet.* 1, 5–8.

some kind of originating evils: they are parallel to each other in that they can both be conceived as the starting point for all sins.<sup>80</sup>

Not until *ep. Io. tr.*, however, does Augustine see any need to explain the contradiction in claiming that both *superbia* and *cupiditas* can be interpreted as the ultimate sources, roots, or heads of all other sins, for which no other causes are needed. According to Augustine, this contradiction is only apparent, and he explains how the two verses (Sir 10, 13 and 1 Tim 6, 10) can be reconciled (*quomodo sibi concordent istae duae sententiae*). Indeed, pride and greed seem to be intertwined to such a degree that they can be taken to describe the same phenomenon. Both vices consist of “going over the limits” (*excessit modum*). Augustine takes Adam as an example of the pride that reveals itself as greed: in Adam’s case a human being created as the image of God wished to “go further than needed,” and was greedy enough to want something more than God (*quid auarius illo, cui deus sufficere non potuit?*).<sup>81</sup> The common ground in pride and greed is thus a kind of theological immoderation, and Sir 10, 13 and 1 Tim 6, 10 both describe this attitude.

Augustine proceeds by depicting certain similarity between pride and love, which may both result in surprisingly similar actions. However, if one’s heart is infected with evil desire (*cupiditas*), the acts only have a superficial resemblance to good deeds. Conversely, if one acts by *caritas*, these acts are always good, independent of their possibly offensive appearance. Therefore, one should always inspect the inner source of actions, to “look for the root”!<sup>82</sup> On the other hand, once a Christian is “rooted” in love, he or she stands on secure ground: nothing evil can result from this root.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>80</sup> The verse Sir 10, 13, together with short statements about its meaning, appears in Augustine’s works from very early on (e.g. *mus.* 6, 40; *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 9, 12; *en. Ps.* 7, 4). O’Connell 2001 studies the interconnection between Sir. 10, 13 and 1 Jn 2, 16, but does not mention 1 Tim 6, 10.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. s. 117, 9 et in *ipso Adam radix omnium malorum auaritia fuit. plus enim uoluit, quam accepit, quia deus illi non sufficit.*

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *ep. Io. tr.* 10, 7 *noli attendere uerba blandientis, et quasi saeuitiam obiurgantis; uenam insipie, radicem unde procedant quaere.* See Dideberg 1975, 104–105, for the interiority of love.

<sup>83</sup> *ep. Io. tr.* 8, 9 *et uidete quanta opera faciat superbia; ponite in corde quam similia facit, et quasi paria caritati. pascit esurientem caritas, pascit et superbia; caritas, ut deus laudetur; superbia, ut ipsa laudetur. uestit nudum caritas, uestit et superbia; ieiunat caritas, ieiunat et superbia; sepelit mortuos caritas, sepelit et superbia. omnia opera bona quae uult facere caritas et facit, agitat contra superbia, et quasi omnia opera bona quae uult facere caritas et facit, agitat contra superbia, et quasi ducit equos suos. sed interior est caritas: tollit locum male agitatae superbiae [...] scriptura diuina intro nos reuocat a iactatione huius faciei forinsecus; et ab ista superficie quae iactatur ante homines, reuocat nos intro. [...] noli attendere quod floret foris,*



The considerations on the identical nature of pride and greed are continued in *de Genesi ad litteram* 11, where Augustine analyses the origins of sin in Paradise where the Devil began to envy human beings because they were created in the very image of God. At the root of this diabolical envy was pride, which Augustine refers to as a “love for one’s own excellence.”<sup>84</sup> Augustine again combines (“with no particular inconvenience”) the two biblical verses in defining this root, and identifies pride with greed:<sup>85</sup> they are the twin sides of the same coin.<sup>86</sup> This, however, presupposes that one has to understand greed in a wider meaning, as not only referring to money and riches.<sup>87</sup> Both are focused on the private good, and share a privative interest in usurping wealth from the common good for one’s own glory and enjoyment.<sup>88</sup> Such a conceited greed was then the root of all evil in the case of the Devil, and became his downfall, for he loved (*amauit*) his own power, and

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*sed quae radix est in terra. radicata est cupiditas? species potest esse bonorum factorum, uere opera bona esse non possunt. radicata est caritas? securus esto, nihil mali procedere potest [...] redite ergo intro, fratres. To be rooted (radicatus) in love has a scriptural background in Eph 3, 17, a verse quoted by Augustine already in mor. 1, 33. Radico appears as a rule only in the positive context of caritas or Christ; with very few exceptions, as in above, or in ciu. 21, 12 on Adam: ea quae in illo fuerat radicata sua stirpe punitus est.*

<sup>84</sup> Gn. litt. 11, 14, 18 *superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae*.

<sup>85</sup> Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 *cui testimonio non inconuenienter aptatur etiam illud*.

<sup>86</sup> The two verses on *cupiditas* and *superbia* also appear in *trin.* 12, 14, explaining the emergence of sin. See also s. *Dolbeau* 26, 33, where pride (Sir 10, 13) and *auaritia* (1Tim 6, 10) both represent different sides of the same coin, *plus uelle quam deum auaritia est, plus uelle quam sufficit auaritia est [...] quid autem superbius eo qui de se praesumendo deserit deum? quid auarius eo cui non sufficit deus? ipsa est ergo superbia quae auaritia in origine peccatorum*. Pride is seen as the root of all sins, but without clear reference to 1Tim 6, 10, also in s. *Dolbeau* 21, 11. Augustine compares the relation of pride and other sins to an illness with a great variety of symptoms. Only the most experienced doctor (*medicus peritissimus, dominus Iesus Christus*) can deduce the causes for all diseases (*causas omnes omnium morborum*), and when he finds the first, original cause (*quam primam inuenerit causam*), he will cut it away like it was a root (*amputat radicem*) to an entire tree of miseries. For Christ as the physician who cures the illness of pride, see Arbesmann 1954.

<sup>87</sup> See also the later *en. Ps.* 118, 11, 6, where Augustine exhibits his exegetical skills in the matter: he was aware that the Greek word in 1Tim 6, 10 referred specifically to a ‘desire for money,’ but Augustine still prefers a more general understanding of Paul’s intention: *apostolus intellegendus est isto nomine genus significasse per speciem, id est, per amorem pecuniae uniuersalem generalemque auaritiam, quae uere radix est malorum omnium*. For pride and envy as affiliated attitudes, see *cat. rud.* 8.

<sup>88</sup> Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 *auaritiam generalem intellegamus, qua quisque adpetit aliquid amplius quam oportet propter excellentiam suam et quendam propriae rei amorem. cui sapienter nomen Latina lingua indidit, cum appellauit priuatum, quod potius a detrimento quam ab incremento dictum elucet; omnis enim priuatio minuit. unde itaque uult eminere superbia, inde in angustias egestatemque contruditur, cum a communi ad proprium damnoso sui amore redigitur*.

his perverse self-love (*peruersus sui amor*) detached him from the sacred company of the angelic community.<sup>89</sup>

Proceeding to humans, Augustine points to the fault of self-appreciation in persons who desire more money, for they tend to regard themselves as the more excellent the more they own riches.<sup>90</sup> Greed, both in its general and special meaning, is deeply bound to one's view of the self: the desire for immoderate acquisition springs from an erroneous view of one's position in relation to God and one's neighbours. Contrary to this kind of depraved love, the right love (*caritas*) does not find its joy in "private excellence" and does not suffer from the inflation of pride.<sup>91</sup> Augustine continues with a highly rhetorical and extensive comparison between *caritas* and *cupiditas*. The evil version of love is characterised by asocial and privative attributes that refer to private good (*priuatus, adrogans dominatio, seditiosus, inuidus, uolens subicere proximum sibi*).<sup>92</sup> The two loves form two cities of good and evil men as well, thus anticipating the major structure of *ciu*.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 *specialis est autem auaritia, quae usitatius appellatur amor pecuniae. cuius nomine apostolus per speciem genus significans uniuersalem auaritiam uolebat intellegi dicendo: radix omnium malorum est auaritia* [1 Tm 6,10]. *hac enim et diabolus cecidit, qui utique non amauit pecuniam, sed propriam potestatem. proinde peruersus sui amor priuat sancta societate turgidum spiritum eumque coartat miseria iam per iniquitatem satiari cupientem.* See also Gn. litt. 11, 23, 30.

<sup>90</sup> See also qu. eu. 2, 47, where pride and greed are tightly connected: *non ita accipiendum est, quod cupidi et superbi, qui nomine illius diuitis significati sunt, in regnum caelorum sint intraturi cum suis cupiditatibus et superbia, sed possibile est deo, ut per uerbum eius, sicut et iam factum esse et cotidie fieri uidemus, a cupiditate temporalium ad caritatem aeternorum et a perniciose superbia ad humilitatem saluberrimam conuertantur.*

<sup>91</sup> Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 *neque enim essent etiam homines amatores pecuniae, nisi eo se putarent excellentiores quo ditiores. cui morbo contraria caritas non quaerit, quae sua sunt, id est non priuata excellentia laetatur; merito ergo et non inflatur.* Also in conf. 3, 16. Augustine applies here the Tyconian rule of *de specie et genere*. See Pollmann 1996, 42–47.

<sup>92</sup> Gn. litt. 11, 15, 20 *hi duo amores—quorum alter sanctus est, alter immundus, alter socialis, alter priuatus, alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter adrogantem dominationem, alter subditus, alter aemulus deo, alter tranquillus, alter turbulentus, alter pacificus, alter seditiosus, alter ueritatem laudibus errantium praefereus, alter quoquo modo laudis audius, alter amicalis, alter inuidus, alter hoc uolens proximo quod sibi, alter subicere proximum sibi, alter propter proximi utilitatem regens proximum, alter propter suam.* Gn. litt. 11, 37, 50 *dixit quidem apostolus: per caritatem seruite inuicem* [Gn 5,13]; *sed nequaquam diceret: inuicem dominamini.* The social aspect of love is also emphasised in many anti-Donatist works. See e.g. c. ep. Parm. 3, 10: *desinant calumniari bonis non operantibus mala per morbidam cupiditatem, sed tolerantibus propter pacificam caritatem.*

<sup>93</sup> See also cat. rud. 31, where pride, along with *cupiditas*, distinguishes the two cities of God and the Devil. In the city of God, humility is the primary virtue. For the origins of the concept *ciuitas dei*, see van Oort 1991, 199–360; O'Daly 1999, 53–62.

During the last two decades of Augustine's life, the image of the root appears in his writing on a general level as connected to the damaging heritage of Adam and Eve: the common origins of humanity is corrupt "in its root."<sup>94</sup> The idea of a perverse self-love as producing the great variety of individual sinful acts and attitudes (together with moral ignorance) finds continuity as well, as in *ciu.* 22, 22, where an exhaustingly long list of sins is followed by the following remark:

[T]hese are the crimes of wicked men; yet they come forth from that root of error and perverse love which is born with every son of Adam.<sup>95</sup>

[transl. Dyson]

We will end our survey on *cupiditas* as the 'root' of evil actions by focusing on two features in the Pelagian debate. The first is a part of a discussion with Pelagius in *gr. et pecc. orig.* and the second is part of Julian's polemical tactics in the second phase of the Pelagian debate.

*De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* was written in response to Pelagius' *de libero arbitrio* in 418. Pelagius had distinguished between three separate factors in acting according to God's will. These factors were *possibilitas*, *uoluntas* and *actio* (or *posse*, *uelle*, *esse*). The first of these factors was a gift of God, necessary for the individual to will and act according to God's law. The other two factors were dependent on the individual's own choice: the will and the actions could be used for either good or bad purposes. In describing the first factor, *possibilitas*, Pelagius had also illustrated it by evoking the image of the 'root.' So a 'root' resided in each individual that could produce either good or bad fruit, "flowers of virtue" or "thorns of vice," respectively.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup> E.g. *gr. et pecc. orig.* 2, 43 *uoluntate peccantem iusto iudicio cum stirpe damnauit, et ideo ibi quicquid etiam nondum erat natum merito est in praeuaricatrice radice damnatum, in qua stirpe damnata tenet hominem generatio carnalis, unde sola liberat regeneratio spiritalis; ench.* 26 *hinc post peccatum exul effectus stirpem quoque suam, quam peccando in se tanquam in radice uitiauerat; ciu.* 14, 26 *uniuersa massa tamquam in uitata radice damnata; c. Iul. imp.* 6, 5.

<sup>95</sup> *ciu.* 22, 22 *quid amor ipse tot rerum uanarum atque noxiarum et ex hoc mordaces curae, perturbationes, maerores, formidines, insana gaudia, discordiae, lites, bella, insidiae, iracundiae, inimicitiae, fallacia, adulatio, fraus, furtum, rapina, perfidia, superbia, ambitio, inuidentia, homicidia, parricidia, crudelitas, saeuitia, nequitia, luxuria, petulantia, impudentia, impudicitia, fornicationes, adulteria, incesta et contra naturam utriusque sexus tot stupra atque immunditiae, quas turpe est etiam dicere, sacrilegia, haereses, blasphemiae, periuria, oppressiones innocentium, calumniae, circumuentiones, praeuaricationes, falsa testimonia, iniqua iudicia, uiolentiae, latrocinia et quidquid talium malorum in mentem non uenit et tamen de uita ista hominum non recedit? uerum haec hominum sunt malorum, ab illa tamen erroris et peruersi amoris radice uenientia, cum qua omnis filius Adam nascitur.*

<sup>96</sup> Pelag. *A. gr. et pecc. or.* 1, 19.

Depending on each individual's will and inclination, this root was thus open to either a good or bad way of life. Augustine reacted against this use of his favourite image by noting that Pelagius had read his Bible carelessly. For instance, there were *two roots* in Christ's parable of trees and fruit, one evil and one good. Alluding to Paul's statement of *cupiditas* being the root of all evil, Augustine concludes that, obviously, by this statement "the apostle admonishes us to understand that the root of all good is *caritas*."<sup>97</sup> Augustine denies the neutral character of the root that Pelagius had suggested and takes a more dualistic stand: there are two kinds of roots, which make two kinds of people, and therefore, two kinds of wills and deeds. Augustine further argued that to alter the quality of the evil root depends not on the will, or the actions, of the individual, but on God's grace. Furthermore, contrary to what Pelagius had suggested, to commit good actions also depends on divine aid. Augustine had already pointed out a problem in Pelagius' position on divine contribution in human actions: if *possibilitas* is said to cause both will and actions, is not God thereby made the instigator of evil deeds as well? By positing two roots, Augustine avoids (or at least postpones) a similar problem, for he can claim that the good root and good fruits are given by God, whereas the evil root and the evil fruits are of human origin (*malam uero arborem homo facit [...] ab eo quippe defectus est origo uoluntatis malae*). "The evil desire of man, which is an evil, has man as its author, or man's deceiver [i.e. the Devil]: it is not from the creator of man."<sup>98</sup> Again, Augustine is very careful to note that this does not lead to a doctrine of two different natures (*non aliam naturam malam initiat*).<sup>99</sup> In other words, concrete metaphors of sin do not imply a materialistic Manichaean stance on moral questions.<sup>100</sup>

While Pelagius' use of the image of *radix* in explaining individual actions and their moral status was in all likelihood not a conscious attempt to dismantle a metaphor so dear to Augustine, the same cannot be said of Julian's way of describing and parodying Augustine's teaching on original sin and *concupiscentia* as directly originating from the Manichaean doctrine of 'root.'

One of such instances can be found in *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 26, where Augustine has to defend himself against Julian's caricature on baptism being compared to

<sup>97</sup> *gr. et pecc. orig.* 1, 19.

<sup>98</sup> *gr. et. pecc. orig.* 1, 21. This evil tree can also be described by the scheme of *triplex cupiditas*.

<sup>99</sup> *gr. et. pecc. orig.* 1, 19.

<sup>100</sup> See Coyle 2009, 82–87.

shaving. This was Julian's way of criticizing the view that baptism does not entail forgiveness of all sins and does not abolish them altogether, but only "shaves" them, leaving the "roots of all sins in the evil flesh" so that they have to be cut again and again like hair from one's face. Such a caricature, Augustine has learned, had been intentionally used on Julian's side to tarnish his views (*adhibere calumniae*). Augustine brusquely denies the force of such a caricature, and affirms that to him baptism really forgives and abolishes sins. Julian's parody, obviously, was meant to underline Augustine's insistence on the remaining sinfulness in a Christian, and his emphasis on the daily repentance of the venial sins that this sinfulness produces. Moreover, it seems likely that Julian did not choose the details of his illustration by coincidence: the roots (*radices*) grow out from the evil flesh (*mala caro*). The Manichaean undertones of this terminology were evident.

The attacks against Augustine's idea of evil desire as a 'root' in each individual appear more explicitly in *c. Iul.* and *c. Iul. imp.* In *c. Iul.* 1, 42, Julian and Augustine proceed from a debate concerning Jesus' parable of trees to Julian's conclusion that "original sin has vanished, because the root of evil cannot be located in that which you say is the gift of God."<sup>101</sup> Augustine disagrees: a root of evil can persist in things that were created good, such as the bodily senses (*nonne sensus hominis donum dei est? et tamen ibi locauit inimicus ille seminator radicem mali, quando peccatum homini serpentina fraude persuasit*) or the soul (*anima*), in which Augustine locates greed as the root of all evil. Augustine is again very careful to stress that his position cannot be seen as agreeing with the Manichaean teaching of evil; on the contrary, it is rather Julian's insistence that evil cannot emerge from good that works for the Manichaean case. From Augustine's perspective, the root of evil springs from the free choice of the human will and resides in the "rational human nature," being as such nothing else than *priuatio boni*.<sup>102</sup>

Julian argues at length in *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 170–187 for the deep similarities between Augustine's and Mani's positions on *concupiscentia carnis*. For this purpose, Julian has managed to get hold of a letter, purportedly written by

<sup>101</sup> Iulian. *c. Iul.* 1, 42 *euanuit, inquis, originale peccatum, quia non potest mali radix in eo quod donum dei uocas locari.*

<sup>102</sup> *c. Iul.* 1, 42 *nec aliunde oriri, nec alicubi esse posse dicit radicem mali, nisi ex natura et in natura rationali; cui esse naturam rationalem non est nisi donum dei: sed quoniam a summo atque incommutabili bono de nihilo facta est, ut esset, quamuis mutabile, tamen bonum; deficere a bono a quo facta est, hoc est ex illa, uel in illa radix mali: quia nihil est aliud malum, nisi priuatio boni.*

Mani to a female follower, and known as *epistula ad Menoch*.<sup>103</sup> Julian claims that the wording of the letter shows how Augustine never completely abandoned Manichaeism on sexuality. Augustine retorts that Julian's sensational disclosure of parallels between Augustine and Mani is, in fact, no sensation at all: "who is there, after all, who has even a slight knowledge of the Manichaean teaching and does not know that the Manichees say that the concupiscence of the flesh is evil?"<sup>104</sup> As it happens, the letter introduces the image of the root (as taught by Apostle Paul in 1 Tim 6, 10) and attaches it to sexual *concupiscentia*. According to *ep. Men.*, it is through *concupiscentia* that the Devil traps human bodies:

He traps them by sight or by touch or by hearing or by smell or by taste. Take away at last the root of this evil tree, and you will immediately see yourself as spiritual. For the root, scripture says, of all evil is concupiscence.<sup>105</sup>

[transl. Teske]

The letter shows well how the Manichaeans viewed *concupiscentia* as the 'origin of evil.' This missive has also convinced Julian of the identical nature of the way Augustine and Mani treat humans as originating from the "diabolical concupiscence," "generated from an evil root" and being claimed by the Devil "as the fruit of this root."<sup>106</sup>

Once again, Augustine seems to be rather undisturbed by the similarities in the terms and the verses of the Bible used, and recurs to his standard defence against Julian's accusations about his crypto-Manichaeism: in contrast to Mani, Catholic faith denies the existence of two opposing

<sup>103</sup> For the letter, see above p. 150 n. 40; 153 n. 50; Alfarić 1918, 74; Lieu 1992, 210; Stein 1998; Harrison & BeDuhn 2001; Lamberigts 2001, 116–117.

<sup>104</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 170.

<sup>105</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 175 *sive per uisum sive per tactum sive per auditum sive per odoratum sive per gustum. tolle denique malignae huius stirpis radicem et statim te ipsam spiritalem contemparis. radix enim, ait scriptura, omnium malorum concupiscentia*. Note the peculiar form of the Pauline verse. Augustine never quotes 1 Tim 6, 10 with the word *concupiscentia*. See Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 143–145. In *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 180 Julian has edited the letter to continue: [...] *tolle, inquit, malignae stirpis radicem et spiritalis fies; de hac apostolus clamat ad Romanos: non bonum quod uolo, sed malum operor quod exhorreo [Rom 7,19]*.

<sup>106</sup> *Iulian. c. Iul. imp.* 3, 181 *fructum concupiscentiae diabolicae hominem dicens [...] malum et de mala radice prolatum [...] quem fructum radicis suae diabolus sibi uindicet*. Julian had already previously referred to Augustine's view of "diabolical libido," *Iulian. c. Iul. imp.* 2, 218 *an lex data nascentibus est, ut qui de libidine, quam dicis diabolicam esse et radicem fructumque peccati, geniti erant, ammonerentur emendare quod facti erant [...]*? See Lamberigts 2001, 126–129, for a discussion on the parallels between Mani's letter and Augustine, as suggested by Julian. Lancel (2002, 419) thinks that Julian resorted to the accusations of Augustine's residual Manichaeism only for tactical purposes.

substances, and holds to the doctrine that the one and only created human substance is corrupted by the “sin of the first man” and that it has to be healed by the “rebirth through the righteousness of the second man.” Furthermore, Augustine could also have defended himself by pointing out the difference between his and Mani’s way of speaking of the ‘root.’ For Augustine by this time had grown accustomed to taking *radix* to represent a combination of greed and pride that go against God and the order of things, not limited to sensual and sexual, unbridled desire.

Let us now turn to the other common figure by which Augustine illustrated a need to interpret *cupiditas* (or *concupiscentia*) as being an inner source for individual, evil acts. While the image of the ‘root’ underscored the inner causality of evil motivation and evil action, the feature following in the next section was designed to give a generalizing, all-embracing model, or a matrix for all evil actions. Naturally, such images easily overlapped, as in *s. Denis* 14, where Augustine describes *cupiditas* as the mighty and worldly force of temptations, described by the Apostle John in 1Jn 2, 16 as *uoluptas carnis, concupiscentia oculorum* and *ambitio saeculi*. “This is some kind of a three-headed dog of Hell.”<sup>107</sup> The three temptations represent three basic roots of a baffling variety of all kinds of sinful acts: “there are many branches, but only one, threefold root.”<sup>108</sup>

#### 4.3. TRIPLE *CONCUPISCENTIA* AS THE MATRIX OF SIN

James O'Donnell has noted that triple *concupiscentia* (or *triplex cupiditas*) as a *formal literary scheme, structuring* Augustine's views of sin, is rather limited in the time frame of Augustine's works. Indeed the scheme is present in the early writings but disappears gradually after *conf.*, being then virtually absent or “fading” after *ep. Io. tr.* (Easter 407). However, the separate members of the three-part scheme obviously maintain their importance in Augustine's thought to the very end of his literary career. As the motif is rather formal and easily discerned in Augustine's texts, it is most convenient to present it here as a separate unit, although it has to be emphasised that the theological contents of the formula are quite similar to the role of *cupiditas* as the opposite form of *caritas*, and as a root of evil actions. As to the function of the scheme, then, *triplex cupiditas* is also clearly intended

<sup>107</sup> *s. Denis* 14, 2 *nescio quis iste tricapitus est canis inferni*.

<sup>108</sup> *s. Denis* 14, 2 *qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix*.

to answer the following questions: *From which general motives do our sins emerge? Is there a universal explanation for individual evil actions?* While triple *concupiscentia* is a formally distinguishable continuation of the more general idea of evil desire as the ‘root’ of all sin and as a debased love for everything else but God (as in the biblical verse, *nolite diligere mundum*), its function is very much the same.<sup>109</sup>

The motif of *triplex cupiditas* has attracted scholarly attention for decades. Often, this attention has been motivated by a desire to point out the possible sources for the theme of *triplex cupiditas* in Augustine.<sup>110</sup> Willy Theiler suggested as early as in 1933 that the theme of *triplex cupiditas* betrays the influence of Porphyrios.<sup>111</sup> In 1963, Robert J. O’Connell proposed an alternative, which he repeated in 1968, that the source of the formula is in Plotinus’ *Enneads*.<sup>112</sup> While pointing out similarities between *each* of the three *cupiditates*,<sup>113</sup> O’Connell was unable to identify a convincing source text for a *firm set* of three-fold *cupiditas*, and he finally appeals to Augustine’s powers to produce an independent synthesis from what are essentially Plotinian elements.<sup>114</sup>

In 1966, however, Olivier Du Roy wrote his account on the theme of *triplex cupiditas*.<sup>115</sup> He criticized both Theiler and O’Connell for their

<sup>109</sup> Cf. the categories of temptations in Evagrius of Pontos, *malign. cogit.* 1, where the strongest three are gluttony (γαστριμαργία), greed (φιλαργυρία) and the desire for renown (δόξα). Evagrius also joins together the condemnation of greed in 1Tim 6, 10 and pride. Evagrius, *malign. cogit.* 1. See Sinkewicz 2003, 137.

<sup>110</sup> Good general treatments are Du Roy 1966 and O’Donnell 1992.

<sup>111</sup> Theiler 1933, followed by O’Meara 1954.

<sup>112</sup> O’Connell 1963; 1968, 173–182.

<sup>113</sup> For example, *superbia*, or τόλμα, and *libido*, or ὕλη, are likewise connected to each other in both Plotinus and Augustine. O’Connell 1968, 173. O’Connell finds the element of curiosity the hardest to track from the Neoplatonic authors; but, as ever, the answer is to be found in Plotinus. O’Connell quotes En. 3, 7, and connects Plotinus’ φύσεως δὲ πολυπράγμονος καὶ ἄρχειν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς with Augustine’s *curiositas* and *superbia* in *mus.* 6, 39. For critical remarks concerning *curiositas*, see Du Roy 1966, 345 n. 2.

<sup>114</sup> As for the parallels between τόλμα and *superbia*, O’Connell is undoubtedly right, but one should perhaps remain careful concerning his confidence in seeing a close-knit ambivalence in Augustine between *superbia* and *libido* as having the “corruptible body” as their sole object, and thus pointing again to original Plotinian ambiguity in the matter. O’Connell 1968, 180: “It is clear from the context [of *Gn. adu. Man.*] that Augustine means this aliquid proprium to stand for the animal skins that symbolize the corruptible body conferred on the soul after the fall [...] Among other things involved in soul’s primal sin, however, is this desire to have a body, aliquid proprium, something suum—something it can independently control, and at the same time ‘delight’ in controlling. Pride? or bodily ‘concupiscence’? The ambivalence of Plotinus’ τόλμα seems, for the moment, to gloss over the difficulty.” See also *ibid.*, p. 182.

<sup>115</sup> Du Roy 1966, 343–367.



inadequate textual evidence in pinpointing any previous philosophical sources for the theme, and stated that the theme was essentially Augustine's own invention.<sup>116</sup> The crucial point in *triplex cupiditas* is, according to Du Roy, its complementarity with the Trinity. The three general vices reflect the persons of the Trinity, respectively.<sup>117</sup> It is to be noted here that this kind of complementarity is found mainly in later works (from *conf.* onwards, perhaps with the exception of *uera rel.*), and does not therefore explain the occurrence and the function of the theme in Augustine's earlier works.<sup>118</sup>

In 1992, James O'Donnell, given his lack of enthusiasm for *Quellenforschung*, proposed by far the most simple and elegant solution to the quest of sources.<sup>119</sup> While he suggests that there are similarities between Augustine's interpretation of 1Jn 2, 16 and Cicero's *off.* 1, 4, 11–13, O'Donnell remarks that in the case of *triplex cupiditas* as a threefold formal set, there are no previous Platonic texts that would support the idea of the triad.<sup>120</sup> Again, as the 'Platonic order' of the three vices (*curiositas*—*superbia*—*concupiscentia carnis*, or *uoluptas*—*superbia*—*curiositas*), is a reconstruction based solely on Augustine's texts, one cannot make much of the changing order of the vices in the different works. As a consequence, O'Donnell concludes, in a similar vein to that of Du Roy: "we must leave room for A.'s own powers of imaginative response to an evocative text."<sup>121</sup> As noted above, O'Donnell also makes the important observation that the role of the three temptations becomes less structural in Augustine's later writings, while the verse quotations "fade" shortly after *confessiones*.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Du Roy 1966, 346: "tout à fait original et profondément marqué par son génie propre." Du Roy refers to the triad of passions (or ἀλογία) in Olympiodorus' commentary, which goes back to the elements of Platonic psychology in Plat. *Rep.* 441–442. Du Roy seems to discard this explanation, and rightly so, (1966, 344 n. 3), but for inadequate reasons.

<sup>117</sup> Du Roy 1966, 348–352. Especially the following passages work as Du Roy's evidence: *c. Secund.* 10, *ciu.* 12, 15–22, *uera rel.* 3.

<sup>118</sup> Dideberg (1975, 175–190) generally agrees with Du Roy in emphasising the synthetic powers of Augustine, and pointing out the nonbiblical extensions of the scheme.

<sup>119</sup> O'Donnell 1992, I, lxiii–lxiv. The Johannine verse also plays a remarkable role in O'Donnell's own interpretation of *conf.*

<sup>120</sup> O'Donnell 1992, III, 204.

<sup>121</sup> O'Donnell 1992, III, 205. Note his choice of passages from those early works of Augustine, in which the resemblances of matured exposition can be traced (e.g. *ord.* 2, 8, 25; *an. quant.* 14, 24). Cf. Verschoren 2002, 223–230, who continues to stress the problem of word-order.

<sup>122</sup> O'Donnell 1992, III, 204. For other relevant studies, see Macqueen 1973; Torchia 1987; 1988; Procopé 1982; 1987; van Fleteren 1976, 1994.

As the appearance, occurrences and disputes on the sources for *triplex cupiditas* in Augustine's works are more than adequately settled, the following section offers an overview of the most relevant texts on the subject; the emphasis in this section is, once again, on the use, or function, of the scheme as describing a general, all-embracing explanation for human sinful behaviour that ultimately reflects the trinitary being of man's creator.

The theme of *triplex cupiditas* does not play a significant role in the early philosophical works (c. *acad.*, *ord.*, *qu.an.*, *sol.*).<sup>123</sup> Its full application evolves in the first anti-Manichaean works (*mor.*, *Gn. adu. Man.*).<sup>124</sup> Furthermore, the scheme grows to structural importance in *uera rel.*, which was Augustine's last work before his ordination.<sup>125</sup>

In *de moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum* all three members of the scheme are already present as separate ideas. So the Fall is due to lust and pride (*cupiditas*, *superbia*).<sup>126</sup> The human mind was created invisible and immaterial. Therefore, it assumed itself to "be of same nature as its Creator, thus cutting itself off by pride from Him to whom it ought to be united by love." Pride is therefore an illusory wish to be divine, in the sense of absolute independency. Finally, man's desire to be his own master and to become a self-sufficient person results in his disobedience to God and His laws. The more this desire is manifested, the deeper one is separated from the Divine Being. As is suitable for an anti-Manichaean work, Augustine refutes all spatial connotations of the Fall, however; for the separation is an "inner" reality, and it is therefore more of an *affectio*, or *cupiditas*:

Thus, the farther the mind departs from God, not in space but in fondness (*affectione*) and greed (*cupiditate*) for things inferior to Him, the more it is filled with foolishness and misery.<sup>127</sup> [transl. Gallagher]

Evil desire that is swollen with pride thus goes against *ordo rerum*: if one is submitted to the created order, one will truly become "like God." However, if one is cut away from the immutable, immaterial and invisible God, and

<sup>123</sup> The separate elements are not altogether absent, however. In *Acad.* 2, 21, Trygetius mentions pride as the greatest of vices (*uitium*). For other possible "adumbrations of the triad," see O'Donnell 1992, III, 205.

<sup>124</sup> See e.g. Verschoren 2002, 213–230, for the genealogy of the *triplex concupiscentia* in the early works.

<sup>125</sup> For the work, see van Fleteren 1976; 1994, 1999.

<sup>126</sup> *mor.* 1, 12; 1, 20–21.

<sup>127</sup> *mor.* 1, 21 *quanto ergo magis longe discedit a deo, non loco, sed affectione atque cupiditate ad inferiora quam est ipse, tanto magis stultitia miseriaque completur*. Note the aspects of *stultitia* and *miseria*, possibly related to the word pair *ignorantia* and *difficultas* in *lib. arb.*

strives for lower things, one will fall out from God in striving for an independent state of being.<sup>128</sup>

In comparable length, the element of curiosity is treated in *mor.* 1, 38, where temperance (which should check *cupiditates*) is said to restrain *curiositas*.<sup>129</sup> Curiosity means to explore that “universal mass of matter we call the world.” This, in turn, leads one to think even of the immutable and incorporeal beings in terms of corporeality. In short, curious pride leads to materialism (“nothing but matter exists”). This presentation on *curiositas* is preceded by a refutation of the “bodily delights” based on 1Tim 6, 10 (*cupiditas omnium malorum radix*). As pride seems to be tightly interwoven with intellectual curiosity as well, it is clear that many of the essential features of *triplex cupiditas* are present in *mor.*

Augustine’s first biblical exercise, *de Genesi aduersus Manicheos*, forcefully exploits the polemical value of the *triplex cupiditas*. At the end of this work, Augustine explicitly brings his former co-religionists under the power of this threefold vice: the curse God made on Satan in the Paradise concerns, in fact, particularly the sect of Mani. However, the three elements were already brought together before this polemical turn.<sup>130</sup> In *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 23, 40, the three *concupiscentiae* are represented as various animals of the created world, brought under man’s control. They also signify Christ’s dominion over His church in the sixth age of the world, in which the different kinds of sinners are brought under His control.<sup>131</sup>

[I]n this age Christ rules souls obedient to him who have come to his Church in part from the Gentiles and in part from the Jewish people. Thus, whether given over to carnal desire (*carnali concupiscentiae*), like the cattle, or blinded

<sup>128</sup> It is clear from the context, that Augustine’s emphasis on the “obedience to divine laws” refers to the intellectually conceived *ordo rerum*, and not to particular divine commandments. See *mor.* 1, 39: *subicere se homines uolunt his rebus per peccata, quae illis per recte facta diuina lege subiecta sunt. quid est enim aliud falsis bonis illudi atque decipi quam teipso inferiora miranda et appetenda arbitrari? habet igitur uir temperans in huiusmodi rebus mortalibus et fluentibus uitae regulam utroque testamento firmatam, ut eorum nihil diligit, nihil per se appetendum putet, sed ad uitae huius atque officiorum necessitatem quantum sat est usurpet utentis modestia, non amantis affectu.* For the rightly ordered love, see *mor.* 1, 57–60. For *ordo amoris* in the early works, see Rief 1962, 332–335.

<sup>129</sup> Du Roy 1966, 346. For the alleged Plotinian influences, see O’Connell 1968, 175–182. For *curiositas* in Augustine, see Labhardt 1960; 1994, 188–196; Torchia 1988.

<sup>130</sup> O’Connell (1968, 175) conjectures without providing good reasons that *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 40 is an addition to the final version of the work.

<sup>131</sup> Du Roy 1966, 346–347; O’Donnell 1992, III, 205: “the first appearance of all three in a single sentence and in the order in which they appear in 1Jn. 2, 16.” Cf. Verschoren 2002, 224, who analyses the passages from the viewpoint of order.

by dark curiosity (*curiositate*), like the serpents, or puffed up with pride (*superbia*), like the birds, men might be tamed by him and grow gentle.<sup>132</sup>  
[transl. Teske]

The scheme thus appears in a highly allegorising context, in which Augustine tries to apply different ages of salvation history to the events in Gen 1. There is no direct polemic against the Manichaean interpretation.<sup>133</sup>

The allegories are brought further in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 17, 26–18, 27, where Augustine expounds on the punishment of the Devil. The punishment (*poena*) is, however, aimed at fallen humans *through* the Devil. In this manner, Augustine instructs his Christian reader to avoid the three main temptations of the Devil:

For the term “chest” signifies “pride” because the strong drives of the soul rule there. The term “belly” signifies “carnal desire” because that part of the body is recognized as softer. Since by these means he creeps up on those whom he wants to deceive, God said, “You will creep upon your chest and belly.” [...] “You will eat the earth,” can be understood in two ways: Either you will own those whom you deceive by earthly desire, that is, sinners, who are signified by the word, earth, or these words surely symbolize the third kind of temptation, namely, curiosity. For one who eats the earth penetrates things deep and dark, but nonetheless temporal and earthly.<sup>134</sup> [transl. Teske]

The third temptation in the order, *curiositas*, once more includes a reference to Manichaean attitude (*tenebrosa penetrat et tamen temporalia*) of a rational, yet materialistic search for the truth and it is introduced with a slight delay in comparison to the first two, possibly for rhetorical purposes. What is noteworthy in these passages from *Gn. adu. Man.* is that Augustine speaks in a generalizing tone of the threefold *genus temptationis*: that is, the temptations cover the all *main routes of sin and the Devil* into the soul of a Christian.

<sup>132</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 23, 40 sicut [...] *Christus regit animas obtemperantes sibi, quae ad ecclesiam eius partim de gentibus, partim de populo Iudaeorum uenerunt, ut ab eo mansuescerent homines uel carnali concupiscentiae dediti sicut pecora uel tenebrosa curiositate obscurati quasi serpentes uel elati superbia quasi aues.*

<sup>133</sup> Unless one should count the phrase *tenebrosa curiositate obscurati* as one. *Curiositas* is often applied particularly to the Manichaeans. For the allegorising tendencies and direct refutations of Manichaean Bible criticism, see Weber 2001a.

<sup>134</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 17, 26–18, 27 *Nomine enim pectoris significatur superbia, quia ibi dominatur impetus animae, nomine autem uentris significatur carnale desiderium, quia haec pars mollior sentitur in corpore. Et quia his rebus ille serpit ad eos quos uult decipere, propterea dictum est: pectore et uentre repes [...] terram ergo manducabis duobus modis intellegi potest: uel ad te pertinebunt quos terrena cupiditate deceperis, id est peccatores qui terrae nomine significantur, uel certe genus tertium temptationis his uerbis figuratur, quod est curiositas. Terram enim qui manducat, profunda et tenebrosa penetrat et tamen temporalia atque terrena.*

The bodily divisions of pride and lust are given according to a traditional division between the breast (θυμός) and the belly (ἐπιθυμία).<sup>135</sup> Pride, *superbia*, however, is taken to be a vice of the soul (*ibi dominatur impetus animae*), while the “fleshly desires” seem to be an issue for the body. As for curiosity, it is not assigned to any particular part in the human constitution, for it emerges partly from corrupt intellect, and partly from attraction to sensed, or “earthly” reality.

Augustine returns to the figure of the serpent in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 25, 38–26, 40. The three temptations are now efficiently appropriated to Manichaean theology, and the victims of the Devil are much alike Manichaeans:

For [the serpent] deceives none but the proud who claim for themselves what they are not, and who soon believe that the supreme God and the human soul have one and the same nature. They deceive also those caught in carnal desires, who are glad to hear that it is not they themselves who do whatever they do in their wantonness, but the nation of darkness. They deceive also the curious who are wise about the things of earth and search out spiritual things with an earthly eye.<sup>136</sup> [transl. Teske]

To Augustine, the three temptations accurately describe the main faults of his former beliefs. Divine nature is not shared by humans (*una eademque natura*). Moreover, the “fleshly desires” and the acts these desires result in, are not committed by an alien nature in human beings (*non ipsi [...] sed gens tenebrarum*).<sup>137</sup> The human intellectual approach (*sapiunt [...] inquirunt*) to spiritual things should not be aimed at earthly and temporal things. The tripartite scheme of sin appears thus as part of Augustine’s anti-Manichaean polemics from the start.<sup>138</sup>

<sup>135</sup> Du Roy (1966, 347) points out a parallel exegesis of Gen 3, 14 in Philo (*all.* 3, 114–115), and ponders the possibility of indirect Alexandrian influences.

<sup>136</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 26, 40 *Non enim decipit [sc. serpens] nisi aut superbos, qui sibi arrogantes quod non sunt cito credunt, quod summi dei et animae humanae una eademque natura sit, aut desiderii carnalibus implicatos, qui libenter audiunt, quod lascivie quicquid faciunt non ipsi faciunt, sed gens tenebrarum, aut curiosos, qui terrena sapiunt et spiritualia terreno oculo inquirunt.*

<sup>137</sup> This is perhaps also a reference to the Manichaean cosmological myth of how the material world came into being through the spontaneous ejaculation of the People of the Darkness. The teaching was included in e.g. Mani’s *Thesaurus*. See, for example, *nat. b.* 44; *c. Fel.* 2, 7; 2, 13. Verschoren (2002, 238) rightly notes here that the occurrences of the word *concupiscentia* in the context of sexual desire are rare or even unextant before *uera rel.* For her useful critical remarks on Lee 1996, see Verschoren 2002, 230–240.

<sup>138</sup> For the presence of Manichaean themes and questions in *Gn. adu. Man.*, see van Oort 2010a, 519–521.

In *de uera religione*, written for Augustine's patron Romanianus in ca. 390, the theme of *triplex cupiditas* "emerges to dramatic structural importance."<sup>139</sup> This work summarizes Augustine's Neoplatonic convictions and arguments against Manichaean cosmology. While the first part of the work concentrates on the ontological status of evil, the second part concerns man's ascent to God. Here the three *concupiscentiae* get their remarkable role as "inner" explanations for those hindrances that stay on the way of the ascent.<sup>140</sup>

Let us now briefly examine Augustine's argumentation. In *uera rel.* 4, 1Jn 2, 15–16 is quoted in its entirety.<sup>141</sup> In his introduction to the work, Augustine gives biblical exhortations to all kinds of sinners (*auaris, luxuriosis, superbis, iracundis, discordiosis, superstitiosis, curiosis*) with one general command in mind: *nolite diligere mundum, quoniam ea, quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi*. The choice of biblical quotations emphasises Augustine's Neoplatonist axioms of immutability, the ascent to the One (God), and inwardness (e.g. *dicitur superstitiosis: regnum dei intra uos est*).

From *uera rel.* 69 on, *cupiditas triplex* assumes an important role as the *fundamental structure* of all sin.<sup>142</sup> Beginning with a gradual description of the forms of idolatry (*ad animalia et inde ad ipsa corpora colenda delabuntur*), Augustine ends in condemning people who do not worship any deities at all but their own thoughts.<sup>143</sup> To Augustine, these people are, in fact, the worst kind of idolizers, for they are entirely in the servitude of *cupiditas triplex*. In other words, they serve pleasure (*uoluptatis*), or high position (*excellentiae*), or show (*spectaculi*). These three objects are considered to

<sup>139</sup> O'Donnell 1992, III, 205, of 1Jn 2, 16. For outlines of the work, see van Fleteren 1976, 478–479 nn. 17–18; Verschoren 2002, 221 n. 71.

<sup>140</sup> van Fleteren 1976, 479, 490–493.

<sup>141</sup> The verse is cited in the same year in *mus.* 6, 45. See also *mus.* 6, 48 *quamobrem neque in uoluptate carnali, neque in honoribus et laudibus hominum, neque in eorum exploratione quae forinsecus corpus attingunt, nostra gaudia collocemus, habentes in intimo deum, ubi certum est et incommutabile omne quod amamus*. Verschoren 2002, 221 n. 70.

<sup>142</sup> Prior to the structural turning point in *uera rel.* 68, *superbia* and *curiositas* are treated in the manner familiar from other works from Augustine's early career. Thus, the Devil is an archetype of impious pride (26), for he loved himself more than God, and did not want to submit himself under God's power. Again, *concupiscentia oculorum* refers to epistemological delusion: man tries in vain to find the first principle (*prima species*) from the sensual world and in its lowest creatures (*naturae corporeae*). *uera rel.* 40. See also *uera rel.* 65. Thus, the realms of *intellectus* are erroneously imagined by means of bodily visions (*phantasma*), and eternal light is conceived as an immense space full of light (cf. *conf.* 5, 20).

<sup>143</sup> *uera rel.* 69 *quidquid animo errante imaginati fuerint*.

be idols due to their force of eliciting people's expectations of happiness from them, either in the form of fleshly joys, futile power, or delights taken in unhealthy visual pleasures.<sup>144</sup>

Being temporal, however, these things—pleasure, power and beauty—pass in time. They can be lost randomly.<sup>145</sup> People following such idols are thus dominated either by their *libido*, or, *superbia*, or *curiositas*, or by all of them together, and while denying all submission to any deities, they end up in servitude of the entire temporal universe and its parts. Finally, Augustine quotes here 1Jn 2, 15–16, and correlates the biblical terms with the ones used in his own exposition.<sup>146</sup>

*Triplex cupiditas* can also be referred to as a threefold temptation (*triplex etiam temptatio*). This is shown by Christ's three temptations in the wilderness (Mt 4, 1–11).<sup>147</sup> The first temptation of the breads teaches how *cupiditas uoluptatis* should be checked—one should not yield even to hunger. If one eats the “inner” food (*intus pascitur*) of God's word, one does not need the pleasures of the “wasteland” (*ista eremo*). The second temptation, to bow in front of the Devil, refers to pride, and it is warded off by a submission to God. The third one (and the most contrived in its context), to leap from the roof of the Temple, is a temptation of curiosity. There was no other reason for Christ to do such a thing than to “conduct an experiment” (*aliquid experiendi*). But divine things cannot be searched for by a method that is visible, and a person who is attached to immutable wisdom is not interested in hurling himself into temporal, “inferior” knowledge (*uera rel.* 71).

Augustine continues to explore true and false religion within the structure of *triplex cupiditas*-scheme.<sup>148</sup> The tone of this exploration is set by an

<sup>144</sup> *uera rel.* 69 *his autem rebus, quibus quisque beatus uult effici, seruiat necesse est, uelit nolit.*

<sup>145</sup> *uera rel.* 69 *possunt autem auferre ista et scintilla ignis et aliqua parua bestiola.*

<sup>146</sup> *uera rel.* 70: *hoc modo tria illa notata sunt, nam concupiscentia carnis uoluptatis infimae amatores significat, concupiscentia oculorum curiosos, ambitio saeculi superbos.*

<sup>147</sup> *uera rel.* 71. Augustine treats the vices in the sequence in which they appear in Mt 4. Evagrius of Pontos (*malign. cogit.* 1) also attaches the three main human temptations to Christ's victorious answers against the Devil.

<sup>148</sup> See Du Roy 1966, 352–363, for an attempt to reconstruct a thoroughgoing Trinitarian theology behind the *triplex cupiditas*-scheme in *uera rel.* Van Fleteren 1976, 491–493, suggests in accordance with Du Roy that the vices refer to the threefold division of the soul in Plato (ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμοειδές, λογιστικόν). It seems, however, that in *uera rel.* Augustine is not so much interested in psychological correspondences of the three basic sins than in simply analysing them. *uera rel.* 78 is an exception; but there only two (higher-lower) parts are mentioned. Neither Du Roy or van Fleteren mention the traditional *auriga*-image in *uera rel.* 83, which appears in connection with *corporis uoluptas*.

explicitly Neoplatonic worldview. Thus, *uera rel.* 72–83 is a treatise on bodily things: how they serve *ordo rerum* in their beauty, and yet how wrong it is to try to find ultimate happiness in them. After bodily *uoluptates*, Augustine turns to pride.<sup>149</sup> *Superbia* is characterised as a wish to be invincible, in imitation of the omnipotent God. Finally, in *uera rel.* 94–100, *curiositas* is treated as a vain intellectual delight, or rather, as a defect. In *uera rel.* 101, Augustine then sums up all the three fundamental temptations.

Let us examine Augustine's description of each vice. Even in their corruption, they paradoxically reflect virtues or point "upwards," to the real source of all good, high and beautiful. In Augustine's monistic worldview, even the basest of sins have reference to what is good.

1. The bodily *uoluptas* attempts to find "convenience" and tries to avoid inconvenience (*conuenientia*—*resistentia*, 72). By the principle of convenience, all bodily things come into being, even in sexual reproduction (74). But the temporal beauties and harmonies are mutable to the extent that they also lead one to conclude that there must be something immutable (*ex his admoneamur incommutabile aliquid esse quaerendum*). As in a sort of paradox, the bodily pleasures remind one to hold them in contempt (83), and the "weakness of visible flesh" helps one to seek eternal beauty in the entire universe (*uera rel.* 84).
2. Likewise, perverse human pride, which consists of a wish to subdue everything under its power, reflects and refers to the ideal state of affairs, where one lives under God's dominion, "imitating" His power, not with pride, but by living according to His laws. In human sinful reality, pride has an "appetite for unity and omnipotence" (*uera rel.* 84) over temporal things, in other words, pride strives for invincibility. The result of the *cupiditas* of pride, however, was and is that human beings are not able to conquer even their emotions (*ira*, *inuidentia*, 85). The fallen humans wish to be unconquerable, but they cannot win even their own vices (85).<sup>150</sup> The aspect of invincibility is then elaborated further. To actually gain the object of prideful appetite (*inuicti esse uolumus*) in a permanent and appropriate way, one has to love (*diligere*) God and one's neighbour as oneself (*uera rel.* 86–92), not as bodily or relational objects (as brothers or sons or spouses), but as "humans" (*homines*) in their eternal (and partly future) essence

<sup>149</sup> *uera rel.* 84–93.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. s. 392, 5.



(88).<sup>151</sup> Again, the right conditions of freedom can be found in the loving God, and by turning away from the love of mutable things. If one wishes to rule, one should submit oneself to God's universal rule (93). In this way, even pride foreshadows real liberty and real power. The sin of pride reminds human beings of their real destiny in God (93).

3. Curiosity is treated last.<sup>152</sup> Augustine defines it as a "joy derived from knowing things" (*de rerum cognitione laetitia*, 94). Even in its depraved form, it refers to the truth, and to finding out the truth. However, in the fallen world, the focus of human intellect has become fuzzy and aberrant in this respect.<sup>153</sup> Nevertheless, there is a way out of this intellectual confusion, and this is God's self-revelation in the Bible (99). Instead of imaginative alimentations in service of curiosity, divine scriptures provide the food of the real Wisdom for the soul (*uera rel.* 100).<sup>154</sup>

Augustine's description of the function of the vices in ascent to God ends in a chiasmic sentence structure, in which the three *cupiditates* are summed up. At the same time, this threefold scheme evolves to a new level. The real objects of the perverted human strivings are stated as *cognitio* (viz. *curiositas*), *facilitas agendi* (viz. *superbia*) and *quies corporis* (viz. *uoluptas*):

This is the return from temporal to eternal things, and the transformation of the old man into the new. What can fail to urge man to strive for virtue, when his very vices urge him? Curiosity seeks nothing but knowledge, which cannot be certain knowledge unless it be knowledge of eternal things which remain ever the same. Pride seeks nothing but power, which has reference to facility in acting. But power is attained only by the perfect soul which is submissive to God and which with great love turns towards his kingdom. Bodily pleasure seeks nothing but rest, and there is no rest save where there is no poverty and no corruption.<sup>155</sup>

[transl. Burleigh]

<sup>151</sup> See O'Donovan 1980, 30–31.

<sup>152</sup> For the order of the temptations and its significance, see O'Donnell's (1992, III, 204) skeptical remarks.

<sup>153</sup> The Manichaean views on divinity are refuted in *uera rel.* 96: according to them, eternal things and God are pictured as corporeal *phantasmata*, as a huge spatial beam of light. Du Roy 1966, 362.

<sup>154</sup> van Fleteren 1976, 492: "the understanding of the Scriptures takes on a more important role than in many of his previous works."

<sup>155</sup> *uera rel.* 101 *haec est a temporalibus ad aeterna regressio et ex uita ueteris hominis in nouum hominem reformatio. quid est autem, unde homo commemorari non possit ad uirtutes capessendas, quando de ipsis uitis potest? quid enim appetit curiositas nisi cognitionem, quae certa esse non potest nisi rerum aeternarum et eodem modo se semper habentium? quid appetit*

This triplicity is then exemplified by two groups of people. The unhappy ones (*miseri*) are not interested in finding the ends or goals (*fines*) to their desires and actions; they prefer studying things to knowing them (*curiositas* instead of *cognitio*), struggle to victory (*superbia* instead of *facilitas actionis*) and hunger and sexual desire to satiety and lack of such desires (*uoluptas* instead of *salus corporis*). In the opposite case, that is, on the way to true happiness, one has to first abandon curiosity, and to acknowledge the “inner” (*intus*) knowledge as the only certain knowledge. Next, one may achieve *facilitas actionis*. The last phase (and apparently the hardest one to achieve) is to receive *quies corporis* by “abstaining from those things without which this life can be lived” (103). This process cannot be perfected in this life, however, as Augustine points out by referring to certain bodily limitations.<sup>156</sup> Hence, one has to wait for the final consummation in Heaven. There, the threefold *cupiditas* has been replaced by *ueritas*, *pax* and *sanitas*, each referring to the struggle felt in this life due to sins (*uera rel.* 103).<sup>157</sup> On the other hand, people who have not submitted themselves to the intellectual ascent towards the immutable God will receive their appropriate eschatological punishment. These people will have to face in a perfected way the things they actually loved in their life because of their *triplex cupiditas* (104).

The beginning of this darkness is fleshly knowledge and the weakness of the bodily senses. Those who delight in strife will be aliens from peace and involved in frightful difficulties. The beginning of the greatest difficulty is war and contention [...] their hands and feet are bound, i.e., all facility of working is taken from them. Those who want to hunger and thirst, to burn with lust and be weary [...] love indigence which is the beginning of the greatest of woes. What they love will be made perfect for them, for they will be where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth.<sup>158</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

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*superbia nisi potentiam, quae refertur ad agendi facilitatem, quam non inuenit anima perfecta nisi deo subdita et ad eius regnum summa caritate conuersa? quid appetit uoluptas corporis nisi quietem, quae est nisi ubi nulla est indigentia et nulla corruptio?*

<sup>156</sup> This he does by quoting Rom 7, 23–25, a passage that will have a deep impact on his teaching about human abilities in virtue. See Chapter 6.

<sup>157</sup> *uera rel.* 103 *Non mirum autem, si hoc dabitur his, qui in cognitione solam ueritatem amant et in actione solam pacem et in corpore solam sanitatem. Hoc enim in eis perficietur post hanc uitam, quod in hac uita plus diligunt.*

<sup>158</sup> *uera rel.* 104 *harum [sc. tenebrarum] initium est carnis prudentia et sensuum corporeorum imbecillitas. et qui certaminibus delectantur, alienabuntur a pace et summis difficultatibus implicabuntur. initium enim summae difficultatis est bellum atque contentio [...] ligantur ei manus et pedes, id est facilitas omnis aufertur operandi. et qui sitire et esurire uolunt et in libidinem ardescere et defatigari [...] amant indigentiam, quod est initium summorum dolorum. perficietur ergo in eis quod amant, ut ibi eis sit ploratus et stridor dentium.*

The eschatological point of view is clear in the final exhortations, where Augustine returns to his original biblical motto (1Jn 2, 16). To love bodily pleasures (*concupiscentia carnis*), to love competition (*ambitio saeculi*) or to love *uisibilia spectacula* (*concupiscentia oculorum*) will have serious, infernal consequences.

Some years after writing *uera rel.*, Augustine completed his *de libero arbitrio*. As we have already seen, *libido* (*cupiditas*) plays a remarkable role as the single foundation of sinful acts in *lib. arb.* 1.<sup>159</sup> In *lib. arb.* 2, Augustine concentrates on the will as the locus of sinful corruption. Thus, in *lib. arb.* 2, 53, Augustine brings the theme of *triplex cupiditas* under the headline of the corrupt will. So threefold *concupiscentia* appears as an interpretative instrument to explain the ways of *uoluntas auersa*. Human aversion from God is organised in three categories, according to the direction of the aversion of the will. If the will directs towards “what is its own” (*ad proprium*), it belongs to the category of pride (*suae potestatis uult esse*).<sup>160</sup> If it turns to inspect “outward things” (*ad exterius*), it falls into the class of curiosity (*quaecumque ad se non pertinent cognoscere studet*). Finally, if it gazes at and prizes the “things below” (*ad inferius*), it is led by bodily pleasure (*uoluptatem corporis diligit*). Augustine readily points out that human will is not evil (*mala*) as such, nor are the goods that the human will is striving after. The evil lies in the direction that the will’s aversive movement takes.<sup>161</sup>

Unquestionably, the most important work using the scheme of *triplex cupiditas* is *confessiones*.<sup>162</sup> The three evil desires give structure not only to Augustine’s view of sin in general, or to his verdict on Manichaeism, but also

<sup>159</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 8–12, 22.

<sup>160</sup> See also *lib. arb.* 3, 28 *aequalitatem angelorum desiderant propter inanem gloriam suam [...] in tali uoluntate perseuerantes [...] potestatem suam potius quam dei omnipotentis diligentibus*. Christ is here described as the “door of humility” (*humilitatis ianua*). Cf. *conf.* 3, 16.

<sup>161</sup> *lib. arb.* 2, 53: *uoluntas autem auersa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conuersa ad proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium conuertitur, cum suae potestatis uult esse, ad exterius, cum aliorum propria uel quaecumque ad se non pertinent cognoscere studet, ad inferius cum uoluptatem corporis diligit. Atque ita homo superbus et curiosus et lasciuus effectus excipitur ab alia uita, quae in comparatione superioris uitae mors est [...] ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus adpetuntur [...] mala sint neque ipsa uoluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus, sed malum sit auersio eius ab incommutabili bono et conuersio ad mutabilia bona; quae tamen auersio atque conuersio [...] est uoluntaria, digna et iusta eam miseriae poena subsequitur.*

<sup>162</sup> For detailed comments and analyses in this respect, O’Donnell (1992) should be consulted. Cf. the classical study by Courcelle (1950a), where this subject is practically non-existent.

to the general composition of the work.<sup>163</sup> He continuously reflects his past life through the scheme, providing eventually a substantial analysis of all three desires and their relation to the senses in *conf.* 10.<sup>164</sup>

From his childhood on, he sees himself bound by these three temptations.<sup>165</sup> In his youth, he is festered with “sacrilegious curiosity” (*sacrilega curiositas*); he laments his visit to a church where he “dared to lust after a girl” (*concupiscere*) and he confesses that the studies he went through were motivated by his vainglory (*gaudebam superbe et tumebam typho*).<sup>166</sup> After recalling his first encounters with philosophy, the crude style of the Bible and the Manichaeans, he sums up the categories of sin (*flagitium, facinus*) as “chief kinds of wickedness.” Their sources are threefold, and often intricately bound together.

They spring from the lust of domination or from the lust of the eyes or from sensuality—either one of or two of these, or all three at once. Thus an evil-living person transgresses your decalogue of three commands with our duty to you and seven with our duty to our fellow human beings.<sup>167</sup>

[transl. Chadwick]

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<sup>163</sup> Of the host of allusions and references, I only quote two: *conf.* 5, 4 *exultant atque extolluntur qui sciunt, et per impiam superbiam recedentes et deficientes a lumine tuo tanto ante solis defectum futurum praevident et in praesentia suum non vident—non enim religiose quaerunt, unde habeant ingenium, quo ista quaerunt—et inuenientes, quia tu fecisti eos, non ipsi se dant tibi, se ut serues quod fecisti, et quales se ipsi fecerant occidunt se tibi et trucidant exaltationes suas sicut uolatilia et curiositates suas sicut pisces maris, quibus perambulant secretas semitas [Ps 8,9] abyssi, et luxurias suas sicut pecora campi [Ps 8,8], ut tu, deus, ignis edax consumas mortuas curas eorum recreans eos immortaliter; conf. 9, 1 sed ubi erat tam annoso tempore et de quo imo altoque secreto euocatum est in momento liberum arbitrium meum, quod subderem ceruicem leni iugo tuo et umeros leui sarcinae tuae, Christe Iesu, adiutor meus et redemptor meus [Ps 18,15]? quam suaue mihi subito factum est carere suauitatibus nugarum, et quas amittere metus fuerat, iam dimittere gaudium erat. eiciebas enim eas a me, uera tu et summa suauitas, eiciebas et intrabas pro eis omni uoluptate dulcior, sed non carni et sanguini, omni luce clarior, sed omni secreto interior, omni honore sublimior, sed non sublimibus in se. iam liber erat animus meus a curis mordacibus ambiendi et adquirendi et uoluitandi atque scalpendi scabiem libidinum, et garriebam tibi, claritati meae et diuitiis meis et saluti meae, domino deo meo.*

<sup>164</sup> See Kotzé 2004, 216–217.

<sup>165</sup> *conf.* 1, 16; 1, 30. O'Donnell 1992, II, 65, 101. See also Augustine's analysis of the possible causes for his theft of pears in *conf.* 2, 13, where a set of *superbia, curiositas* and *luxuria* is joined with another set consisting of emotions.

<sup>166</sup> *conf.* 3, 5–3,6. O'Donnell 1992, II, 160. Augustine's friend Alypius was notorious for his curiosity to see the shows. See the depiction of s. *Denis* 14, 3, where Augustine opposes a good version of *spectacula* (i.e. those of the pains of the martyrs) to the reproachable traditional ones.

<sup>167</sup> *conf.* 3, 16 *haec sunt capita iniquitatis, quae pullulant principandi et spectandi et sentiendi libidine aut una aut duabus earum aut simul omnibus, et uiuitur male aduersus tria et septem, [...] decalogum tuum, deus altissime et dulcissime.*

Proceeding with his biographical account of threefold desire, Augustine provides an account of his time spent in the Manichaean sect. *Conf.* 4 starts with dark undertones. By the delusion of the followers of Mani and by his own ambitious plans for a career, he also was deluded in a full spectrum of *cupiditates*. In brief, he was both proud and vain.<sup>168</sup> He was also won over by greed.<sup>169</sup> He started to live with the future mother of Adeodatus, in an agreement that was dictated by sexual desire.<sup>170</sup> Augustine ends the book by depicting himself in servitude to evil desires and as a prodigal son among “meretricious lusts.”<sup>171</sup>

After having written in some length on memory in *conf.* 10, Augustine proceeds to analyse the central topic of *continentia* and the threefold temptation of evil desire. Here continence contains and offers a remedy to all aspects of Augustine’s past sinful life (*concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi*).<sup>172</sup> Whereas threefold *cupiditas* covers the sins of Augustine’s own *uita* in general,<sup>173</sup> *concupiscentia carnis* covers the sensual aspects of sin in particular.<sup>174</sup> The account of sensual aspects of *con-*

<sup>168</sup> *conf.* 4, 1 *seducebamur et seducebamus falsi atque fallentes in uariis cupiditatibus et palam per doctrinas, quas liberales uocant, occulte autem falso nomine religionis, hic superbi, ibi superstitiosi, ubique uani.*

<sup>169</sup> *conf.* 4, 2 *uictoriosam loquacitatem uictus cupiditate uendebar.*

<sup>170</sup> *conf.* 4, 2 *in illis annis unam habebam non eo quod legitimum uocatur coniugio cognitam, [...] experirer exemplo meo, quid distaret inter coniugalis placiti modum, quod foederatum esset generandi gratia, et pactum libidinosi amoris, ubi proles etiam contra uotum nascitur.* See also *conf.* 6, 25 *non amator coniugii sed libidinis seruus eram.*

<sup>171</sup> *conf.* 4, 30 *malarum cupiditatum seruus [...] bonam partem substantiae meae sategi habere in potestate [...] profectus sum abs te in longinquam regionem, ut eam dissiparem in meretrices cupiditates.* For the allusions to prodigal son in *conf.* see O’Donnell 1992, II, 95–98.

<sup>172</sup> *conf.* 10, 40–41 *da quod iubes et iube quod uis: imperas nobis continentiam [...] per continentiam quippe conligimur et redigimur in unum, a quo in multa defluximus. Minus enim te amat qui tecum aliquid amat quod non propter te amat. continentiam iubes: da quod iubes et iube quod uis. iubes certe, ut contineam a concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitione saeculi [1 Io 2,16].* O’Donnell 1992, III, 200: “Everything about *conf.* as literary artefact conspires to emphasise the place of *continentia* in A.’s view of his life and his conversion.” For continence and Augustine in general, see Hunter 1994; Schlabach 1998.

<sup>173</sup> *conf.* 10, 39 *temptatio est uita humana super terram.* O’Donnell 1992, III, 203, on 1Jn 2, 16 “this passage gives structure to the first eight books as well as to this second half of Bk. 10.” Cf. the roughly contemporary *cat. rud.* 55, where the scheme is part of a shorter baptismal instruction. *cat. rud.* 55 *tu itaque credens ista, caue tentationes: [...] immoderatis uoluptatibus uentris et gutturis, aut impudicos, aut uanis curiositatibus uel illicitis deditos, siue spectaculorum, siue remediorum aut diuinationum diabolicarum, siue in pompa et typho auaritia et superbiae.* Note that people driven by these temptations are found not only among the pagans and the heretics, but also inside the church.

<sup>174</sup> Augustine follows the traditional partition of the five senses that was strongly represented in Manichaean anthropology as well. O’Donnell 1992, III, 167–168; Kotzé 2004, 216–217.

*cupiscentia* starts with an account of sexual desires and spontaneous images seen in dreams.<sup>175</sup> The tone of Augustine's report on his current state of sexual continence is surprisingly confident: it is perfectly possible to God to grant a better state of mind in this respect: the "glue of lust" will soon be dissolved.<sup>176</sup> The concrete physical abstinence is mentioned only casually, "this was done even before I became a dispenser of the sacrament." In Augustine's current personal position, nocturnal sexual illusions seem to represent only a fragment of the entire spectrum of sensual *concupiscentia*.<sup>177</sup>

Moving to the five senses and to the risks they entail, Augustine is more concerned about the lingering temptations of gluttony, lurking behind the acceptable needs for nourishment, than about the effects of sexual *concupiscentia*.

I struggle every day against uncontrolled desire in eating and drinking. It is not something I could give up once and for all and decide never to touch it again, as I was able to do with sexual intercourse. And so a rein has to be held upon my throat, moderated between laxity and austerity.<sup>178</sup>

[transl. Chadwick]

Whereas the effects of past sexual desires are lingering in Augustine's dreams like rather harmless phantom pains, the temptation of food and drink is a daily temptation, which requires constant vigilance. Again, Augustine emphasises God's ability to grant continence even in an immoderate desire for food and drink.<sup>179</sup> While the sense of smell is dismissed as something that does not cause any serious appeal to Augustine, he is ready to

<sup>175</sup> *conf.* 10, 41. Traditionally, sexual propagation and the senses belonged to the same set of sensual activities together with the ability of speech, which in Augustine's composition is treated together with flattery and deception in connection with pride. See Long & Sedley I, 315–316 (Aetius). Although Augustine holds these images to be slightly disturbing, resulting from his past *consuetudo*, he deems them not culpable, despite the fact that the dreamer may even give rational consent to these illusory images. See Matthews 1992, 90–106; Mann 1999, 160–162.

<sup>176</sup> *conf.* 10, 42 *auebis, domine, magis magisque in me munera tua, ut anima mea sequatur me ad te concupiscentiae uisco expedita, ut non sit rebellis sibi atque ut in somnis etiam non solum non perpetret istas corruptelarum turpitudines per imagines animales usque ad carnis fluxum, sed ne consentiat quidem. nam ut nihil tale uel tantulum libeat, quantum possit nutu cohiberi etiam in casto dormientis affectu non tantum in hac uita, sed etiam in hac aetate, non magnum est omnipotenti, qui uales facere supra quam petimus et intellegimus* [Eph 3,20].

<sup>177</sup> Cf. his earlier agonies in the matter, in *conf.* 8, 10–13; 8, 17.

<sup>178</sup> *conf.* 10, 47 in *his ergo temptationibus positus certo cotidie aduersus concupiscentiam manducandi et bibendi: non enim est quod semel praecidere et ulterius non attingere decernam, sicut de concubitu potui. itaque freni gutturis temperata relaxatione et constrictione tenendi sunt.*

<sup>179</sup> *conf.* 10, 45.

confess that he cannot guarantee a *safeguarded* indifferent position even on this matter: “No one should be complacent in this life which is called a ‘total temptation.’”<sup>180</sup> Both the sense of hearing and the sense of sight lead to an even more uncertain ground. The aesthetic pleasures derived from beautiful singing and visually pleasant works of art are powerful enough to cause lapses. The visual pleasure of light and colours is all the more deplorable, as it is always present, unlike agreeable voices and songs.<sup>181</sup>

In general, the presentation of temptations of five senses has an undeniably contrived appearance.<sup>182</sup> Nevertheless, all five sensual temptations, added with the separate case of sexual desire, are designed to reinforce the arguments of progress and dependency on God’s grace, made frequently during the discussion on each sense. Furthermore, Augustine seems to constantly remind his reader of the inherent goodness of the sensual reality, despite the risks of misguided commitment that it may entail.<sup>183</sup>

*Curiositas* is treated as a higher form of temptation, based on the five senses, although not taking pleasure in the sensations as such but in “perceptions acquired through the flesh” (10, 54).<sup>184</sup> The idea is exemplified by a desire to see mangled corpses,<sup>185</sup> a desire to achieve useless knowledge, to use magical arts, and a desire to experience miracles with the pretext of religion.<sup>186</sup> Although Augustine again maintains that the grave forms of these temptations no longer belong to his present life as a Christian, he also wishes to make a confession for the more trivial forms of curiosity.<sup>187</sup> For instance, Augustine blames the element of distraction, the banality of

<sup>180</sup> *conf.* 10, 48 *nemo securus esse debet in ista uita, quae tota temptatio [Iob 7,1] nominatur.*

<sup>181</sup> *conf.* 10, 50 *tamen cum mihi accidit, ut me amplius cantus quam res, quae canitur, moueat, poenaliter me peccare confiteor et tunc mallet non audire cantantem.* 10, 51 *pulchras formas et uarias, nitidos et amoenos colores amant oculi [...]* *et tangunt me uigilantem totis diebus, nec requies ab eis datur mihi, sicut datur a uocibus canoris, aliquando ab omnibus, in silentio.* 10, 53 *ego autem haec loquens atque discernens etiam istis pulchris gressum innecto, sed tu euellis, domine, euellis tu, quoniam misericordia tua ante oculos meos est [Ps 25,3]. nam ego capior miserabiliter, et tu euellis misericorditer aliquando non sentientem, quia suspensus incideram, aliquando cum dolore, quia iam inhaeseram.*

<sup>182</sup> *conf.* 10, 41–53. In O’Donnell’s words (1992, III, 217): “alien to our taste.”

<sup>183</sup> Cf. the strongly emotional language in the roughly contemporary (ca. 401) s. *Denis* 14, 2 *quanta mala habet, quanta mala facit carnalis uoluptatis appetitio. inde adulteria, fornicationes: inde luxuriae, ebrietates: inde quicquid titillat sensus inlicite, et mentem penetrat suauitate pestifera, addicit carni mentem, deturbat ex arce rectorem, subdit seruienti imperantem. et quid poterit homo facere rectum in se ipso peruersus?*

<sup>184</sup> *conf.* 10, 54. For *curiositas* in *conf.*, see Blumenberg 1961, 36–41.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. *Plat. Rep.* 439e.

<sup>186</sup> *conf.* 10, 55.

<sup>187</sup> *conf.* 10, 57: a dog hunting a rabbit, a lizard or a spider catching flies.

the images emerging from the sensual world, and intruding in the midst of “thinking some weighty matter” of “deepest importance.”<sup>188</sup>

Proceeding to the third member of threefold lust, that of pride (*superbia*), Augustine presents this as the most severe temptation, for there are virtually no secure means for investigating it in one’s own soul:

In temptations of a different sort I have some capacity for self-exploration, but in this matter almost none.<sup>189</sup> [transl. Chadwick]

*Superbia* imitates God’s sovereignty in a perverse way. To love the power, praise and fear that come from other people, forms an obstacle for the perfection of love. The extreme difficulty in warding off this temptation lies in its close connection to good things, “good life and good actions.”<sup>190</sup> The appreciation of one’s community leads to a gradually increasing self-regard at the expense of a truthful relation to God. In addition, pride has a self-reflective capacity: if I renounce my prideful attitude, I may simultaneously feel pride of this very renunciation.<sup>191</sup> Thus, pride can never be safely discerned by the person who feels it: it is a blind spot in one’s self-knowledge. Of the three temptations that Augustine has listed here, the case of pride most clearly seems to affirm his view that he cannot effectively part with his own sins and evil desires. The threefold *concupiscentia* is there for God to heal; only God can deliver the soul from temptations. The ultimate example of pride is to regard advances in virtuous living to be one’s own achievement, and to enjoy or proclaim these advances in a private fashion, without “sharing this grace with the community.”<sup>192</sup> God commands continence in self-regard and pride as well, for it is only his to give.<sup>193</sup> The view of extreme dependency on *gratia dei* that was formulated in *Simpl.*, thus reappears in Augustine’s thoughts about his possibilities to achieve a virtuous life.<sup>194</sup> Consequently, Book 10 ends in praise of the incarnated Word,

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<sup>188</sup> Evagrius had also made similar observations on the difficulty of focusing one’s thoughts. See Sorabji 2000, 362.

<sup>189</sup> *conf.* 10, 60 *est enim qualiscumque in aliis generibus temptationum mihi facultas explorandi me, in hoc paene nulla est.*

<sup>190</sup> E.g. the love and praise that various *officia* deserve. *conf.* 10, 59.

<sup>191</sup> *conf.* 10, 63.

<sup>192</sup> *conf.* 10, 64 *intus est aliud in eodem genere temptationis malum, quo inanescunt qui placent sibi de se [...] sed sibi placentes multum tibi displicent non tantum de non bonis quasi bonis, uerum etiam de bonis tuis quasi suis, aut etiam sicut de tuis, sed tamquam ex meritis suis, aut etiam sicut ex tua gratia, non tamen socialiter gaudentes, sed aliis invidentes eam.*

<sup>193</sup> *conf.* 10, 60 *imperas nobis et in hoc genere continentiam: da quod iubes et iube quod uis.*

<sup>194</sup> This is also discernible in *s. Denis* 14, 4–5. Celebrating Cyprian’s martyrdom, Augustine says to the parish that only God may give the ability to resist the temptations, *ubi mors*



who has been shown to be a much more potent and valid medicine to cure Augustine's self-deceptive temptations than any of the methods that have been suggested by the philosophers.<sup>195</sup> The three evil desires are summarised as representing all the sicknesses of the soul.<sup>196</sup> As a consequence, the true mediator between God and man is invoked to cure these sicknesses.<sup>197</sup>

After this extended treatise of threefold *concupiscentia* in *confessiones*, the scheme moves into the background, only to reappear briefly in the last book, where Augustine returns to his favourite anti-Manichaean tool of identifying the soul's movements with the various creatures of Genesis. In the contenance that God will grant, these movements, or threefold desires, may be checked and changed into tame beasts.

However, Augustine wishes to draw a line between legitimate "movements" and between the qualities that form the culpability of the threefold evil desires for these latter qualities belong to a "dead soul."<sup>198</sup> By the creative Word of God, the sinful movements of the dead soul are then awakened and changed into good ones.<sup>199</sup>

The biblical source text (1 Jn 2, 16) of *triplex cupiditas* is covered in a collection of sermons on 1 Jn (*in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem 2, 10–12, 14*, written in 407), where it is located in a discussion concerning the

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*uenerit, nulla remanebit ambitio, nulla curiositas oculorum, nulla appetitio sordidarum et carnalium uoluptatum: una uita contemta omnia superantur. beatus ergo laudetur in domino. quando hoc posset, si non adiuuisset dominus? quando uinceret, si non spectator, qui coronam parabat uiuenti, subministraret uires laboranti?*

<sup>195</sup> These are exemplified by the Neoplatonic theurgical rites, *conf.* 10, 67. O'Donnell 1992, III, 241.

<sup>196</sup> *conf.* 10, 66 *ideoque consideraui languores peccatorum meorum in cupiditate triplici.*

<sup>197</sup> *conf.* 10, 69 *pro nobis tibi uictor et uictima, et ideo uictor, quia uictima, pro nobis tibi sacerdos et sacrificium, et ideo sacerdos, quia sacrificium, faciens tibi nos de seruis filios de te nascendo, nobis seruiendo. merito mihi spes ualida in illo est, quod sanabis omnes languores meos per eum, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellat pro nobis [Rom 8,34]. Cf. doct. chr. 1, 13 sic sapientia dei hominem curans, se ipsam exhibuit ad sanandum, ipsa medicus ipsa medicina. quia ergo per superbiam homo lapsus est, humilitatem adhibuit ad sanandum: serpentis sapientia decepti sumus, dei stultitia liberamur.*

<sup>198</sup> *conf.* 13, 30 *continete uos ab immani feritate superbiae, ab inerti uoluptate luxuriae et a fallaci nomine scientiae, ut sint bestiae mansuetae et pecora edomita et innoxii serpentes. motus enim animae sunt isti in allegoria: sed fastus elationis et delectatio libidinis et uenenum curiositatis motus sunt animae mortuae, quia non ita moritur, ut omni motu careat, quoniam discendendo a fonte uitae moritur atque ita suscipitur a praetereunte saeculo et conformatur ei.*

<sup>199</sup> *conf.* 13, 31 *seruiunt enim rationi haec animalia, cum a progressu mortifero cohibita uiuunt et bona sunt.* The "change" of three evil desires is supposed in *s. Denis* 14, 2 *non auferatur cupiditas, sed mutetur [...]* *Quid cupiebas? uoluptatem carnis, concupiscentiam oculorum, ambitionem saeculi.*

love of the world.<sup>200</sup> The main danger in the trio of depraved love is the way its forms are bound in *time*. The flow of time drowns everyone who runs headlong into it. The only remedy against temporality is Christ, who is “a tree in the midst of the flowing water of time.”<sup>201</sup> Albeit created by God, the created good things conceal a risk of enticement to love them instead of the Creator.<sup>202</sup> By claiming an ambiguity in the term, Augustine can say that the “world” (*mundus*) may also be understood to refer not only to the good order of things, but to those who love the created reality as their source for happiness (*diligere ad beatitudinem*).<sup>203</sup> The entire existence of these people is based on the three worldly desires.<sup>204</sup> In loving the sensual pleasures and objects, they “enjoy” that which ought to be only “used” in moderation and in reference to God.<sup>205</sup> The “fleshly” desires seek bodily goods;<sup>206</sup> the desire of the “eyes” (*curiositas*) appears in theatres, shows, magical arts and in the wishes of those Christians who wait too eagerly for miraculous signs from God. Finally, *ambitio saeculi* means pride, a wish to be great in one’s own eyes either by wealth or by some other power.<sup>207</sup> Succinctly put, the people of the world love things that eventually and in time will be lost.

The three worldly desires thus provide a neat summary of the perverted and opposite love, or *cupiditas*.<sup>208</sup> However, Augustine is not content only to categorise the wrongly oriented love into the three temptations, for he also wants to show how these temptations may be conquered. This he does (as in *uera rel.*) by pointing to the example of Christ and His three

<sup>200</sup> An exhaustive analysis of *ep. Io. tr.* is offered by Dideberg 1975; for triple concupiscence as the love of the world, see 175–190. Dideberg treats Augustine’s *uoluptas*, *curiositas* and *superbia* vaguely as “sa conception des passions” (1975, 183).

<sup>201</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 10 rerum temporalium fluuius trahit: sed tanquam circa fluuium arbor nata est dominus noster Iesus Christus.*

<sup>202</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 11.*

<sup>203</sup> See also *s. Denis 14, 2 quis eum mundus non cognouit? dilector mundi*. Dideberg 1975, 180.

<sup>204</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 12 ipsi non habent nisi ista tria, desiderium carnis, desiderium oculorum, et ambitionem saeculi.*

<sup>205</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 12 ne ad fruendum hoc ametis, quod ad utendum habere debetis.* Food, drink and sex are given as examples.

<sup>206</sup> See also *ep. Io. tr. 10, 6 qui claudunt oculos contra caritatem, obdormiscunt in concupiscentiis delectationum carnalium. euigila ergo. delectationes enim sunt, manducare, bibere, luxuriari, ludere, uenari: pompas istas uanas omnia mala sequuntur.*

<sup>207</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 13 ambitio saeculi superbia est. iactare se uult in honoribus; magnus sibi uidetur homo, siue de diuitiis, siue de aliqua potentia.*

<sup>208</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 tria sunt ista, et nihil inuenis unde tenetur cupiditas humana, nisi aut desiderio carnis, aut desiderio oculorum, aut ambitione saeculi.*

temptations in the desert (Mt 4, 1–10).<sup>209</sup> In fact, by keeping Christ and his victory of Satan's temptations in mind, one should be able to completely dispel the threefold *concupiscentia*.<sup>210</sup> In this way, the zero-sum game of the two loves is retrieved again. There is no room for the love of God in a person who is bound with *concupiscentia mundi*, but once the worldly desires have stepped aside, there is room again for *dilectio dei*.<sup>211</sup> Augustine returns to the main argument on the importance of choosing one's objects of love correctly: only divine love can assure eternity. "You are what you love." Therefore, if one loves God, one will eventually turn up to "be a god."<sup>212</sup>

It is clear that the theme of *cupiditas triplex* functions in Augustine's earlier works, together with the image of the root, as a concrete answer to the question, "whence the evil?" The scheme is designed to describe a general explanation for human sinful behaviour, and it is clearly formed in opposition to his former Manichaean conviction of evil substance residing in human nature; some of its allegorical applications, as we have seen in *Gn. adu. Man.*, even find their very target in the Manichaean religion. Whatever the exact sources for this threefold division of sin are, its role and importance is plain enough. *Triplex cupiditas* should cover all the moral deficiencies in the bodily, the intellectual and social levels of human behaviour.

<sup>209</sup> See Dideberg 1975, 186, who overlooks *qu. eu.* 1, 47, where triple *cupiditas* occurs in a casual remark on the temptations of the Christ in Gethsemane. *qu. eu.* 1,47 *sicut temptatio cupiditatis trina est, ita et tentatio timoris trina est. cupiditati quae in curiositate est opponitur timor mortis; sicut enim in illa cognoscendarum rerum est auditas, ita in ista metus amittendae talis notitiae. cupiditati uero honorum uel laudis opponitur timor ignominiae et contumeliarum. cupiditati autem uoluptatis opponitur timor doloris. non absurde ergo intellegitur propter trinam temptationem passionis ter dominum orasse ut transiret calix, sed ita ut potius impleretur uoluntas patris. Cf. qu. eu. 2,13 (superbia, curiositas).*

<sup>210</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 tenentes ista, non habebitis concupiscentiam mundi: non habendo concupiscentiam mundi, non uos subiugabit nec desiderium carnis, nec desiderium oculorum, nec ambitio saeculi.*

<sup>211</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 et facietis locum caritatis uenienti, ut diligatis deum. quia si fuerit ibi dilectio mundi, non ibi erit dilectio dei.* See also *ep. Io. tr. 6, 3*. Similar emphasis on totality can be found in *s. Denis* 14, 2 *in concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas est, in ambitione saeculi superbia est. qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix.*

<sup>212</sup> *ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 tenete potius dilectionem dei, ut quomodo deus est aeternus, sic et uos maneatis in aeternum: quia talis est quisque, qualis eius dilectio est. terram diligis? terra eris. deum diligis? quid dicam? deus eris? non audeo dicere ex me, scripturas audiamus: ego dixi, dii estis, et filii altissimi omnes [Ps 8,6]. si ergo uultis esse dii et filii altissimi, nolite diligere mundum, nec ea quae sunt in mundo. si quis dilexerit mundum, non est caritas patris in illo. quia omnia quae sunt in mundo, desiderium carnis est, et desiderium oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex patre, sed ex mundo [1 Io 2,15 sq.]. s. Denis 14, 2 non enim faciunt bonos et malos mores nisi boni uel mali amores.*

*Triplex cupiditas* thus works as a theologically pregnant idea in explaining man's disability and unwillingness to have a vision of God and to participate in divine life.

Furthermore, Augustine often represents *triplex cupiditas* as a temptation. Thus, in *Gn. adu. Man.*, the Devil's successful attempt to entice Adam and Eve is divinely punished by a threefold diabolical power over humans. Even Christ is tempted by the Devil according to the schema of *triplex cupiditas* (*uera rel.*). Obviously, Augustine does not wish to restrict *triplex cupiditas* to being merely an outward force with no initial human involvement; for the responsibility for the actions made in the scheme of triple concupiscence remains on the subject whether it is the case of Adam and Eve, or present humanity. The ascent to God begins and ends in conquering the threefold sin of the intellectual disturbances of curiosity, separation from God's nature in pride, and the love of temporal, bodily beauty in lust.

In many senses, *uera rel.* can be said to represent a climax in the role of *triplex cupiditas*. This motif governs and structures the latter part of the work and gives it a compositional coherence. The contents of threefold *concupiscentia* are evolved at a high level of sophistication as well. In the narrower sense of the word, *concupiscentia carnis*, *concupiscentia oculorum* and *ambitio saeculi* become a *theological* triad. They are the fundamental factors that inhibit man's final destiny, that is, his participation with God. In all their perversity, even these vices reflect the actual goals of *salus*, *cognitio* and *facilitas*, which are achieved only in relation to true harmony, true wisdom and true power.

Augustine's Neoplatonic solution in refuting the Manichaeon teaching of evil substance involves a commitment to good even in the case of such concepts that describe sin and evil: that is, even *triplex cupiditas* refers to the origin of all being.<sup>213</sup> *Vera rel.* thus posits human sinful motives and actions in the form of *triplex cupiditas* as an opposing, anti-Trinitarian force; this is not in the sense of an independent, absolute negative 'matter,' but as an explanation for sin and how it is distributed in humanity. Threefold desire obstructs one's knowledge of God (*curiositas*), it distorts man's subordination to one Being (*superbia*) and misleads the human sense of beauty and proportion to a pursuit of vanishing bodies (*concupiscentia carnis*). The

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<sup>213</sup> Of course, this Neoplatonic solution could be interpreted as representing a "positive" or at least an instrumental character of *concupiscentia* in the process of ascent, or renewal. Nevertheless, I believe Augustine's only intention here is to guarantee the coherence of a good Neoplatonic universe: all things have their designed place in the *ordo*, and are thus "good," i.e. at least used for good purposes. Thus, in the end, the final goal of evil is "good."

force of the threefold scheme lies more in *distinguishing* wrongful thoughts and acts under three different categories depending on their relation with internal motives and different objectives; as such, the scheme seems to be less concerned of the problem of the *origin* of sin than the image of the 'root.'

In actual contents, *triplex cupiditas* with its three parts are closely knit to Augustine's view of the corruptive influence of temporal and mutable goods to the soul. The fleshly pleasures and delights of temporal knowledge distract and inhibit one's vision of God. In addition, the desire to abandon submissive participation with God and a striving after an independent essence of one's "own" all reflect Augustine's strongly Neoplatonically conditioned anthropology and theology in the context of *triplex cupiditas*.

Alongside *uera rel., conf.* also represents *triplex cupiditas* in structural scale. The three evil desires serve as a matrix of Augustine's past life, and they also serve as a tool in charting his present risks of temptations. In addition, the scheme offers a systematic tool in listing all the wondrous ways in which God has given his grace to Augustine's life. As for the concrete possibilities of this grace, Augustine has, in *conf.*, unshaken confidence. In *ep. Io. tr.* the scheme appears in conjunction with the polar opposition of the two loves and their ultimate goals. As is fitting for a sermon to a Christian congregation, the perspectives of renewal are strongly present in *ep. Io. tr. 2* as well.

As noted above, the formal scheme of triple *concupiscentia* fades away in structural importance in Augustine's works soon after *conf.* and *ep. Io. tr.*<sup>214</sup> Exceptions can be found in a few sermons, however, which were written during the years 412–420, and in which Augustine treats 1Jn 2, 16 as describing depraved love for temporary things.<sup>215</sup> In his debate with Julian, this verse is discussed, but only briefly, and as an appendix to the more general and urgent horizon of *concupiscentia carnis*.<sup>216</sup>

<sup>214</sup> O'Donnell 1992, III, 207.

<sup>215</sup> s. 112 attaches *triplex cupiditas* to the three answers given to the dinner invitation in Lk 14. The evil desires appear in the following order: *superbia, curiositas, uoluptas*, and with familiar contents. What is striking in the interpretation that the Johannine verse now gets, is the way it is applied to the Donatians; the final exhortations of the parable (*cogite intrare*) clearly point to this way. s. 162, on the other hand, treats *dilectio mundi* as part of a commentary on 1 Cor 6, 18, and as an explanation for the theological meaning of *fornicatio*. s. 162,4 *ista ergo dilectio mundi, quae uniuersalem in se concupiscentiam continet mundi, generalis est fornicatio, qua peccatur in corpus proprium; eo quod omnibus corporalibus et uisibilibus et temporalibus desideriis et uoluptatibus humanus indesinenter seruit animus, ab ipso creatore uniuersorum desolatus atque derelictus.*

<sup>216</sup> This observation is made by Dideberg 1975, 187–189.

While the formal scheme loses significance, it does not, however, mean that the three vices or evil desires would disappear from Augustine's teaching of sin: on the contrary, the role of *superbia* as explicating the first and foremost cause of the Fall is nowhere more stressed than in Augustine's later expositions of the Genesis narratives, and pride maintains its role as the primal, radical source of sin (*Gn. litt.*, *ciu.* 13–14); *curiositas* is implicitly involved e.g. in the condemnation of *physici* in *ench.* 9, where the futile inquiries on natural phenomena and their causes are criticised. *Concupiscentia carnis*, in turn, will return with an incomparable force in the Pelagian polemics.<sup>217</sup>

#### 4.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a survey of a typical feature in Augustine's ethics (the two opposite forms of love, *caritas* and *cupiditas*) by using two images, or literary distinguishable forms, namely the image of the 'root' (*radix*) and the scheme of the threefold evil desire (*triplex cupiditas*). These two images both highlight Augustine's need for a generalising account of the source and matrix of sin; they describe its origin, they synthesise its overwhelmingly various manifestations, and they provide tools for evaluating the different kinds of risks entailed in the different kinds of temptations. All these aspects are covered by the image of the root, which concentrates on the source and cause for sinful actions, and by the scheme of *triplex cupiditas*, which offers a concise, fundamental matrix of the variety of sins and temptations. Both of these descriptive tools are regularly opposed to the force of divine *caritas*, and all its adjoining qualities, e.g. humility, immutability, order, and so on.

Augustine uses the image of the root rather constantly: it appears in early works, and is part of his debates with the Pelagians. Equally constant is his concern with this image: due to its rather concrete form and its apparent affinity with the Manichaean terminology, it is at risk of leading the readers' thoughts into a Manichaean, materialistic view of sin as appearing as another nature in the created human constitution. This concern was usurped by Augustine's opponents, most acutely by Julian, during the later Pelagian debates. By drawing caricatures of the roots of evil and by pointing out the striking similarities with Manichaean texts, which likewise used the image of the 'root' in relation to *concupiscentia*, Julian attempted to

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<sup>217</sup> An interesting example of Augustine's way of discerning between sexual *concupiscentia* and a universal *concupiscentia* can be found in the sermon quoted above (s. 162), dated to the year 416.

question Augustine's position. Even before his outspoken Pelagian opponent, however, Augustine is careful enough to clarify the basic difference between his and the Manichaean position: no suggestion of two different natures is meant by the image of the 'root,' even in contexts where Christ's parable of the two trees and the two kind of fruits defines the tone.

Parallel in function, the scheme of *triplex cupiditas* is exploited in various works from the beginning of the 390s. It provided Augustine not only a generalising instrument to describe the various levels of sins and temptations, but also an effective propaganda weapon with which to characterise his former co-religionists. In some central works, the matrix of triple *concupiscentia* even structures large elements of composition. While Augustine's use of 1Jn 2, 16 as a generalising device seems to dissolve after *conf.* and *ep. Io. tr.*, the individual elements of the scheme obviously continued to strongly influence Augustine's position in conceiving the mechanisms of temptation, fall and sin. Only speculation is left to offer explanation for this dissolution. One could suggest that the three-fold scheme as a general explanation for all human sinful behaviour and as a common form to all temptations appeared too limiting and inflexible, and analyses along more flexible lines that were offered by the separate members of the scheme were found to be more satisfactory to Augustine. Perhaps Augustine also thought that the power of the scheme for a literary composition had already been exhausted fully in *uera rel.* and *conf.* What is absolutely certain, however, is that during the 410s and the 420s it was *concupiscentia carnis* that became Augustine's main occupation in the context of Christian renewal.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCUPISCENTIA AND PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS OF EMOTIONS

haec est hominis uita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius rationi ueritatique consentiunt, et uocantur gaudia et amores sancti et casti et boni. si autem non consentiunt, dum negligenter reguntur, conscindunt et dissipant animum et faciunt uitam miserrimam, et uocantur perturbationes et libidines et concupiscentiae malae.

Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31

uerum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus adinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam de uerbis cupidiores esse contentionis quam ueritatis. apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam ciues sanctae ciuitatis dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum deum uiuentes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.

ciu. 14, 9

So far, we have traced Augustine's thoughts on *concupiscentia* in lines of divine punishment and as an originating, 'radical' evil. These functions of *concupiscentia* could be identified, in most general terms, as theological, for they were attached to Augustine's ideas of God and divine justice on the one hand, and on his insistence on searching the fundamental cause for man's evil actions against God, himself and his neighbour, on the other hand.

It is now time to present a function of *concupiscentia* that could, again in a rather heuristic way, be termed as philosophical, namely the function of *concupiscentia* as part of Augustine's 'theory of emotions'.<sup>1</sup> The role of emotions (*passio, perturbatio, πάθος*)<sup>2</sup> in Augustine's thinking has drawn some attention in recent scholarship, and its links to previous traditions and

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<sup>1</sup> It is questionable whether Augustine indeed had any clearly articulated and comprehensive theory of the emotions of his own, or he was merely satisfied in using traditional elements of various schools on this issue, for reasons suggested in this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine's terminology of emotions is flexible. Terms occur such as *adfectus, passionis, perturbationes*, or even *libidines* in the general sense of 'emotion.' See O'Daly & Zumkeller 1986.



deviations from them have been studied with care, thus allowing a more nuanced picture of Augustine's contribution to the philosophy of emotions in general. In particular, the role of *concupiscentia*, as connected to the ancient philosophical traditions of Stoicism and Platonism, has also been of interest for the scholars of the history of philosophy during the past two decades or so.<sup>3</sup>

The task in this chapter is to present an overview of Augustine's way of discussing *concupiscentia* in a context which bears identifiable debt to the philosophical traditions concerning emotions, and to examine those parts of this debt that were of particular importance to Augustine. Most importantly, I will attempt to show how Augustine's discussions on *concupiscentia* that were connected to the context of the philosophical traditions developed in his thoughts to useful secondary tools for his more urgent, primarily theological needs. Most studies of Augustine's views on emotions concentrate on the most crucial texts in the matter, i.e. *ciu.* 9 and 14, which show Augustine directly in dialogue with the philosophical schools.

There were, however, certain themes that evoked in Augustine more or less reflected positions in relation to the emotions, and to desire in particular. Some of these themes are very basic and commonplace ideas of the soul's partition into an irrational and a rational part, of the progress from the initial stages to an emotion (or sinful act) proper, or of the use of the concept of consent in determining whether or not an emotion (or sinful act) has taken place.<sup>4</sup> Augustine's commitments to various philosophical traditions in this respect were eclectic and his principal source for the philosophy of emotions is Cicero.<sup>5</sup> Obviously, only a selection of the instances when Augustine returns to these ideas and situates *concupiscentia* into the

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<sup>3</sup> For general treatises of the philosophy of mind and emotions, see Gersh 1986; Dillon 1990; Annas 1992; Nussbaum 1994; Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Sorabji 2000; Knuuttila 2004. For the emotions in the Stoic tradition, see Lloyd 1978; Brennan 1998; Cooper 1998; Graver 2007. For the position of Plotinus, see Emilsson 1998. The role of Philo in the history of emotions is discussed by Dillon & Terian 1976; Aune 1994 and Graver 1999. Christian contributions to these philosophical traditions are studied by e.g. Savon 1984 (on Ambrose and Jerome); Williams 1993 (on Gregory of Nyssa); Nicholson 1997 (on Lactantius); Parel 2001 (on Clement of Alexandria). For terminology of emotions in Christian writers, see Braun 1962, 62–65.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. *diu. qu.* 77 on whether emotions are sin.

<sup>5</sup> See O'Daly 1987, 46–54, esp. 51n140. In *de ciuitate dei* Augustine mainly quotes from two other authors as well, i.e. Aulus Gellius and Apuleius. For Cicero's own fluctuating affiliations and style of philosophy, see Gluckner 1988, 63. For Cicero's influence on Augustine on the subject of emotions, see Brachtendorf 1997.

architecture of these received traditions is discussed in this chapter. Thus, for example, the allegorical, or psychological, reading of Gen 1–3, which we have already discussed in previous chapters, also finds its place in this chapter, representing Augustine's familiarity with the previous Christian, or even Jewish, discussions on the soul and temptations.

In addition, some special questions were part of the traditional set of doctrines of emotions, and Augustine also demonstrates his familiarity with these questions. Such special problems would include *concupiscentia* in dreams, habituation of *concupiscentia*, sexual shame, or even the treatment of *concupiscentia* with a certain kind of music. Some of these special questions hold a more permanent place in Augustine's philosophy of *concupiscentia*, some appear only in passing. Last but not least, Augustine's apologetic concerns in direct dialogues with pagan philosophical traditions will be of interest in this chapter: what kind of tactical moves does Augustine employ when discussing *concupiscentia* in the context of theories of emotions.

In philosophical traditions preceding Augustine, the terms *cupiditas* and *libido* were used to signify irrational human desires as opposed to tranquil reasoning.<sup>6</sup> Along with *concupisco* and its derivatives, Augustine regularly also contrasted these terms with calm and controlled reasoning, and attached desire to the appetitive lower part of the soul, or sometimes even identified the part itself as *libido*. Already in his earliest works, Augustine opposes a lifestyle that follows *libidines* and *cupiditates* to a philosophical and rationally conditioned existence.<sup>7</sup> In general, Augustine's approach to *concupiscentia* as an emotion bears Platonist marks, but the elements and questions of Stoic tradition are equally familiar to him as well.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 2, pp. 23–28.

<sup>7</sup> Thus, in *Acad.* 1, 11, Licentius describes ideal living in the following way: *uiximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum uindicantes et a cupiditatum facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi, hoc est secundum diuinam illam partem animi uiuentes, quam beatam esse uitam hesterna inter nos definitione conuenit*. See also *Acad.* 1, 23. The return to the fatherland of the soul is a journey ending in a triumph over *libidines*, as is stated in *Acad.* 2, 22: *de uita nostra de moribus de animo res agitur, qui se superaturum inimicitias omnium fallaciarum et ueritate comprehensa quasi in regionem suae originis rediens triumphaturum de libidinibus atque ita temperantia uelut coniuge accepta regnaturum esse praesumit securior rediturus in caelum*.

<sup>8</sup> Augustine's familiarity with the traditional images of emotions and their control can be gleaned e.g. from *uera rel.* 83, where Augustine claims that the soul earned weakness to the body (*imbecillitas*) in Paradise by attaching itself to lower, bodily goods: the restoration process of the soul is pictured as a charioteer (*auriga*) gaining control and moderation again over his bolting horses. See *Plat. Phaedr.* 246a–256e; *Ambr. Isaac* 8, 65.

Augustine's subscription to the rational/irrational bipolarity of the soul, in which the emotions, and *concupiscentia*, originate from the lower part, makes him a standard Christian Platonist of Late Antiquity.<sup>9</sup> These later followers of the Platonic, or Neoplatonist, view normally emphasised the gap between the affective movements based on sense perceptions and between the intellectual, contemplative soul free of such emotions (for Augustine, however, the picture was not that tidy).<sup>10</sup> But the distinctively Stoic talk of the involuntary and preparatory stages of an emotion ('pre-passions'); the emotions as spatial changes of the soul; and the importance placed on rational consent as a sign of moral responsibility are also present in Augustine's

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<sup>9</sup> O'Daly 1987, 13. *Plat. Rep.* 439c–440b: "we'll call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures." *Plat. Tim.* 69a makes use of the eminent tripartite division: the ambitious part, that "exhibits manliness and spirit," restrains by force the "part consisting of appetites, should the latter at any time refuse outright to obey the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel." See also *Tim.* 70e–71e. For moral responsibility, cf. *Tim.* 86d. For Plato's own diverse positions and for an evaluation of the moral status of the emotions in Plato, see Dillon (1993, 188): "there is a good deal of semantic juggling involved in the controversy (is a properly moderated passion a passion at all, after all?), and Plato could be quoted on either side of it. In *Phaed.*, for instance, he would seem to be on the side of the extirpation of the passions, while in the *Republic*, the passionate part of the soul cannot be done away with, but only moderated by the reason and spirit, acting in unison. Platonists on the whole tended to side with Aristotle (though Antiochus of Ascalon seems to have adopted the Stoic ideal of apatheia, if we may judge from Cic. *Acad. Pr.* 135, and the Platonist fellow traveller, Philo, manages to combine the two ideals by relating them to different degrees of moral progress, cf. the contrast between Aaron and Moses, *Leg. All.* 3.129–132)." Knuuttila & Sihvola (1998, 1–5) also point to Plato's differing descriptions in the different dialogues.

<sup>10</sup> For Plotinus' view on emotions, see Emilsson 1998, 340, who forms the problem in brief: "First, if undergoing an emotion involves a change in the soul, it seems that its immortality is threatened [...] Secondly, the body is below the soul in Plotinus' hierarchy of things [...] Thus nothing below the soul should be able to affect the soul. The emotions, which typically appear to have their beginning in the body or in the sensible world and end in the soul, are an apparent violation of this law." For a Christian modification of the problem in Marius Victorinus, see Clark 1974, 159–160. Alcinous' *Handbook* (Dillon 1993) represents the later Platonic tradition, sharing the basic belief of the soul's division and showing a critical mind against the Stoic views ("neither judgments nor opinions, but rather motions of the irrational parts of the soul," *Alcin.* 32). Alcinous teaches moderation (*metriopatheia*) of the emotions (for the distinction "tame" and "wild," see Dillon 1993, 196–198). See also *Alcin.* 25, 7 (Dillon 1993, 34): "The souls of the gods too possess both a critical element, which might also be called cognitive, and further an appetitive element, which one might term also dispositional, and an appropriative element. These are to be found as faculties in human souls, but after embodiment the latter two suffer alteration, the appropriative faculty into the libidinous, and the appetitive into the spirited." For the distinctions of virtue according to the faculties of the soul in Middle Platonism, see *Alcin.* 29 (Dillon 1993, 38–39) with comments.

views on emotions in general, and in *concupiscentia* in particular.<sup>11</sup> In addition, Augustine frequently uses the Stoic tetrachord of generic emotions, or a variation of it, as representing the sphere of the basic movements of the soul.<sup>12</sup> Recent assessments of Augustine's thoughts of emotions as a whole have varied, depending on the viewpoint individual scholars have adopted on Augustine's philosophical affiliations.<sup>13</sup> Here I will briefly mention three significant evaluations.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> See O'Daly's (1987, 48) presentation of *Io. eu. tr.* 46, 8, on spatial qualifications (*contractio, diffusio, fuga, progressio*) of emotions as "figurative" states of the soul. On a larger scale, Sorabji 2000 emphasises the importance of the Stoic analysis for Augustine in discerning between pre-passions, or 'first movements,' and the emotions proper.

<sup>12</sup> *trin.* 6, 8; *ciu.* 14, 5; *Io. eu. tr.* 60, 3. By the Stoic tetrachord of emotions, the group of four basic emotions of fear, desire, joy and grief is meant, for which see SVF 3, 394 and Long & Sedley 1987, i, 419–423.

<sup>13</sup> There has been much ado about searching broad and implicit 'Stoic' and 'Platonic' motives in larger contexts of Augustine's thought. Sometimes these labels are used in very general meaning, without claims of historical dependencies. Consider Wetzel's (1992, 10) statement: "When I insist on Augustine's Platonism, I allude broadly to his philosophical orientation and not narrowly to his ties to the Neoplatonism of Porphyry and Plotinus." Wetzel (1992, 11) himself prefers Stoicism, with Neoplatonic influences, as the primary source for Augustine's ethics. Cf. Wetzel 1992, 56–57. See also O'Connell 1970, 49: "It should be borne in mind in this connection that Augustine could have found many Stoic themes already Platonized in Plotinus' *Enneads*. Indeed, the eclectic movements in ancient-world philosophy encouraged some of the Stoics to Platonize many of the insights of their school. This does not prevent one from making an educated guess as to a theme's original derivation from the Stoic heritage." For a critique of O'Connell's educated guesses, see again Wetzel 1992, 70–72.

<sup>14</sup> Apart from those works mentioned above, Augustine's philosophical heritage and his views on emotions has been studied from various angles. Wetzel (1992) charts, sometimes in rather speculative mode, Augustine's development in his views on the will, virtues and ends, but (as he himself readily admits) his account is not a historical description ("I found it impossible to maintain a sharp distinction between interpretation and reconstruction [...] I could not make sense of what Augustine said without sometimes having to consider what he was trying to say, what he might have said, or even on occasion what he ought to have said," pp. xi–xii). For an example of Wetzel's approach of "reconstruction" see e.g. his rephrasing of Augustine's defence against the Pelagians in *retr.* 1, 8 (Wetzel 1992, 122–123). Augustine's debt to Stoicism has been emphasised by e.g. Verbeke 1958, Spanneut 1975 (see also Spanneut 1994 on the ideal of *apatheia*), and especially Colish 1990, 142–238. In her account of Augustine and the passions (1990, 207–210, 221–225), she stresses, on one hand, the consistent way in which Augustine follows Stoic tradition in the matter (e.g. the passions are not derived from the body, p. 209), and on the other hand, Augustine's development in using parts of the Stoic ethical tradition (e.g. the ideal of *apatheia*, pp. 221–225). Augustine's views of emotions and consent in dreams, has been analysed by Matthews 1992, 90–106 and Haji 1999. Johannes Brachtendorf's (1997) article on Augustine's debt to Cicero's Tusculan disputations is useful and penetrating. Lössl (2002) compares Augustine's and Julian's views of emotions in general, and of pain (*dolor*) in particular. Cavadini (2005) discusses Augustine's descriptions of sexual

Gerard O'Daly views the matter as part of the problems concerning the relation of the body and soul.<sup>15</sup> In O'Daly's neutral and concise account, Augustine is depicted as being in a constant interaction with the Stoic and Platonist traditions. Though "syncretistic" (p. 48) this may be, O'Daly does not fail to bring to the fore many points in which Augustine deviates from the previous traditions and transforms classical material to new uses. Thus, O'Daly emphasises how Augustine shared the Platonist belief on the virtuous use of controlled emotions, and notes how special problems originating from the Platonist division of tripartite soul are present in Augustine, such as the problem of mortality vs. immortality of the irrational part.<sup>16</sup> However, Augustine distances himself from the Platonist identification of emotions as arising from the body.<sup>17</sup> Again, O'Daly notes how Augustine both adapts and rejects Stoic views: the notions of emotions as disturbances of exclusively human rationality and the spatial terminology of the emotions as soul's "positions" or "conditions" are of Stoic origin.<sup>18</sup> Although Augustine seems to subscribe to the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*, he criticizes its application to temporal life. According to Augustine, true *apatheia*, and thereby "transposed" *eupatheiai*, await Christians in heaven.<sup>19</sup> O'Daly comments mainly on Augustine's major discussion of emotions in *ciu.* 9 and 14.

Richard Sorabji has studied the impact of Stoic theory of emotions on Christian authors.<sup>20</sup> For Augustine's part, Sorabji concentrates on Books 9 and 14 of *de ciuitate dei*, but also includes a substantial discussion of Augustine's debate with Julian. In his book, Sorabji formulates a theory that Augustine did not have the means to discern between 'first movements' and emotions proper, like the Stoics (primarily Seneca) had done. Instead, Augustine muddled the distinction in *ciu.* 9 by way of a terminological vagueness.<sup>21</sup>

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intercourse before the Fall in a rather speculative tone (see e.g. his discussion of sexual intercourse without the "signifier" of lust, pp. 205–208).

<sup>15</sup> O'Daly 1987, 40–54.

<sup>16</sup> O'Daly 1987, 53–54.

<sup>17</sup> O'Daly 1987, 47. See also O'Daly 1986, 420, for Augustine's use of *appetitus* as corresponding rather to the Stoic notion of impulse than the Platonic appetitive element of the soul.

<sup>18</sup> O'Daly 1987, 47–48.

<sup>19</sup> O'Daly 1987, 51.

<sup>20</sup> Sorabji 2000, 343–417.

<sup>21</sup> Sorabji 2000, 384, 375, where he refers to his theory as "the history of a mistake": "In Gellius' report of Stoicism there is a change of one single letter of the alphabet. This change was enough to mislead Augustine, and so to play a role, if only small one, in shaping Western views on sexuality." The ambiguity, according to Sorabji, lies in the verb *pauescere* (p. 383), a word that no Stoic would have used for mere prepassion.

This mistake, so Sorabji, led Augustine to treat the slightest involuntary movements (the Stoic 'first movements' or *propassiones*) as being emotions proper.<sup>22</sup> For this reason, they cannot be eradicated, and what is recommended instead is moderation by rational will.<sup>23</sup> Sorabji notes that Augustine makes crucial reservations to this theory when it comes to sexual desire (*concupiscentia carnis*), which Augustine holds culpable despite its obvious involuntariness. Sorabji implicitly argues that Augustine's inability to understand the classical Stoic distinction between involuntary movements and voluntarily assented emotions produces an untenable and confused account on "lust."<sup>24</sup> In general, Sorabji tends to view Augustine as representing and adapting the Stoic positions of the emotions, although he points out the "distortions" described above.<sup>25</sup>

Simo Knuuttila's account of Augustine's theory of emotions concentrates on *conf.* and *ciu.*<sup>26</sup> Where O'Daly and Sorabji tended to emphasise Augustine's ties to the Stoic heritage,<sup>27</sup> Knuuttila stresses the overall Platonic understanding of the emotions in these passages and notes Augustine's critical opinions about the Stoic tradition.<sup>28</sup> Knuuttila offers useful comments on Augustine's various concepts of the will and on their relation to the emotions,<sup>29</sup> and is interested in the way Augustine follows the preceding tradition concerning fictitious emotions.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, Knuuttila disagrees with Sorabji's view of Augustine's disability to discern between the first movements and the voluntary assented emotions, by rightly suggesting that Augustine saw the first movements as well as all human emotional patterns "contaminated by original sin." The old Stoic analysis did not therefore work as such in the Christian and Augustinian version: the first allurements to sin are not distinct, previous states to the emotions, but initial emotions.<sup>31</sup> Due

<sup>22</sup> The alteration is also noted by Brachtendorf 1997, 298.

<sup>23</sup> Sorabji 2000, 380.

<sup>24</sup> Sorabji 2000, 380–381. Sorabji seems to be one of the few to note the exceptional character of *concupiscentia* in *ciu.* 14 as compared to the theory of emotions proposed in *ciu.* 9.

<sup>25</sup> Sorabji 2000, 375.

<sup>26</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 152–172.

<sup>27</sup> O'Daly's (1987, 49) characterization of the Augustinian interpretation of *ciu.* 9, 4 (about the Stoic sage on rough seas) could very well represent his general view on Augustine's exposition of the emotions: "Augustine makes this interpretation of Stoic doctrine, which [...] he understands to be in harmony with the Platonic and Aristotelian views, his own."

<sup>28</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 153, 156–157, 160.

<sup>29</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 159, 168–172.

<sup>30</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 164–166.

<sup>31</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 170–172.

to the Fall, “emotions have become relatively autonomous”: the strongest example of autonomy is sexual desire that occurs spontaneously not only in the mind but also affects involuntary movements in the body.<sup>32</sup>

### 5.1. EMOTIONS, *LIBIDO* AND ANTI-MANICHAEAN APOLOGY (388–396)

That many of the traditional attitudes and discourses connected with the emotions were relevant to Augustine already from the early stages of his literary career in his thinking about *concupiscentia*, or rather *cupiditas* and *libido* at this time, becomes evident by taking a look at some of his works that precede his seminal work, *ad Simplicianum*. These works introduce an Augustine who depicts (not with any innovative approach) the unreasonable and miserable life under the tyranny of desires and passions. He appropriates an old Christian tradition of reading the first chapters of Genesis as a psychological allegory. Moreover, Augustine sketches a persuasive analysis of how the manifestly lower level of bodily reality and bodily temptations are able to divert higher levels of the soul from the intellectual goods they should naturally (or *ordinate*) pursue. Finally, he shows his fellow Christians that to commit oneself to emotional states, and to lapse under a sustained rule of *cupiditates* lies in each one’s own power.

After composing his early dialogues on various philosophical questions, as a prolegomena to Christian faith, as it were, Augustine commenced to write his anti-Manichaean work on human free will.<sup>33</sup> While the later books concentrate on the punitive effects of the Fall, it is in *de libero arbitrio* 1 (388), in which Augustine depicts *libido* as the most serious opponent to reason and to the rational way of life. *Libido* is defined with Stoic undertones as a committed desire or love for things that one can lose “against one’s will” (*lib. arb.* 1, 10, *inuitus amittere*).<sup>34</sup> The goal of virtuous life is calm and detached use of these temporal goods. In the course of the argument in *lib. arb.* 1

<sup>32</sup> Knuuttila 2004, 157. See also p. 169, “concupiscence as the permanent inherited weakness we have for sinful things inclines us to evil desires.”

<sup>33</sup> The four dialogues, *Acad.*, *beata u.*, *ord.* and *sol.*, have usually been treated as representing a philosophical or even something of a pre-Christian stage in Augustine’s career. See, however, Carol Harrison’s (2006, 35–73) recent reclaim concerning their Catholic Christian character.

<sup>34</sup> The word *libido* is constantly translated as ‘passion’ in Robert Russell’s translation (FC 59) and as ‘passione’ in De Capitani 1987. For an analysis of lust and affections in *lib. arb.* 1, see Wetzel 1992, 62–68. Wetzel’s emphasis is on the temporality of the objects of desire: “Affections are the internal springs of sin when they move sinners to seek beatitude in the possession of external goods.” (p. 67).

(from *lib. arb.* 1, 18 on), Augustine describes a person who is living in perfect order. Such an order would result from reason, or the higher part of the soul, being in control of all actions. The *libidines* (now in the plural) would then appear as the irrational movements of the soul, but they could not form significant temporal attachments anymore.<sup>35</sup> Bodily pleasures are seen as an animal activity, and they create a serious disorder in the human soul. Moreover, desires that are distinctively limited to human experience, such as *amor laudis* or *adfectatio dominandi* (*lib. arb.* 1, 18), and which also strive for temporal goods, are to Augustine “irrational.” If these desires (*appetitus*) cannot be subjected to reason, they will take control of man’s higher part, and will eventually result in an unhappy life.<sup>36</sup>

This sketch of the human soul and the dangers facing it from its inward movements takes for granted that the soul, consisting of rational and irrational components, is able to function in an orderly manner if it lives in accordance with the “eternal law,” which prescribes that reason should have control over all human appetites and *libidines*. In the wise man’s (*sapiens*) ideal state of the soul, the inferior movements always comply with the superior domination of reason.<sup>37</sup>

After these statements about the ideal state of the human soul and its rational order, Augustine moves on to present his actual (anti-Manichaeic) agenda in *lib. arb.*, and to show how there is no other source for a disordered and sinful life than the free will of each human being. To show this, Augustine attempts to affect his readers with a presentation of the soul’s lamentable state if it, of its own free choice, would enter in the company of desire and become its follower (*cupiditatis comes*). Augustine is insistent upon his claim that such a companionship only results from the mind’s own choice: no other exterior or interior force can move or persuade the higher part of the soul, which by definition has higher value and strength due to the right and just order of things.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 18 *si dominetur atque imperet ceteris, quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse hominem ordinatissimum.*

<sup>36</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 18 *nam et iste adpetitus, cum rationi subditus non est, miseros facit. [...] hisce igitur animae motibus cum ratio dominatur, ordinatus homo dicendus est. non enim ordo rectus aut ordo appellandus omnino est, ubi deterioribus meliora subiiciuntur. [...] ratio ista ergo uel mens uel spiritus cum irracionales animi motus regit, id scilicet dominatur in homine, cui dominatio lege debetur ea, quam aeternam esse comperimus.* For the Stoic notion of *aeterna lex*, see De Capitani 1987, 198.

<sup>37</sup> As De Capitani (1987, 478) notes, Augustine does not here support the Stoic ideal of the complete eradication of the irrational movements.

<sup>38</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 21. The underlying question of how a lower entity can affect a higher one is of Plotinian origin. There is a gap between *mens* and *anima* and their respective activities



Augustine's description of the rational mind living in and under the company of *libido* is intentionally colourful. This state of affairs is seen as a tyrannical "rule of the *libido*," and it leads to a variety of sufferings and dire consequences. If *libido* or *cupiditates* are allowed to control reason, one may bid farewell to both moral and intellectual progress. The rule of *libido* brings with it a sustained existence in various, contradicting emotions.<sup>39</sup>

Well, then, are we to take lightly a punishment entailing such consequences as these, where passion lords it over the mind (*libido dominatur*), dragging it about, poor and needy, in different directions, stripped of its wealth of virtue, now mistaking the false for the true, even defending something vigorously at one time only to reject at another what it had previously demonstrated, while all the while it rushes headlong into other false judgments; now withholding all assent, while fearful for the most part of the clearest demonstrations; now in despair of the whole business of finding the truth while it clings tenaciously to the darkness of its folly; now at pains to see the light and understand, and again falling back out of weariness to the darkness? And all the while, the cruel tyranny of evil desire (*cupiditatum regnum tyrannice saeuat*) holds sway, disrupting (*tempestatibus perturbet*) the entire soul and life of man by various and conflicting surges of passion; here by fear (*timore*), there by desire (*desiderio*); here by anxiety (*anxietate*), there by empty and spurious delights (*laetitia*); here by torment over the loss of a loved object, there by a burning desire to acquire something not possessed; here by pain for an injury received, there by the urge to revenge an injury. On every possible side, the mind is shriveled up by greed, wasted away by sensuality, a slave to ambition, is inflated by pride, tortured by envy, deadened by sloth, kept in turmoil by obstinacy, and distressed by its condition of subjection. And so with other countless impulses that surround and plague the rule of passion (*regnum libidinis*).<sup>40</sup>

[transl. Russell]

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that seems wide enough to have resulted in such a problem. See Emilsson 1998, 340. Note also that in *ord.* 2, 2, 6–7, Licentius had asserted that for the wise man, memory and sense perceptions belong to the lower part of the soul.

<sup>39</sup> Augustine also thinks that such a state is a veritable "punishment" (*poena*). See Chapter 3.

<sup>40</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 22 *quid ergo? num ista poena parua existimanda est quod ei libido dominatur expoliataque uirtutis opulentia per diuersa inopem atque indigentem trahit, nunc falsa pro ueris adprobantem, nunc etiam defensitantem, nunc improbantem quae antea probauisset et nihilominus in alia falsa inruentem, nunc adsensionem, suspendentem suam et plerumque perspicuas ratiocinationes formidantem, nunc desperantem de tota inuentione ueritatis et stultitiae tenebris penitus inherentem, nunc conantem in lucem intellegendi rursusque fatigatione decidentem; cum interea cupiditatum illud regnum tyrannice saeuat et uariis contrariisque tempestatibus totum hominis animum uitamque perturbet, hinc timore inde desiderio, hinc anxietate inde inani falsaque laetitia, hinc cruciatu rei ammissae quae diligebatur inde ardore adipiscendae quae non habebatur, hinc acceptae iniuriae doloribus, inde facibus uindicandae; quaquauersum potest coartare auaritia, dissipare luxuria, addicere ambitio, inflare superbia,*

Thus, a general commitment to serve *libido* results in various disturbed emotions (e.g. *timor*, *desiderium*, *anxietas*, *laetitia*). This happens if the rational soul has voluntarily thrown itself down from the “citadel of virtue” and submitted itself under the rule of the *libido*.<sup>41</sup>

The terms, images and the commonplace architecture of the soul in Augustine’s *lib. arb.* 1 are recognizable enough. They are tools, or bricks, borrowed from the distinct traditional discussions on emotions, both from the Platonic and Stoic sources. But Augustine is not here interested in giving his audience any coherent theory of the emergence, structure or technical therapy of desire or any other emotion for that matter, nor does he wish to outline any constructive role for the emotions to contribute to the life of a wise man. Instead, a somewhat crude opposition of the virtuous and vicious ways of life and their origins in the choice of human free will is what Augustine attempts to achieve here, in order to emphasise that each of us is, or at least should be, able to resort to one’s own will in starting to live a virtuous life.<sup>42</sup> The function of this startling account of emotions (at first sight, at least) is clearly to underline the primacy of the simple task of getting one’s will to love God, and His eternal goods: in the opposite case, as we are told, the tyranny of evil desire will torment us in innumerable ways.<sup>43</sup> The overtly negative tone in which Augustine here describes emotions is not a reflected philosophical position, despite Augustine’s familiarity with the terminology: it is, rather, an educated rhetorical tool in the service of distinctively Christian goals.<sup>44</sup>

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*torquere inuidia, desidia sepelire, peruicacia concitare, adflictare subiectio et quaecumque alia innumerabilia regnum illius libidinis frequentant et exercent?* De Capitani (197, 479) suggests that part of the description has autobiographical undertones. See also O’Donnell 1992, I, xlvihi.

<sup>41</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 20 *ex arce deicere et libidini subiugare*. The Stoic tetrachord is likewise present in an obvious way. Evodius agrees that the state described above by Augustine would be a “just punishment” for such a crime, but he is not yet intellectually convinced of the existence of the ideal state of the soul that Augustine has here assumed (*lib. arb.* 1, 23).

<sup>42</sup> *lib. arb.* 1, 29. See Wetzel’s remarks in this respect (1992, 76): “The affections [...] become the mind’s irrational motions, subject to the dictatorial authority of wisdom. These affections have no power to disrupt beatitude, because they have no right or authority to do so.”

<sup>43</sup> When this task is fulfilled, the temporal goods appear as *adiafora* (*lib. arb.* 1, 33).

<sup>44</sup> For our present purposes, it does not matter much whether Augustine here believed in his rather “optimistic” image of the powers of human will as depicted in *lib. arb.* 1, or whether the first book is only an intentionally simplistic prelude for the more “pessimistic” books that follow. For a reading that stresses the continuity of *lib. arb.* 1–3, see Harrison C. 2006, 222–224 (p. 223, “Augustine [...] leads his pupil [...] from the simple to the complex, the plain to the profound, the straightforward to the difficult”).

Another account of desire situated in traditional Christian imagery that was seen to be suitable to analyse human psychology and emotions can be found in Augustine's earliest commentary on the first chapters of Genesis, *de Genesi aduersus Manichaeos* (389), written only shortly after *lib. arb.* 1.

According to Augustine, the divine mandate to humans to have command over all other creatures is due to the fact that man was created in God's image. This notion elicits an anti-Manichaean argument, which unfolds in two phases: first, Augustine declares that *imago dei* cannot be found in the human bodily constitution but rather in reason or intellect, that is, according to the "interior man." It is exactly due to this quality that humanity is still able to have dominion over animals. The second point is that Augustine proceeds in his "spiritual reading" by transferring the self-evident fact of humans being more reasonable than animals into a statement on human psychology. In *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 20, 31, Augustine interprets the animals of Paradise to mean the lower bestial movements of the soul. So as the beasts in Paradise were given under human dominance, so these movements must be controlled by reason and power of virtue. This means that the movements of the soul (*motus*) must be dominated by temperance and modesty, for if the opposite occurs they will gradually change into shameful habits (*consuetudines*).<sup>45</sup> Against his Manichaean past, Augustine now claims that these *motus* are anything but "alien to our soul" (*non enim alieni a nobis sunt motus animi nostri*).<sup>46</sup> Taking this step, Augustine has not only saved *Gen.* 1, 27–28 from a naively realistic Manichaean critique but has also moved himself into a position where he can give a more credible account of those movements, which the Manichaean anthropology labelled as the work of *gens tenebrarum*. These movements are a natural and inherent part of the soul, even though they can be said to be low and susceptible to cause some bad changes.

It therefore seems for a moment that Augustine wishes to impart a constructive role to the emotions; he even states that if (or when) these movements are directed and submitted to "reason and truth," they could be

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<sup>45</sup> Note how Augustine takes these "movements" to be temporal changes: the soul (here *anima*) is mutable *temporaliter* because of its passions (*adfectiones*), even though it is not mutable spatially (*localiter*) like the body. See also *uera rel.* 18. For Augustine's figurative use of Stoic spatial qualifications of emotions, see O'Daly 1987.

<sup>46</sup> See also *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 11, 16 where Augustine emphasises—again contrary to his previous Manichaean views—the importance of a correct view on the two created parts of the soul: *<conside>ratio [...] illa est difficilis, qua intellegit in seipso aliud esse rationale quod regit, aliud animale quod regitur.*

called “holy, pure and good joys and desires (*amores*).” However, this line of thought is not extended any further, for Augustine then hastens to expound on the opposite way of handling these lower movements: if one neglects their control, they will lead to a “most miserable life.” Such movements deserve the infamous names of *perturbationes* or *libidines* or *concupiscentiae malae*.<sup>47</sup> With these rather simple moves, which from the viewpoint of the philosophical traditions of emotions do not offer anything revolutionary, Augustine renounces his former Manichaean views of human psychology with devastating blows: his former idea of the structure of the soul was erroneous, and is now replaced with a standard Platonic version, seasoned with a Christian emphasis on the original created goodness of both parts of the soul. Moreover, he is able to relocate the concept of *concupiscentia*, which the Manichaeans held in disgust, to be a mere intemperate movement, or a passion of the soul. This terminology is similar to *lib. arb.* 1, where all such movements were already labelled by the term *libido*.<sup>48</sup>

The biblical source text of Gen 1, 27–28 therefore gave Augustine a starting point from where he could expound his anti-Manichaean psychology of emotions and *concupiscentia*. The choice of these particular verses to be read in a “spiritual” way, that is, explaining allegorically certain facts of human psychology, was not Augustine’s own, but was backed by a venerable Christian tradition.<sup>49</sup> Nonetheless, it is not until *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, when

<sup>47</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 20, 31 *haec est hominis uita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius rationi ueritatique consentiunt, et uocantur gaudia et amores sancti et casti et boni. si autem non consentiunt, dum neglegenter reguntur, conscindunt et dissipant animum et faciunt uitam miserrimam, et uocantur perturbationes et libidines et concupiscentiae malae. de quibus nobis iam praecipitur, ut eas cum quanto possumus labore crucifigamus in nobis, donec absorbeatur mors in uictoriam. dicit enim apostolus “qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus et concupiscentiis”.* The “therapy” of emotions is thus likened in Paul’s simile to crucifixion. Gal 5, 24 remains part of Augustine’s scriptural palette in discussing *concupiscentia* and its treatment, see e.g. *exp. prop. Rm.* 26; *en. Ps.* 25, 6; *c. Adim.* 21; *Io. eu. tr.* 118, 5; *ench.* 14. Some manuscripts read the following: *carnem suam crucifixerunt cum perturbationibus et concupiscentiis*.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Lee 1996, 128, 133–134, who seems to think that by using (in a very narrow and fixed meaning) the word *libido*, Augustine automatically reproduces a merely sexual, Manichaean view of *concupiscentia*. For a critique of Lee’s claims, see Verschoren 2002, 230–240.

<sup>49</sup> See Cox 1982, 124–131, for Origen’s bestial imagery concerning Gen 1, 28. In general, the Christian psychological readings of Genesis 1–3 were deeply influenced by the accounts of Philo of Alexandria. See, for example, *Phil. all.* 3, 107–160, where the serpent is seen as representing sensual pleasures (ἡδονή). See also *Phil. all.* 2, 71–108. In Philo’s view, God laid curse on pleasure, which is the worst of all passions (τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν χεῖρων), because it is “like a kind of starting-point and foundation” for all passions. Thus desire (ἐπιθυμία), for example, “comes into play through love of pleasure” (ἡ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία γέγρονε δι’ ἐρωτος ἡδονῆς). In *quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin* 31–48, the serpent represents both pleasure

Augustine reaches the figures of Adam and Eve, that the commonplace themes of the classical traditions of emotions and the traditional Christian exegesis are combined in Augustine's concentrated effort to answer and to refute the Manichaean views of the emergence and quality of sin.<sup>50</sup>

Augustine's psychological reading of Adam and Eve (*Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 11, 15–13, 18) starts with an assertion of the need for a correct understanding of the soul's structure—an understanding that can only be achieved by figurative reading, and by turning inwards from the bodily world to intellectual vision. This apparently is exactly what is missing in the Manichaean critique of the Genesis narratives. The tale of the creation of two different sexes has a deeper secret to conceal. The creation of Eve in the Genesis narrative is not told “without a cause.”<sup>51</sup> In presenting God as making Adam fall asleep, in order to create Eve from his rib, Augustine also invites his readers to “fall asleep” (*quasi obdormiscere*) and to turn from the coarse, physical world to the higher realm of intellectual truths, conveyed by the figurative language of the Scripture.

The creative act of God, that is, the appearance of Eve from Adam's inward turn, is something that the former Manichaean Augustine here considers to be a new understanding of the soul's structure, as something more profound than merely knowing about man's position in the realm of nature (*illa est difficilis [sc. ratio], qua intellegit in seipso aliud esse rationale quod regit, aliud animale quod regitur*).<sup>52</sup>

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(*QG* 1, 31) and desire. “For the serpent is a symbol of desire, as was shown; and woman is a symbol of sense, and man of mind. So that desire becomes the evil origin of sins, and this first deceives sense, while sense takes the mind captive” (*QG* 1, 47 [transl. Marcus]). Philo enjoyed certain respect in the eyes of both Greek and Latin Christian exegetes, such as Origen and Ambrose. See e.g. Ambr. *parad.* 2, 11. For an overview of Philonic reception in Augustine, see Runia 1993, 320–330; for the role of Philo in Stoic tradition, see Graver 1999; 2007, 88, 102–105.

<sup>50</sup> A bipartite structure of the soul as represented by the two sexes appears in the final sections of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1. Augustine here meditates the seven ages of the world, and considers how they can be applied to the soul's ascent to God. The sixth age (or the age of the Church) becomes manifest through Christians who have control over their own movements or affections. For these people, the lower part of the soul serves reason, not sin (*temeritati atque peccato*). As a result of such domination over the emotive part of the soul, God's image in human beings will become restored. As a man should rule upon his wife, so should intellectual contemplation have preference over outward action (*masculus-femina; intellectus-actio*). See also *c. Faust.* 22, 27.

<sup>51</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 12, 17 *non utique sine causa ita facta est, nisi ut aliquod secretum intimaret*. Thus, the creation narrative is “a myth with a meaning” (Pagels 1988a, 63–64).

<sup>52</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 12, 16 *ut enim hoc uideatur, non est opus oculis istis corporeis, sed quanto quisque ab istis uisibilibus rebus in interiora intellegentiae secesserit (hoc est autem quasi obdormiscere), tanto melius et sincerius illud uidet. Ipsa enim cognitio, qua intellegitur in nobis aliud esse quod ratione dominetur, aliud quod rationi obtemperet*.

This new *cognitio* also leads to a new understanding of the place and quality of *concupiscentia*. One has to have control over the sensual part of the soul, so that the concupiscence of the flesh does not resist reason, but obeys the higher part, and “ceases to be fleshly.”<sup>53</sup>

Overall, Augustine’s presentation moves along traditional lines if it is considered from the viewpoint of classical philosophical psychology and Christian exegesis:

The woman was made as an illustration of this, for the order of things makes her subject to man. Thus we can also come to see in one human what we can see more clearly in two humans, that is, in the male and the female. The interior mind, like virile reason, should hold subject the soul’s appetite by means of which we control the members of the body, and by just law it should place a limit upon its helper, just as man ought to rule woman and ought not to allow her to rule him.<sup>54</sup> [transl. Teske]

The evident sexual difference of the first human beings refers to a division in the soul between *appetitus animae*, which operates the bodily functions,

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<sup>53</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 12, 16 *deinde, ut quisque huic suae parti recte dominetur, et fiat quasi coniugalit in seipso, ut caro non concupiscat aduersus spiritum, sed spiritui subiugetur, id est concupiscentia carnalis non aduersetur rationi, sed potius obtemperando desinat esse carnalis, opus habet perfecta sapientia.* For a “change” in the lower part of the soul, see also *uera rel.* 78, where Augustine attaches *concupiscentia* to the lower part of the soul. One has to subjugate “this woman” into one’s service, and then it no longer can be called *cupiditas* but *temperantia*. The correct order between appetite (*cupiditas, libido*)—reason (*mens, ratio*)—Christ becomes realised only if one follows “Christ, our head.” Augustine is sometimes, though not often, in the habit of identifying the lower part with its movements, the affective part thus called e.g. *concupiscentia*. See e.g. *op. mon.* 40 *illam quippe significant partem eo ipso, quo mulieres sunt, quae concupiscentialis dici potest, cui mens dominatur, etiam ipsa subdita deo suo, quando rectissime et ordinatissime uiuitur. quod ergo est in uno homine mens et concupiscentia—illa regit, haec regitur; illa dominatur, haec subditur—hoc in duobus hominibus, uiro et muliere, secundum sexum corporis figuratur.*

<sup>54</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 11, 15 *ad huius rei exemplum femina facta est, quam rerum ordo subiugat uiro, ut, quod in duobus hominibus euidentius apparet, id est in masculo et femina, etiam in uno homine considerari possit: ut appetitum animae, per quem de membris corporis operamur, habeat mens interior tamquam uirilis ratio subiugatum et iusta lege modum imponat adiutorio suo, sicut debet uir feminam regere nec eam permittere dominari in uirum.* For Augustine’s figurative readings of sexes, see both O’Meara 1980 and Pagels 1988a, 64–65; 1988b. See also *conf.* 13, 32–34. The metaphor reappears on a large scale in *trin.* See van Bavel 1989; Soenneken 1989. Psychological insights based on sexual division go back to Plat. *Tim.* 69e: “And since one part of the mortal soul was naturally superior to the other, they built the hollow of the trunk in sections, dividing them the way that women’s quarters are divided from men’s.” In the tripartite division the ambitious part, that “exhibits manliness and spirit” restrains by force the “part consisting of appetites, should the latter at any time to refuse outright to obey the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel.” Cf. also Dillon 1993, 26 [*Alcin.* 16, 2]: “others who had been overcome by injustice would come on their second birth to the life of a woman.”

and *mens interior* or *ratio*, which contemplates the eternal “perfect wisdom.” In the ideal state, the soul functions in a harmonious unity. In other words, the higher masculine intellect (*mens interior*) rules over the lower feminine part of the soul, which in turn works as an instrument for controlling the body.<sup>55</sup>

If the lower part of the soul would obey (*obtemperare*) reason, no sin would occur. Contrariwise, if the lower element would come to control the higher, “the household,” or the soul as a whole, would “turn into perversity and misery.” As it is, the lower, or “feminine,” part of the soul is the part dealing with the sensory world through the body. Hence, it is the only avenue by which sin is able to enter the rational soul.<sup>56</sup> While Augustine does not seem here to have any major difficulties in assuming that the sensory world and bodily affects may cause a change to the worse even in the higher part of the soul, the elaborated gradual mechanism of the soul’s fall may reflect something of the old Neoplatonic difficulty to understand why the intellectual soul, participating in eternal wisdom, ever fell to the lower realms in the first place.<sup>57</sup> However, it is safe to assume that Augustine’s interest in commonplace Platonist psychology and his insistence in *Gn. adu. Man.* to label *libido*, or *cupiditas*, as indigenous to the lower parts of the soul, is dictated by his need to refute the Manichaeon model of the emergence of evil actions and the account for their causes, and to reformulate the concept of concupiscence to fit his new understanding (*ratio*, or *cognitio* concerning the structure of the soul) in Platonist Christian psychology. “Our desires” have therefore been deprived of their Manichaeon, substantial status, and they are also said to have a chance of undergoing a process through which

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<sup>55</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 11, 15 *uirilis ratio subiugaret sibi animalem partem suam, per quod adiutorium imperat corpori [...] ut appetitum animae, per quem de membris corporis operamur, habeat mens interior tamquam uirilis ratio subiugatum.* Cf. 2, 13, 18 where *pars inferior* practises *fortitudo* and *temperantia* and 2, 26, 40, where both parts are said to be created by God. In *Gn. adu. Man.*, Augustine uses words such as *obtemperare*, *dominare*, *subiugare* and *praeesse* in the context of an orderly operating soul. Everything in a human being occurs *ordinatissime*, in a sequence that follows the forms of rationality. The weight of the argumentation lies in present ‘psychological’ presuppositions. So if we understand how and in what order a soul should properly function, we can also understand why Christ or God’s wisdom is of a higher order than human intellect. For rationality in God’s universe and its Stoic affinities, see Colish 1990, 156–159.

<sup>56</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 14, 20 *non enim etiam ratio nostra deduci ad consensionem peccati potest, nisi cum delectatio mota fuerit in illa parte animi, quae debet obtemperare rationi tamquam rectori uiro.*

<sup>57</sup> For the impassibility of the rational soul in Plotinus, see Emilsson 1998. For the problem of the soul’s impassibility and emotions, see Knuuttila 2004, 98–101.

they cease to be “carnal.” They are inordinate movements only in the sense that they do not always obey rational control, but not in the sense that they would be a compulsive essence, alien to the human soul.<sup>58</sup> So Augustine builds on the biblical source text, and its three protagonists (the serpent, Eve, Adam), with the elements provided by the Platonist psychology, and presents his gradually proceeding heuristic model of how a consented evil action comes forth, and what is the actual place of *cupiditas*, or *libido*, in this narrative.<sup>59</sup> The function of evil desire in an emotional context is thus revealed to be a concept that serves the purposes of theological apology. The model is constructed as follows:

1. First comes the serpent’s *suggestio* through the five bodily senses, or the bad *cogitatio*.
2. It is followed by the response of the lower part of the soul (*cupiditas*).
  - a. If *cupiditas nostra* is not “moved” (*mouebitur*), no sin results.
  - b. If *cupiditas* “moves,” it then proceeds to the next phase.
3. Finally, the response of reason (*ratio*) is given.
  - a. If reason checks and reins *cupiditas*, some struggle is felt, but no sin results.
  - b. If reason consents (*consentiat*) and decides to do according to the *libido* of the lower part, sin is resulted, with the consequence that the soul is expelled from happy life.

In agreement with the traditional views of emotions, one has to be held morally responsible (*iam enim peccatum imputatur*) only if an assent is

<sup>58</sup> There is a strong polemical undertone also in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 17, 25, where Augustine explains how Adam and Eve reacted to their shared guilt. Augustine indicates that such is the mechanism of sin even in present times: in their pride, people are prone to accuse God for their own assents to sin. This, of course, is what the Manichaeans do in asserting the foreign nature of lower movements.

<sup>59</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 14, 21 *etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur, cum ad peccatum quisque delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus, serpente, muliere, et uiro. nam primo fit suggestio siue per cogitationem, siue per sensus corporis, uel uidendo, uel tangendo, uel audiendo, uel gustando, uel olfaciendo: quae suggestio cum facta fuerit, si cupiditas nostra non mouebitur ad peccandum, excludetur serpentis astutia; si autem mota fuerit, quasi mulieri iam persuasum erit. sed aliquando ratio uiriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit. quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum, sed cum aliquanta luctatione coronamur. si autem ratio consentiat, et quod libido commouerit, faciendum esse decernat, ab omni uita beata tamquam de paradiso expellitur homo. Iam enim peccatum imputatur, etiamsi non subsequatur factum; quoniam rea tenetur in consensione conscientia.* As pointed out in Dorothea Weber’s edition to *Gn. adu. Man.*, Gregory the Great was influenced by the division of phases (Greg. *moral.* 4, 27 *suggestio, delectatio, consensus, defensionis audacia* = Aug. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 14, 21).



given to the movement that arose from the lower part (*rea tenetur in consensione conscientia*).<sup>60</sup>

The question of the habituation of the emotions surfaces in Augustine's discussion on the punishment of Eve. The affective part of the soul (Eve) will suffer from "birth pangs" when it starts the habituation to obey the demands of the rational mind, instead of "fleshly joys." The conflict that arises from one being captive to the old, bad habits on some occasions, and one wishing to overcome these habits on other occasions, leads to a state of "difficulty and pain." This is when the new *consuetudo* of the control of reason over affects is being born. Trained (*erudita*) by these pains, the lower part of the soul thereby becomes obedient to the dominion of *ratio*. In this way, through the lens of figurative reading, the curse (*quae uidentur maledicta*) that Eve receives from God is more like a precept—but only "if we do not read spiritual things in a carnal way."<sup>61</sup>

Thus far, Augustine's apologetic bias in interpreting the Genesis accounts of human creation by the traditional, commonplace theories of the emotions has been somewhat modest and remained implicit.<sup>62</sup> However, after providing a psychological account of the creation of the soul, with which he has intended to instruct his Catholic Christian audience, Augustine adopts an openly polemical stance by attempting to purport that the Genesis accounts also contain a prophecy of things to come.<sup>63</sup> According to this

<sup>60</sup> Evil suggestion may be resisted in the earlier phase as well. *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 18, 28 ut *eum* [sc. the suggestion of the Devil] *in ipso initio malae suasionis excludat*.

<sup>61</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 19, 29 *cautius iam et diligentius rationi obtemperat tamquam uiro et ipsi quasi erudita doloribus conuertitur ad rationem et libenter seruit iubenti, ne iterum in aliquam perniciosam consuetudinem defluat*. See also *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 21, 31, for Eve's name as *uita*: when the affective part of the soul obeys reason, it will be called "life," and when it resists bad habits and begets a new habit for doing what is right, it will also become a "mother of all living." For *consuetudo*, see Zumkeller 1986b.

<sup>62</sup> I use the term 'apology' in a wider sense to cover not only the direct and hostile attacks against a competing system of thought, but also the discussions that can be defined as 'protreptic,' which address an audience that the writer wishes to convert with e.g. using the terminology of the competing party, and giving it new meanings. Thus, an 'apologetical bias' or 'apology' is present in Augustine's text when he is treating subjects that he knew were controversial from the Manichaean viewpoint, and for which he is wishing to win converts to the Catholic faith. For definitions and useful discussion on apology, protreptic, paraenetic and communication, see now Kotzé 2004, 59; 2011.

<sup>63</sup> The instructive function of Genesis accounts is emphasised with such asides as *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 14, 21 *etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur, cum ad peccatum quisque delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis*, or 2, 15, 22 *pertinet enim maxime ad nostram salutem: nam ideo haec scripta sunt ut iam talia caueamus*. From the viewpoint of the instructive function of *Gn. adu. Man.*, the accounts of *cupiditas/libido/carnalis concupiscentia* work as

prophetic reading, Augustine claims, it is easy to cast the three main roles of the Genesis narrative. While the figures of Adam and Eve may have multiple meanings (Adam may signify either Christ or a Christian), it is perfectly clear for whom the serpent stands: *haereticorum uenena significat, et maxime istorum Manichaeorum, et quicumque ueteri testamento aduersantur*.<sup>64</sup> With this line of thought, Augustine proceeds in giving a present-day, anti-Manichaean explanation for the various details in the Genesis account. Occasionally, the explanation seems to be even satirically propagandistic, as when Augustine claims that the Manichaean teachings are designed to “seduce us through our carnal concupiscence.”<sup>65</sup>

Augustine had applied the philosophical commonplace views concerning the soul’s parts and emotions to the Genesis narratives with apologetical intentions and as subsidiary instruments. This becomes explicit in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 26, 40. The ways of the serpent and the ways of Eve as well as their respective offspring (i.e. Manichaeans and Catholic Christians) are opposed to each other. Augustine connects his previous explanations of the parts of the soul and the habituation of the affects of the sensual part, or *pars animalis*, to an openly hostile stance against the Manichaean psychology and understanding of the emotions in general, and of *concupiscentia* in particular. All parts of the soul are God’s design, even the affective part, albeit for the need to habituate it under rational moderation:

There will, however, be enmities between it [the serpent] and the woman, and between its seed and the woman’s if she bears children with pain and turns to her husband so that he may rule over her. For then one can know that one part of us does not belong to God as its author and another to the nation of darkness, as these men say. Rather the part that has the power of ruling in man and that lower part that should be ruled are both from God.<sup>66</sup>

[transl. Teske]

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psychological mirrors and are therefore naturally placed in a context that the traditional theories of emotions had usually addressed. These narrations offer a certain explanation of how morally responsible evil actions and bad habits evolve to touch even the higher, intellectual part of the soul. This seems also to be the reason for the surprisingly flexible way in which Augustine treats the Genesis accounts simultaneously as historical events and psychological truths, i.e. he has no urgent need to draw a tight distinction between Eve before her Fall and our present emotional part of the soul after the historical Fall. The entire process of the Fall in Paradise in *Gn. adu. Man.* mainly represents our misguided emotional responses.

<sup>64</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 25, 38.

<sup>65</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 26, 39. See also 2, 27, 41, where the Manichaeans are identified with the personification of Stupidity in Prov 9, 13–18 (*sub mulieris imagine*).

<sup>66</sup> *Gn. adu. Man.* 2, 26, 40 *erunt autem inimicitiae inter istum et mulierem, et inter semen*

Only a few years later after *Gn. adu. Man.*, Augustine returns to his figurative reading of Genesis, again combined with an analysis of the progress of a temptation. While the analysis in *de sermone Domini in monte* (394), shares most of the elements with *Gn. adu. Man.*, there is an interesting clarifying addition as well. When Augustine's account of the Sermon of the Mount reaches Jesus' teaching on lust and adultery (Mt 5, 27), he reproduces the three-stage progress of the temptation of *Gn. adu. Man.*<sup>67</sup> First, the serpent persuades Eve, i.e. the lower part of the soul receives suggestions or persuasions from the sense perceptions or memories. This may then lead the lower part of the soul to feel pleasure, or *delectatio* (Augustine's example is here taken from fasting, *cum ieiuamus et uisis cibis palati appetitus adsurgit, non fit nisi delectatione*). Augustine here underscores the outward character of the sense perceptions; pleasure is only possible if these bodily sensations are, as it were, transported into the soul (*si qua talia fantasmata intus uersantur in anima de corpore forinsecus tracta sunt*). However, a sin in the proper sense only occurs if the lower part is able to receive reason's (*ratio*) consent for the pleasure felt in the lower part. Rational consent is therefore once again brought to the fore to determine moral responsibility.<sup>68</sup> Augustine had started his analysis by asserting that one has to distinguish the proper consent to one's *libido* from a mere preceding "tickling" (*titillatio*) of the flesh. The preparatory stage of an emotion is thus separated from the emotion proper (*s. dom. m. 1, 12, 33*).<sup>69</sup> Reason, in turn, should be submissive

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*eius, et semen mulieris, si pariat ista filios quamuis cum doloribus, et se ad uirum suum conuertat, ut eius ipse dominetur. Tunc enim potest cognosci non aliam partem in nobis pertinere ad auctorem Deum, et aliam ad gentem tenebrarum, sicut isti dicunt; sed potius et illud quod regendi habet potestatem in homine, et illud inferius quod regendum est, ex Deo esse [...].*

<sup>67</sup> *s. dom. m. 1, 12, 34–36.*

<sup>68</sup> There is a parallel discussion on rape in *mend. 40*, where Augustine discusses the effects of sexual coercion in the rape victim: *agendum quibus possumus uiribus, et pia supplicatione, ut cum uiolanda appetitur pudicitia corporis nostri, nec ipse animae sensus extremus, qui carne implicatus est, aliqua delectatione tangatur; si autem hoc non potest, uel mentis in non consentiendo castitas conseruetur*. In cases when the lower, sensual parts of the soul cannot totally resist the feeling of some kind of pleasure in coerced intercourse, we have to preserve the integrity of the highest part, for it is by that part the human integrity as a whole is vouchsafed. See the "natural separation" of the affective and rational parts of the soul in Dillon 1993, 31–32, 149 [*Alcin.* 24, 1].

<sup>69</sup> The position of reason against the lower emotional movements becomes clear in other parts of *s. dom. m.*, as well. Thus, for example, peacemakers (Mt 5, 9) are people who subdue all the soul's movements under reason. Once fleshly desires (*concupiscentiae*) are thus reined, these people will become God's kingdom. *s. dom. m. 1, 2, 9 omnes animi sui motus componentes et subicientes rationi, id est menti et spiritui, carnalesque concupiscentias habentes edomitae fiunt regnum dei.*

to a higher power, that is, to the embodied Truth in Christ (*mens et ratio, subiciatur potiori, quod est ipsa ueritas*).

Nonetheless, this already familiar analysis is added to a more precise view of how sin gradually takes hold of a person and becomes a habit (*consuetudo*). While in *Gn. adu. Man.* Augustine was satisfied with opposing the good habits and the bad habits with each other, and underscored the pain emerging from the gradual disavowal of the latter, he now makes a clearer point of the emergence of the *consuetudo* and its continuity with the three-stage process of the emotions. The process during which an evil habit is born is symmetrical to that of the inner movements in the soul. An evil habit is thereby formed with a repeated sequence of consented temptations, which are then made visible in outward actions, and again, if the actions are repeated long enough, the sequence becomes fossilised as a habit. Augustine compares this process to the circumstances surrounding death and funerals. First, sin is committed by the consent of the reason (or, as in Augustine's inward/outward metaphor of a funeral procession, the sin is still "lying inside the house"), not producing any external action. Second, a secret consent may erupt into a sinful act (as in "being carried out of the door"). Finally, the repeated process of actions leads to an addictive habit (*consuetudo*), which Augustine compares to the fate of a corpse, burdened beneath layers of earth in the grave (*terrena mole*).

In *Gn. adu. Man.*, Augustine's anti-Manichaean motive in using the traditional scheme of the emotions was explicit. While not a polemical work *per se*, *s. dom. m.* can be suggested as reflecting similar concerns to those of Augustine's previous analyses in Genesis readings: *consuetudines*, with all their seemingly involuntary traits, are now joined to the sequence of *suggestio/delectatio/consentio*, which was originally presented to counter the Manichaean view of evil.<sup>70</sup> Even persons with the most deeply rooted evil habits should not despair of conquering them "with Christ leading and helping the Christian warfare." This can be perceived in those remarks by Augustine that insist on the free and non-compulsory character of the movements and choices of the soul.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Augustine is explicitly countering Manichaean teaching in *s. dom. m.* 2, 9, 32. The Donatists are referred to in 1, 5, 13. Neither party is mentioned by name.

<sup>71</sup> *s. dom. m.* 1, 12, 34 *non enim cogit qui suadet. et omnes naturae in ordine suo gradibus suis pulchrae sunt, sed de superioribus, in quibus rationalis animus ordinatus est, ad inferiora non est declinandum. nec quisquam hoc facere cogitur; [...]* *non enim hoc committit inuitus*. Note also how Augustine expands the context of evil sexual desire to cover all corrupt human affects and desires in the lines following immediately his discussion on the emergence of

The traditional, and again, rather commonplace views of emotions serve here once more as a tool for Augustine to emphasise two simple facts of the Christian Catholic anthropology: first, that we are morally responsible for our thoughts and actions; and second, that even our seemingly involuntary and mechanical habits are of our own doing. Both these facts were antithetical to Augustine's Manichaean past.

Let us close our survey on Augustine's early attempts to locate *concupiscentia* in the traditional models of emotions by a brief look at a curious collection of diverse problems which indicate that the questions related to the emotions and their moral status were indeed on the menu in Augustine's circle in Hippo. In this collection, *de diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* (388–396), Augustine ponders a set of questions concerning the soul and its movements.<sup>72</sup> In addition, the collection includes two source quotations, one from an obscure text by a certain Fonteius, and another from Cicero's *de inventione*, and these also attest to Augustine's interest in combining the existent, commonplace philosophical psychology with his theological apology against the basic Manichaean solutions of the soul and of its responsibility for evil actions.<sup>73</sup> Unfortunately, especially in the case of Fonteius' quotation, neither of these texts include any extensive comments by Augustine.

The series of four questions in *diu. qu.* 33–36 treats *caritas* and its relation to the emotional movements of the soul. Augustine begins with the traditional set of emotions (*diu. qu.* 33), “fear” (*metus*) being the foremost. The

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sinful action. The Manichaean notion of sexual lust as a substantial evil in each human person is refuted once more by a redefinition of desire as the soul's own movement, and by a generalizing notion of desire that undermines its merely sexual contents: *quis dubitet omnem malam concupiscentiam recte fornicationem uocari, quando anima neglecta superiore lege qua regitur inferiorum naturarum turpi uoluptate quasi mercede prostituta corrumpitur?* (*s. dom. m.* 1, 12, 36). See, again, for a parallel in *mend.* 10 *etenim libido quoque ipsa recte definitur appetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponeuntur*.

<sup>72</sup> Augustine's psychology in *diu. qu.* 7 shows obvious Neoplatonic features. Man consists of soul and body; depending on how the word ‘soul’ is understood, it either includes or excludes the exclusively human, rational part of *mens*. O'Daly 1987, 7–8.

<sup>73</sup> Bardy (1952, 11–50) has suggested that roughly the first twenty-four questions of the work are composed around philosophical, and anti-Manichaean themes. The first one is *diu. qu.* 12, quoted from a certain Fonteius and his work *de mente mundanda ad uidendum deum*. Here the sensible world is depicted as defiled by a *malignus spiritus*, who “darkens the senses with darksome affections” (*tenebrosis affectibus tenebrat sensus*): these words remind one of the Manichaean turns of phrases. Pépin (1992, 134) suggests that Fonteius' affiliation was “aux confins du platonisme et du christianisme.” The second extensive source quotation is from Cicero (*diu. qu.* 31 = *Cic. inv.* 2, 159–167 *temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio*).

other three—*cupiditas*, *aegritudo*, and *laetitia*—follow fear in a construction that resembles the Stoic tetrachord of emotions.<sup>74</sup> Augustine concludes that one should love (*amare*) a rational life where no fear is felt for the things that one can lose (*diu. qu.* 35).<sup>75</sup> Augustine seems to be interested here in the analysis of the emotions as some kind of a preparatory stage, or as an intellectual tool, on the way to Christian baptism and to the Christian way of life. To acknowledge the fear (*metus*, *timor*) of loosing one's temporal possessions leads to a gradual opening to the love (*caritas*) of God. Thereby, the Christian option is also opened:

Now, however, as soon as a habitual avoidance of sin has shown the supposedly burdensome to be easy, there is need to begin tasting the sweetness of piety and commending the beauty of virtue so that the freedom of charity might stand out in comparison with the bondage of fear. Then, after the faithful have received the rites of regeneration (and these should be deeply moving), they must be clearly shown the difference between two men: the old and the new [...].<sup>76</sup> [transl. Mosher]

The concise question in *diu. qu.* 77 gives the impression of a rash note. Augustine proves wrong a syllogism that tries to demonstrate that fear and desire (*timor*, *cupiditas*) are not sins if they are passions (*passio*, *pati*). Augustine denies the crucial premise as a *non sequitur*. If something is a passion and felt in “a passive state,” it does not follow that it would definitely not be a sin. This argument, against which Augustine takes a stand, seems to be based on a Plotinian notion of *pati* as something that is limited to the lower parts of the soul, and consequently as something that cannot be said to be “our own,” that is, in the Christian idiom used in this question, a sin. The syllogism seems to lean on the meaning of *pati* in the sense of being an object of some outward influence, and therefore involving no personal commitment in the strict sense, as in emerging from *ratio*. But Augustine is only satisfied in denying this as a logical misstep. To claim that emotions are only “happening” in us, and are *only* caused by an outward influence, as in the narrow sense of *pati*, is something Augustine will not admit. On

<sup>74</sup> See Cic. *Tusc.* 4, 10–11. The tetrachord had become commonplace long before the time of Augustine. Knuuttila 2004, 52, 112.

<sup>75</sup> In the last question of the series, an addition is made: one should fear God (*diu. qu.* 36).

<sup>76</sup> *diu. qu.* 36, 2 *iam uero cum aliqua non peccandi consuetudo quod onerosum putabatur facile esse persuaserit, incipiat gustari dulcedo pietatis et commendari pulchritudo uirtutis, ut caritatis libertas prae seruitute timoris emineat. tunc iam persuadendum est fidelibus praecedentibus regenerationis sacramentis, quae necesse est plurimum moueant, quid intersit inter duos homines, ueterem et nouum [...].*

the contrary, he seems to rather hold on to the Stoic view of the *perturbatio*, which always entails the assent of reason, and accordingly also a notion of *pati* as something which remains our own responsibility. Hence an emotion cannot be logically excluded from the Christian notion of sin, and to end up in a state of emotion is not equivalent to being in a purely “passive state.” One is morally responsible for one’s emotions, including *cupiditas* and *timor*. Therefore, to “suffer” from an emotion can be condemnable, that is, a sin (*peccatum*).<sup>77</sup>

While it is not possible to draw any further conclusions on this brief piece of text, it does indicate, however, that during the years 388–396, Augustine had an active interest in the traditions of the emotions and their moral status.<sup>78</sup> As we have seen, this interest was not a scholarly exercise for its own sake, but was deeply invested with Augustine’s need to counter his main theological opponents of the time, namely the Manichaeans. Thus far, we have seen how Augustine has made an effort to convince his audience of how an unreasonable and miserable life led under the tyranny of desires is due to our own, deliberate choices. Augustine has consistently insisted that to commit oneself to emotional states, and under a sustained rule of *cupiditas/libido*, which he seems to take as something of an emotion *par excellence*, is in the will’s power, (or *eph’ hemin*):<sup>79</sup> it is therefore possible to control and fight off the suggestions of these movements of the soul (which, Augustine points, were corrupted by the Fall). He has also shown how a psychological reading of Gen 1–3 teaches us to appropriate both the rational and irrational part of the soul as our own nature. Furthermore, he has attempted to clarify how the bodily and obviously lower part of reality has been able to divert reason from intellectual goods.

In all these aspects, Augustine found a useful tool in the teachings of various philosophical traditions of the emotions. It may also be an important matter to notice that in the early stages of his literary career Augustine has not been especially keen on distinguishing between these various tra-

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<sup>77</sup> For a useful discussion of the Plotinian distinction between actions and passions, see Remes 2007, 90–93.

<sup>78</sup> There were, of course, other themes related to the emotions that concerned the Christian circles of amateur philosophy as well. For divine *apatheia* and biblical exegesis on God’s emotions, see *diu. qu.* 52; for *passiones* in Christ, see *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 8, 14 *motus* [...] *non perturbati animi*; *diu. qu.* 80.

<sup>79</sup> For the philosophical tradition in this respect, see Remes 2007, 89 with literature; although the phrase ‘up to us’ had a distinctively Stoic ring, it was also used by the Platonic authors who were important sources for Augustine’s philosophical education, such as Aulus Gellius and Plotinus.

ditions, nor has he felt any kind of need to pit these traditions against each other, as will happen in his later works. In his early works, Neoplatonic and Stoic emphases, phrases and questions converge fluently with a distinctly apologetic concern.

It seems in place to note here also that Augustine is constantly positive about the real possibility of achieving the moderation that the lower part of the soul and its movements need. There is an implicit confident strain in the depictions of *libido*, or *cupiditas*: with God's help, people are able to turn into virtuous sages, and moderation, or the good use of the lower part of the soul, is set as an attainable goal. Thus, the sinister description of the emotional disturbances in *lib. arb.* 1 and the lamentable chain of effects in *Gn. adu. Man.* and *s. dom. m.* also serve as instructive reflections on what should be avoided (with the necessary implication that the irrational tyranny of passions indeed *can* be avoided) in the Christian way of life. The struggle with evil desire as an emotional force is seen from the vantage point of the "citadel of virtue."<sup>80</sup>

## 5.2. CONTINUITIES AND INTERLUDES

So far, our cases of evil desire as situated in the traditional philosophical frames of emotions have preceded Augustine's pivotal work, *de diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*. In the following sections, texts will be reviewed that followed this arguably revolutionary work. First, we will observe how Augustine's preoccupation with the emotions and *concupiscentia* was continued in three major works, written or commenced shortly after *Simpl.* The three works in question, *conf.*, *c. Faust.* and *trin.*, will highlight some of the continuities in Augustine's use of psychological commonplaces, such as its aptitude in Manichaean polemics as well as the allegorical reading of Gen 2 in the use of psychological observations.

### 5.2.1. *Affective Confessions*

*Confessiones* is a complicated work in its own right, but this is true also from the viewpoint of the present study.<sup>81</sup> The form and contents of this literary masterpiece do not easily lend themselves to straightforward classifications

<sup>80</sup> We will return to this angle to *concupiscentia* in Chapter 6.

<sup>81</sup> For a general discussion of emotions in *conf.*, focusing on Augustine's views on the aesthetic and artificial emotions, and emotions and the will, see Knuuttila 2004, 162–168, 171.



of philosophical sources, or taxonomies of purposes in the using of or the alluding to such sources.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, Augustine moves fluently between various functions of *concupiscentia* in this work: as we have seen in the previous chapter, Augustine uses the theme of *triplex cupiditas* to the degree of giving structure to large parts of the work. We will once more briefly return to this work in the next chapter, to discuss the dimensions of Christian renewal in its presentation of *concupiscentia* and Romans 7.

Corrupt desire, or *concupiscentia*, or *libido*, can thus be seen in various shades in *conf.* Indeed, the very last book of the work offers an illustrating example of the overlapping functions of concupiscence as an emotion (1), matrix of sin (2), and renewal (3). In *conf.* 13, 30–31, Augustine sees in the human domination over the animal kingdom an allegory of the soul's moderation over the passions of the soul (1). These passions are named according to *triplex cupiditas* (2), connected to representative groups of animals: *fastus elationis (bestiae)*, *delectatio libidinis (pecora)* and *uenenum curiositatis (serpentes)*. Such passions, claims Augustine, are “movements of a dead soul” and can be renewed and reformed into quiet, tame and harmless affections to serve reason, when a person is renewed according to God's image in Christ (3).<sup>83</sup>

### *Commonplaces*

Augustine's familiarity and engagement with the philosophical traditions of emotions surfaces occasionally in the pages of *conf.* Thus, *conf.* repeats the commonplace view of *cupiditas* as one of the generative emotions.<sup>84</sup> In *conf.* 2, 13, both *triplex cupiditas* and a set of emotions coming close to the traditional Stoic tetrachord appear in a list in which they are contrasted to God and His qualities. Augustine holds that even in these aberrant movements of the soul, something is reflected of the original creation and of the being of the Creator. The latter part of the list is designed in a Stoic fashion, where each of the objects of the emotions is presumed to be resulted from

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<sup>82</sup> Nevertheless, *conf.* has provided a rich quarry for the miners of sources, influences and affinities. See O'Donnell 1992, I, xx–xxxi with literature. For the purposes of *conf.* see now van Oort 2008b and Kotzé 2004; 2011, 20.

<sup>83</sup> *conf.* 13, 30–31.

<sup>84</sup> Note that Augustine is quite sensitive to the fact that the traditional sets of emotions are only simplified heuristic devices for a manifold phenomenon of affective experiences. *conf.* 4, 22 *grande profundum est ipse homo, cuius etiam capillos tu, domine, numeratos habes et non minuuntur in te: et tamen capilli eius magis numerabiles quam affectus eius et motus cordis eius.*

mistaken preferences or from choices of attachment; these emotions are then compared to God and His being.

Anger (*ira*) seeks revenge; who avenges with greater justice than you? Fear (*timor*) quails before sudden and unexpected events attacking things which are loved, and takes precaution for their safety; to you is anything unexpected or sudden? [...] Regret (*tristitia*) wastes away for the loss of things which cupidity (*cupiditas*) delighted in. Its wish would be that nothing be taken away, just as nothing can be taken from you.<sup>85</sup> [transl. Chadwick]

The Stoic tetrachord, together with notions of *cupiditas*, surfaces again in *conf.* 10, 21–22, where the relation of emotions to memory is analysed.<sup>86</sup> While recording his past, Augustine has noted that he is able to remember, for instance, his desires without actually feeling them anymore.<sup>87</sup> The same applies to an intellectual analysis of the said emotions; one can discuss emotions and categorize them without actually feeling the affects under consideration.<sup>88</sup>

### Concupiscentia in Manichaean Colours

Apart from these more easily recognizable references to the traditional discourses of the emotions, *conf.* abounds in characterizations of *concupiscentia* that could be labelled as affective, or even sensuous in tone. Thus, in a famous passage, Augustine recalls his youth and social relations being stained by *concupiscentia*.

The single desire that dominated my search for delight was simply to love and to be loved. But no restraint was imposed by the exchange of mind with mind, which marks the brightly lit pathway of friendship. Clouds of muddy carnal concupiscence (*concupiscentia carnis*) filled the air. The bubbling impulses of puberty befogged and obscured my heart so that it could not see the

<sup>85</sup> *conf.* 2, 13 *ira uindictam quaerit: te iustius quis uindicat? timor insolita et repentina exhorrescit rebus, quae amantur, aduersantia, dum praecauet securitati: tibi enim quid insolitum? quid repentinum? aut quis a te separat quod diligis? aut ubi nisi apud te firma securitas? tristitia rebus amissis contabescit, quibus se oblectabat cupiditas, quia ita sibi nolle, sicut tibi auferri nihil potest.*

<sup>86</sup> *conf.* 10, 21 *affectiones quoque animi mei eadem memoria continet non illo modo, quo eas habet ipse animus, cum patitur eas, sed alio multum diuerso.* Knuuttila 2004, 158–159.

<sup>87</sup> *conf.* 10, 21 *nam et laetatum me fuisse reminiscor non laetus et tristitiam meam praeteritam recordor non tristis et me aliquando timuisse recolo sine timore et pristinae cupiditatis sine cupiditate sum memor.* Augustine will return to the topic of memory and emotions in *trin.* 11, see pp. 232–234.

<sup>88</sup> *conf.* 10, 22 *quidquid de his disputare potuero diuidendo singula per species sui cuiusque generis et definiendo, ibi inuenio quid dicam atque inde profero, nec tamen ulla earum perturbatione perturbor, cum eas reminiscendo commemoro.*

difference between love's serenity and lust's darkness (*caligine libidinis*). Confusion of the two things boiled within me. It seized hold of my youthful weakness, sweeping me through the precipitous rocks of desire (*abrupta cupiditatum*) to submerge me in a whirlpool of vice.<sup>89</sup> [transl. Chadwick]

This passage is written in a strongly sensual language (reminiscent of a comparable depiction of the tyranny of *libido* in *lib. arb.* 1). The clarity and serenity of right love is strongly, even dualistically opposed to muddy, shadowy desires. The contrast between light and darkness is vivid and striking, and the imagery around the “muddy” *concupiscentia carnis* is designed to convey an impression of an almost material element of disturbance and being out of control.<sup>90</sup> Similar imagery of stained friendship is used again in *conf.* 3, 1:

I therefore polluted the spring water of friendship with the filth of concupiscentia (*concupiscentiae*). I muddied its clear stream by the hell of lust (*libidinis*), and yet, though foul and immoral, in my excessive vanity, I used to carry on in the manner of an elegant man about town.<sup>91</sup> [transl. Chadwick]

Augustine claims that he loved to love, but the love he was in was not the love he really sought. The bodily and exterior forms of love were not love that would have had healthy effects for the soul. Since the emotions of love did not originate from a love of immutable God, but from a love of bodily things, the “incorruptible nourishment” only seemed more unattractive.<sup>92</sup> According to Annemare Kotzé, these passages contain a strong protrep-

<sup>89</sup> *conf.* 2, 2 *et quid erat, quod me delectabat, nisi amare et amari? sed non tenebatur modus ab animo usque ad animum, quatenus est luminosus limes amicitiae, sed exhalabantur nebulae de limosa concupiscentia carnis et scatebra pubertatis et obnubilabant atque obfuscabant cor meum, ut non discerneret serenitas dilectionis a caligine libidinis. utrumque in confuso aestuabat et rapiebat imbecillam aetatem per abrupta cupiditatum atque mersabat gurgite flagitiorum.*

<sup>90</sup> O'Donnell 1992, II, 111: “These specially vivid metaphors of loss of control arising from self-will and concupiscentia, leading to loss of self, prepare the paradox of restoration of self and of control through surrender to a power outside the self.”

<sup>91</sup> *conf.* 3, 1 *uenam igitur amicitiae coinquinabam sordibus concupiscentiae candoremque eius obnubilabam de tartaro libidinis, et tamen foedus atque inhonestus, elegans et urbanus esse gestiebam abundanti uanitate.*

<sup>92</sup> *conf.* 3, 1 *quaerebam quid amarem, amans amare, et oderam securitatem et uiam sine muscipulis, quoniam fames mihi erat intus ab interiore cibo, te ipso, deus meus, et ea fame non esuriebam, sed eram sine desiderio alimentorum incorruptibilem, non quia plenus eis eram, sed quo inanius, fastidiosior.* Thereby Augustine sets the stage for an analysis of the emotions that the theatric plays in Carthage excited in him (*conf.* 3, 2–4 *ego tunc miser dolere amabam*). In retrospect, Augustine reproaches the tragedies on the basis that they are designed to arouse feelings only for the sake of the artificial enjoyment of these feelings (*cupere esse miseros, ut misereatur*). Knuuttila 2004, 164–166.

tic tendency towards an expected Manichaean readership. The language of food, contaminated friendship, and sexual desire were all designed to communicate forcefully with a Manichaean audience.<sup>93</sup> By writing about *concupiscentia carnis* (or *libido*) in such colourful tones and materialistic pictures (*caligo, nebula, sordes*), Augustine creates a hook by which he attempts to capture his former co-religionists' attention, and to have them follow his way out from the darkness of Manichaean vanities into the light of Catholic Christianity.

Augustine's underlying anti-Manichaean purpose in *conf.* can also be discerned in his reproaches against his own lost work *de pulchro et apto*. This work was, according to Augustine, based on a division between the monad and the dyad, of which the monad represented everything that is good, being a principle of unity and concord, while the dyad was a principle of division and discord, and thus evil. As for the generative emotions (or parts of the soul) of *ira* and *libido*, in *pulch.* Augustine located them to the workings of the dyad, and held it to be some kind of substance of irrationality.<sup>94</sup> Such a view of *libido* and human emotional matrix was fitting enough for a young and ambitious Manichaean convert that Augustine was, but in retrospect these musings receive his outright condemnation, based on the simple Platonist and Christian psychological principles of the parts of the soul, all as created and all as vulnerable to corruption:

Just as crimes occur when the mind's motive force, which gives the impetus for action, is corrupt and asserts itself in an insolent and disturbed way, and as vicious acts occur if obsession has captured the mind's affective part which is the root of the impulse to carnal pleasures, so also errors and false opinions contaminate life if the reasoning mind is itself flawed.<sup>95</sup> [transl. Chadwick]

All the parts of the soul may be vitiated by sin and evil, and therefore, all the parts are implicitly created by God, and thus originally good. The crimes

<sup>93</sup> Kotzé 2004, 199–203, 211–215.

<sup>94</sup> *conf.* 4, 24 *et cum in uirtute pacem amarem, in uitiositate autem odissem discordiam, in illa unitatem, in ista quandam diuisionem notabam, inque illa unitate mens rationalis et natura ueritatis ac summi boni mihi esse uidebatur, in ista uero diuisione irrationalis uitae nescio quam substantiam [...] miser opinabar. et illam monadem appellabam tamquam sine ullo sexu mentem, hanc uero dyadem, iram in facinoribus, libidinem in flagitiis, nesciens quid loquerer.* The terminology of monad and dyad is of Pythagorean origin. See O'Donnell 1992, II, 257–258, for further literature.

<sup>95</sup> *conf.* 4, 25 *sicut enim facinora sunt, si uitiosus est ille animi motus, in quo est impetus, et se iactat insolenter ac turbide, et flagitia, si est immoderata illa animae affectio, qua carnales hauriuntur uoluptates ita errores et falsae opinionēs uitam contaminant, si rationalis mens ipsa uitiosa est.*

(*facinora*) against the neighbour; the vices (*flagitia*) against one's own body and soul, and the errors committed against the mind, concern all three parts of the soul, *animus*, *anima* and *mens*, respectively.<sup>96</sup> Thus, the evil in the appetitive part consist of immoderation by which "carnal pleasures" are "imbibed" in the soul.

### *Therapy of Concupiscentia in Conf.*

Augustine's evaluations of his past life teem with colourful depictions of his emotional behaviour, especially of his sexual desire and continence. The crucial role of continence, celibacy and fighting with *concupiscentia carnis* in the overall plot of *conf.* has been charted exhaustively, and there is no need for extensive documentation in this respect.<sup>97</sup> In *conf.* 6, 20–26, Augustine recalls the turbulent period of life before his conversion, and the special hindrance of the idea of celibacy that caused him excessive agony.<sup>98</sup> Yet, Augustine seems to blame as much his inability to see continence as a free and immediate gift of God, as his reluctant attitude towards abandoning his sexually active life.<sup>99</sup> Writing *conf.* (some years after *Simpl.*), Augustine notes how he erroneously had first thought that sexual continence could be achieved by his own resolution, and that the allurements of sexual concupiscentia could be overthrown by his own initiative. In other words, he did not

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<sup>96</sup> See O'Donnell, II, 258–259 on the tripartite soul, and his comment ad loc.: "Here the trinitarian analogy applies in the first instance to the categories of sin [...] and the other terms are employed in the first instance because of their applicability to each category of sin." For terminology, see also O'Daly 1987, 7–8. The division is distinct from the two-part-division of *conf.* 13, 47, where Adam represents, anticipating the positions in *trin.* 12, *mentis ratio* and Eve symbolizes *appetitus actionis*.

<sup>97</sup> For this theme in *conf.*, see especially O'Donnell 1992, III, 3–4, 7–10 with literature.

<sup>98</sup> See e.g. *conf.* 6, 21 *deligatus morbo carnis mortifera suauitate trahebam catenam meam solui timens*; 6, 22 *uehementer consuetudo satiandae insatiabilis concupiscentiae me captum excruciat*; 6, 25 *quia non amator coniugii sed libidinis seruus eram, procuraui aliam, non utique coniugem, quo tamquam sustentaretur et perduceretur uel integer uel auctor morbus animae meae satellitio perdurantis consuetudinis in regnum uxorium. nec sanabatur uulnus illud meum, quod prioris praecisione factum erat, sed post feruorem doloremque acerrimum putrescebat et quasi frigidius, sed desperatius dolebat*. O'Donnell 1992, II, 374: "continence first appears here as the central issue retarding the 'conversion.'"

<sup>99</sup> *conf.* 6, 20 *putabam enim me miserum fore nimis, si feminae priuarer amplexibus, et medicinam misericordiae tuae ad eandem infirmitatem sanandam non cogitabam, quia expertus non eram, et propriarum uirium credebam esse continentiam, quarum mihi non eram conscius, cum tam stultus essem, ut nescirem, sicut scriptum est, neminem posse esse continentem, nisi tu dederis*. Cf. also Augustine's view on continence in *uirg.* 25 *continentes, corpus usque ad contemptas nuptias castigantes, se ipsos non in corpore, sed in ipsa concupiscentiae radice castrantes*.

at first realize continence to be comparable to divine grace, in that it, too, should be seen exclusively as a *donum dei*.<sup>100</sup> In *conf.* 6–8, Augustine composes an extensive narrative, which is focused on God's mysterious action in granting Augustine what He demands (*da quod iubes*): Augustine depicts himself as clay, or earth (*humus*), upon which God works His miracles (*conf.* 6, 22 *sic eramus, donec tu, altissime, non deserens humum nostram miseratus miseros subuenires miris et occultis modis*).

The basic proposition of *conf.* 8 then gives Augustine's audience a simple enough understanding of God's grace and the way it affects the human soul: only grace is able to create the virtue of continence and control over corrupted affects in general, and *concupiscentia carnis* in particular.

We have already seen the way Augustine thinks about the effects of Christian renewal in *conf.* 13, 30–31. According to this remark, the force of the corrupted passions in the form of *triplex cupiditas* is tamed by divine grace: *seruiunt enim rationi haec animalia, cum a progressu mortifero cohibita uiuant et bona sunt*.<sup>101</sup>

#### 5.2.2. Contra Faustum

Augustine's largest directly anti-Manichaean work after writing *Simpl. contra Faustum*.<sup>102</sup> In general, *concupiscentia*, *cupiditas*, or *libido* along with the other emotions are depicted as being irrational and wrongly ordered movements, having their source in the lower part(s) of the soul. They do not originate in the immutable and righteous God. In *c. Faust.*, Augustine also

<sup>100</sup> See Zumkeller 1986, 39; O'Donnell, II, 374–375.

<sup>101</sup> See also *conf.* 13, 49 *fidelium animam uiuam per affectus ordinatos continentiae uigore formasti atque inde tibi soli mentem subditam et nullius auctoritatis humanae ad imitandum indigentem renouasti ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam praestantique intellectui rationabilem actionem tanquam uiro feminam subdidisti*. The answer of the contemporary *doctr. chr.* 1, 24–25, which is a brief study of the body, the mind (or *spiritus*, from Gal 5, 17, which Augustine here quotes) and the corrupted habits of *concupiscentia*, remains in this respect inconclusive. Augustine there writes how one should tame the untamed fleshly habit of *concupiscentia*, which weighs the body, and to turn it into a 'better one' (*hoc etiam in hac uita meditandum est, ut consuetudo carnalis mutetur in melius nec inordinatis motibus resistat spiritui*). Apparently, this mutation will cause much labour, but should be possible in this life; the language betrays uncertainties (*meditandum est*). See also *doctr. chr.* 2, 9–11 for a change in the quality of emotions.

<sup>102</sup> For Faustus, see Decret 1970, 51–70. Bammel (1993, 4–6) discusses Faustus' use of the letters of Paul as source texts for central Manichaean doctrines (e.g. the two principles, the division between the old man and the new man). For a quite recent discussion on the figure of Faustus and his role in Augustine's own conversion, see BeDuhn 2010, 106–134 and van Oort 2011, 558–564.

rather carefully avoids the accusations by Faustus that disordered emotions could be assigned to the holy people of the biblical narratives, and stresses the modification and rational control of emotions.

The most extensive discussion of the emotions and evil desire takes place in *c. Faust.* 22, where Faustus treats the offensive Old Testament narratives of the divine emotional movements and the reproachable passions of the patriarchs. Faustus blames the God of the Old Testament as being tormented by various dark passions, such as envy (*inuidus*), fear (*timens*), and anger (*irascens*).<sup>103</sup> Again, the patriarchs and kings of Israel, who are venerated by Catholic Christians, not only suffered from wild sexual desires (*insana flagrans cupido, inconcessa libidinis flamma*), but also fell prey to greed, homicide and all other kinds of atrocities. Faustus contends that the emotional imagery in which God and his actions in the Old Testament is described, and the immoral and irrational conduct of patriarchs all serve as evidence in favour of the Manichaean case: the Old Testament should be abandoned as a distorted, misleading and outright deceitful text.<sup>104</sup>

Augustine responds to these accusations that, to begin with, God is not liable to any effects from the part of His creation, anymore than Christ suffered from any emotions or would be liable to charges of any immoral affects.<sup>105</sup> Here, as elsewhere, the difficulty posed by the emotional language of the Bible is solved by linguistic ingenuity: for according to Augustine, even the pagan philosophers have used flexible terminology when denoting virtues in terms which strictly speaking refer to harmful passions. Augustine refers to Cicero's way (without explicitly naming him) of describing the Stoic *eupatheiai*, listing three generic emotions and their acceptable counterparts.<sup>106</sup> In short, God simply cannot be *perturbatus*. Therefore, the

<sup>103</sup> God's envy in the Genesis narratives was a consolidated part of the Manichaean polemics against the Old Testament. See Raveaux 1987, 64–65.

<sup>104</sup> For the Manichaean criticism and its Marcionite roots, see Lieu 1992, 51–53, 154–158.

<sup>105</sup> *c. Faust.* 22, 9–14. On Christ and his perfectly voluntary emotions, see *c. Faust.* 26, 8 *nam homo plerumque etsi nolit, irascitur; etsi nolit, contristatur; etsi nolit, dormit; etsi nolit, esurit ac sitit: ille autem omnia ista, quia uoluit.*

<sup>106</sup> *c. Faust.* 22, 18 *docti eorum [sc. paganorum] discernant inter uoluntatem et cupiditatem, gaudium et laetitiam, cautionem et metum [...] his binis uerbis ea, quae priora posui, uirtutibus, quae autem posteriora, uitii adponant: pleni sunt tamen libri eorum, cum abusione istorum nominum, quae proprie uitia significant, etiam uirtutes sic appellantur.* Cic. *Tusc.* 4, 13–14 *uoluntas—libido vel cupiditas effrenata; gaudium—laetitia; cautio—metus.* In accordance with Cicero's list, *aegritudo* falls out from Augustine's account. See further Colish 1990, 222. In addition, Augustine notes that the Hebrew language may as well denote both a bad and a good action by the same word, as in the case of jealousy (*c. Faust.* 22, 18 *zelus*).

emotional language and imagery used of God refers metaphorically to God's immutable justice and to His actions, in the same way the philosophers have resorted to the flexible use of language in these matters.<sup>107</sup> So Augustine effectively applies the rule he had already used in *Simpl.* 2, 2, 2: *eodem uerbo non eodem modo*.

But what about the allegations against the Old Testament patriarchs and their seemingly immoral conduct and vicious passions? While pointing out that the superficially reproachable actions of the central Old Testament figures are *sui generis*,<sup>108</sup> Augustine proceeds by defining sin on a more general level. Thus, sin is a transgression of the eternal law, which in other words equals as the commandment to preserve "the natural order" (*ordo naturalis*). Augustine then depicts this order in a human person by using a standard Platonist model: every human individual consists of (*c. Faust.* 22, 27) *corpus*, *anima*, and *ratio*. *Ratio* in itself is divided between the "active" (*actiua*) and the "contemplating" part (*contemplatiua*), of which the contemplative part excels, for the image of God lies in that part of each human being. Thus, if there would be a person who would always and in all instances control his or her "mortal pleasures," no sin would occur.<sup>109</sup> Consequently, all who do not rein in their pleasures commit a sin against the "natural order" of creation in their body-soul composition.<sup>110</sup> The "mortal pleasures" (*mortales delectationes*) are intended to be used for retaining or regaining corporeal health; however, if they become unbridled, they evolve into sins and cease to be moderated by reason.<sup>111</sup>

With these general considerations, Augustine then begins to give a detailed answer to Faustus' objections. Augustine states that Abraham did not fall into wild sexual desires, for he only tried to guarantee offspring for

<sup>107</sup> *c. Faust.* 22, 21.

<sup>108</sup> Augustine's first objection to Faustus' criticism is to claim that all the seemingly immoral actions of the patriarchs and prophets act as signs for Christ. To find fault with these would be comparable to the childish objections of schoolboys who are eager to correct Virgil's Latin. *c. Faust.* 22, 24–25 *uitam fuisse prophetica[m] totumque illud regnum gentis Hebraeorum magnum [...] fuisse prophetam*.

<sup>109</sup> *c. Faust.* 22, 28 *quapropter hominis actio seruienti fidei seruienti deo refrenat omnes mortales delectationes et eas cohercet ad naturalem modum meliora inferioribus ordinata dilectione praeponens. si enim nihil delectaret illicitum, nemo peccaret*. Note the unambiguously conditional language by which Augustine here demonstrates the purely theoretic character of such a presumption.

<sup>110</sup> Sin is thus limited to human beings and fallen angels (i.e. those without bodies but already been shown to commit sins). Animals (*non possunt*) and good angels (*nolunt*) are excluded.

<sup>111</sup> *c. Faust.* 22, 29.



himself by having sex with Hagar, nor can be Sarah be reproached either, for she, too, only wished to have children. Thus, their action was completely dictated by the higher purposes of reason.<sup>112</sup> The vocabulary in this passage refers consistently to irrational, unbridled desires (*libido*, *concupiscentia carnalis*, *insana cupiditas*, or *cupido* in Faustus) opposing the rational *uoluntas* according God's eternal law.<sup>113</sup>

Augustine's explanation is similar for the incestuous actions undertaken by Lot's daughters: the daughters only wished to procreate offspring, and while they could not know that any other man was still alive on earth, they had an excusable motive for their act; therefore, the accusation of *nefaria libido* appears to be without force. And as Augustine remarks, whatever the motive for this act was, the narrative as such does not recommend the actions it describes.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, Augustine hints, Faustus' reproach of polygamous marriages only reflects his own shortcomings in the matter: if Faustus thinks that children cannot be conceived without indecent lust and dirty pleasures, that is Faustus' problem, not the patriarchs.<sup>115</sup> As the figures of the Old Testament were strengthened by heroic self-control in this respect, they were even able to have many wives at the same time.<sup>116</sup> Augustine concludes the case of Jacob and his wives by pointing out how Jacob's only concern was to provide both Lea and Rachel with children;

<sup>112</sup> c. *Faust.* 22, 30–31.

<sup>113</sup> c. *Faust.* 22, 31 (on Sarah) *neque enim conscientiam suam flagitio coniugis miscuit, quo ille suam libidinem turpi et illicita uoluptate satiare, sed etiam illa naturali ordine filios uolens [...] non cedens uiro concupiscenti, sed iubens oboedienti [...] numquam hoc faceret mulier, si in corpore uiri carnali concupiscentia teneretur [...] nunc uero propterea sic propagandi uoluntas pia fuit, quia concumbendi uoluntas libidinosa non fuit.* Augustine polemically turns the allegations concerning evil desires against Faustus, who is thus said to be driven by *insana criminendi cupiditas* (22, 30) or *libidine calumniandi* (22, 32) himself! Again, the charge of irrationality is turned against Mani as well (22, 30 *non igitur Abraham prolis habendae insana cupiditate flagrabat, sed Manichaeus prolis deuitandae insana uanitate delirabat*). In line with the evaluations of the Old Testament, Solomon is pointed out as an example of exhibiting conduct that is opposite to the patriarchs: *plures uxores [...] magis ad libidinem quam ad propaginem habuit.*

<sup>114</sup> c. *Faust.* 22, 45.

<sup>115</sup> c. *Faust.* 22, 47 *sed quia homines aliter se habentibus iam moribus et legibus non possunt delectari uxorū multitudine nisi libidinis magnitudine, ideo errant et putant haberi omnino non potuisse uxores multas nisi flagrantia concupiscentiae carnalis et sordidae uoluptatis.*

<sup>116</sup> c. *Faust.* 22, 48. *Possunt isti maledici etiam sanctos apostolos accusare, quod non caritate generandi filios uitae aeternae, sed cupiditate laudis humanae [...] euangelium praedicauerint [...] hanc in ecclesia gloriam peruersa uoluntate Simon perditus concupiuit.* The question of the virility of the patriarchs is treated in Augustine's systematic account of hermeneutics as well. *doctr. chr.* 3, 27–28.

therefore, Jacob was a servant of justice, not of evil desire (*si concupiscentiae, non iustitiae seruus esset*).<sup>117</sup>

Again, when it comes to the rational moderation of the disturbed passions, the case of Moses is taken as an example. Faustus had found fault in Ex 12, 35–36, where the Israelites plunder the Egyptian gold and jewellery, accusing Moses of greed (*cupiditas*) in committing such a crime. Augustine answers by pleading to divine commandment. Moses acted in accordance with God's directions in this matter, and cannot therefore be accused of greed or of any other disturbed movement of the soul.<sup>118</sup> If Moses or other prominent figures of the Old Testament are acting under clear orders by God, they cannot be acting under any reproachable emotions, even in the cases that would in ordinary circumstances be deemed as resulting from such perturbations. Indeed, whatever God commands is by definition rational and in accordance with *aeterna lex*. Plundering the gold of Egypt was therefore not committed by greed (*humana cupiditate*, 22, 74). The patriarchs' seemingly immoral actions were often based on divine, purposeful and rational mandates.<sup>119</sup> From this perspective, Moses acted in obedience, not in rage (*non saeuens, sed oboediens*).

The immoral actions in the history of Israel are thus immoral only in an illusory way. They have not been committed by reproachable passions, but by God's unerring command. Therefore, despite their seemingly irrational appearance, they are in fact wholly rational, for God cannot give irrational commandments.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>117</sup> In his more constructive part of the exegesis, Augustine is emphatic that one cannot obtain the vision of wisdom without much toil and labour (cf. Jacob's toil under Laban). *c. Faust.* 22, 53. Moreover, the moderation of desire is achieved with no less trouble. All other narratives of the seemingly immoral behaviour of patriarchs are interpreted with similar preconditions of rational ends: *hanc [...] modestiam, hanc concupiscentiae coercionem et in commixtione corporum coniugalium solum adpetitum posteritatis humanae* (*c. Faust.* 22, 50). See also *c. Faust.* 29, 4: *inlicitus itaque et temperantiae legibus non subiectus membrorum illorum usus est turpis, non ipsa membra [...] sic eis generationi tantummodo consulentes utebantur, ut ille naturalis motus nullo modo turpis esset, qui non libidini, sed rationi seruiret; c. Faust.* 30, 6.

<sup>118</sup> Augustine's 'voluntaristic' mood surfaces here (22, 71–72): *penes dominum esset consilium iubendi, penes famulum autem obsequium peragendi. sed deus, inquit, uerus et bonus nullo modo talia iussisse credendus est. immo uero talia recte non iubet, nisi deus uerus et bonus, qui et solus nouit, quid cuique iubendum sit.*

<sup>119</sup> Unlike the usual evils of war which can be summarized thus (anticipating the ideas of social and political corruption in *ciu.*): *nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, incapatus atque inplacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si qua similia.* *c. Faust.* 22, 74. See also *c. Faust.* 22, 75 [*bellum*] *quod humana cupiditate geritur.*

<sup>120</sup> Nothing new is left to be said for the death penalty that Moses imposes on the idolaters:

Augustine's positions of *concupiscentia* as a philosophically coloured emotion in *c. Faust.* still rely on the validity of the standard psychological views of the emotions he had subscribed to in his earlier works. The obvious difficulties of the unflattering stories about the ancestors of Israel are cleared away with contrived explanations that are, nevertheless, in line with Augustine's emphasis on the rational control of emotions and the rational motivation of human action. In *c. Faust.*, the commonplaces of Platonic psychology still back Augustine's anti-Manichaean stand.

### 5.2.3. De Trinitate

Augustine's major theological and psychological work, *de trinitate*, was begun approximately at the same time *conf.* and *c. Faust.* were completed, but *trin.* was not finished, however, until about two decades had passed after its inception. In 416, *trin.* 12 together with all previous books were published, as it seems, against Augustine's will.<sup>121</sup> The final version of *trin.* was completed some time during 419–425.<sup>122</sup> Despite its important role in Augustine's trinitarian theology and philosophy of the mind, the work only digresses in ethical topics, mainly in *trin.* 12 and 13, the latter concerning the role of luck in human happiness, and the previous book dealing with Augustine's *uti-frui*-distinction. It is with this motivation that Augustine returns briefly to the figures of Adam and Eve and the psychological insights these figures provide for his overall project in *trin.*<sup>123</sup>

As in *Gn. adu. Man.*, the Genesis narrative of the Fall again has a tale to tell about the human mind. The roles are, however, now cast somewhat differently, and Augustine is altogether keen to stress the unity of the soul with its trinitarian functions on the various levels of perception, memory, cogitation and self-knowledge. Hence, Adam and Eve are not so much perceived as different parts of the soul than as two diverging aspects of

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the passage is to be read figuratively, as concerning human sinful passions (*ira, concupiscentia mala*). See *c. Faust.* 22, 92 quoting Ps 4,5 (*irascimini et nolite peccare*) and Col 3,5.

<sup>121</sup> *ep.* 174.

<sup>122</sup> For the date, see Brachtendorf 2007; for the work in general, see Brachtendorf 2000; 2003.

<sup>123</sup> See Brachtendorf 2000, 199–206; 2007, 374. The psychological allegory of Gen 2 here also offers Augustine an explanation for the seemingly contradictory assertions by Paul in 1 Cor 11, 7. *trin.* 12, 19, *ad hoc tantummodo audienda est, ut intellegatur apostolus imaginem Dei uiro tantum tribuendo, non etiam feminae, quamuis in diuerso sexu duorum hominum, aliquid tamen significare uoluisse quod in uno homine quaereretur*. For modern discussions of these aspects, see Boerresen 1981, 26–30; van Bavel 1989, Soenneken 1989.

the rational mind, reflecting in an individual soul the image of God that was bequeathed to both sexes in Paradise. In this, Augustine follows a line of thought he had already suggested in *conf.* 13, 47 and *c. Faust.* 22, 27–28, but now with fuller argumentation. Augustine explains that as sense perceptions are shared equally by humans and animals, neither Adam nor Eve can stand as symbols for these. Therefore, the senses (*sensus corporis*) are now represented by the snake.<sup>124</sup>

While Augustine has thus refined his previous view of the psychological contents of Genesis 2–3, he continues to use these figures as stages in a progressive account of temptation and sin.<sup>125</sup> Thus, when sensual images are transferred from the *sensus corporis* to the higher part of the soul, they are encountered by two varying aspects of reason (*ratio*). These two aspects stand for Eve and Adam, i.e. for the practical (*scientia*) and contemplative (*sapientia*) “parts” of reason.<sup>126</sup> An occasion for sin arises when the bodily senses present something worthy of pursuing for its own sake (*frui*) and not only in reference to God (*uti*). There is, according to Augustine, a difference in the degree in the way in which the reason may consent to the representation of the values from the *sensus corporis*. This difference is due to two levels of consent in the reason. On the first level, only the practical part of reason consents to the insight that temporal and private goods are worthy of *fruitio*, and takes pleasure in this thought (*cogitationis delectatio*). This is comparable to the decision by Eve to submit to the serpent’s suggestion. The second, more serious case of consent occurs when the reason *as a whole*, together with the practical and contemplative sides, decides to act according to the presentation of values given by the *sensus corporis* and

<sup>124</sup> Augustine is aware that with such readjustment of the allegorical roles of the figures of Paradise, he is here breaking a venerable Christian tradition, as well as refining his own previous position in *Gn. adu. Man. trin.* 12, 20 *nec me fugit quosdam qui fuerunt ante nos egregii defensores catholicae fidei et diuini eloquii tractatores cum in homine uno cuius uniuersam animam bonam quendam paradisum esse senserunt duo ista requirerent, uirum mentem, mulierem uero dixisse corporis sensum.*

<sup>125</sup> There is a reason for such a cumulative progress, claims Augustine (*trin.* 12, 15–16): *nec ad tam turpem et miserabilem fornicationem semel ab exordio prosiliret, sed sicut scriptum est: qui modica spernit paulatim decidet. quomodo enim coluber non apertis passibus sed squamarum minutissimis nisibus repit, sic lubricus deficiendi motus negligentes minutatim occupat.*

<sup>126</sup> *trin.* 12, 17 *sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur; aeterna uero et incommutabilia spiritalia ratione sapientiae intelleguntur. rationi autem scientiae appetitus uicinus est quandoquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur ratiocinatur ea quae scientia dicitur actionis.* Sorabji (2000, 374) seems to miss Augustine’s reconsiderations here, taking Eve to represent “pleasure or appetite.”

mediated through the *ratio scientiae*. Whereas mere pleasure in the thought of a misjudged *fruitio* does not result in concrete action, the decision of the higher part of reason does result in such action.<sup>127</sup> Augustine wants to be exact here: there is a noticeable and important difference between the two kinds, or levels, of consent. A mere thought (*sola cogitatio*) that derives satisfaction from “holding and fidgeting with pleasure” (*tenens tamen et uoluens libenter*) things that should be rejected immediately is to be carefully distinguished from a decision to act according to such a thought.<sup>128</sup> Nonetheless, such a thought should also be counted as a sin; as sins, they are however, of a much less (*longe minus*) serious character as those perpetrated in action.<sup>129</sup>

Some noteworthy aspects can be discerned in Augustine’s retouched image of Adam and Eve in *trin.* 12. First, the heavy emphasis on temptations as referring to mistaken judgments of value. So it is not the bodily and sensual images as such that give rise to temptation, but a temptation occurs only if these images are connected to a mistaken judgment of their inherent value in producing happiness. In other words: Should the soul refer the

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<sup>127</sup> *trin.* 12, 17 *cum ergo huic intentioni mentis quae in rebus temporalibus et corporalibus propter actionis officium ratiocinandi uiuacitate uersatur carnalis ille sensus uel animalis ingerit quandam inlecebram fruendi se, id est tamquam bono quodam priuato et proprio non tamquam publico atque communi quod est incommutabile bonum, tunc uelut serpens alloquitur feminam. huic autem inlecebrae consentire de ligno prohibito manducare est. sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superioris uero auctoritate consilii ita membra retinentur ut non exhibeantur iniquitatis arma peccato, sic habendum existimo uelut cibum uetitum mulier sola comederit. si autem in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum ut si potestas sit etiam corpore compleatur, intellegenda est illa mulier dedisse uiro suo secum simul edendum illicitum cibum. neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suauiter uerum etiam efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni nisi et illa mentis intentio penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus mouendi uel ab opere cohibendi malae actioni cedat et seruiat.*

<sup>128</sup> Knuuttila (2004, 170) insists on the importance of immediacy in the action of the higher part: “the suggestion is not a sin, nor is the incipient pleasure of cogitation, provided that it is destroyed by the higher part as soon as it becomes aware of it.”

<sup>129</sup> *trin.* 12, 18 *nec sane cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur illicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et uoluens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum sed longe minus quam si et opere statuatur implendum. et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus uenia petenda est pectusque percutiendum atque dicendum dimitte nobis debita nostra [Mt 6,12], faciendumque quod sequitur atque in oratione iungendum: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris.* Augustine then strongly emphasises the unity of the mind by abandoning the allegory of Adam and Eve and rejecting its applicability even to the minute details: it would be a serious mistake to think that, as in Adam and Eve’s case, the *ratio scientiae* and *ratio sapientia* each carry their own individual responsibility in consenting or not consenting to the temptation. Even the “lighter” consent of only taking pleasure in thoughts of something evil, is culpable for the whole person: *haec quippe una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur.*

images of bodily senses to its own *fruitio* or should they be referred to God? Should the bodily goods be pursued for oneself as private belongings, or should their temporal existence be duly acknowledged and submitted to the eternal true goods that cannot suffer from any loss or privation? And as an answer: if the higher part of the *ratio* consents to a misguided calculation of goals (*officium ratiocinandi*), and the body is used to perpetrate these goals, a sin is at hand. The distinction of *uti-frui* has here been merged with noticeable clarity into the psychological allegory of Adam and Eve, which in *Gen. adu. Man.* was presented more in lines with a schematic Platonist account of the soul, and used there as a crude polemical tool against the Manichaean radical dualism.<sup>130</sup>

With this reassessment in the main function of the allegory, the roles of the Genesis narrative have also been subjected to reconsideration. Eve is no longer seen as simply representing the lower part of the soul, but the active, non-contemplative part of reason. However, even in this function, the Eve-part is still (as in *Gn. adu. Man.*) responsible for the contacts with the sensible world, and in *mediating* them from the snake, that is, she is active in processing irrational suggestions, which arise from the sense-perceptions, to the higher, intellectual soul. Together with the emphasis of temptation as a judgment of value, goes Augustine's wish to clarify how the distance is won between the bodily images and senses on the one hand, and the contemplative reason, which holds as its natural object of vision the immutable, eternal God, on the other hand.<sup>131</sup> Crucial in this respect is then the mediating role that *ratio actionis* has in submerging higher reason into the servitude of *triplex cupiditas*:

[T]hus referring all its means to the following ends: curiosity, searching for bodily and temporal experience through the senses; swollen conceit, affecting to be above other souls which are given over to their senses; or carnal pleasure, plunging itself in this muddy whirlpool.<sup>132</sup> [transl. Hill]

Thus, the role of *cupiditas* or *concupiscentia* in the psychological scheme concerning Adam and Eve seems to have waned from its position that it had for instance in *Gn. adu. Man.* Certain elements of the philosophical

<sup>130</sup> *trin.* 12, 21.

<sup>131</sup> Again, diverse concerns that could be labelled as both 'Stoic' (temptations as mistaken judgments of value) and 'Neoplatonic' (how the higher, immutable intellect comes to touch the sensible reality) thus merge in Augustine's psychological views.

<sup>132</sup> *trin.* 12, 14 *omnia officia sua ad eos fines referens quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia per corporis sensus quaerit, aut tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat excelsior, aut caenoso gurgite carnalis uoluptatis immergitur.*

traditions of emotions are conserved or developed further (e.g. the place and nuances in the role of consent), but the role of *concupiscentia*, or *cupiditas*, as explaining away the seemingly dualistic experience of reason versus the bodily desires of the soul, has been watered down in *trin.* 12.

In discussing the various trinitarian structures in the sense perceptions and memories, Augustine makes some interesting remarks on the emotions and their ethical value that relate to their intensity and ability to either bring out physical changes in the subject, or to create powerful distractions in the mind.<sup>133</sup> Overall, Augustine regularly makes negative judgments of a soul that lives according to the exterior trinities (*deformiter uiuit*), attaching mistaken values to bodily objects or to their recalled images (such a misapprehension is named *turpis cupiditas*, in opposition to *laudabilis uoluntas*, which only “uses” external things), or of a soul that experiences too intense (*uiolenta*, *nimia*) emotions through bodily senses.

At the level of the external sense perceptions (*species corporis—imago impressa—uoluntas animi*), Augustine notes how the will to keep an external bodily object in the hold of the senses (Augustine’s example here is sight) may become so intense (*uiolenta*) that even the body may be changed and affected by the act of perception (e.g. chameleons, pregnant mothers affecting their foetuses by their *libidines*). Such an intense will is thus better called *amor*, *cupiditas*, or *libido*.<sup>134</sup>

Proceeding to the level of the interior perceptions (the trinitarian structure is here formed of *memoria*, *interna uisio* and *uoluntas*), Augustine offers examples of how the will may be entirely submerged into the realm of interior images, turning towards them with such a force that even reason (*ipsa ratio*) cannot then discern between real or imagined objects. In these situations, people tend to be driven by such images as if they were in the midst of those actions or emotions, sometimes with such a force that they may exclaim something, or as in Augustine’s special example of a man who was able to produce particularly vivid expressions of women:

I remember once hearing a man say that it was usual with him to see the form of a woman’s body so vividly and as it were so solidly in his thoughts (*cogitando*) that he would as good as feel himself copulating with her and seed would even flow from his genitals.<sup>135</sup> [transl. Hill]

<sup>133</sup> These trinitarian structures are not the actual *imago dei*, as becomes clear in *trin.* 11, 8. Even human sinful actions, however, have certain resemblances to God’s being.

<sup>134</sup> *trin.* 11, 5. The behaviour of Jacob’s sheep (Gen 30, 37) is also cited as an example of this phenomenon.

<sup>135</sup> *trin.* 11, 7 *et memini me audisse a quodam, quod tam expressam et quasi solidam speciem*

Comparable to the occasions where the will forms the inner vision (*acies animi*) with excessive force are situations in which the conscious will seems to be overridden by dreams (*in somnis per imagines ludimur*), or by some other inner confusion, which may take place during fits of madness, divination, or prophecy. In these cases, however, the inner vision of the soul is driven by necessity (*necessitate incurrat*) to such images, and is therefore to be carefully discerned from a voluntary submersion to interior imagery.

Augustine also makes some brief but important remarks on emotions and their effect on the exterior or interior sense perceptions. First, it does not matter whether the sensed or imagined object is connected to attraction or repulsion (*cupiendo seu metuendo*): in both cases, the will produces an intention to watch the object with equal force (*rapitur animus in ea contuenda quae fugiat*). Second, Augustine claims that the more intensive (*uehementior*) the emotion is, be it either *cupiditas* or *metus*, the more clear and detailed (*expressius*) is the *acies animi* that beholds the image.<sup>136</sup>

The digressive or accidental remarks in *trin.* on the emotions, and their ethical value in general, or on desire in particular, thus show us a non-polemical Augustine, either developing his own scriptural-psychological allegories or making fine-tuned remarks on the interrelations between the

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*feminei corporis in cogitando cernere soleret, ut ei se quasi misceri sentiens, etiam genitalibus fluere.* Augustine takes this as evidence for the powers that the soul (*anima*) has over the body, for it can in these occasions move the body and change its quality. The interaction of body and soul, with a focus on emotions, is a topic that interested Augustine in *Gn. litt.* 10 as well. Discerning between two different desires (based on Gal 5, 17), Augustine points out how the fleshly concupiscence (the one Paul mentions in Gal 5, 17) is generated by the soul (*anima*) but necessarily needs body (*caro*) for its material. *carnem sine anima concupiscere nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. ex utroque enim fit: ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio nulla sentitur, ex carne autem, quod sine illa carnalis delectatio non sentitur.* *Gn. litt.* 10, 12, 20. A fleshly desire is thus denied to be derived from the body alone; nor is the soul able to desire without any contact to the body. "Fleshly desire" is a result from the interactive relationship of both. While the flesh provides the soul with the material of desire, the actual emotion of *concupiscentia* is felt as an enjoyment (*delectatio*) in the soul (*anima*). For Ambrose's idea on *concupiscentia* in the body-soul paradigm, see Ambr. *Isaac* 7, 60 *ignorantia et concupiscentia animae sunt aegritudines, sed ad speciem quam ad materiem magis referuntur. materia est caro, species est ignorantia et concupiscentia. cur igitur caro accusatur, cum tantae sint in specie labes? quia nihil species potest sine materia. denique nihil species securis sine materia facit. quid enim esset concupiscentia, nisi eam caro inflammaret?* This is built on Plotinian material (*En.* 1, 1, 4; 1, 8, 8). For Ambrose's knowledge of Plotinus, see Lennox-Conyngham 1993, 114–119.

<sup>136</sup> From these depictions, it is indeed clear that Augustine conceives emotions as "forms of will," or volitions. Knuuttila 2004, 159, 168.



senses, memory and emotions as overdriven volitions. Again, these considerations betray some influences of the traditional discourses of emotions (e.g. the physical effects of emotions, and, more implicitly and suggestively, the emphasis on the emotions as overdriven or overdone, or as voluntary responses to mistakenly valued objects, resembling Stoic notions), but also something of Augustine's own philosophical capabilities.<sup>137</sup> However, in the course of the Pelagian debate, he was forced to have another, reflexive look at what he conceived to be the mistakes of commonplace philosophical psychology about the emotions in general, and about *concupiscentia* in particular. These reflections can be found in their sharpest form in *ciu.*, and in Augustine's debate with Julian of Aeclanum.

### 5.3. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS—*DE CIUITATE DEI* AND THE DEBATE WITH JULIAN OF AECLANUM (410–430)

In the third and last section of this chapter, we will see Augustine at his most sceptical towards the contribution of the traditional (or commonplace) philosophical positions on the emotions in connection with *concupiscentia*. It seems reasonable to presume that if *Simpl.* held a crucial position in Augustine's understanding of grace, this may have had some repercussions for his way of using the traditional views of emotions and their therapy as well. Did a stronger notion of grace affect Augustine's emphasis on the soul's passions and their controllability? Did Augustine become critical of certain facets of the old philosophical views of the emotions and their moderation?<sup>138</sup> What would be Augustine's reaction if he would be opposed to a philosophical analysis of his views of sexual *concupiscentia*? However, as we have seen in the previous section, the evidence for such repercussions during the decade following *Simpl.* remains at best inconclusive.<sup>139</sup> Nonetheless,

<sup>137</sup> For these Stoic notions, see Graver 2007, 38–41, 66–70.

<sup>138</sup> Such a development has been argued by e.g. Wetzel 1992, 50–55, 98–111.

<sup>139</sup> *Simpl.* as such does not betray any particular interest in desire in the framework of a general theory of emotions; a more relevant question for Augustine in this work was about *cupiditas* or *concupiscentia* and their role in Christian renewal and in interpretation of Rom 7. The only instance where Augustine's discussion moves along the themes of emotions and their quality in *Simpl.* is on the question of whether God is actually affected by anger or pity in the same way as human beings are (*Simpl.* 2, 2, 2). Augustine's answer can be succinctly put as following: *eodem uerbo non eodem modo*. Only after human emotions are “distilled” from their disturbed and temporal aspects, one can obtain a glimpse of what kind of states of the divine mind are meant by the biblical phrases about God's wrath, jealousy or pity.

in this last section it will be argued that Augustine indeed had to consider some modifications or adjustments in his use of psychological commonplaces, the kind of which we have seen he used in his earlier works against the Manichaeans. These adjustments, with a more direct criticism towards the philosophical schools on the matter of the emotions in general, and *concupiscentia* in particular, came somewhat late, however, in connection with the Pelagian crisis.

So far, we have seen how Augustine appropriated certain commonplace elements of traditional philosophical psychology into his theological campaigns, mainly against the Manichaeans. The Platonist insights into the soul and its parts had shown Augustine how to include even subrational desires into the created human constitution. Together with the Stoic emphasis on the sovereignty of reason over emotions, with consent marking the limits of moral responsibility, these insights were all an effective part of Augustine's reformulations against his previous radically dualistic and fatalistic psychological views. To complete this account, it is therefore time to see how Augustine was also able to be critical of the mainstream philosophical views. For that, we shall first turn to Augustine's most extensive and comprehensive discussions of the traditional theories of emotions, in connection with his insights into evil desire. These can be found in his *magnum opus*, *de ciuitate dei*, mainly in Books 9 and 14. We will then select some points of argument from the debate between Augustine and Julian that concern *concupiscentia*, emotions and the representatives of the philosophical traditions.

### 5.3.1. *De Ciuitate Dei* 9 and 14

The larger setting of Augustine's goals in his discussion of emotions in *de ciuitate dei* 9 could be reduced to very basic propositions such as to worship demons and to use them as intermediaries between the gods and men is foolishness, or to think that a virtuous life could be achieved without divine aid is a mistaken ethical standpoint. Thus, Augustine's theological deconstruction starts with an argument by which he shows that the demons are unable to use virtue to overpower their emotions, and therefore such spirits are not in any reasonable way worthy of people's worship.<sup>140</sup> No creatures, be they demons or anything else, can work as mediators between

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<sup>140</sup> *ciu.* 9, 3.

men and God. This leads Augustine to confirm that there is, however, one real mediator, the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ.<sup>141</sup>

With such theological points, Augustine starts *ciu.* 9. These specifically apologetic and Christian, basic tenets underlie Augustine's discussion of the emotions in *ciu.* 9; and while it is relatively easy to point out Augustine's simple strategic aims in *ciu.* in connection to the role and importance of the pagan philosophical traditions, it is easy to get implicated into, and thus put too much weight on, the clever tactical moves by which Augustine proceeds in his considerations of the philosophical schools. The main function of these considerations is to commend and to end with the goal and contents of the Christian way of life, and not to present detached and balanced philosophical inquiries as such.<sup>142</sup> It is therefore crucial to notice how Augustine's discussion of the philosophical traditions of the emotions is embedded into this larger context of the correct object of worship, the goal of the virtuous life and the possibility (of which Augustine is explicitly sceptical in *ciu.*) of reaching such a way of life with the assistance of pagan philosophy.<sup>143</sup>

Within the context of emotions, Augustine pursues his strategy by creating the effect of the uselessness of all philosophical schools alike in achieving virtuous life, and combines therefore artificially the conflicting views of emotions in these traditions. Then he argues that none of the schools is able to teach or achieve control of the affectional impulses in this life, and thereby lead people into a happy life. In the course of argument, Augustine represents all humankind (Stoics and Platonists and Peripatetics included) sharing with the unhappy demons the inability to help their disturbed states of mind. The solution Augustine offers in *ciu.* 14 is already pointed at in *ciu.* 9—only Christians are able to put their emotions to constructive uses.<sup>144</sup> As it seems impossible to eliminate emotions from this life, Augustine offers

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<sup>141</sup> Augustine returns to this theological starting point in the last sections of *ciu.* 9, where he makes the comparison between these two kinds of mediators in terms of pride and humility: demons in their emotional upheavals are proud enough to expect divine honours to be given to them, while Christ is the only lowly and humble mediator between God and men.

<sup>142</sup> *ciu.* 9, 15; 9, 17.

<sup>143</sup> It is not intended here that Augustine would have treated the philosophical schools as unable to offer constructive aid to anyone due to their impractical and theoretical nature, and that only the Christian faith was practically oriented to overcoming difficulties in moral behaviour. For Augustine, too, philosophical traditions were "ways of life," but they were mistaken in their basic premises about God and virtue. See Hadot 1993, 1995, 2002.

<sup>144</sup> *ciu.* 9, 5.

another solution: one has to receive the right kind of “reason,” or “attitude,” or love, which directs the emotions into an ordered and reasonable contribution in the progress towards happy life.<sup>145</sup>

Let us examine closer how Augustine tactically reaches his strategic ends. As a prelude to a more serious discussion of the schools and their conflicts, he chooses Apuleius’ account of the gods and *daemones* (Apul. *de deo Socratis* 12) to represent a Platonic case concerning the difference between the gods and the lower spirits.<sup>146</sup> The *Platonici* have been Augustine’s partners in dialogue in his previous books and they will continue to be so in *ciu.* 9.<sup>147</sup> Soon enough, Augustine is led to inquire about the nature of the emotional life of the demons by Apuleius’ somewhat lyrical notion of the demons and their “minds being tossed upon a heaving sea by all their thoughts.”<sup>148</sup> With relish, Augustine points out that the demons must be miserable creatures indeed, for not only the inferior parts of their souls are disturbed by emotions, but also their very minds (*mens*) are in turbulent states. Augustine then compares these creatures to wise men (*homines sapientes*) who are able to resist such disturbances with untroubled minds.<sup>149</sup> Or are they? This episode works as Augustine’s lead to test the more serious ideas, conceived by Stoics and the other schools, of control over the emotions. The wise man, or the Stoic *sapiens*, represents the test case, for if he fails, then no

<sup>145</sup> In his well-known phrase, Augustine refers to these affects as “wills” (*uoluntates*, *ciu.* 14, 6), but these dynamic movements of the soul are ordered, and directed by the singular will, *caritas*. For evaluations of Augustine’s aims in his discussion of emotions in *ciu.* see Wetzel 1992, 98–111; Brachtendorf 1997. Sorabji (2000, 380–384) concentrates more on how Augustine misinterpreted the Stoic tradition and less on Augustine’s own intentions in doing so. Knuuttila (2004, 153–162) is also rather economical in speculating Augustine’s motives for his tendentious representation of the Stoics in *ciu.* 9.

<sup>146</sup> Why Apuleius? Augustine certainly knew about the more reputed Neoplatonist philosophers. Perhaps it was Apuleius’ “vague psychological terminology” (O’Daly 1999, 119) that offered Augustine a useful starting point in his critique of the philosophical traditions of emotions, and ultimately, in pointing out their uselessness in reaching *beata uita*. Augustine’s manoeuvre is thus understandable, but of course, “unfair” (*ibid.*). O’Donnell (1980) suggests another reason, similarly related to apologetic concerns: Apuleius was a popular read in those philosophical circles with which Marcellinus was acquainted, and worried about (*ep.* 136, 1), and thus gave Augustine a reason to direct his criticism against this author.

<sup>147</sup> *ciu.* 9, 1 *Platonici* [...] *praecipui philosophorum ac nobilissimi* [...] *cum quibus uelut cum excellentioribus placuit istam examinare quaestionem.*

<sup>148</sup> *ciu.* 9, 3. Discussion with Apuleius had commenced already in the previous book, *ciu.* 8, 14–18, on the passions of the demons.

<sup>149</sup> *ciu.* 9, 3 *ut ne hominibus quidem sapientibus comparandi sint, qui huius modi perturbationibus animum, a quibus humana non est immunis infirmitas, etiam cum eas huius uitae conditione patiuntur, mente inperurbata resistunt, non eis cedentes ad aliquod adprobandum uel perpetrandum, quod exorbitet ab itinere sapientiae et lege iustitiae.*

other candidates can be found. Again, Augustine provides his audience with an entertaining philosophical anecdote, this time from Aulus Gellius (*noct. Att.* 19, 1). Augustine's tendentious use of Gellius' report has been noted on several occasions, and there is no need for any further detailed analyses of the discrepancies between Augustine's and Gellius' reports here.<sup>150</sup> A simple comparison of terminology, following the outline of Richard Sorabji can however be presented as follows:

AULUS GELLIUS (*Noct. Att.* 19, 1)

α) hominem conspicimus pavidum et exterritum

β) "quid hoc est," inquit "o philosophe, quod, cum in periculis essemus, timuisti tu et palluisti? ego neque timui neque pallui." "si quid ego" inquit "in tanta violentia tempestatum videor paulum pavefactus, non tu istius rei ratione audienda dignus es."

γ) quanam illa ratio esset pavoris sui

δ) quid super isto brevi quidem, sed necessario et naturali pavore maiores nostri, conditores sectae Stoicae, senserint

ε) sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est non opinione alicuius mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium mentis atque rationis praevertentibus.

ζ)

AUGUSTINE (*ciu.* 9, 4)

α) ui timoris expalluit

β) diues luxuriosus [...] inludens, quod extimuisset atque palluisset

γ) quanam illa ratio esset pauoris sui

δ)

ε) animi uisa [...] necesse est etiam sapientis animum moueant, ita ut paulisper uel pauescat metu, uel tristitia contrahatur, tamquam his passionibus praeuenientibus mentis et rationis officium; nec ideo tamen in mente fieri opinionem mali, nec adprobari ista eisque consentire.

ζ) ita illud periculum perhorresceret, ut palloris etiam testimonio prodere-tur. uerum tamen et illam poterat per-motionem pati, et fixam tenere mente sententiam,

<sup>150</sup> The story appears also in *qu.* 1, 30. For the discrepancies between Gellius and Augustine, see Brachtendorf 1997, 297–300; Sorabji 2000, 372–384; Knuuttila, 153–155. For a minimalist suggestion of Augustine's knowledge of Gellius' work, consult O'Donnell 1980, who thinks that Augustine even used some type of intermediary florilegium in his treatment of Gellius.

AULUS GELLIUS (*Noct. Att.* 19, 1)

η) rebus forte id genus, quibus dixi, obortis pavescere sensim et quasi albescere non insipientis esse hominis neque ignavi putemus et in eo tamen brevi motu naturali magis infirmitati cedamus, quam quod esse ea, qualia visa sunt, censeamus.

θ)

AUGUSTINE (*ciu.* 9, 4)

η) non minus Stoicus quam Peripateticus pauescat et palleat, ea non aequaliter appellando, sed aequaliter aestimando?

θ) ita mens, ubi fixa est ista sententia, **nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidunt inferioribus animi partibus**, in se contra rationem praeualere permittit; quin immo eis ipsa dominatur eisque non consentiendo et potius resistendo regnum uirtutis exercet.

The phrases in roman show how Augustine faithfully renders parts of Gellius' terminology.<sup>151</sup> The original Stoic terminology, which kept the first movements, or prepassions, strictly separate from the actual emotions, had already become muddled in Gellius' report, and this suits Augustine's purposes well. The phrases in bold are examples of Augustine going even further in making futile the crucial differences between the Stoic, Platonist, and the Peripatetic views of emotions.<sup>152</sup> Gellius' report, in fact, serves Augustine's purposes so well that the choice of the source seems hardly coincidental so as to betray mere innocent ignorance on Augustine's part.<sup>153</sup> On the contrary, with Gellius' report, Augustine is able to show that the ancient schools were splitting hairs on a problem they were essentially in agreement: one should control one's emotions "in the lower parts of the soul" in order to achieve happy life in this life on one's own, without God's help.<sup>154</sup> According to Augustine, this is a serious mistake.

<sup>151</sup> As Sorabji (2000, 375) has pointed out, even Gellius' terminology is essentially mistaken.

<sup>152</sup> For Augustine's take on the Peripatetic views, Knuuttila (2004, 155) notes: "Augustine apparently did not have any clear picture of the Aristotelian theory; he assumed that it did not differ significantly from the Platonic view."

<sup>153</sup> Brachtendorf (1997, 298 n. 32) argues that Augustine's way of interpreting the Stoic *commoda* and the Platonic *bona* is part of his larger strategy and analogical to his way of conflating the Stoic view on prepassions and the Platonic model of the parts of the soul. Thus, Brachtendorf also thinks that Augustine's alterations are deliberate and designed for his larger scale purposes in *ciu.*

<sup>154</sup> *ciu.* 9, 4 *ita mens, ubi fixa est ista sententia, nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidunt inferioribus animi partibus*. Augustine's final conclusion on his discussion here reveals his Platonic preference over Stoic psychology.

Remarkably, Augustine takes Gellius' account further by claiming that some *passions* briefly by-pass (*passionibus [...] paulisper praeuenientibus*) the controlling function of the mind, thus affecting a short period during which even the soul of the wise necessarily and unavoidably grows pale with *fear* and is contracted by *sadness* (Augustine uses here the terms of the actual emotions). This is much more than what is said in Gellius' original report, according to which the Stoic view is paraphrased as "the soul moving, contracting and growing pale [...] by certain rapid and unsolicited movements, which happen before the function of mind and reason."<sup>155</sup> With these moves, Augustine has deliberately misrepresented certain points of the Stoic theory, and subsequently dismissed it together with other theories. Augustine is not interested in (in his view) the secondary differences in these theories of the quality of the preceding movements; instead, he wishes to oppose these pagan visions of attaining the virtuous life by presenting his own Christian understanding of emotions and their relation to a good life. Thus, in the next period, we see Augustine establishing this understanding by accentuating the "righteous use" of emotions under the governance of mind and God. Augustine's point of view is emphatically Christian, and he here stresses the difference between the Christian and pagan solution to the problem of emotions, and hence, to a happy life.

*Within our discipline*, then, we do not so much ask whether a *pious soul* is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but whence comes his sadness; not whether he is afraid, but what he fears.<sup>156</sup>

[transl. Dyson, italics mine]

Formally, Augustine's solution resembles that of the Platonic model; what is added, is his idea of the supernaturally given motivation in the moderation and "righteous use" of the passions.<sup>157</sup>

In *ciu.* 9, Augustine analyses the passions and the theories of emotions as a whole, and he does not feel the need to pursue his investigation to include the considerations of individual emotions, such as desire. However, Augus-

<sup>155</sup> Sorabji 2000, 378.

<sup>156</sup> *ciu.* 9, 5 *non est nunc necesse copiose ac diligenter ostendere, quid de istis passionibus doceat scriptura diuina, qua christiana eruditio continetur. deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuuandam mentique passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas, ut in usum iustitiae conuertantur. denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat.*

<sup>157</sup> See Knuuttila 2004, 160–161.

tine returns to the theories of emotions in *ciu.* 14, and provides yet another, fuller account of his understanding of the philosophical theories of emotions, of their lesser value and of their shortcomings as compared to his own Christian version. In this discussion, Augustine uses a particular emotion to highlight his argument of the corrupted human emotions, whose control and moderation is impossible with the aid offered by the philosophical discourses; for it seems to him, that certain movements of the lower part of the soul are even capable of violently rapturing the mind's consent, and their moderation requires something else than is given by the schools. For such a raptured consent, Augustine offers the special example of sexual desire (*concupiscentia carnis*).

As we have seen in Chapter 3, the focus in *ciu.* 14 is uncompromisingly theological. Augustine describes the first sin as a deliberate abandonment of God and His good will, and as the ultimate act of the pride of humanity to live its life "on its own." In course of the argument of *ciu.* 14, concerning emotions in general and *libido*, or *concupiscentia*, in particular, Augustine anticipates his critique of the ancient philosophical traditions of the virtues in later books. These traditions, albeit having found some fundamental truths concerning God, creation and humankind, have never understood the incarnation of Christ or divine grace. The book starts with Augustine's definitions of *caro* and *spiritus*. He thereby charts the way in which the Bible uses these words: 'flesh' denotes both the human body and the mind, when they are both in opposition to God's will.<sup>158</sup> To live 'according to the flesh' is ultimately a sign of belonging to *ciuitas terrena*, or *ciuitas diaboli*. As for the opposite, to live according to the spirit is to live according to God's will, and to let the basic attitude of love (*caritas*) direct one's mind and actions. People living according to the spirit are also by definition members of the City of God.

In such a context, Augustine returns to the discussion of emotions where he left in *ciu.* 9, 5:

What is important here is the quality of man's will. For if the will is perverse, the emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will be not only blameless, but praiseworthy.<sup>159</sup> [transl. Dyson]

<sup>158</sup> See Mayer 1986. For a developmental account of Augustine's theology of the body, see Miles 1994, 6–20. For the Christian attitudes toward the body, see also the material collected in Courcelle 1965.

<sup>159</sup> *ciu.* 14, 6 *interest autem qualis sit uoluntas hominis; quia si peruersa est, peruersos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, uerum etiam laudabiles erunt.*



Once more, Augustine opposes his Christian view of the emotions to that of the “philosophers,” claiming that because the right basic attitude of Christians is “righteous,” their emotions are all righteous as well.<sup>160</sup> Augustine then gives several examples of such rightly ordered Christian emotions. These are grouped according to three different categories: first, Christians may have just emotions in relation to their eternal destiny; second, acceptable emotions arise in relation to sin and good works; and third, Scripture commends the good emotions that arise in the time of temptation. Johannes Brachtendorf has called these emotions “second-order passions,” for they seem all to be “reactions to sin, i.e. reactions to the victory of first-order passions.”<sup>161</sup> This may be true for many examples that Augustine has to offer, but not necessarily for all of them: it is hard to see why the emotions arising from, for example, good works should be counted as second-order passions.<sup>162</sup>

Augustine emphasises that the Christian version of passions are not meant to serve individual purposes and happiness only: the emotions are, so to speak, communal.<sup>163</sup> The epitome of such communal Christian emotions was the apostle Paul, to whom Augustine dedicates a rather long sequence of eulogy in *ciu.* 14, 9.

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<sup>160</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9 *uerum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam de uerbis cupidores esse contentionis quam ueritatis. apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam ciues sanctae ciuitatis dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum deum uiuentes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.*

<sup>161</sup> Brachtendorf 1997, 301.

<sup>162</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9 *ut gaudeant in operibus bonis, audiunt: hilarem datorem diligit deus.*

<sup>163</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9 *non solum autem propter se ipsos his mouentur affectibus, uerum etiam propter eos, quos liberari cupiunt et ne pereant metuunt, et dolent si pereunt et gaudent si liberantur.* In a sermon dating after ca. 419, Augustine centres Christian affective responses around Christ, with a heavily critical stance against the Stoic ideal of apathy (described as *stupor*). *Io. eu. tr.* 60, 3 *pereant argumenta philosophorum, qui negant in sapientem cadere perturbationes animorum. stultam fecit deus sapientiam huius mundi; et dominus nouit cogitationes hominum, quoniam uanae sunt. turbetur plane animus christianus, non miseria, sed misericordia; timeat ne pereant homines Christo, contristetur cum perit aliquis Christo; concupiscat adquiri homines Christo, laetetur cum adquiruntur homines Christo; timeat et sibi ne pereat Christo, contristetur peregrinari se a Christo; concupiscat regnare cum Christo, laetetur dum sperat se regnaturum esse cum Christo. istae sunt certe quatuor quas perturbationes uocant, timor et tristitia, amor et laetitia. habeant eas iusti de causis animi christiani, nec philosophorum Stoicorum, uel quorumcumque similium consentiatur errori; qui profecto quemadmodum unitatem existimant ueritatem, sic stuporem deputant sanitatem, ignorantes sic hominis animum, quemadmodum corporis membrum, desperatius aegrotare, quando et doloris amiserit sensum.*

Accordingly, concrete examples of rightly ordered Christian emotions occur in the Bible. But they can also be defined in more general terms as being “exhibited in the proper circumstances” (*ubi oportet adhibentur*), and being “consequences of right reason” (*rectam rationem sequantur*).<sup>164</sup> Augustine formulates yet another qualification of virtuous emotions, but finds this to be fully manifested only in Christ: for He only has been able to accept an emotion to take place in the mind “when He so willed.”<sup>165</sup> When it comes to the Christians, however, even the acceptable emotions are more ambiguous, and they may take place in the mind against one’s will.<sup>166</sup> Even so, these types of emotions are signs of humanity, and should not be thought as something to be completely eradicated. Augustine condemns the ideal of *apatheia* as insensitivity.<sup>167</sup>

In his concluding general remarks on emotions in *ciu.* 14, 9, Augustine returns to his fundamental division between *ciuitas dei* and *ciuitas impiorum*. Augustine has exposed his own theory of the Christian emotions as a critique of other views of emotions, be they either unreflected or more elaborately philosophical. The representatives of these competing views he now labels either as “convulsed by the emotions as if by diseases and upheavals” or, referring to a more reflective attitude to emotions, as people who “seem to control and in some way temper those emotions, they are [...] proud and elated in their impiety.” The Stoic representatives of *apatheia* are

<sup>164</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9.

<sup>165</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9 *nullum habens omnino peccatum adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicauit [...] ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita cum uoluit suscepit animo humano.*

<sup>166</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9 *etiam cum rectas et secundum deum habemus has affectiones, huius uitae sunt, non illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus. itaque aliquando, quamuis non culpabili cupiditate, sed laudabili caritate moueamur, etiam dum nolumus flemus.*

<sup>167</sup> The term ‘eradication’ surfaces in the debate with Julian. This term appears only briefly in *c. Iul.* 4, 8, where Julian had pointed out to Augustine that if *concupiscentia carnis*, or *calor genitalis* in Julian’s diction really is evil by nature, it should be eradicated (*extirpandus*), not “quieted” (*componendus*). Julian knew of methods by which overheated male *libido* may be moderated: music, particularly in spondaic rhythm, is a good way of acquiescing *libido*. Julian quotes here a well-known story, handed down by e.g. Cicero. *c. Iul.* 5, 23. Similar non-cognitive therapies were described by several philosophers in the various schools. Sorabji 2000, 81–91, 405–406. Augustine provides a standard reply: *concupiscentia* is an unavoidable evil that has to be suffered in this life. This is, by the way, one of the rare instances in Augustine’s corpus where the word *extirpare* occurs in relation to emotions, and *concupiscentia*. The initiative, in addition, came from Julian’s side. Generally, Augustine only uses *extirpare* or *eradicare* in the biblically coloured context of one’s basic motives, or attitudes, of *cupiditas* or *caritas*. The former should be “eradicated,” while the other should be “implanted.”

characterised as “so entranced by their own self-restraint that they are not stirred or excited or swayed or influenced by any emotions at all.”<sup>168</sup>

Having thus depicted the philosophical traditions of emotions in a polemical way that serves well his larger purposes in *ciu.*, Augustine moves on to discuss some biblical evidence of emotions (especially passages concerning the origin of sin). By doing this, he is gradually able to focus on a special case of emotion which he thinks exemplifies the way in which even the most involuntary emotional impulse (to the degree of being actually a punishment), may serve righteous purposes in the life of a Christian, and a Christian only. Augustine’s analysis of emotions is intervened by a discussion on how and why, in fact, the human soul became corrupted and disordered in Paradise (*ciu.* 14, 10–15). After this theological discussion, Augustine proceeds to treat the problem of sexual desire.<sup>169</sup> Augustine uses sexual desire (*libido*) as an extreme example of the disordered emotional responses in this life. It is important to remember that Augustine’s discussion of *libido* in *ciu.* 14 is tightly woven into the more theological context of it being a corresponding punishment for the first self-centred movement of the will in Paradise. This theological framework tones and directs everything Augustine has to say about *libido* in *ciu.* 14. While certain elements of both the Stoic and Platonic traditions are used in Augustine’s discussion in a *commune bonum* fashion, his main concern is to show the inadequacy and the erroneous goals of the ancient therapies. Augustine pursues this concern by emphasising the disordered state of sexual desire as opposed to the Golden Age means of conception in Paradise (which entailed a complete and tranquil voluntary control of the sexual organs); by studying the iron grip of the disordered *libido* even in the legitimate contexts of (Christian) marriage; and by treating sexual shame as providing an obvious testimony for the detachment of *libido* from the voluntary control of the body.

Augustine therefore describes *libido* as the most disordered of all emotions.<sup>170</sup> While *libido* affects a strong bodily pleasure, its influence on the mind is equally serious, and the whole person is moved by the joint affect and appetite of both the body and the soul. During the climax of *libido*, the ability of the mind to focus (*acies cogitationis*) on anything else becomes nearly impossible.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> *ciu.* 14, 9.

<sup>169</sup> For Augustine’s discussion on obedience, disobedience and its just punishment, see Chapter 3.

<sup>170</sup> By *libido* with no specifying attributes, Augustine denotes sexual desire (see Chapter 2).

<sup>171</sup> *ciu.* 14, 16.

Augustine mentions several times the extreme disjunction between *libido* and rational will. In other words, there are times when there seems to be no connection between the dual effects of *libido* on the body and the mind: *libido* may stir one's body without any incitations of the soul; on the other hand, *libido* may "burn in the mind," but "grow cold in the body." Thus *libido* may even contradict its own agitations.<sup>172</sup>

Subscribing to the Platonic view of three parts of the soul, Augustine claims that the two lower parts were not corrupted before the Fall. However, due to the Fall, these two parts became in constant need of rational moderation and control, and reason should therefore direct them into good uses: anger, or the spirited part, is needed in "just coercion" and *libido*, or the desiring part, is used for the reproduction of children. In this life, even Christians (*qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt*) have to control and curb these impulsive parts of their souls. However, there lies a crucial difference between *ira* and *libido*. Whereas anger produces voluntary movements of the body (angry words, or even punches), the actual effects of *libido* remain involuntary even in the area of bodily movements. This is because "the sexual organs have somehow fallen so completely under the sway of lust that they have no power of movement at all if this passion is absent [...] it is this that makes us ashamed."<sup>173</sup> The shame and disorder of *libido* lies in that it practically bypasses the higher functions of the soul, and snatches (*eripuit*) away what should be under the will's control.<sup>174</sup> The "natural order" of things dictates that the soul should be in control of its own lower parts; at least it should have control over all bodily movements. Both of these kinds of control of the soul fail under the influence of sexual desire, which therefore for Augustine represents the extreme case of emotional disorder in our fallen world.<sup>175</sup> Even the Christians, high above all philosophically oriented

<sup>172</sup> *ciu.* 14, 16.

<sup>173</sup> *ciu.* 14, 19 *opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. at uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit.*

<sup>174</sup> *ciu.* 14, 20 *in eius quippe inoboedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus subdidit et potestati uoluntatis eripuit.*

<sup>175</sup> *ciu.* 14, 23 *et utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse animus imperat corpori facilius quam sibi. uerum tamen haec libido, de qua nunc disserimus, eo magis erubescenda extitit, quod animus in ea nec sibi efficaciter imperat, ut omnino non libeat, nec omni modo corpori, ut pudenda membra uoluntas potius quam libido commoueat.*

aspirations to control emotions, have to confess now and then that they are overcome by the suggestions of *libido* (but only in a rather restricted sense). Augustine notes that in all other emotional states the struggle is felt only inside the soul, and even though the lower parts would achieve victory over the higher part, the strife would remain internal, “for it is then conquered only by itself, and so is itself still the victor.”<sup>176</sup> This is not so in the case of sexual desire, where the movements of the body seem to overrule the higher control of the soul.

In discussing emotions in general and sexual desire in particular, Augustine is prone to emphasise the way they influence the members of the City of God, i.e. Christians.<sup>177</sup> These people are inevitably affected by emotions, and sometimes even by disordered emotions, of which *libido* represents the extreme case. The citizens of *ciuitas dei* are, however, able to use even *libido* for good purposes, that is, for the procreation of new members to the City.<sup>178</sup> Moreover, their struggle against disordered emotions is itself ordered; in other words, it does not lead the members of the City of God into even more damaging attitudes of pride and illusory views of one’s independency in a supposed control over emotional impulses.

On the other hand, the members of *ciuitas terrena* are once more seen as prey to their impious impulses. The most serious forms of opposition to God are noted in the end of *ciu.* 14, where Augustine sums up the two different qualities of the two cities as follows:

In the Earthly City, princes are as much mastered by their lust for mastery (*dominandi libido dominatur*) as the nations which they subdue are by them [...] the city loves its own strength (*diligit uirtutem suam*) as displayed in its mighty men [...] Thus, in the Earthly City, its wise men, who live according to man, have pursued the goods of the body or of their own mind, or both [...] Professing themselves to be wise (that is, exalting themselves in their wisdom, under the dominion of pride, *dominante sibi superbia in sua sapientia sese extollentes*), they became fools.<sup>179</sup> [transl. Dyson]

Augustine thus sees both the secular powers of *ciuitas terrena* and its cultural values and representatives as having failed in their different projects of attempting to reach control, either over social communities or over the

<sup>176</sup> *ciu.* 14, 23.

<sup>177</sup> *ciu.* 14, 19 *ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur.*

<sup>178</sup> *ciu.* 14, 16. To use evil things for good purposes is, in fact, characteristic of God’s works, *ciu.* 14, 27.

<sup>179</sup> *ciu.* 14, 28.

mind and body. The meandering discussions of emotions in *ciu.* 9 and 14 have one very particular end: this end is not to show how close to the truth the ancient philosophical traditions have come, but rather, how they have failed in their attempts in reaching virtuous life, wisdom and God.<sup>180</sup> The reasoning is similar enough in the main argument later in *ciu.* 19, where Augustine discusses the connection between the rightly ordered soul and the rightly ordered communities. Only when people adjust their loves and lives according to God's will they become able to pursue a right and just order in their souls, in their families and in their public lives. Augustine denies this to be possible for anyone but Christians, albeit non-Christians may form communities based on their shared convictions on what to love and pursue.<sup>181</sup> In *ciu.* 19, 4, Augustine discusses the cardinal virtues in relation to the old philosophical schools, and denies that any of these virtues can be achieved or practised without the Christian faith. Augustine sums it all up in *ciu.* 19, 27 by asserting that only Christians are efficiently able to resist vices, and even they do it with difficulty.<sup>182</sup>

The special and rather distinctively Augustinian exposition of the sexual *libido* is one part of his tactics to illustrate how the emotional disorder of fallen humankind cannot be in any way reinstated and put to good use except in the Christian context of "holy matrimony" and in a "wise and pious style of life." Outside the City of God, *libido* either drives people to a desperate hunt of pleasure or to a doomed attempt at self-control, which may appear as successful on the level of reining in the wild, involuntary incitations of *libido*, but necessarily leads to pride and self-deception without the right wisdom, namely the Christian *pietas*.<sup>183</sup> In *ciu.* 14, sexual desire, situated in a familiar scheme of the traditional discussions of emotions, is therefore given some extra potency in order to highlight Augustine's major apologetic and theological goals. Augustine is driven by a need to show that the philosophical therapies of emotions are essentially similar, and also similar in their inadequacy; even the renewed, and supernaturally motivated Christian community finds it hard or even impossible to gain full control over the emotional impulses in this life. *Libido* in *ciu.* 9 and 14 can therefore be seen as a psychologically treated proof for theological realities, which are awaiting their outcome in future life.

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<sup>180</sup> See *ciu.* 19, 21; 19, 23–24. See also *ciu.* 22, 23.

<sup>181</sup> See *ciu.* 19, 21; 19, 23–24.

<sup>182</sup> See also *ciu.* 22, 23.

<sup>183</sup> *ciu.* 14, 28.

5.3.2. *Critical Encounters with Philosophy, Emotions,  
and Christian Psychology in the Debate with Julian of Aeclanum*

The last major discussions on *concupiscentia* in the context of the ancient philosophical traditions of the emotions can be found in Augustine's debate with Julian.<sup>184</sup> Due to the nature of the debate, the insights presented by Augustine have an air of being piecemeal discussions of various technical subjects. The seemingly fragmentary notions do, however, confirm the undercurrent found in *ciu.*: that is, Augustine finds some use for the philosophical notions of *concupiscentia*, but remains quite critical of what he conceives as the pagan option in dealing with the causes and origins of the problem of *concupiscentia*. At the same time, Augustine does seldom miss an opportunity to remind us of the correct context of conceiving the role and status of *concupiscentia*, i.e. Christian renewal after baptism (see further Chapter 6). The emphasis on sexual desire, peculiar as it may seem to modern tastes, returns to theological reasons: the overwhelmingly, even compellingly strong sexual desires cannot be overcome using pagan (or Pelagian, for that matter) insights, as they are hardly composed even by Catholic Christians, who are, after all, aided by God's grace.

*Is Concupiscentia an Emotional Quality?*

A brief discussion between Julian and Augustine on *concupiscentia* as an "emotional quality" (*affectionalis qualitas*) occurs in *c. Iul.* 6, 53–56.<sup>185</sup> Julian had read from *nupt. et conc.* 1, 28 Augustine's remark on *concupiscentia* as being an "affection of evil quality" (*affectio malae qualitatis*).<sup>186</sup> This has

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<sup>184</sup> Augustine's final, voluminous debates with Julian have been studied from the viewpoint of the philosophical traditions of emotions by Sorabji 2000, 400–417 (excluding dreams and consent); and Lössl 2002, writing on Julian's conception of pain. Sorabji takes an openly critical stance against Augustine and finds Julian's positions on the emotions more convincing than those of Augustine's. Sorabji 2000, 416: "Julian won the philosophical, but Augustine the political, battle." Cf. Rist 1994, 327, for Julian's critique of Augustine's views of sex: "Julian's failure was precisely as a philosopher." Lössl (2002, 203–207) is more modest in judgment, advocating rather a fair treatment of Julian's philosophical and theological positions. Cf., however, Lössl's (2002, 242) concluding remarks: "Even though Julian ostensibly stressed that the claims of medicine were much more limited than Augustine assumed, what he in fact proposed was a theological explanation and justification of natural philosophical and scientific research in its own right. In doing so he may not have solved once and for all the question concerning the nature and causes of pain, but some of his suggestions have stood the test of time remarkably well."

<sup>185</sup> Mentioned later by Augustine in *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 105.

<sup>186</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 28 *non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor.* Augustine seems to be somewhat

led Julian to ask what exactly Augustine had meant by such a definition. Julian's inquiry is based on Aristotle's definitions of inherent emotional qualities (the third class of qualities, παθητικαὶ ποιότητες) in *Cat.* 8b–9b (Bekker), where permanent affectional qualities are separated from the transient emotional states of the body and soul.<sup>187</sup> In Aristotle's exposition, an affection of the body, such as becoming pale, should therefore be distinguished from an affectional quality, such as being pallid, for the latter kind of quality is "difficult to remove, or [it] indeed remain[s] throughout life." Concerning the soul, Aristotle had mentioned as examples of affective qualities, insanity, and irascibility, that is, such various states of the soul, with which one is born. Furthermore, such states of the soul which have resulted from causes that are "difficult to remove, or altogether permanent," are also affective qualities of the soul. These differ from proper affections, such as losing temper (in contrast to the quality of irascibility).

Julian seems to have made two comments based on Aristotle's account.<sup>188</sup> First, if *concupiscentia* is *affectio malae qualitatis*, as Augustine had claimed, it cannot have such necessitating and irremovable features as Augustine had given it. *Affectio* (or πάθος) is by definition "coming and going" (*accedens recedens*). But if, as it seems, Augustine intended to view *concupiscentia* as *affectio qualitas*, then he should acknowledge its inherent and permanent created value as something good.<sup>189</sup>

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irritated by Julian's lengthy remarks about what he himself considered to be of secondary importance: *quod uero te libuit tam multum de qualitatum differentia disputare, quia ego semel nominaui qualitatem*, c. *Iul.* 6, 53.

<sup>187</sup> Lamberigts (2008, 257–258) suspects that Julian did not have direct access to Aristotle, but used "a summary as one might find in a handbook of philosophy."

<sup>188</sup> Julian. A. c. *Iul.* 6, 55 *tertia species qualitatis est, inquis, affectio et affectionalis qualitas. affectio autem in qualitate ob hoc ponitur, ais, quia principium qualitatum est; cui etiam reputantur ad momentum accedentes recedentesque aut animi aut corporis passiones. affectionalis uero qualitas, inquis, omnibus quibus euenerit, ex maioribus orta causis ita inhaerescit, ut aut magnis molitionibus, aut nullis omnino separetur.*

<sup>189</sup> I depend here on Josef Lössl's accounts. Lössl 2001, 115: "Julian hatte jedoch gefragt, wie Augustinus dazu komme, die Konkupiszenz als emotionale Qualität zu bezeichnen, wo er ihr doch nur die Eigenschaften einer vorübergehenden Emotion zubillige, insofern er sie nicht mit der Personsubstanz identifiziere, was manichäisch sei." Lössl 2002, 220–221: "In that respect all emotions fulfill a positive role in the universe. They possess ontological value, a quality of being, or, as Aristotle put it, 'emotional quality' (*affectio qualitas*). They are life-enhancing and therefore good; and that includes all emotions, not just the nice and pleasant ones [...] but also emotions like greed, desire for power and sexual pleasure, concupiscentia [...] They are all attached, as accidents, to 'emotional quality,' and are therefore good; and even if one were to apply stricter standards to the term 'good,' as the Stoics did, one might



Augustine seems to start his answer by making an indirect admission of a mistake. Indeed, in Julian's and Aristotle's terms, to name *concupiscentia* as a bypassing affect is a misnomer. Augustine makes his admission by explaining his oft repeated position of *concupiscentia* as not being a substance, but a defect. However, according to Augustine, "many philosophers have asserted it is a faulty part of the soul." To Augustine, this should be taken as a synecdoche: the created lower part of the soul becomes named after the vice it is influenced by.<sup>190</sup> Hereafter, Augustine begins to answer directly Julian's remark. Whereas Julian seems to have taken *concupiscentia* (or any other emotion or emotional quality) to be something designed by God and enriching the human experience, Augustine's ground conviction is quite the opposite. He starts by helpfully providing what he thinks was missing from Julian's account, in order to aid those of his readers who did not have direct access either to Julian's works or to Aristotle's original exposition.<sup>191</sup>

Julian seems not to have offered any detailed cases of the difference between affections and affectional qualities, but only to have raised interest in the permanence, and hence inherent goodness, of the qualities. However, Augustine is more than willing to provide such examples.<sup>192</sup> Thus, he reports a series of passing emotions and *qualitates* they may be resulted from, with reference to Aristotle's original cases of blush (ἐρυθρός) and blusher (ἐρυθρία), pallor and fear (φοβηθείς, ὠχρός), angered man (ὀργιλώτερος)

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still speak of them as indifferent. A prejudicial attitude, however, like, e.g., Cicero's against *uoluptas*, or Augustine's against *concupiscentia carnis* [...] is, according to this model (followed by Julian) not rationally sustainable." For Julian's application of Aristotle's categories, see further Lössl 2001, 81n28; 114–115.

<sup>190</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 53.

<sup>191</sup> It is well known that Augustine claims to have read Aristotle's *Categories* in his youth (*conf.* 4, 28 *legi eas solus et intellexi*). The work was available in Latin translation, presumably by Marius Victorinus (see, however, Stead 1986–1994, 446). For categories in Augustine, see also *imm. an.* 5, and Du Roy 178, n. 2; O'Daly 1987, 36. Brachtendorf (2000, 131–139) discusses the parallels and the differences between Aristotle and Augustine on qualities and relations. Is the present discussion on Aristotle with Julian based on Augustine's own readings of the work? It seems that here Augustine was forced to check this philosophical source text, as this becomes clear from the examples of the distinction between an affection and an affectional quality. For evaluations of Augustine's philosophical readings, see O'Donnell 1980 (on Latin authors only); Marrou 1958, 34–37; 240–248; Hagendahl 1967. For Aristotle in Augustine in general, see Stead 1986–1994.

<sup>192</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 54 *haec quidem satis explicasti scientibus: sed quia contemnendi non sunt, qui lecturi libros nostros disciplinae huius ignari sunt. quod deesse uideo, faciam ut a me illustrentur exemplis.*

and irascibility (ὀργίλος, ὀργή).<sup>193</sup> Aristotle's example of an inherent mental disease is replaced by alcoholism in Augustine's scheme:

	<i>Affection</i>	<i>Affectional quality</i>
<i>Soul</i>	Fright ( <i>timere</i> )	Timidity ( <i>timidus esse</i> )
	Angered ( <i>iratus</i> )	Irascibility ( <i>iracundus</i> )
	Intoxication ( <i>ebrius</i> )	Alcoholism ( <i>ebriosus</i> )
<i>Body</i>	To grow pale ( <i>pallens</i> )	Pallid ( <i>pallidus</i> )
	To blush ( <i>rubens</i> )	Blusher ( <i>rubicundus</i> )

While Augustine's choice of examples show a familiarity with Aristotle's source text, his following remarks also betray his intention of using the distinction between an affection and an affectional quality. All qualities of the soul represent an undesirable, if not forthright vicious state of the soul. Moreover, Augustine does not have much regard for what seemed to be Julian's point in picking up Aristotle's distinction: morally neutral qualities cannot, or even *should*, be "separated" from the subject, for they are inherent, or natural properties (Aristotle had used the words κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν τῇ γενέσει). On the contrary, Augustine puts weight on the actual examples, which (added to the case of alcoholism) point to his conclusion, backed by scriptural evidence, that such qualities are morally degenerate and lead to a habituated sinful life. Therefore, they can, and should be opposed by baptised Christians. Paul's plight in Romans 7 is taken as a biblical case for a person suffering from such an affectional quality: does Julian think that Paul should have remained satisfied with his inherent feature he is complaining of?<sup>194</sup> Baptism stands as a crucial watershed in Augustine's view of moral qualities, for only after baptism it is possible to resist various affectional qualities, or "habits" (*consuetudines*), as Augustine calls them in *c. Iul.* 6, 55, highlighting two cases of habituation, or acquired moral qualities. The first of these cases is the already mentioned alcoholism, which Augustine considers a self-afflicted habit, not an inborn disease. The other case is corrupted sexual desire, which, like alcoholism, "draws people to

<sup>193</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 9b (Bekker). Aristotle does not provide an example of affection, or a bypassing effect, for insanity here.

<sup>194</sup> *c. Iul.* 6, 54 *quando secundum eam dicitur animus malus, uel potius homo malus; nonne metuis, ne uoluntas bona aut non ibi esse possit, aut ualere nihil possit? nonne concedis, hominem miserum, quicumque ille sit uel fuerit, certe aduersus talem clamasse qualitatem, uelle adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum non inuenio?* For baptism as a central tenet of Augustine's view of *concupiscentia*, see Chapter 6.

the ways of evil habit"; unlike alcoholism, however, it is an innate evil quality. Moreover, Augustine notes that in the case of sexual desire, there are certain differences between people who have habituated themselves to different ways of using sex: a widow or a former prostitute are mentioned as people who have stronger inclinations to *concupiscentia genitalium* than a virgin or a person who has no experience of sexual relations. Once more, Augustine seems to treat inborn *concupiscentia* as a curious kind of bad moral habit, sharing similarities to personally acquired habits in its effects, but different in its cause. Augustine argues in ways that must have seemed odd and mistaken to Julian, that even though the affectional quality, or habit of *concupiscentia* is not self-afflicted and not achieved by personal contribution, but is inborn (*ingenita*), it is still "ours"; that is, we are morally responsible for it.<sup>195</sup> Whereas Julian argued that an inborn quality is by definition good, or at least neutral, Augustine's perspective extends moral responsibility to the "given" and inherent properties of the individual souls: thus, he is also able to treat them as being evil and corrupted. But such old habits or qualities can be replaced by new ones, maintains Augustine, pointing to baptism, by which such good qualities are implanted to be cultivated during Christian renewal. The old sinful habits of an alcoholic or a prostitute are replaced by new ones in baptism, and the inclinations of the old life are gradually weakened and diminished, while the new good quality (*concupiscentia bona*) grows stronger.<sup>196</sup>

According to Augustine these notions of habits also refute Julian's brief conclusive remark in his discussion about affectional qualities that it would be better to talk about *concupiscentia* as a sense perception (*sensus*) than as a quality. For if bad inclinations can be changed for good habits, there is not much sense in naming such inclinations as sense perceptions: a more

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<sup>195</sup> c. Iul. 6, 55 *cum et ipsa in nobis sint, nec aliena, sed nostra sint. nam et uinolentiae consuetudini utique malae, quam sibi homines fecerunt, non nascendo traxerunt, resistunt post baptismum, ne eos ad mala solita pertrahat: et tamen malo resistitur, dum concupiscentiae per continentiam denegatur, quod per consuetudinem concupiscitur. unde etiam contra istam genitalium concupiscentiam, quae ingenita nobis est per originale peccatum, uehementius uidua quam uirgo; uehementius meretrix quando casta esse uoluerit, quam quae semper fuit casta, confligit: et tanto amplius in ea superanda uoluntas laborabit, quanto maiores ei consuetudo uires dedit. ex isto et cum isto hominis malo nascitur homo: quod malum per se ipsum tam magnum est, et ad hominis damnationem atque a regno dei separationem tantum habet obligationis, ut etiamsi de parentibus regeneratis trahatur, nonnisi, quemadmodum in illis, sola regeneratione soluatur, atque isto unico remedio praepositus mortis a prole pellatur, quo a parentibus est pulsus.*

<sup>196</sup> c. Iul. 6, 56.

reasonable stance is to think of *concupiscentia* or any other quality as being sensed in itself in the soul. Thus, the increase and decrease of *concupiscentia* can also be sensed.<sup>197</sup>

The above account shows how the philosophical traditions were, even in a very special and technical form, part of Augustine's and Julian's debate over *concupiscentia*. It seems undisputable that Augustine was perfectly aware of Julian's starting point in *Categories*, and had even done some cross-checking himself. However, although familiar with a specific philosophical discussion of the emotions, Augustine seems rather reluctant to develop any further notions based on Aristotle's distinction, and certainly is not willing to express affiliation to an author that Julian had claimed to fight on his side—despite the ambiguous state of the source text and its potential to back both Julian's and Augustine's positions in the debate. On the contrary, Augustine is eager to join the Aristotelian terminology to what he takes to be much more firmer ground of scriptural evidence, and colours the distinction between *affectio* and *affectionalis qualitas* as a variation of a distinction between sin and habitual sin.

Richard Sorabji is correct in claiming that this was due to Augustine's axiomatic contention of treating *concupiscentia* as evil by definition. However, there is perhaps a bit more to that: for Augustine, consistent to his entire argument in his debate with Julian, quickly adds the divine intercession of baptism into an analysis of an originally philosophical distinction. Julian's remark was made from a philosophical, and technical perspective, but Augustine soon turns it into a yet another way to prove that baptism offers the means to cope with evil *concupiscentia*. By the time the debate with Julian was in full swing, Augustine had very clear ideas of the role and status of *concupiscentia*, and how to deal with it. These ideas, however, were not formed along the lines of philosophical sets of concepts, even if Augustine seems able to have recourse to these concepts, if needed, but only to adjust and attach them to the more central and weighty arguments of theological and biblical nature. In *c. Iul.* 6, 53–56, we see an Augustine who is rather unenthusiastic in expounding *concupiscentia* in terms of the traditional philosophical distinctions, notwithstanding the apologetic context, the ambiguity of the source text, and Julian's previous condescending

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<sup>197</sup> It seems that because Julian wished to emphasise the inherent goodness of *concupiscentia* he also preferred to label it a *sensus*, thus emphasising the absurdity of trying to “diminish” it in its lawful limits, *quando minuitur concupiscentia, sensus minuitur*. See Lössl 2002, 209, 219–221.

remarks of Augustine's philosophical abilities. To Augustine, *concupiscentia* has moved beyond philosophical competence.<sup>198</sup>

*Stolen Consent, Dangers of the Senses and the Flaws of Philosophy*

The concept of consent regularly appears in the debates of Augustine and Julian, but not many particularly significant or pertinent remarks are made on the topic. There are, however, a few interesting passages in which Augustine finds some use for the traditional views of consent and its relation to emotions, sexual desire being once again the extreme example.

Augustine presents at least one special case in which even Christians seem to be unarmed against grave (*turpes*) consented actions, namely dreams.<sup>199</sup> While awake, a Christian is able to control and fight against *concupiscentia*. But in dreams, such control may fail and fighting may cease, and the "consent is stolen from them" (*furatur assensus*). Augustine's peculiar metaphor here underlines the inexplicable nature of this phenomenon. The consent, as it were, slips even to approve of certain grave sins. Augustine seems to think that this has something to do with the "sleeping senses" which can be tricked by certain disturbing images in dreams.<sup>200</sup> However, Augustine, as elsewhere, does not think that consent in dreams should

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<sup>198</sup> Ironically, the discussion here confirms, in a restricted sense, Julian's caustic remark of "priests who are not able to judge over Christian doctrines by Aristotle's categories." Iul. A. c. Iul. 2, 37. However, this is not to say that the debate between Julian and Augustine was a debate between an Aristotelian philosopher and a Christian theologian. Julian also had theological presuppositions on the subjects of the debate, and attempted to use his philosophical training to show the inconsistency of Augustine's position. See Lössl 2001, 120. The status of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal will be discussed in Chapter 6.

<sup>199</sup> In *Gn. litt.* 12, 15, 31 (written ca. 412–415), Augustine had already addressed the question of sexual images in dreams and whether they are sins or not, cf. *Gn. litt.* 12, 30, 58 (for this topic, see Matthews 1992, 90–106; Mann 1999, 160–162; Haji 1999, 166–182). According to *Gn. litt.*, dreams should be treated as vivid images of something that has been discussed while awake, which obviously can be done without consent to any sinful thoughts. Apparently, Augustine seems to think that when dreaming, the ability to discern between consented images and images that are only "working tools" of a reasoned conversation is critically weakened. Thus, even unintentional and reproachable sexual images may appear in dreams and are not to be deemed to be sins. However, the process of Christian renewal should have some effect on the choices made in dreams, as well; but Augustine does not go into detail in discussing the quality of such improvement. Augustine mentions Solomon as an example of making the right choices in dreams.

<sup>200</sup> c. Iul. 4, 10 *quid agit in eis, quos contra se compellit uigilare atque pugnare; et si quando ab eis ullum uel in somnis furatur assensum, cum euigilauerint, gemere et inter gemitus dicere, quomodo impleta est anima mea illusionibus? quia cum sopitos deludunt somnia sensus, nescio quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur assensus; quae si imputaret altissimus, quis uiueret castus?*

count as morally responsible, probably because this kind of consent is as illusory as the dream images it is given.

Shortly thereafter, Augustine emphasises the force by which the desires for sensual pleasures present themselves to the soul and “impel” consent. This he does by presenting a fourfold division of the functions of senses (*uiuacitas, utilitas, necessitas, libido sentiendi*).<sup>201</sup> The “lust for sensation” is the one that worries Augustine, for it “impels us by the appetite of carnal pleasure to sense something, whether we mentally consent to or resist it.”<sup>202</sup>

What follows is a short and loosely composed study of the various sense perceptions and their effects and evil uses. Thus, pleasing scents, or music, or food, may cause *libido sentiendi*. Concerning food and eating, Augustine would prefer alimentation that would be completely void of scents and taste, for these entail a constant risk of excessive pleasure for those who consume food. A much safer way of eating would be analogical to breathing air, which does not taste or smell of anything.<sup>203</sup> So far, this can be compared to Augustine’s ideal of paradisiacal intercourse, which would have been a completely tranquil and unemotional procedure.<sup>204</sup> Many bodily sensations are linked to pleasure, and this creates a “very great nuisance and danger.” However, Augustine is very clear about the difference between the pleasures of eating and pleasures of sex (in the lawful context of marriage). The latter entails such a submerging effect on the mind and body that practically every higher mental activity seems to be excluded,

<sup>201</sup> The division bears resemblance to the Stoic views of *phantasmata* and *oikeiosis*. *c. Iul.* 4, 65 *aliud esse sentiendi uiuacitatem, uel utilitatem, uel necessitatem, aliud sentiendi libidinem. uiuacitas sentiendi est, qua magis alius, alius minus in ipsis corporalibus rebus pro earum modo atque natura quod uerum est percipit, atque id a falso magis minusue discernit. utilitas sentiendi est, per quam corpori uitaeque quam gerimus, ad aliquid approbandum uel improbandum, sumendum uel reiendum, appetendum uitandumue consulimus.*

<sup>202</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 65 *libido autem sentiendi est, de qua nunc agimus, quae nos ad sentiendum, siue consentientes mente, siue repugnantes, appetitu carnalis uoluptatis impellit.* Cf. also the language in *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 27 *caro aduersus spiritum concupiscens in quaeque illicita atque inhonesta praecipitat.* Augustine mentions also morally commendable desires and wishes, but they are not called *libidines*. See Cipriani 2010, 982–983.

<sup>203</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 68.

<sup>204</sup> As we have seen from *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 34–35, Augustine pondered the different options on the problem of Adam and Eve’s hypothetical sexual intercourse before the Fall. In *c. Iul.* Augustine once again ends up having two possibilities: either there was no *carnalis concupiscentia* at all or there was a *carnalium sensum libido* that was perfectly under the control of the will (*c. Iul.* 4, 69). Augustine prefers the former option (4, 71) because of the violent force of empirical sexual pleasure. Similarly, *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 17. See Sorabji 2000, 406–408.

whereas one can easily discuss or even debate important matters at the table.<sup>205</sup> If a married Christian couple has lapsed into sexual intercourse with the inferior intention of *delectatio carnalis*, it is clear, so argues Augustine, that they afterwards feel ashamed when they are again able to “think clearly.”<sup>206</sup>

Augustine’s argument is built climactically: he starts with the less dangerous sensations of smelling, tasting, and touching, concluding these to be more directed at seeking convenience or natural health. Pleasant scents produce a very limited sensation of pleasure; and concerning food, it is perfectly possible to discern between a healthy and natural consumption on the one hand, and unnecessary and lustful gourmandizing on the other, even though the limits of unnecessary eating may sometimes be difficult to find. The apogee of various *concupiscentiae* is then sexual desire, for the reasons mentioned above.

But it is Augustine’s remarks that follow the discussion of sensations that are of particular interest here. After he has made the concession of analysing the various sensations and the intensity and quality of the pleasures they may affect, and then showing how sexual desire is the most forceful and dangerous sensation of all, he subsequently demonstrates how such a view is in line with even the pagan philosophers who had “no belief concerning the life of the first man, the happiness of paradise, or the resurrection of

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<sup>205</sup> c. *Iul.* 4, 71 *quem permittit aliquid, non dico sapientiae, sed cuiuslibet rei aliud cogitare? nonne illi totus animus et corpus impenditur, et ipsius mentis quadam submersione illud extremum eius impletur?* The source for the conviction that nothing reasonable can be thought of during intercourse is Cic. *Hort.* (frg. 84 Grilli). Cicero is quoted in c. *Iul.* 5, 42 where Augustine suggests an analogy between sleeping and using *libido*, for both may be used to good ends, even though both exclude rational thought and reflection on their usefulness (i.e. in sleep one is not able to make judgments on the healthy effects of sleep, and during intercourse, one is not able to calculate the rational and pious motives of procreation). The difference between *libido* and sleeping, in Augustine’s view, is presumably that during intercourse the will preserves its “command” (*imperium*) but becomes momentarily unable to use this due to the force of *libido*, whereas in dreams this command is (voluntarily) given away (*sed somnus cum occupat membra, non ea facit inoboedientia uoluntati; quia et ipsam uoluntatem ab huiusmodi alienat imperio*). For a discussion of *imperium*, see Sorabji 2000, 409–410. An equally interesting distinction between permission and consent is made in *mend.* 40: *sed permittendi potest esse aliqua ratio, consentiendi autem nulla. tunc enim consentimus, cum approbamus et uolumus: permittimus autem etiam non uolentes, euitandae alicuius maioris turpitudinis gratia*. Permission is here seen as passive subjugation to an outer force, whereas giving or withholding consent is always freely at hand as an independent, inner, active assent of the mind.

<sup>206</sup> c. *Iul.* 4, 71 *ita hinc emergitur, et quasi in auras cogitationis post illum gurgitem respiratur, ut fiat consequens, quod uerum ait quidam, et paenitendi quae est cum uoluptate uicinitas*.

bodies.”<sup>207</sup> Augustine implies that his view of *concupiscentia carnis*, albeit debated in a more philosophical context, depends on the articles of faith, of which he has here listed the most relevant to the question. Nevertheless, the philosophical positions on pleasure and the emotions may be granted a subsidiary role, as in the case of Cicero and his statement in *Hortensius*, even if he “did not know where this [battle between the flesh and the spirit] originates.”<sup>208</sup> Yet Cicero did not “favour concupiscence” in the way Julian does, but went in the opposite direction together with Augustine. Ancient philosophical views of the emotions provide Augustine a flexible tool in highlighting, developing and debating *concupiscentia*, but the origin of *concupiscentia*, the purpose and the means to deal with it, are explained and given by Christian doctrine and the Scripture.

Let us, then, who have learned in the true and holy philosophy of true godliness that the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh (Gal 5, 17), blush as we hear the true judgments of the ungodly.<sup>209</sup>

[transl. Schumacher]

The great number of philosophers whom Julian has mentioned in his *ad Turbantium* does not impress Augustine, mainly for two reasons. First, Julian fails to mention any true moral philosophers (4, 76), relying only on natural philosophers. Second, and more importantly, Julian’s philosophers are flawed by the simple fact that they were not familiar with the Christian doctrines about *conditio humana*:

What could they have learned or said about Adam, the first man, and his wife; about their first prevarication; about the cunning of the Serpent; about their nakedness without embarrassment before sin, always with embarrassment after sin? Could they have heard anything like the Apostle’s words “Through one man sin entered into the world and through sin death, and thus death has passed unto all men; in who all have sinned”? What could men without knowledge of those writings and of this truth know about the matter?<sup>210</sup>

[transl. Schumacher]

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Richard Sorabji’s remarks (2000, 412–413) of Augustine’s failed attempts to provide a philosophically satisfactory reason for the unique position of *libido*, “[i]t depends on a literal interpretation of Genesis,” and his notion of an “other-worldly rationale” for Augustine’s attack on lust. As can be seen in Augustine’s reflections on Cicero, he did not try to conceal these rationales, but gave them a place of pride even in the context of a philosophical debate on *concupiscentia*. For the role of Cicero in *c. Iul.* in general, see Testard 1958, i, 244–245.

<sup>208</sup> In fact, it is *uoluptas* that Cicero here finds reprehensible, but Augustine has no difficulties in making the analogy with *concupiscentia*. See also *c. Iul.* 4, 76–78. Cf. Lössl 2002, 219–201.

<sup>209</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 72.

<sup>210</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 77 *quid enim illi didicerant, uel quid locuti fuerant de primo homine Adam et eius coniuge, de prima eorum praeuaricatione, de serpentis astutia, de nuditate corporis ante*



As soon as Augustine denies the worth of philosophical tradition concerning man, creation and the soul, he also acknowledges certain viewpoints that assert that the present state of humanity resembles a divinely ordained punishment. Again, Augustine uses Cicero's *Hortensius*, which quotes a lost account by Aristotle of the Etruscan pirates who tortured their victims by attaching corpses of the dead to living people—this being a metaphor for the human condition being torn between the union of the body and soul. This proves to Augustine that some philosophers have understood something right—but they lack the most important aspect, which, in turn, the Christians do possess:

Did not the philosophers who thought these things perceive much more clearly than you the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, and the power and justice of God, though not aware of the grace given through the Mediator for the purpose of delivering men?<sup>211</sup> [transl. Schumacher]

There are thus, in Augustine's view, some philosophical ideas of emotions that may be put in the service of Christian doctrine of the Fall and, indirectly, of grace and renewal. Nevertheless, to resist and overcome *concupiscentia*, more is needed than what the ancient moral philosophy had to offer.

### *Shame, Sex and Cicero*

In addition to the view that sexual desire hinders all reasonable thinking, Augustine also appeals to other factors in arguing its evil character. These appeals also have a dilettante air of familiarity with philosophical discourse on emotions, although no particularly profound arguments can be found in them. Thus, for instance, Augustine remarks that only humans are capable of experiencing sexual desire as something evil, for only in humans *libido* is opposing reason.<sup>212</sup> Animals lack reason, and therefore the movements of

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*peccatum sine confusione, et cum confusione continuo post peccatum? quid denique tale audierant, quale illud est quod ait apostolus, per unum hominem peccatum intrauit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccauerunt [Rom 5,12]? See also c. Iul. 4, 60.*

<sup>211</sup> c. Iul. 4, 78 *nonne qui ista senserunt, multo quam tu melius graue iugum super filios Adam et dei potentiam iustitiamque uiderunt, etiamsi gratiam, quae per mediatorem liberandis hominibus concessa est, non uiderunt?* For the scriptural corrigendum Augustine offers for such a view, see c. Iul. 4, 83.

<sup>212</sup> Augustine also notes the irrational character of *concupiscentia carnis* in the way that it does not yield to the differentiation between good and evil ends, but strives for licit and illicit objects alike. Only by Christian conscience and intellect, is it possible to judge between good and evil goals. See Griffiths 2009. c. Iul. 4, 7; 6, 50; c. Iul. imp. 4, 69 *concupiscentia uero carnis indifferenter illicita et licita cupiuntur, quae non concupiscendo, sed intellegendo diiudicantur; nec ab illicitis abstinetur, nisi concupiscentiae resistatur.*

*libido* are innocent in them.<sup>213</sup> This only highlights Augustine's core belief of sexual desire: it is not *libido* as such, or sexual intercourse as such, that bothers Augustine, but its disorder, irrational and uncontrollable character that he finds fault with.

[C]oncupiscence is a good in a brute, to delight a nature unable to desire wisdom [...] it is said to be a good for the brute, whose spirit it delights without opposition, but an evil for man, in whom it lusts against the spirit.<sup>214</sup>

[transl. Schumacher]

The aspect of disorder and involuntary actions of *libido* are, according to Augustine, also the reason for sexual shame.<sup>215</sup> In the fallen state of humankind, it is not mere nudity that should cause shame on every occasion, but the "unaccustomed appearance" of sexual arousal.<sup>216</sup> Moreover, both man and woman are able to feel sexual shame, due to the equal effects of disorder caused by *concupiscentia*.<sup>217</sup> In *c. Iul.* 4, 58–62, Augustine enters into a minor debate on Cicero's legacy in the question of shame. First, he denies the relevance of Julian's quotation of *de natura deorum* to explain why people hide certain parts of their bodies from view. There are many reasons for such concealment, points out Augustine, but only shame and the wish to avoid bodily pleasure and sexual desire cause people to hide their sexual organs from public view. Furthermore, all analogies to animals are off the point (*non idem esse arietis et Publii Africani bonum*), but more importantly, Augustine claims that the main intention of the pagan philosophers, such as Cicero, are on his side, not Julian's. Even though Cicero did not know the testimony of the Scripture on original sin, he could make true assertions concerning the human condition and emotional disorder. "He saw the reality, but did not know the cause."<sup>218</sup>

### Cognitio Peccati—An Analogy to a Classical Stoic Doctrine?

Thus far, we have been satisfied with giving examples of the explicit dialogue and transformation of the philosophical traditions of emotions in Augustine's debate with Julian. However, our discussion will end by

<sup>213</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 35. The notion of animals not being capable of affects traces back to Chrysippus. See O'Daly 1989, 47 n. 128.

<sup>214</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 74. See also *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 38–40.

<sup>215</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 58–62; *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 37. This aspect of *libido* has been discussed by Rist 1994, 324–326 and Sorabji 2000, 411–412.

<sup>216</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 16.

<sup>217</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 62.

<sup>218</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 60 *rem uidit, causam nesciuit*.

considering a recent suggestion by Risto Saarinen (2011) of implicit Stoic influence in one, precise detail in the Julian debates. This detail concerns those passages in Augustine's argumentation that speak of *concupiscentia* as *peccatum*. Do these passages resemble to the classic Stoic doctrine of the emotions as rational, judgmented impulses from the start; a doctrine not yet modified with the later development of the first movements or prepassions (which was Augustine's standard way of dealing with *concupiscentia* and its moral status)?<sup>219</sup> As a consequence, concupiscence would be a (sinful) emotion as soon as the controlling mind, or will, would be able to recognize its presence in the soul without the need of distinguishing between prepassions, which are not (yet) consented to, and the emotions proper which have received the assent, and thereby are considered as being morally responsible. There are certain elements in Augustine's thought that lend plausibility to this suggestion. For instance, Augustine claims more than once that the power of *concupiscentia* is connected to the power of the controlling reason and its abilities to make judgments, recognize and, in a way, give form or label the movements of *concupiscentia*. So Augustine makes a rather brief statement in *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 221 of the sin which is increased in the newborn later, after the acquisition of the will, and the original concupiscence then drags (*trahente*) the assent with it.<sup>220</sup> *Concupiscentia* is in a passive state without the active rational mind, or will, which to Augustine is not yet formed in a newborn baby. Similarly in *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 235, the active power of *concupiscentia* goes hand in hand with the growing cognitive

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<sup>219</sup> Saarinen 2011, 24: "Augustine in some cases connects the desire of concupiscence with the judging power of reason. Concupiscence is sin, for instance, when reason learns the command not to covet and this act of learning and recognition evokes the desire. Concupiscence is likewise a sin when it contains a judgment of disobedience and rebellion against the rule of reason. These passages affirm the view of concupiscence as judgment which in itself involves consent. They break the twofold sequence of desire and consent and claim in a genuinely Stoic manner that the awareness of some desires already involves proper judgment and assent."

<sup>220</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 221 *peccatum, sine quo nemo nascitur, crevit uoluntatis accessu originali concupiscentia trahente peccantis assensum*. See also *ciu.* 21, 16 *prima hominis aetas, id est infantia, quae sine ullo renisu subiacet carni, et secunda, quae pueritia nuncupatur, ubi nondum ratio suscepit hanc pugnam et fere sub omnibus uitiosis delectationibus iacet, quia, licet fari iam ualeat et ideo infantiam transisse uideatur, nondum in ea est praecepti capax infirmitas mentis*. Conversely in *ciu.* 22, 24 *ipse itaque animae humanae mentem dedit, ubi ratio et intelligentia in infante sopita est quodam modo, quasi nulla sit, excitanda scilicet atque exerenda aetatis accessu, qua sit scientiae capax atque doctrinae et habilis perceptioni ueritatis et amoris boni; qua capacitate hauriat sapientiam uirtutibusque sit praedita, quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste aduersus errores et cetera ingenerata uitia dimicet eaque nullius rei desiderio nisi boni illius summi atque immutabilis uincat*.

abilities of the mind: “[C]oncupiscence begins to burn especially from the age of youth. Its power is, of course, dormant in an infant, just like reason, just like the will.”<sup>221</sup> Such statements bypass the standard first movement-second movement pattern; instead they stress the character of *concupiscentia* as something that only waits for the awakening of reason and the will in order to be identified, and is experienced as both *poena peccati* and *peccatum*.

Furthermore, Augustine certainly sees God’s law as a necessary element in recognising the genuine character of *concupiscentia*; the law assists in giving a right cognitive form to *concupiscentia*, which may have been a hitherto unreflected, and unquestioned force in a person living in ignorance of the law.<sup>222</sup> This position is colourfully described in one of Augustine’s sermons, where he composes a satirical caricature of a man who is a lecherous drunkard who lives a happy life with abundant alcohol and many women and yet he cannot see that he is in the chains of *concupiscentia*. Only when God’s law hits him hard and opens his eyes to have a correct recognition of sin and *concupiscentia* does the man realize that what he had thought to be happiness and bliss is, in fact, sin. *Concupiscentia* receives its authentic cognitive form through the Law, and is eventually known as the sin it always was.<sup>223</sup>

However, as Augustine continues it becomes clear that this correct recognition of *concupiscentia* is of no avail to the man: it only makes him “not only a sinner, but also a criminal.” Augustine has led his pathetic character to a dead end, in which even the divine aid of the recognition of *concupiscentia* (or one’s impulses and seeing them as rational judgments as such, in the instant they are sensed and noticed, as Saarinen suggests) does not help. This is also Augustine’s main intention in all the passages in which he writes about the law giving *cognitio peccati*, that is, helping a person to identify his or her *concupiscentia* as sin. Something else is needed to *resist concupiscentia* than correct information, or reflected judgments upon its character. This always leads Augustine to an inquiry for grace. With no exception, the correct identification of *concupiscentia* appears in the writings of Augustine in connection with his Pauline exegesis of Romans, by which he describes the progress from the non-Christian stage to the Christian one. The correct information offered by the law, *cognitio peccati*, is seen as an ultimately

<sup>221</sup> c. *Iul. imp.* 2, 235 *concupiscentia de iuuenali aetate maxime accenditur, cuius utique uis in infante sopita est sicut rationis, sicut ipsius uoluntatis.*

<sup>222</sup> *gest. Pel.* 21; c. *ep. Pel.* 1, 14; *cont.* 7; *gr. et lib. arb.* 5; c. *Iul. imp.* 3, 210; c. *Iul. imp.* 4, 28; c. *Iul. imp.* 6, 41; *en. Ps.* 83, 10; s. 153, 6.

<sup>223</sup> s. 153, 6–9, 14. See also TeSelle 2001 and Martin 2001.

unfruitful work of God, which only exacerbates and adds fuel to the distress caused by *concupiscentia*: *cognitio* is not the same as *euictio*, or *consumptio*, which is the working of grace.<sup>224</sup> As the term of *cognitio peccati* is taken from Paul, and the function of such a *cognitio* is always to underline the solution to the undesirable state of affairs this *cognitio* brings about, i.e. grace, some caution seems to be necessary in seeing these remarks of *cognitio peccati* as simply analogical to the old Stoic concept of emotions as judgments of reason. It is true, however, that Augustine's approach in such contexts as seen in s. 153 pushes the question of the different moral states of *concupiscentia* depending on the mind's assent to background. That is to say, *concupiscentia* in a non-Christian person (either in *sine lege* or *sub lege* state) is always a sin, and there is no need to use the first movement viz. second movement-analysis there, unlike for a person in the state of Christian renewal.

#### 5.4. CONCLUSION

In this Chapter, we have charted how *concupiscentia* is connected to Augustine's general knowledge and use of the common philosophical and psychological notions of the emotions.

In his earlier works, Augustine found it useful to appropriate *libido*, alongside with other emotions, as a corrupted but inherent part of the soul, situated within the standard Platonist bipartite or tripartite account of the soul. Augustine's appropriation of the commonplace themes of philosophical psychology worked on two tiers. First, he was able to counter the Manichaean dualist account of the soul as a division between two natures, of which the good and divine one could not be held accountable for the evil and corrupted one. A continuing emphasis in Augustine's early works is also to claim the fundamental unity of the soul in this respect. In terms of Augustine's allegorical reading of Genesis, both Adam and Eve are created by God. The problems arise from a disorder in the soul, not from a division of natures. Second, Augustine responds to the Manichaean perspective on sin by creating an account with certain variations, where the progression of the sensual enticements and temptations into a full blown evil act or sin is depicted in terms very similar to those of the traditional theories of emergence of emotions. The elements of preparatory stages ('prepassion'), the consent of reason, and the actual emotion (or sin) are present in Augustine's

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<sup>224</sup> *gest. Pel.* 21; *gr. et lib. arb.* 22.

thoughts from early on. They are applied in varied ways in his works during the 390s; and many of these works have explicit or implicit anti-Manichaean tenets.

In his larger works that were composed or commenced in the late 390s, i.e. *conf.*, *c. Faust.* and *trin.*, Augustine continues to use certain commonplaces of the Platonic and Stoic traditions of emotions, leaning e.g. on the tripartite division of the soul in confronting Manichaean anthropology, using the classification of generic emotions, and even making some pertinent remarks on the relation of the voluntary attention, memory and emotions in *trin.* In these works, he also develops his original stance on Adam and Eve's role in his analysis of the progress of a temptation into a proper sin; their roles in figurative exegesis is adjusted in order to fit Augustine's concern in both locating the *imago dei* in the *ratio sapientiae* and in justifying a Pauline statement over the subject. The role of *cupiditas* (or *libido* or *concupiscentia*) as conceived in the tradition of the commonplace emotional psychology in these interludes is rather difficult to evaluate: sometimes, as in *trin.*, it appears somewhat faded and sometimes it is utilized along the previous strands of thought of Augustine's anti-Manichaean tactics, as in *c. Faust.* or in *conf.*

From the 410s on, Augustine, however turns to a more reflective and critical stance towards the philosophical traditions of the emotions in relation to the status and role of *concupiscentia*. In *ciu.*, he develops an extensive exposition of emotions, both in philosophical traditions, and in what could be called his own contribution. By ways charted in this chapter, Augustine combines diverse pagan teachings of emotions and virtue, finds them partially correct, but useless in the end, and juxtaposes them with his own scheme of temporal, communal (or Christ-centred) emotions (or, in Johannes Brachtendorf's diction, "second-order passions"). Concerning *concupiscentia*, or *libido*, we have noted the negative impact which Augustine deliberately imputes to this concept in conjunction with his exposition of the emotions. *Concupiscentia* is treated as a violent, compulsive, and punitive force, which cannot be resisted and tempered outside *ciuitas dei*. All attempts to rein it in with the tools and analyses provided by the traditional insights into the emotions seem to be, in Augustine opinion, futile and ridiculous. This emphasis finds continuity in Augustine's debate with Julian, where the representatives and sources of the traditional philosophical views of the emotions are evoked from time to time. Augustine is not willing to spend his time in what he takes to be a fruitless exercise; he is merely satisfied with pointing out certain useful ideas by either Aristotle or Cicero on different points concerning *concupiscentia*, but he is not in the

least willing to enter into a scholarly debate over Christian revealed truths with philosophical tools and terms into the same degree Julian has seemed to be (and has himself claimed, e.g. with his quip on priests, dogmas and Aristotle's categories).

It thus seems clear that Augustine was not particularly interested in treating *concupiscentia* in the context of the philosophically conditioned discussion on emotions *as such*. There seems to be, more often than not, an apologetic, or 'theological' concern in Augustine's way of linking his concept of *concupiscentia* to the debates of emotions. Augustine was rather well aware of the main discussions of the ancient philosophical schools, albeit from inferior Latin sources, but these discussions served him as an ancillary role in his thinking of *concupiscentia*. At best, they were a sign of the abilities of pagan philosophy to identify certain problems in human nature, but they could not provide effective help in dealing with these problems. This also seems to apply to the use of the traditional discussions of the emotions in Christian context; an example of such a context and use is the familiar gallery of roles in Genesis as an application of human psychology. In sum, the treatises of evil desire in terms of the traditional discourse of the emotions seem to be more often than not dictated by varying apologetic agendas.<sup>225</sup>

Augustine's position on sexual desire has been criticized for its exceptional role and for its emphasis on the violently compulsive effects of sex as compared to the other emotions in a frame of philosophical psychology. Richard Sorabji has concluded that there seems to be no philosophically

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<sup>225</sup> Kolbet (2010) is a recent study of Augustine's relation to the classical philosophical ideal of the cure of the souls, and its rhetorical dimensions. Kolbet stresses Augustine's essential continuity with traditional views of the therapy of emotions, but is also aware of discontinuities, as can be seen from his descriptions of the difference between younger and "mature" Augustine in the issue. Thus, Augustine "adapts," "alters" and "recontextualizes" (Kolbet 2010, 12); "nearly always makes them [sc. philosophical categories] his own to such a degree that they become nearly unrecognizable" (p. 13); finally, Augustine "not only questions the desirability of the human ends promoted by philosophy, but also the efficacy of the means employed to achieve them" (p. 130). See also Kolbet 2010, 129, 132. It is easy to agree with Kolbet's rather general claim that both the preceding philosophical traditions and Augustine's version of them advocated a need to "cure" the soul through non-conventional wisdom by a process of oral teaching (or "psychagogy"). In other words, while Augustine criticized, even dismissed some parts of traditional theories of emotions, and found them, at best, as an incomplete testimony of revealed Christian truths, as shown in the present chapter, he naturally shared certain, very general elements of the preceding philosophical traditions. My interpretation is interested on the critical, distinctive Augustine, whereas Kolbet searches for the common heritage.

convincing grounds for the special character of sexual desire as an emotion. The explanation, of course, lies in the direction Sorabji himself points to: Augustine sees *concupiscentia carnis* as evil because it is a divine punishment, a theologically conditioned inner disobedience of the soul, and as such, it is God's decree. While these grounds are non-philosophical, they are nonetheless essential for Augustine's way of treating *concupiscentia* even in the context of philosophical theories, and he does not wish to discuss *concupiscentia* as being totally detached from such theological views as Adam and Eve's Fall, justice, grace, baptism and the Christian struggle in the renewed state.<sup>226</sup>

In the next and final chapter this study explores the function of *concupiscentia* within the context of the only aid Augustine knew would effectively cure the workings of evil desire, namely Christian baptism. We will also see why the (traditional Stoic) concept of consent gained so much importance, especially in the later stages of Augustine's thought. Once more, this development found its impetus not from some newly found philosophical interest on Augustine's part but, as shall be argued, was bound to his deepening understanding of what it is to be a Christian, *dei gratia*.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> Thus, Augustine's use of corrupt and evil desire in the scheme of the theories of the emotions of the philosophical tradition finds certain correspondence in his stance between the philosophical and theological concerns as paraphrased by MacIntyre (2009, 29–31): "[Philosophy] is dependent [of theology] in that the point and purpose of its enquiries and the significance of the conclusions of its arguments can only be understood from within a theologically committed standpoint [...] And a theological perspective brings to light the defects and the inadequacies of any purely philosophical, purely natural standpoint. For what we have learned from the Christian revelation is that blessedness is not to be had in this present life and that the exercise of the virtues does not achieve happiness. The virtues are engaged in an unending struggle with vices and evils and the most that we can expect [...] is that we will be able to avert certain evils, at least for the time being."

<sup>227</sup> See here Löhr 2008, who also explores Augustine's and Pelagius' differing views on human capacities in reaching salvation as a continuation of ancient therapies, and refers to Pierre Hadot's studies (p. 225, "Pelagius' Argumentation greift auf Grundeinsichten antiker philosophischer Seelsorge zurück.") Löhr (2008, 230–234) thus sees e.g. Augustine's *conf.* representing the ancient philosophical protreptic tradition, although the solutions are, of course, different from those of Pelagius. Löhr (2008, 231) points out how the insulting refrain *da quod iubes et iube quod uis* is tightly connected with Augustine's description of *triplex cupiditas* and the weakness of the will; however, both the refrain and the descriptions of weakness should work as a powerful protreptic discourse for a new life in and through divine grace. For a similar suggestion to read *conf.* as a philosophical consolation, see now Lössl 2011.





## CHAPTER SIX

### GRACE AND RENEWAL— THE DOMESTICATION OF *CONCUPISCENTIA*

unde hoc est, quod dicit habitare in carne sua non utique bonum, id est peccatum?—unde nisi ex traduce mortalitatis et adsiduitate uoluptatis? illud est ex poena originalis peccati, hoc ex poena frequentati peccati; cum illo in hanc uitam nascimur, hoc uiuendo addimus. quae duo scilicet tamquam natura et consuetudo coniuncta robustissimam faciunt et inuictissimam cupiditatem, quod uocat peccatum et dicit habitare in carne sua, id est dominatum quendam et quasi regnum obtinere.

Simpl. 1, 1, 10

ego enim putabam dici ista non posse, nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnis concupiscentia subiugatos, ut facerent quidquid illa compelleret; quod de apostolo dementis est credere.

c. Iul. 6, 70

#### 6.1. INTRODUCTION

Thus far, we have seen how Augustine develops the functions of *concupiscentia* in the contexts of divine punishment (Chapter 3), as part of his views on the origin of evil (Chapter 4), and in the context of the traditional topics of the philosophical theories of the emotions (Chapter 5). It is now time to discuss how Augustine treats the problem of *concupiscentia* in the context of Christian renewal. This includes how Augustine sees the states of *concupiscentia* before and after God's grace is received, the differences between these states, and how grace affects *concupiscentia*, or how *concupiscentia* affects the person experiencing Christian renewal.<sup>1</sup> Once more, a loose chronological order will be followed in reading Augustine's works with this context in mind. As with previous functions, however, we will not attempt to offer a detailed historical account of the genesis of *concupiscentia* in relation to Christian renewal, but instead provide an overview of the

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<sup>1</sup> For the multidimensional concept of grace in Augustine, see TeSelle 1970, 161–162; Lössl 1997; Drecoll 1999.

relevant material and highlight possible continuities and certain discrepancies in Augustine's thought.

In this chapter, it will be suggested that there is a growing awareness in Augustine of the continuity of the effects of *concupiscentia* that lasts even after grace is received.<sup>2</sup> Hand-in-hand with this awareness is Augustine's conviction of *concupiscentia* as a fully resistible and weakened force of residual sin. While he begins to realise that *concupiscentia* should be realistically identified as a part of a problem for a Christian believer, he makes *concupiscentia* part of the solution. We will see how Augustine proceeds from rather vague beginnings in which he is either reluctant or ambiguous about locating *concupiscentia* in a person under renewal, to a detailed and outspoken conception, in which *concupiscentia* is clearly present in the Christian, but in a very qualified and restricted sense.

In discussing Augustine's position on *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal, it is difficult to bypass his reading of Romans 7. Therefore, we will also see the ways in which Augustine locates *concupiscentia* in its Christian, "internalised" sense in Paul's narrative of the inner struggle between the "law of sin" and the "inner man." It will be shown that Augustine's new reading of Romans 7, from 411 onwards, is tightly connected to his other ways of qualifying and restricting the effects of *concupiscentia* in the renewed Christian.<sup>3</sup>

In the following analysis, the main stress is thus on Augustine's crucial treatises on grace and human abilities on the one hand, and on his interpretation of Romans 7 on the other. All of these find their climax in the anti-Pelagian period and in Augustine's debates with Julian of Aeclanum.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For the strict discontinuity with the old man and the new man in the Pelagian view, see the outline of Brown 1972, 195–197.

<sup>3</sup> We have already seen how Paul's texts played a remarkable role in the Manichaean discussions on 'root,' see above Chapter 4. There is already an extensive number of studies concerned with Augustine's development of the exegesis of Rom 7, and my study is not an attempt to offer a detailed historical reconstruction of Augustine's exegesis in this respect. See Burns 1979; Babcock 1979; Berrouard 1981; Fredriksen 1988; Ring 1989; Stark 1989; Delaroche 1996; Martin 2001; van Fleteren 2001; TeSelle 2001; Verschoren 2004. For the notoriously difficult problem of the identity of the *ego* in Paul's source text, see the diverging views of e.g. Schweizer 1964, 133–134; Stowers 1994; 2003; Anderson 1996; Lichtenberger 2000; Thurén 2000.

<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note that while the role of baptism as a medium of God's grace and as a crucial starting point of Christian renewal steadily gains importance in Augustine's thought, his anti-Donatist writings, which likewise deal with problems related to baptism and sin, have little or no relevance to the problem of *concupiscentia*. For a rare example, see *c. litt. Pet.* 2, 154, in which Augustine compares the Donatists to *concupiscentia* by characterising both as spiritual enemies. The rational soul loves its body, but has a duty to control the fight

The question of development in Augustine's thought seems to be a permanently unresolved problem. Recent studies tend to stress the continuity of Augustine's thought, in contrast to the exaggerations of the past decades, in which Augustine effectively was split into two distinct and separate halves.<sup>5</sup> Concerning Augustine's position on *concupiscentia* under Christian renewal, there are at least two indisputable mileposts: the turn of *ad Simplicianum* to grace, and Augustine's changed reading of Romans 7. These landmarks will structure the following analysis, but this is not to advocate a purely disjunct and arbitrary way of thought in Augustine. As for the case of *concupiscentia* and its relation to renewal, one could perhaps speak of a steady development from vague beginnings to a coherent, and rather complicated view of *concupiscentia* in a baptised Christian.<sup>6</sup>

## 6.2. DISAVOWING *CONCUPISCENTIA*—VAGUE BEGINNINGS

From early on, Augustine discerns different stages, or levels, in the process of renewal. In *de uera religione* 48, he introduces an archetypal distinction between the "old man" (*uetus homo*) and the "new man" (*nouus homo*). The "old man" is exterior and earthly (*terrenus*),<sup>7</sup> being attached to temporal and mutable goods. In contrast, the "new man" is detached from the temporal things and gradually attaches to what is divine, immutable and rational. The life of the "old man" is described as *uita hominis uiuentis ex corpore et cupiditatibus rerum temporalium colligati*.<sup>8</sup>

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against its hostile movements in the same way as a Catholic Christian should love a Donatist but hate his or her rebellious attitude. On a more general level, Simonis 1968 tracks Augustine's premises of infant baptism during the Donatist controversy and their continuation and development during the Pelagian struggle, showing how the ecclesiological presuppositions (*salus extra ecclesiam non est*) had a role to play in the way Augustine makes the hamartiological conclusions in the Pelagian controversy (i.e. infants are guilty of *peccatum originale*). Simonis 1968, 500. Similarly, TeSelle (1970, 261) argues that "in controversy with the Donatists [...] Augustine first began to qualify his own perfectionism with an awareness of the continuing actuality of sin and the need of incorporation into Christ." See also Burns 1980.

<sup>5</sup> For a strong version of the case for continuity, see e.g. Harrison C. 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Some of the views expressed in this chapter have appeared in condensed form in Nisula 2010.

<sup>7</sup> The opposites *exterior* vs. *interior* also appear in *diu. qu.* 51, where they are discussed in their biblical context (2 Cor 4, 16 "outer man corrupted—inner man renewed"). The "outer man" and "inner man" can both refer to Adam. Thus, they both are parts of created humanity. They can, however, also refer to Adam as a sinner, and to Christ as righteousness (*diu. qu.* 51, 1). See also *c. ep. Man.* 36, 41.

<sup>8</sup> *uera rel.* 48.

Then a description follows of the “new man,” which is divided into seven spiritual “ages.”<sup>9</sup> Augustine here characterises renewal as a process of sublimation from the coarse historical facts to the more purely rational ways of Christianity, where “fleshly appetite” is “married” to reason and exists under the control of reason. The result of this marriage is that sin loses all attraction (*etiamsi omnes concedant, peccare non libeat*). This process ends in the sixth phase with a total submersion into an “eternal mode of life, where everything temporal has been left aside.”<sup>10</sup> In Augustine’s vision of the seven stages of renewal, *libidines* and earthly *cupiditates* are mainly allotted to the realm of the “old man,” while the life of the *homo nouus* is depicted as being capable of vanquishing these appetites even to the degree that the renewed person does not feel any urge to sin. However, Augustine wishes to add that no one is able to live solely as a “new man.” In other words, the “old man” follows with the interior, renewed person until death.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, this remark is not elaborated on further; no clear view emerges of how the desires and urges of the old man affect the renewed person, if at all.<sup>12</sup>

Augustine’s vagueness in allocating the urges and desires of the “old life” into the renewed life is also reflected in his works concerning renewal

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<sup>9</sup> *uera rel.* 49 *nonnulli totum [sc. ueterem hominem] agunt ab istius uitae ortu usque ad occasum, nonnulli autem uitam istam necessario ab illo incipiunt, sed renascuntur interius [...] iste dicitur nouus homo et [...] habens distinctas quasdam spiritaes aetates suas.* See *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 23, 40, where the seven stages of human progress are also mentioned, but in a different context of salvation history: *homo nouus* appears there in conjunction with the incarnation of Christ.

<sup>10</sup> *uera rel.* 49 *tertiam iam fidentiore et carnalem appetitum rationis robore maritantes gaudentemque intrinsecus in quadam dulcedine coniugali, cum anima menti copulatur et uelamento pudoris obnubitur, ut iam recte uiuere non cogatur, sed etiamsi omnes concedant, peccare non libeat [...] sextam omnimodae mutationis in aeternam uitam et usque ad totam obliuionem uitae temporalis transeuntem perfectam formam, quae facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem dei.*

<sup>11</sup> *uera rel.* 50 *ueterem [...] possit in hac uita unus homo agere, nouum uero [...] nemo in hac uita possit nisi cum uetere, nam et ab ipso incipiat necesse est et usque ad uisibilem mortem cum illo quamuis eo deficiente se proficiente perduret.*

<sup>12</sup> Note also that in *s. dom. mont.* 2, 6, 23 Augustine briefly takes up Rom 7, 18, 25 and infers to the “resistance,” or “weakness” of the body, which is prone to *carnalis consuetudo*. See van Fleteren 2001, 90–91. See also *c. Adim.* 21, where Augustine works with a similar set of concepts. The “old life,” or the “old man,” has been received from Adam. The sin of Adam was a properly voluntary act, while in the fallen humankind, it has grown “natural” (*naturale*). Again, Augustine does not elaborate as to how and when the old life is “destroyed,” but is satisfied with only claiming that this is done by the cross of Christ. *qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus concupiscentiis. tali enim cruce uetus homo, id est uetus uita perimitur, quam de Adam traximus, ut quod in illo fuit uoluntarium, in nobis fieret naturale. quod ostendit apostolus dicens: fuimus et nos aliquando natura filii irae sicut et ceteri.*

and Romans 7 during the 390s. These works stem from a roughly coinciding period.<sup>13</sup> Let us first turn to the collection of the various questions and answers, *de diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, based on the discussions in the ascetical community of Hippo.<sup>14</sup> The imperfect state of renewal surfaces in question 65. Here Augustine discusses the allegorical meaning of Lazarus' resurrection. To Augustine, the story is an allegory of the soul's progress towards divine life. Lazarus's tomb, the stench of his body, and the strips of cloth, all signify carnal life, the sins of fleshly desires.<sup>15</sup> Although alive, Lazarus comes out of the tomb with his face and body all wrapped in cloth. This detail produces a highly interesting, but again, rather vague and scant remark on renewal and "fleshly desires"; like Lazarus, the renewed Christian leaves the "carnal vices" behind. Because the Christian still inhabits a body, he or she cannot be totally estranged to *molestiis carnis*. Here Augustine also quotes a few words from Romans 7 (v. 25 *mente seruio legi dei, carne autem legi peccati*), which he explains in the following question as being words of a person who is on the verge of the *sub gratia* state.

Thus Augustine hints here that the remains of the old life in the flesh are somehow present in the Christian, who cannot be free from all sin and ignorance, even if being reborn and renewed.<sup>16</sup>

In the following question (*diu. qu.* 66), Augustine returns to the mixed character of renewal, and discusses Romans 7 at some length. Augustine now uses a four-stage model to depict the progress of renewal: *ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace*.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Fredriksen (1988, 90 n. 13) dates *diu. qu.* 65 and 66 after *exp. prop. Rm.*, "because of their more developed concept of the *massa*." She refers to the metaphor of *massa luti* in *exp. prop. Rm.* 54 and *massa peccati* in *diu. qu.* 68, 3–4, finding the latter more nuanced, and thus following the former in time. Mosher (1977, 19) treats the problem of dating more carefully. The similar details of argumentation, e.g. sin as an unintelligible reality and notions of *carnis prudentia*, suggest a roughly concurrent composition. Cf. here Drobnier's (2000, 2003, 2004) strict principles of dating, in which dating that is based on more or less developed expositions of the same motifs is categorically discarded.

<sup>14</sup> For the implications of this audience, see Martin 2001, 61–62, 65.

<sup>15</sup> *diu. qu.* 65 *terrenorum peccatorum, id est cupiditatum carnalium*.

<sup>16</sup> *diu. qu.* 65 *alieni a molestiis carnis esse non possumus [...] libera ab omni peccato et ignorantia esse non potest*.

<sup>17</sup> These stages are called *differentiae* or *actiones* (66, 3 *ex quo comprehendimus quattuor esse differentias etiam in uno homine, quibus gradatim peractis in uita aeterna manebitur, diu. qu.* 66, 3; see also *diu. qu.* 61, 7). Fredriksen 1988, 90–92; Martin 2001, 62: "while drawing upon the inherited tradition for components of this four-fold framework, the overall configuration with the the four descriptive labels and the interrelated progression of the stages is uniquely Augustine's."

Augustine begins with an overview of law, sin and humanity. Law as such cannot help fallen humanity. Law prohibits us to covet, and yet we do.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, life under law is described as a life driven and harassed by worldly pleasures (*temporales uoluptates*) and with the emotions being in control (*passiones [...] operatas in membris nostris*); these forces eventually lead to death, and they can be said to rule over humans. The first-person narrative in Rom 7, 15–23 describes such a person, living “under law.”<sup>19</sup> In contrast, a Christian lives in the law of the Spirit, which frees him or her from the law of sin and death. In addition, this results in the Christian no longer desiring harmful things (*non concupiscamus*), but fulfilling the orders made by Law, and doing this “without difficulty and most willingly.”<sup>20</sup> Consequently, the slavery from evil desire and other passions belongs to the past, to a time when the Christian was still under the Law of sin.<sup>21</sup> In these kinds of statements, Augustine posits a clear demarcation line between a stage that is *sub lege* and one that is *sub gratia*; the problems due to the “law of sin” in Romans 7 would be neatly limited to life before grace.

However, this is not the whole story. Despite these statements, Augustine also immediately assures us that even a person under grace (*sub gratia*) is not totally alienated from the *passiones*.

Therefore he who now serves with the mind the Law of God dies to these passions, although the passions themselves are not yet dead as long as he serves with the flesh the law of sin. Consequently there still remains in the one under grace something which, [although] incapable of overcoming him or taking captive, [will persist, nonetheless,] until the mortification of all that which draws its strength from the habits of sin and which is the reason why the body even now is said to be dead as long as it does not give perfect obedience to spirit.<sup>22</sup>

[transl. Mosher]

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<sup>18</sup> *diu. qu. 66, 1 lex ergo peccati et mortis, id est quae imposita est peccantibus atque morientibus, iubet tantum ne concupiscamus, et tamen concupiscimus.*

<sup>19</sup> *diu. qu. 66, 5 sunt uerba hominis sub lege constituti nondum sub gratia, qui etiam si nolit peccare, uincitur a peccato.*

<sup>20</sup> *diu. qu. 66, 1 accedente autem gratia id ipsum quod lex onerosè iusserat iam sine onere ac libentissime implemus [...] facit ut non concupiscamus et impleamus iussa legis, non iam serui legis per timorem, sed amici per caritatem.*

<sup>21</sup> *diu. qu. 66, 2 sub istis passionibus tamquam sub uiro dominante agebat anima, antequam ueniret gratia per fidem.*

<sup>22</sup> *diu. qu. 66, 2 his ergo passionibus moritur qui iam seruit menti legi dei, quamuis ipsae passiones nondum mortuae sint, quamdiu carne seruit legi peccati. restat ergo adhuc aliquid ei qui est sub gratia, quod eum non uincat nec captiuum ducat, donec mortificetur totum quod consuetudine praua roboratum est; et inde corpus etiam nunc mortuum esse dicitur, quamdiu non perfecte seruit spiritui.*

Hence, there is still “something” (*aliquid*) that causes the body to be “mortal,” although this “something,” a reluctance of the flesh, can no longer overcome the mind’s freedom to serve righteousness nor to achieve victories for sin.<sup>23</sup> These general introductory statements are then followed by a more precise and systematic presentation, in which Augustine describes each stage and their corresponding words in Rom 7–8.

Augustine seems to suggest that a distinctive feature in discerning whether one belongs to *sub lege* or *sub gratia* is the effectiveness or weakness of the remains of past sins in affecting forbidden actions.

Under the law we now live forbidden to sin, and yet, overcome by sin’s habits, we sin because faith does not yet assist us. The third phase of life is when now we trust fully in our Deliverer and do not attribute anything to our own merits, but, by loving his mercy, we are no longer overcome by the pleasure of evil habit when it strives to draw us into sin. But, nonetheless, we still suffer from its attempted seductions, although we are not betrayed to it.<sup>24</sup>

[transl. Mosher]

In describing the transition from the second to third stage, Augustine clearly searches for something that he could assign to both stages, but in a qualified mode in *sub gratia*. His language varies between the different labels in pinpointing this “something.” Thus, on the *sub lege* stage, the bonds of the *consuetudo carnalis* and *naturale uinculum mortalitatis* are too strong to be broken and withheld.<sup>25</sup>

By the transition to the third stage, however, the *reluctans mortalitas carnis* and *desideria carnalia* are restricted in their force, and the *prudencia carnalis* is changed into a “spiritual wisdom.”<sup>26</sup> The soul then starts to

<sup>23</sup> *diu. qu.* 66, 2. Cf. *diu. qu.* 67, 5, where Augustine states that this life is led with a certain *molestia*.

<sup>24</sup> *diu. qu.* 66, 3 *sub lege est actio, cum iam prohibemur a peccato, et tamen eius consuetudine uicti peccamus, quoniam nos nondum adiuuat fides. tertia actio est, quando iam plenissime credimus liberatori nostro, nec meritis nostris aliquid tribuimus, sed eius misericordiam diligendo iam non uincimur delectatione consuetudinis malae, cum ad peccatum nos ducere nititur, sed tamen adhuc eam interpellantem patimur, quamuis ei non tradamur.*

<sup>25</sup> *diu. qu.* 66, 5.

<sup>26</sup> The transition from *sub lege* stage to *sub gratia* stage is covered in Rom 7, 24 (*miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?*), which forms a bridge between the two stages. The frontier lines of this bridge are somewhat blurred. The verse is in similar use in *diu. qu.* 67, 6. See also *en. Ps.* 6, 7 and Ring’s (1989, 390–391) discussion. *Diu. qu.* 67, 6 has perplexed scholars for the reason that Augustine seems to abandon his strict division between the two stages. See Berrouard 1981, 108–109 (who thinks that Augustine does not here “work exegetically anymore”); Martin 2001, 68; followed by Harrison C. 2006, 132, who see such use as anticipating Augustine’s later, anti-Pelagian view of Rom 7. Hombert (1998, 226–227) emphasises that Augustine deals with Rom 7 extremely rarely in sermons predating



desire spiritual goods and to hold temporal ones in contempt. Augustine even seems to claim that the fleshly wisdom, or *prudencia carnis*, vanishes altogether. But then it is defined to be a “disposition” or an affection of the soul, which ceases completely (*omnino*) only after the entire soul is converted towards eternal goods. Augustine concludes that even the person *sub gratia* still has to suffer from certain “needs” (*indigentia*) of the bodily things.<sup>27</sup> In a way that will become his standard conviction, Augustine argues that in the third stage, that is *sub gratia*, one does not, nonetheless, consent to the movements (*motus*) arising from the needs of bodily reality, for the mind of the renewed person serves God’s law.<sup>28</sup> It is noteworthy that the terminology in this question is fluctuating and searching. Instead of naming *concupiscentia* as being straightforwardly the number one problem for a person *sub gratia*, Augustine vacillates and circumscribes. There is, however, an awareness of the presence of remnants of “something” of the old *sub lege* person, still lingering in the renewed Christians.

At approximately the same time as addressing the questions dealing with Romans in *diu. qu.* Augustine also composed other relevant commentaries to Paul. In 394 he wrote an exegetical treatise on Romans, concentrating only on certain passages (*expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos*). The four-fold division of *ante legem*, *sub lege*, *sub gratia*, *in pace* is introduced already in connection with Rom 3, 20. In this work, the stages (*gradus*) are characterised in terms of their relation to *concupiscentia*—despite the fact that *concupiscentia* does not even occur in the source text (*exp. prop. Rom. 12*).<sup>29</sup>

411. In general, Harrison C. (*ibid.*) claims Augustine’s exegesis of the stages to be a “theoretical rehearsal [...] wholly absent elsewhere”; at the same time admitting that the demarcation line between *sub lege* and *sub gratia* is still present in Augustine’s main anti-Pelagian works (*ibid.*). See however *s. dom. m.* 2, 6, 23, in which Rom 7, 18, 25 are read as concerning the body and mind of a Christian person. van Fleteren 2001, 90–91.

<sup>27</sup> *diu. qu.* 66, 6 *mortuum corpus dicit [...] ut indigentia rerum corporalium molestet animam, et quibusdam motibus ex ipsa indigentia uenientibus ad appetenda terrena sollicitet.*

<sup>28</sup> *diu. qu.* 66, 6 *quibus tamen quamuis existentibus mens ad illicita facienda non consentit, quae iam seruit legi dei.*

<sup>29</sup> *exp. prop. Rm.* 13–18 *ante legem sequimur concupiscentiam carnis, sub lege trahimur ab ea, sub gratia nec sequimur eam nec trahimur ab ea, in pace nulla est concupiscentia carnis. ante legem ergo non pugnamus, quia non solum concupiscimus et peccamus, sed etiam approbamus peccata. sub lege pugnamus, sed uincimur, fatemur enim mala esse, quae facimus, et fatendo mala esse utique nolumus facere, sed quia nondum est gratia, superamur [...] uenit ergo gratia [...] quod cum fit, tametsi desideria quaedam carnis, dum in hac uita sumus, aduersus spiritum nostrum pugnant, ut eum ducant in peccatum, non tamen his desideris consentiens spiritus, quoniam est fixus in gratia et caritate dei, desinit peccare. non enim in ipso desiderio prauo, sed in nostra consensione peccamus.*

The evil desires are a legacy from the first sin of the first man (*trahimus ex primo peccato primi hominis*), and they are born out of the mortality of the flesh. Thus they will not cease to exist until the Resurrection, where our bodies are changed into a better state of being. When a person has cried for God's help, he or she receives grace, and the state of *concupiscentia* is changed. In short, it no longer drags us into sin (*trahimur*). Instead, we are free not to follow or to be dragged away by it (*nec sequimur eam nec trahimur ab ea*). The result of renewal in the third stage is put bluntly: consent is simply not given to the evil desires. Thus, the renewed person ceases to sin (*desinit peccare*), because his or her spirit is "fixed" in God's grace and love. The ability to never yield to evil desire is the hallmark of living *sub gratia*.<sup>30</sup> There are no qualifications or differentiation between venial sins and flagrant crimes; the life of the renewed with the remnants of the *desideria praua* is depicted in clear and unambiguous tones.<sup>31</sup>

The actual analysis of Romans 7 is conducted along similar lines. When God's law is made known to the sinner, *concupiscentia* grows in force (*omnis, id est, consummata fiat*) and exceeds the limits of prohibition (*etiam contra legem fiat et praeuaricatione crimen accumulet*). The verses that stress the inability to act according to God's law (Rom 7, 19–20, "I do not do what I want") are explained as coming from the lips of the person living under the Law, whose will is only able to call for God's help.<sup>32</sup> After grace is received, life under law is efficiently ended, and another one begins, in which evil desires are no longer consented to.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> *exp. prop. Rm. 13–18 hinc enim ostendit esse desideria, quibus non oboediendo peccatum in nobis regnare non sinimus. See also exp. prop. Rm. 35 quia ergo non consentimus desideriis prauis, in gratia sumus et non regnat peccatum [...] cui autem dominatur peccatum, quamuis uelit peccato resistere, adhuc sub lege est, nondum sub gratia.*

<sup>31</sup> Similarly in *exp. prop. Rm. 35 non enim oboedit desiderio peccati quamuis adhuc sollicitent concupiscentiae et prouocent ad consensionem, donec uiuificetur etiam corpus et absorbeatur mors in uictoriam. quia ergo non consentimus desideriis prauis, in gratia sumus et non regnat peccatum in nostro mortali corpore. See also en. Ps. 4, 6 etiam si surgit motus animi, qui iam propter poenam peccati non est in potestate, saltem ei non consentiat ratio et mens, quae intus regenerata est secundum deum, ut mente seruamus legi dei, si adhuc carne seruimus legi peccati.*

<sup>32</sup> *exp. prop. Rm. 44 tunc enim peccatis uincitur, dum uiribus suis iuste uiuere conatur sine adiutorio liberantis gratiae dei. Augustine still holds on to his view of liberum arbitrium (that is soon to be abandoned in Simpl.): though a person under the Law cannot help his or her defeats to sin and concupiscentia, he or she can implore God for help by means of liberum arbitrium.*

<sup>33</sup> *exp. prop. Rm. 36 adhuc manentibus in nobis desideriis et incitamentis quibusdam ad peccandum non oboedimus tamen neque consentimus. See Fredriksen 1988, 91–92.*

Thus, Augustine emphasises in his interpretation the categorical difference between the stages of *sub lege* and *sub gratia* in their relation to *concupiscentia*. In other words, a renewed person simply does not consent to the remnants, or the law of sin, or to the *carnalis consuetudo*, or to the law of mortality. The “fleshly habit,” active in the person *sub lege* fights against “the law of mind” and “captivates” one under sin. *Carnalis consuetudo*, or *concupiscentia*, is a result of Adam’s transgression; because of it, we are bound to mortality.<sup>34</sup> The presence of evil desires in the renewed state is acknowledged in this depiction, but not much else is said about the renewed person’s problems or ways of surviving with them.<sup>35</sup>

Augustine’s contemporary commentary on the Galatians (*expositio epistulae ad Galatas*) repeats many notions of *concupiscentia* and renewal that we have seen in *diu. qu.* and *exp. prop. Rom.*<sup>36</sup> The comments on the verse Gal 5, 17 are the most important from our perspective.<sup>37</sup> The fourfold division of *ante legem*, *sub lege*, *sub gratia*, *in pace* is also used here. The people living “under law” are characterised as people who attempt to abstain from sin, but are defeated by it. People living under grace, however, do not succumb to sin, for they do not prefer anything to the treasure of righteousness given by God.<sup>38</sup> The presence and anticipated annihilation of the *desideria carnis* in the *sub gratia* stage are acknowledged again in a simple, matter-of-fact tone.<sup>39</sup> The presence of desires against God’s love is labelled as *aduersitas carnis*, and Augustine now also makes the notion of this adversary serving as a practice or a training for the renewed Christians.<sup>40</sup> They

<sup>34</sup> *exp. prop. Rm.* 45–47 *legem autem peccati dicit ex transgressionem Adae conditionem mortalem, qua mortales facti sumus. ex hac enim labe carnis concupiscentia carnis sollicitat et secundum hanc dicit alio loco: fuimus et nos naturaliter filii irae sicut et ceteri [Eph 2,3]; satis ostendit condemnationem non esse, si existant desideria carnalia, sed si eis ad peccandum non oboediatur. quod contingit his, qui sub lege constituti sunt, nondum sub gratia. nam sub lege constituti non solum repugnantem habent concupiscentiam, sed etiam captiui ducuntur, cum obtemperant ei. non autem contingit his, qui mente seruiunt legi dei, thus also s. dom. mont. 2, 6, 23.*

<sup>35</sup> In *exp. prop. Rm.* 51 these problems are vaguely referred to as *molestiae de corpore*; see also in *exp. prop. Rm.* 53.

<sup>36</sup> For this work, see Ring 1996–2002, 1199–1207; Plumer 2003, 1–118.

<sup>37</sup> *exp. Gal.* 46–48.

<sup>38</sup> *exp. Gal.* 46.

<sup>39</sup> *exp. Gal.* 46 *existant desideria carnis de mortalitate corporis, tamen mentem ad consensionem peccati non subiugant. ita iam non regnat peccatum in nostro mortali corpore, quamuis non possit nisi inhabitare in eo, quamdiu mortale corpus est. primo enim non regnat, cum mente seruimus legi dei quamuis carne legi peccati, id est poenali consuetudini, cum ex illa existunt desideria, quibus tamen non oboedimus. postea uero ex omni parte extinguitur.*

<sup>40</sup> *exp. Gal.* 47 *quippe non eas omnino habere non iam certamen sed certaminis praemium est, si obtinuerimus uictoriam perseuerando sub gratia.*

are “touched” by the “movements” of evil desires but do not consent to them, for they live a stable life in “a greater love.”<sup>41</sup> The ability to resist these movements is once again coolly noted. Augustine’s language continues to fluctuate: the adversary of the renewed person is called *desideria*, *naturalis consuetudo*, etc. Here Augustine also makes the distinction between “having sin” (*habere peccatum*) and actually committing sin (*peccare*), one which will become a standard argument in Augustine’s view of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal. Augustine is sufficiently confident to claim that even the passive state of having sin can be diminished effectively in this life.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, in Augustine’s first attempts to clarify the position and effects of the remnants of the “old life” in the renewed self, *concupiscentia* seems to be present, but in a vague and shifting form. All the descriptions of the *sub gratia* stage, a subcategory created for exegetic purposes, do somehow admit that the Christian life still awaits perfection; however, the force of *concupiscentia* is mainly located in the *sub lege* stage, where it is seen as a powerful bondage to sin.<sup>43</sup>

Admittedly, Augustine also uses the concept of consent in his notions of Christian renewal already in his early works. But the “*aliquid*” that should not be, and indeed is not, consented, remains vague in its effects and designation. Moreover, the notion of the consent in the renewed state remains very straightforward, or even crude: Augustine has no need to develop qualified or elaborated views of the kinds of sins that would be fatal to consent, or to discuss whether there are some “lighter” kinds of sins that cannot be avoided even during Christian renewal.

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<sup>41</sup> exp. Gal. 48 *immobiles in maiore caritate consistunt*. Cf. c. Fort. 22 *cum autem gratia dei amorem nobis diuinum inspirauerit et nos suae uoluntati subditos fecerit [...] ab ista lege liberamur, cum iusti esse coeperimus*.

<sup>42</sup> exp. Gal. 48 *nam in quo peccatum non regnat, non peccat, id est qui non oboedit desideriis eius, in quo autem non existunt omnino ista desideria, non solum non peccat, sed etiam non habet peccatum. quod etiam si ex multis partibus in ista uita possit effici, ex omni tamen parte nonnisi in resurrectione carnis atque commutatione sperandum est*.

<sup>43</sup> This is particularly the case in *lib. arb.*, which we have not included in the analysis here, because Augustine has little to say about renewal in that work, important as such as it is for Augustine’s theology of sin and grace.

6.3. *INUICTISSIMA CUPIDITAS*—  
IN SEARCH OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE

Augustine's *de diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* is usually mentioned as a critical watershed in his theology of sin and grace.<sup>44</sup> Already Augustine himself recognised the tensioned, process-like flow of the argument in this work.<sup>45</sup> The relevant questions from our perspective appear in *Simpl.* 1, where the first question concerns Romans 7, and the second question relates to Romans 9. We shall now have a closer look at these questions.

As we have already seen, Paul's narrative in Romans 7 is, according to Augustine, an exercise of rhetorical transformation: Paul takes on the role of a person who is still *sub lege*.<sup>46</sup> Augustine contends that God's law does not cause anyone to sin, nor does it produce the desire (*concupiscentia*) to sin, but rather informs us of its true nature and existence: the sinner has sole responsibility for it.<sup>47</sup> What is important is the way that Augustine depicts *concupiscentia* as an irresistible force if one lives without grace: the recognition of God's law only increases the powers of *concupiscentia*.

[C]oncupiscence was even increased, since it could not be resisted when grace was not yet received. For concupiscence acquires greater strength when in addition there is violation of a law. It is aggravated when it is done against the law, and becomes a worse sin than if there had been no law prohibiting it.<sup>48</sup>

[transl. Burleigh]

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<sup>44</sup> The concise presentation of de Bruyn (1993, 1–10) is a good introduction for what has been a source for extensive studies in past decades (for different angles, see, for instance, Burns 1980; Flasch 1995; Lössl 1997; Drecoll 1999). *Simpl.* is usually given a crucial position in Augustine's theological development of the doctrine of grace. Most scholars stress the groundbreaking character of this work, some others, however, see it as a natural follow-up of a process already begun in the very earliest expositions of Augustine. For a clear, but provocative overview in favour of the latter view, see Harrison C. 2006, 3–19. See already TeSelle 1970, 159, for a moderate emphasis of continuity.

<sup>45</sup> *retr.* 2, 1, 1 *laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia.*

<sup>46</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 1 *uidetur mihi apostolus transfigurasse in se hominem sub lege positum.* For the verb *transfigurare*, see Quint. *Inst.* 6, 2, 1 *quare adhuc opus superest cum ad obtinenda quae uolumus potentissimum, tum supra dictis multo difficilius, mouendi iudicum animos atque in eum quem uolumus habitum formandi et uelut transfigurandi.*

<sup>47</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 2.

<sup>48</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 3 *nondum accepta gratia concupiscentiae resisti non poterat, augetur etiam, quia maiores uires habet concupiscentia crimine praeuicationis adiuncto, cum etiam contra legem facit, quam si nulla lege prohiberetur.*

An accurate knowledge of one's sinful state does not help the victim of these forces; on the contrary, the insight given by God's law only adds to the guilt of the perpetrator.<sup>49</sup> In Augustine's report, sin is described in a language that emphasises the importance of correct insight and recognition. Thus, Paul's words (Rom 7, 10 "and I died") mean, "I *knew* myself to be dead."<sup>50</sup>

In depicting the human state of *sub lege*, Augustine does not spare his words. This is a life branded with servitude. While even people under grace might be said to be carnal "to a certain extent" (*ad quendam modum*), the attribute properly denotes those who live under law, for they are "not reborn" away from the sinful life.<sup>51</sup> This state is further qualified as a state of slavery under evil desires (*libido, cupiditas*):

[One is] being compelled to serve lust as chattel-slave. He who knows that an act is prohibited and rightly prohibited, and yet does it, knows that he is the slave of an overmastering desire.<sup>52</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

The verses Rom 7, 16–17 are explained with an extraordinary stress on the compulsory and debilitating force of *concupiscentia*. The *persona hominis sub lege constituti* speaks in Paul's voice and attests to a grave form of submission to *concupiscentia*:

He is still speaking in the person of a man under the law and not yet under grace who is brought to do wrong by some dominant desire, and by some deceptive sweetness associated with prohibited sin.<sup>53</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

Augustine here subscribes to a *sub lege* Paul, who is so bound to the dominant evil desire that even the identity of the agent is at stake (*non ego*): "Paul" is "drawn" to sin, "betrayed" by the sweetness of forbidden sin, and is finally overcome by *cupiditas*, and thus fulfilling its bids.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Although some pleasure is achieved by sin, it all dries up through the resulting guilt (*reatus*) and death. *Simpl.* 1, 1, 5.

<sup>50</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 6. This solves the problem of the words that seem to suggest that there was no sin at all before the Law, but also reflects Augustine's insistence on *intellectus* in the matters of sin and grace. See Lössl 1997, 79–80.

<sup>51</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 7 *qui autem nondum est sub gratia sed sub lege ita carnalis est, ut nondum sit renatus a peccato.*

<sup>52</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 7 *delectatur etiam contra legem facere, cum tanto magis libet, quanto minus licet. [...] cogatur tamquam emptum mancipium servire libidini. sentit enim se seruum dominantis cupiditatis qui prohibetur et se recte prohiberi cognoscit et tamen facit.*

<sup>53</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 9 *loquitur enim adhuc ex persona hominis sub lege constituti nondum sub gratia, qui profecto trahitur ad male operandum concupiscentia dominante atque fallente dulcedine peccati prohibiti.*

<sup>54</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 9 *propterea dicit: non ego operor illud, quia uictus operatur. cupiditas quippe id operatur, cui superanti ceditur. ut autem non cedatur sitque mens hominis aduersus cupiditatem robustior, gratia facit.*

Eventually, in *Simpl.* 1, 1, 10, Augustine ends up characterising the human servitude under sin in extreme terms. The sin that “dwells within” a person *sub lege* is a joint product of both the “sprout of mortality” (*tradux mortalitatis*),<sup>55</sup> and the constantly present allurements of pleasures (*adsiduitas uoluptatis*). The first is brought along at birth, the second is cumulative in each individual’s life. These two together, as it were, nature and nurture combined (*natura et consuetudo*), form a robust and invincible evil desire (*cupiditas*) that is called sin and said to inhabit our flesh. Augustine interprets the “inhabitation” of this strong chain of sin to mean primacy (*principatus*), an overwhelming control over all better aspirations. The notion of inhabitation entails, in Augustine’s view, that the person *sub lege* is entirely subjected to *cupiditas* and serves, as it were, as a domain for it.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, the weight and force of evil desire is too much for human weakness: although a person living *sub lege* would want the things that God’s law reveals, the burden of mortality and self-afflicted habit effectively prevent all such wishes to be manifested in action. Both of these factors boost *concupiscentia* as insuperable. Hence, *concupiscentia* may even be called one’s “second nature.”<sup>57</sup> In Augustine’s account, *concupiscentia* comes out of the battle as the incontestable winner (*concupiscentia superans* is repeated throughout the exegesis).

From these sobering visions, Augustine still manages to draw a hopeful conclusion. While it is true that a person *sub lege* cannot achieve a virtuous

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<sup>55</sup> Fredriksen 1986, 96. *Tradux* already appears in Ambrosiast. in *Rom* 7, 22 *hic est interior homo, quia non in animo habitat peccatum, sed in carne, quia est ex origine carnis peccati, et per traducem omnis caro fit peccati.*

<sup>56</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 10 *unde hoc est, quod dicit habitare in carne sua non utique bonum, id est peccatum?—unde nisi ex traduce mortalitatis et adsiduitate uoluptatis? illud est ex poena originalis peccati, hoc ex poena frequentati peccati; cum illo in hanc uitam nascimur, hoc uiuendo addimus. quae duo scilicet tamquam natura et consuetudo coniuncta robustissimam faciunt et inuictissimam cupiditatem, quod uocat peccatum et dicit habitare in carne sua, id est dominatum quendam et quasi regnum obtinere.* The inhabitation, or occupancy of sin ends, however, when God’s grace is present: as *concupiscentia* no longer then has primacy, it cannot be properly said to continue to inhabit the person.

<sup>57</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 11 *certe enim ipsum uelle in potestate est, quoniam adiacet nobis; sed quod perficere bonum non est in potestate, ad meritum pertinet originalis peccati. non enim est haec prima natura hominis sed delicti poena, per quam facta est ipsa mortalitas quasi secunda natura, unde nos gratia liberat conditoris subditos sibi per fidem. sed istae nunc uoces sunt sub lege hominis constituti nondum sub gratia. non enim quod uult facit bonum qui nondum est sub gratia, sed quod non uult malum hoc agit superante concupiscentia non solum uinculo mortalitatis sed mole consuetudinis roborata.* For the “natural” terminology see also *c. Adim.* 21. *uetus homo, id est uetus uita perimitur, quam de Adam traximus, ut quod in illo fuit uoluntarium, in nobis fieret naturale.* Cf. *retr.* 1, 10, 3.

life, nor conquer the rule of *concupiscentia*, the possibility always remains of appealing to God. In fact, the very burden of the Law and mortality are intended for our benefit. As they show the miserable condition under the slavery of *concupiscentia*, they press us to seek aid from divine resources. What is thus left (*hoc enim restat*) for the human will *sub lege*, who is in every other aspect “conquered, damned, captive,” is the freedom to call for God’s help in one’s anguish and bondage to sin.<sup>58</sup>

In *Simpl.* 1, 2, Augustine effectively denies all human possibilities of reaching salvation in his interpretation of Romans 9, which represents Paul’s revision of the story of Jacob and Esau. All merits preceding grace are excluded; thus, even the act and initiative of seeking help is only due to God’s grace. The argumentation proceeds in a hide-and-seek manner; and in order to explain why some people are saved and others are not, Augustine eventually has to draw his wildcard of congruent divine call, which is ultimately yet another way to avoid the problem. The problem of divine equality and justice then naturally becomes acute.<sup>59</sup> The conclusions in *Simpl.* 1, 2 are nothing short of staggering: Jacob was saved without any preceding merits and Esau was damned without any preceding merits. The ways of God are inscrutable.

In this second question, Augustine places, if possible, even more emphasis on the strong, iron grip of sin and *concupiscentia*. All humankind together—the total progeny of Adam—forms a “lump of sin”: as such, it has no rights whatsoever to demand merciful action from God. On the contrary, the rights of the debtor remain on God’s side.<sup>60</sup> In line with the previous

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<sup>58</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 1, 14 *hoc autem totum ideo dicitur, ut demonstretur homini captiuato non esse praesumendum de uiribus suis. unde Iudaeos arguebat tamquam de operibus legis superbe gloriantes, cum traherentur concupiscentia ad quidquid illicitum est, cum lex de qua gloriabantur dicat: non concupisces. humiliter ergo dicendum est homini uicto damnato captiuo et nec saltem accepta lege uictori sed potius praeuaricatori, humiliter exclamandum est: miser ego homo. quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum [Rom 7,24 sq.]. hoc enim restat in ista mortali uita libero arbitrio, non ut impleat homo iustitiam cum uoluerit, sed ut se supplicii pietate conuertat ad eum cuius dono eam possit implere.*

<sup>59</sup> Augustine holds tightly to God’s justice, even under the utmost paradox of glaring inequality. *Simpl.* 1, 2, 16 *sit igitur hoc fixum atque immobile in mente sobria pietate atque stabili in fide, quod nulla est iniquitas apud deum. atque ita tenacissime firmissimeque credatur id ipsum, quod deus cuius uult miseretur et quem uult obdurat, hoc est cuius uult miseretur et cuius non uult non miseretur, esse alicuius occultae atque ab humano modulo inuestigabilis aequitatis.* If we are unsatisfied with the way God treats humankind, this is only because we are unable to understand our own position (*o homo, tu quis es?*).

<sup>60</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 2, 16.



question, *concupiscentia* holds sway: it binds the entire humankind under joint guilt and debt, repressing effectively all initiative towards God. *Concupiscentia* is a ruling power (*regnans*); it is diffused in all those who are part of the fallen humankind.

But carnal concupiscence now reigns as a result of the penalty of sin, and has thrown the whole human race into confusion, making of it one lump in which the original guilt remains throughout.<sup>61</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

In the end, Augustine has engraved in the minds of his hearers the total inability of free will to choose freely anything but sin. Referring to Gal 5, 17, Augustine claims that the bondage of *concupiscentia* in those who are "sold unto sin," i.e. in those who live without grace, is simply too strong to give room for any kind of other possibilities. Hence, it is God's absolute act of will that picks out those who are to be saved from the mass (*consparsio*) of the damned.

The apostle, therefore, and all those who have been justified and have demonstrated for us the understanding of grace, have no other intention than to show that he that glories should glory in the Lord. Who will call in question the works of the Lord who out of one lump damns one and justifies another? Free will is most important. It exists, indeed, but of what value is it in those who are sold under sin? "The flesh," says he, "lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh so that ye may not do the things that ye would."<sup>62</sup> [transl. Burleigh]

In *Simpl.*, the force of *concupiscentia* is emphatically limited to the narratives concerning the soul *sub lege*, while the renewed soul is omitted from the focus. To claim that this results from the plain fact that Augustine interprets Romans 7 as being a testimony of a *sub lege* person, and therefore the voice of the renewed is not heard, would be to evade Augustine's fundamental decision to read Romans 7 as such in the first place. It is clear from *Simpl.* that Augustine, knowingly or not, disavows *concupiscentia* from the renewed life by painting it in such vivid colours as a

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<sup>61</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 2, 20 *sed concupiscentia carnalis de peccati poena iam regnans uniuersum genus humanum tamquam totam et unam conspersionem originali reatu in omnia permanente confunderat.*

<sup>62</sup> *Simpl.* 1, 2, 21 *nulla igitur intentio tenetur apostoli et omnium iustificatorum, per quos nobis intellectus gratiae demonstratus est, nisi ut qui gloriatur in domino gloriatur. quis enim discutiet opera domini, ex eadem conspersione unum damnantis aliud iustificantis? liberum uoluntatis arbitrium plurimum ualet, immo uero est quidem, sed in uenundatis sub peccato quid ualet? caro, inquit, concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, ut non ea quae uultis faciatis.* See Lössl 1997, 94–95.

problem of people living without God's grace. This is seen for instance in the way Augustine depicts God as the only subject who can "invite and delight" the human will, which is perverted by its own evil choices and bound to servitude under the invincibly robust powers of habituated concupiscence.

In *de doctrina christiana*, written for the most part contemporaneously with *Simpl.*, Augustine touches upon the problem of *concupiscentia* and renewal in passing. From the general setting of rightly ordered loves in *doctr. chr.* 1, 23–24, Augustine proceeds to an analysis of the body-soul relation.<sup>63</sup> Augustine rejects all kinds of hatred against the body as such, and defends only such ascetic practices that are motivated by moderate continence (*continentia*) and are aimed at curbing the lusts (*libidines*); it is these lusts that "abuse" (*male utentes*) the body, i.e. they are habits of the soul that are inclined to "enjoy the lower things."<sup>64</sup> Therefore, it would be a mistake to despise one's body on the basis of Paul (Gal 5, 17 *caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem; haec enim inuicem aduersantur*).

These words were spoken because of the ungovernable habits of the flesh, against which the spirit lusts not in order to destroy the body but to make it subservient to the spirit, as our nature demands, by taming its lusts, that is, its evil habits.<sup>65</sup> [transl. Green]

Augustine distinguishes somewhat vaguely between *concupiscentia indomita* and *edomita*. Christian renewal should somehow bring about that the wild, untame *concupiscentia* is changed in its quality. But Augustine does not provide any answers to the questions of how this would happen, and to which extent this should be achieved. This much is said, however, that while complete domination of the spirit over the body will not be realised until the Resurrection, evidently the goal for a Christian must be that the fleshly habit of the body will be changed for the better:

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<sup>63</sup> Clearly motivated by a need to discredit the Manichaeian contempt for the body which seems to be supported by e.g. Gal 5, 17.

<sup>64</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 24 *quod autem continentia quadam et laboribus quasi persequi uidentur corpora sua, qui hoc recte faciunt, non id agunt, ut non habeant corpus, sed ut habeant subiugatum et paratum ad opera necessaria. libidines enim male utentes corpora, id est consuetudines inclinationis animae ad fruendum inferioribus, per ipsius corporis laboriosam quandam militiam extinguere adfectant.*

<sup>65</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 25 *dictum est enim hoc propter indomitam carnalem consuetudinem, aduersus quam spiritus concupiscit, non ut interimat corpus sed ut concupiscentia eius, id est consuetudine mala, edomita faciat spiritui subiugatum, quod naturalis ordo desiderat.*

[I]t should be our concern in this life that the tendency of the flesh (*consuetudo carnalis*) is reformed and not allowed to resist the spirit with its unruly impulses.<sup>66</sup> [transl. Green]

While ascertaining goodness for both the mind and body, Augustine again stresses the habituated and enslaving character of evil desires (*consuetudinis uinculum*), which have to be overcome by the spirit. The chain of *consuetudo* has become “planted” into the human offspring as if being a law of nature (or, “naturally ingrained,” transl. Green).<sup>67</sup> From Augustine’s depiction in *doctr. chr.*, it again seems clear that the rule of *concupiscentia* as something actually dividing one’s person does not belong to the status of renewal: the binding force of *libido* and *consuetudo* are brought under a healing process so that they would be “changed” and that the bodily needs should be mitigated under the rule of the spirit. Further in *doctr. chr.* 3, in the context of the division between *caritas* and *cupiditas*, Augustine notes that there are two kinds of people. The first will receive the final judgment of God, for they have been unwilling (*noluerunt*) to conquer their *cupiditas*. On the other hand, there are people who have succeeded in this, and have overcome the realm of *cupiditas*. According to Augustine, this is the meaning of Paul’s harsh words in Gal 5, 24 (*carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus et concupiscentiis*).<sup>68</sup> The outcome of this passing notion remains somewhat ambiguous, and the “crucifixion” of the forces of “untamed desires” is not elaborated on further.<sup>69</sup>

In *confessiones* 7–8 Augustine describes a series of conversions. A change from an intellectual approach to a moral one is apparent (*conf.* 8).<sup>70</sup> The end of *conf.* 7 (26–27) lucidly describes the threshold between the intellec-

<sup>66</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 25 *hoc etiam in hac uita meditandum est, ut consuetudo carnalis mutetur in melius nec inordinatis motibus resistat spiritui.*

<sup>67</sup> *doctr. chr.* 1, 25 *per consuetudinis uinculum, quod a parentum etiam propagine inueteratum naturae lege inoleuit.*

<sup>68</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 17 *angustia in omnem animam hominis operantis malum, Iudaei primum et Graeci [Rom 2,7–9]. sed hoc ad eos cum quibus euerit ipsa cupiditas, qui eam uincere noluerunt. cum autem in homine cui dominabantur, regna cupiditatis subuertuntur, illa est aperta locutio: qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem crucifixerunt cum passionibus et concupiscentiis [Gal 5,24].*

<sup>69</sup> *doctr. chr.* 3, 16–17.

<sup>70</sup> O’Donnell 1992, II, 391. Note also O’Donnell’s musings of “middle time” (*ibid.*). The change also seems to entail a transition from a trinitarian perspective to the incarnation of Christ. For this, see Du Roy 1966, 96–106. In Augustine’s own words, the letters of Paul began to show him *una facies eloquiorum castorum* (*conf.* 7, 27). Biblical allusions to Paul frequent the last pages of *conf.* 7.

tual and moral conversion.<sup>71</sup> The *libri Platoniorum* appeared inefficient in reaching the divine homeland, and so Augustine sees himself to be in the helpless state of the Pauline man *sub lege* (Rom 7, 22–23).<sup>72</sup> From his post-Simplician perspective, Augustine confesses that only the grace of Christ (Rom 7, 24) was able to set him genuinely free, i.e. not only in terms of knowledge, but also in terms of action.<sup>73</sup>

*Conf.* 8 is a study of Augustine's imperfect and unsuccessful attempts to master his will and thus accomplish his own conversion.<sup>74</sup> After recounting the story of Victorinus' conversion, Augustine turns to an analysis of his own state of will at that time.<sup>75</sup> Augustine explicitly identifies himself in the two agents of Gal 5, 17.<sup>76</sup> Importantly, Romans 7 is strongly present in the description as well.<sup>77</sup> Paul's words on *concupiscentia* are confirmed by Augustine's own experience. His will is bound through a chain of events, to which he is himself responsible. The images of strong chains abound in the narrative: by a perverted choice of the will, it has changed to a "lust" (*libido*). A long habituation to lust has changed it to "necessity" (*necessitas*). As a result, Augustine lives in "harsh bondage." The "new will" that *knows* better is too weak to *act*, to accomplish its own deliberation.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>71</sup> See Berrouard 1981, 105–106; and O'Donnell's (1992, II, 478–479) comments.

<sup>72</sup> *conf.* 7, 27. For the significance of *libri Platoniorum* in the twentieth century Augustinian scholarship, see e.g. Cary 2000, 33–36.

<sup>73</sup> O'Donnell 1992, III, 3–4: "The central issue, 'conversion,' is presented in terms that were only possible for A. after he reached the positions he expressed in *diu. qu. Simp.* 1.2." Cf. the reflections on the difference between *Platoniorum libri* and Scriptural truths in *conf.* 7, 26 *beatificam patriam non tantum cernendam sed et habitandam*. See also *conf.* 8, 11 *et non erat iam illa excusatio qua uideri mihi solebam [...] seruire tibi, quia incerta mihi esset perceptio ueritatis: iam enim et ipsa certa erat. ego autem adhuc terra obligatus militare tibi recusabam*.

<sup>74</sup> For extensive comments for the entire context in *conf.* 8, 10–27 see O'Donnell 1992, III, 30–55.

<sup>75</sup> Augustine's position on the will in *confessiones* has received considerable attention. For various interpretations, see Dihle 1982, 127; Fredriksen 1986, 20–26; Rigby 1987, 69–84; Stark 1989; O'Donnell 1992, III, 30–31; Saarinen 1994, 26–31; Harrison C. 2000, 89–93; Sorabji 2000, 336; Knuuttila 2004, 162–168; Müller 2009, 323–335. For Marius Victorinus and his commentaries on Paul, see Erdt 1980.

<sup>76</sup> *conf.* 8, 11.

<sup>77</sup> For the readings of Rom in *conf.*, see O'Donnell 1992, III, 3–4. For the identity of Rom 7 and Augustine in the time just before his conversion, see *ibid.*, III, 34–35. See also Stark 1989, 352–357.

<sup>78</sup> *conf.* 8, 10 *uelle meum tenebat inimicus et inde mihi catenam fecerat et constrinxerat me. quippe ex uoluntate peruersa facta est libido, et dum seruitur libidini, facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas. quibus quasi ansulis sibimet innexis—unde catenam appellaui—tenebat me obstrictum dura seruitus. uoluntas autem noua, quae mihi esse coeperat, ut te gratis colerem fruique te uellem, deus, sola certa iucunditas, nondum*

Augustine had found Paul's dichotomic presentation to be convincing, because it described an inner conflict which Augustine himself was acutely feeling, and which was not caused by some exterior, foreign element (as in the Manichaean teaching), but resulting from a division of one's own self, one's own will. While at this stage, Augustine recalls himself to have identified more with the "better" will by the knowledge he had received, he still has to admit that what he was actually doing were the actions his "old will" was recommending.<sup>79</sup>

All intellectual objections to Christian faith had vanished, and what was needed now was an undivided effort of the will.<sup>80</sup> However, no such effort emerged. Bound by all the chains of *libido*, *concupiscentia* and *consuetudo*, Augustine depicts himself as having been too weak to make the leap from the perception of the truth to a conversion accomplished by an intact will, and to make a change in his *mores*. He had received the divine knowledge and exhortation, but he could not find a way to answer that call by himself (*conf.* 8, 12 *non erat omnino quid responderem*). In terms of Romans 7, as he still was living *sub lege*, he took delight in God's law, but continued to serve the "law of sin." That delight was inefficient (*frustra*), for the bondage of self-inflicted habit prevented him from an effective use of the will.<sup>81</sup>

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*erat idonea ad superandam priorem uetustate roboratam. ita duae uoluntates meae, una uetus, alia noua, illa carnalis, illa spiritalis, confligebant inter se atque discordando dissipabant animam meam.* Augustine's sexual practice and continence are, of course, at stake in his moral dilemma (*conf.* 8, 13 *uinculum desiderii concubitus*). However, there is some sense in O'Donnell's observation (1992, III, 34) that Augustine's insistence on celibacy was to him a "sign" (or "test," *ibid.*, 8) of his ability to answer God's call. See also O'Donnell 1992, III, 7–10. Again, continence applies to other desires than sexual ones in *conf.* as well: in the above-cited passage, sex is mentioned together with *saecularium negotiorum seruitus*. See also *conf.* 8, 30; *conf.* 9, 18 (on Monnica and her *consuetudo*) with comments by O'Donnell 1992, III, 117–118.

<sup>79</sup> *conf.* 8, 11 *sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro concupisceret aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem* [*Gal* 5,17], *ego quidem in utroque, sed magis ego in eo, quod in me approbavam, quam in eo, quod in me improbavam. ibi enim magis iam non ego, quia ex magna parte id patiebar inuitus quam faciebam uolens.* The new will counts thus more as an actual will. O'Donnell 1992, III, 34: "At *diu. qu. Simp.* 1, 1, 1, A. still takes the position that Rom 7, 7–25 is written in the person of 'hominem *sub lege* positum'; by making those word his own here [...] A. depicts himself in that same condition, looking for a grace that will liberate him from concupiscence."

<sup>80</sup> *conf.* 8, 11 *et non erat iam illa excusatio qua uideri mihi solebam [...] seruire tibi, quia incerta mihi esset perceptio ueritatis: iam enim et ipsa certa erat. ego autem adhuc terra obligatus militare tibi recusabam*; *conf.* 8, 12 *non erat omnino, quid responderem ueritate conuictus, nisi tantum uerba lenta et somnolenta.*

<sup>81</sup> The bondage of *concupiscentia* is thus seen as presently "involuntary" (*tenetur* [...] *inuitus*), although the choice or fall to *concupiscentia* has been "voluntary" (*uolens inlabitur*). Augustine does not specify the exact nature of this choice until somewhat later.

After an excursion concerning Ponticianus' report about Antony, which is again replete with examples of true conversion of the will, Augustine turns back to evaluate his own state at the time.<sup>82</sup> The lingering effect of *concupiscentia* is recalled in a presentation of his past youthful prayers, while Augustine notes that all persuasive intellectual arguments became completely ineffective due to his strange inability to make a final decision.<sup>83</sup> Questioning himself on the problem of the divided will, Augustine alludes to the punishment (*poena*) that was due to the freely willed sin of Adam.<sup>84</sup> It is partly Augustine himself, and partly the "sin which dwells in" him that is the cause to his inability to will whole-heartedly:

[T]he self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwilling. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came about against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of an alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind. And so it was 'not I' that brought this about 'but sin which dwelt in me,' sin resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was a son of Adam.<sup>85</sup>

[transl. Chadwick]

Being *sub lege*, Augustine is bound by the punitive sin that inhabits him: from the part of his "new will," he may say that this happens against his will (*inuitus*), but from the viewpoint of his full identity, he has to confess a responsibility in his "own mind" for a sin chosen "more freely" by Adam.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Augustine's cry in *conf.* 8, 19 (*surgunt indocti et caelum rapiunt*) recalls the comparison made in *Simpl.* 1, 2, 22.

<sup>83</sup> *conf.* 8, 17 *petieram a te castitatem et dixeram: da mihi castitatem et continentiam, sed noli modo. timebam enim, ne me cito exaudires et cito sanares a morbo concupiscentiae, quem malebam expleri quam extinguere*. The anguished report of a half-wounded will (*conf.* 8, 19–20) is far from the easiness of *lib. arb.* 1: yet another hint of the strong redaction from the part of the post-Simplician Augustine.

<sup>84</sup> *conf.* 8, 21 *poenarum hominum et tenebrosissimae contritiones filiorum Adam*. See also *conf.* 8, 22.

<sup>85</sup> *conf.* 8, 22 *ego eram, qui uolebam, ego, qui nolebam; ego eram. nec plene uolebam nec plene nolebam. ideo mecum contendebar et dissipabar a me ipso, et ipsa dissipatio me inuito quidem fiebat, nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae. et ideo non iam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum [Rom 7,17] de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius Adam*.

<sup>86</sup> The emphasis on responsibility is due to the Manichaean explanation to which Augustine devotes some time to refute it in *conf.* 8, 23–24. Despite the divisions and all the talk of numerous wills (by Paul and Augustine himself, *conf.* 8, 21, *ideo sunt duae uoluntates*), the will remains a single entity. For the differences between the Aristotelian concept of reluctant actions and Augustine's idea of an imperfect second-order will, see Knuuttila 2004, 171–172.

Reading these reports of Augustine's state of will, one has to bear in mind that they concern a state of will *before* a divinely effected conversion to a life led *sub gratia*. The effects of *concupiscentia*, derived from Adam and strengthened by his own habituating action, are felt most acutely in the will of a person under the law.<sup>87</sup> Of the renewal *sub gratia*, and consequently of the renewed will, Augustine has little to say in *conf.* 8. The change between the two states finally occurs in the famous garden scene, through a divine oracle, and without Augustine's own contribution.<sup>88</sup>

It is not until *conf.* 10, when Augustine turns his attention from his memories of his past struggles with sin to his present life as a Christian—and he quickly mentions that to remember one's past emotions is a completely different matter from actually suffering from them, a way of noting a clear discontinuity with his past self.<sup>89</sup> We have already seen how Augustine uses the function of root in the form of *triplex cupiditas* in *conf.* 10, so only brief observations are made here on the way Augustine characterises his present temptations in terms of the three worldly desires.<sup>90</sup>

On *concupiscentia carnis* and its particular sexual form, Augustine admits that he still suffers from vivid dreams which are able to produce a quasi-consent to illicit acts. But this is not necessarily his "true self," for in a waking state, his reason would "remain unmoved" when facing such persuasions.<sup>91</sup> Augustine seems confident that in time, his dreams will also undergo a similar healing process to his waking state, "by a more abundant outflow of your grace."<sup>92</sup> Then, the "glue of *concupiscentia*" would be eradicated so that the dreams would no longer have his self committing sexual actions, nor even consenting to them in dreams. But when will this happen? Augustine leaves open certain possibilities, either *non tantum in hac uita, sed etiam in hac aetate*, or in *pax plenaria* of the next life.

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<sup>87</sup> For a lively image of the habituated desires, see also *conf.* 8, 26, where the old loves whisper to Augustine, an Orphean figure returning from Hades, to turn back, suggesting to him various disturbing images in order to achieve their objective.

<sup>88</sup> The oracle is first received with rational suspicion, but then accepted as a "divine command." *conf.* 8, 29. O'Donnell 1992, III, 61.

<sup>89</sup> *conf.* 10, 21 *affectiones quoque animi mei eadem memoria continet non illo modo, quo eas habet ipse animus, cum patitur eas, sed alio multum diuerso [...] me aliquando timuisse recolo sine timore et pristinae cupiditatis sine cupiditate sum memor.*

<sup>90</sup> O'Donnell (1992, III, 199) is satisfied with a general remark: "That life after baptism was a struggle with concupiscence was obvious to A., and became over time an increasingly important part of his teaching." All examples of this obvious fact are taken from later works than the *conf.*

<sup>91</sup> *conf.* 10, 41.

<sup>92</sup> *conf.* 10, 42.

Similarly, eating presents dangers for Augustine's renewed self, as do beautiful voices, and lights and colours.<sup>93</sup> However, Augustine also limits the effects of some of these temptations, much like the sexual temptations in dreams. Thus, the pleasures of lovely voices no more subjugate him, although he still finds "some contentment" (*aliquantula acquiesco*) in harmonious singing. Again, he is able to admit that pleasing scents do not have any particular effect on him.<sup>94</sup> The case of the lights and colours is different, and Augustine writes in a more anguished tone of the sensual pleasures aroused by beautiful colours and visual aesthetics.<sup>95</sup>

On the subject of *curiositas*, Augustine first stresses his own progress by God's grace: *ecce multa praeciderim et a meo corde dispulerim*.<sup>96</sup> The old forms of curiosity lie behind in the past (theatre, astrology, etc.). But Augustine hastens to add that in "tiny and contemptible matters," his curiosity is still alive. Although these are tiny and mundane, Augustine is careful not to underestimate their effects on his renewed self.<sup>97</sup>

Augustine's treatment of pride resembles the two other forms of *concupiscentia*. On the one hand, he acknowledges the major changes in his life concerning this temptation (*tu scis, quanta ex parte mutaueris*).<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, Augustine knows that pride has not left him alone, nor will it ever in this life.<sup>99</sup> Summarizing the effects of all three forms of worldly *concupiscentiae*, Augustine notes that after having made a considerable progress in relation to *concupiscentia carnis* and *curiositas*, *superbia* remains the most dangerous temptation.<sup>100</sup>

In confessing all the remnants of the *triplex cupiditas* in his contemporary life as the bishop of Hippo, Augustine emphasises more than anything the almighty powers of God's grace: even if Augustine's residual sins and temptations are many and great, God's medicine is more potent.<sup>101</sup> Thus, the turn made in *Simpl.* is clearly present in *conf.*, and God's grace is depicted in its "steamroller" form, as Carol Harrison puts it, "assaulting human beings [...]"

<sup>93</sup> *conf.* 10, 44; 10, 49; 10, 51–53.

<sup>94</sup> *conf.* 10, 48.

<sup>95</sup> One should perhaps not put too much weight on the varying degrees of "success" or "anguish" in respect to the five senses, for Augustine may deliberately vary his approach due to literary reasons. O'Donnell 1992, III, 217.

<sup>96</sup> *conf.* 10, 56.

<sup>97</sup> *conf.* 10, 57.

<sup>98</sup> *conf.* 10, 58.

<sup>99</sup> *conf.* 10, 59.

<sup>100</sup> *conf.* 10, 60.

<sup>101</sup> *conf.* 10, 69 *magni sunt idem languores, multi sunt et magni; sed amplior est medicina tua.*



causing pain and suffering, disregarding or overriding their wills, purging and cleansing them like a consuming fire.”<sup>102</sup> The overarching presence of grace and the total dependence on its effects from start to end now makes possible a more realistic, or keener picture of the effects of *concupiscentia* in the renewed state.<sup>103</sup> In *conf.*, at least the door is clearly and unambiguously open for a search of *concupiscentia* in Augustine’s own post-conversion state, and he scrutinizes the residue of his past life in the renewed state with unprecedented care.

We have already seen how the Manichaean anthropology exploited Pauline imagery in describing evil desire as the substantial root of all evil. In *contra Faustum*, the large anti-Manichaean work contemporary to *conf.*, Faustus and Augustine argue about renewal in a sexual subtext (*c. Faust.* 24). Faustus recalls the apostolic teaching of two men, of which one is “outer,” “old,” or “earthly,” and the other is “inner,” “new” or “heavenly.”<sup>104</sup> From a Manichaean perspective, the old man is born bodily by humans who are “bound with fleshly ties” (*carnalis uinculis*) and with an immodest burning passion (*furor, intemperantia*). Faustus, of course, refers here to sexual desire (*libido*).<sup>105</sup> In contrast, the new, inner man is created by God at the moment of conversion.<sup>106</sup>

Initially, Augustine’s reply bypasses Faustus’ condemnation of sex and instead stresses the integrity of the created human being: “there are not two persons.”<sup>107</sup> Paul’s qualifications of the inner and outer man refer to the mind and body, which together form one human person. However, both the inner and exterior part of a person are affected by the consequences of Adam’s sin, which properly should be understood as the “old life.”<sup>108</sup> Therefore, God will

<sup>102</sup> See Harrison C. 2006, 248, 286.

<sup>103</sup> See Martin 2001, 8; van Fleteren 2001, 98.

<sup>104</sup> *c. Faust.* 24, 1.

<sup>105</sup> *c. Faust.* 24, 1 *modus quoque nascendi duplex est: unus ille furoris et intemperantiae proprius, quo sumus a generatoribus turpiter et per libidinem sati [...] si cum in utero fingimur, ut fere gentibus placet et Iudaeis et ipsis uobis, tunc nos deus format ad imaginem suam et ueteres nos facit et per furorem ac libidinem creat [...] corpora nostra furiosis genitorum complexibus seminauit.*

<sup>106</sup> Faustus backs his arguments with Pauline evidence, mainly Eph 4, 22–24 and Col 3, 9–10.

<sup>107</sup> *c. Faust.* 24, 2 *non [...] duos homines [...] sed unum, quem totum deus fecerit.* Only in the final sequence of *c. Faust.* 24 does Augustine provide some snide comments on the Manichaean view of sexes, and stresses that these were of God’s good design, not a scheme of *gens tenebrarum*.

<sup>108</sup> *c. Faust.* 24, 2 *et interiore et exteriori sui parte, inueterauit propter peccatum et poenae mortalitatis addictus est [...] ueterem autem hominem nihil aliud apostolus quam uitam ueterem dicit, quae in peccato est, in quo secundum Adam uiuitur.*

renew both the inner and outer man, though on a different schedule: the inner man is renewed in the present life (*nunc*), while the outer man will not be new until after the Resurrection (*tunc*).<sup>109</sup> Here Augustine is satisfied with leaving the question open as to how the inner renewal will proceed in this life, and to what extent it will be achieved. In a previous passage, Augustine clearly limits the effects of *concupiscentia* during renewal to the body, as he works out an allegorical interpretation for the fact that in the story of Noah, men and women are mentioned separately while entering the ark, but when coming out from the ark, a distinction is no longer made between the sexes. Augustine states that this means that here in this life, the baptised person (*in hoc enim tempore huius sacramenti*) lives in a tension between the body and soul, but during the Resurrection, there will be no more of *concupiscentia* left in the body to resist the spirit any longer.<sup>110</sup> Again, the precise nature of the residue of *concupiscentia* is left vague, even though its presence in the baptised is acknowledged. To assign *concupiscentia* to the body only in a very general way in the renewed state seems at this point to be a sufficiently functional solution.<sup>111</sup> A noteworthy detail in *c. Faust.* 12, 21 is also the way in which baptism, renewal and *concupiscentia* are connected in an emergent form: Augustine will return to this combination in the years to come.

So far, we have seen how Augustine, as a rule, tends to treat *concupiscentia* mainly as a strong chain binding those who have not received God's grace. Augustine's important treatise, *Simpl.*, offered a detailed exegesis of

<sup>109</sup> *c. Faust.* 24, 2 *renouatur autem nunc secundum interiorem hominem, ubi secundum sui creatoris imaginem reformatur, exuens se iniustitiam, hoc est ueterem hominem, et induens iustitiam, hoc est nouum hominem. tunc autem, cum resurget corpus spiritale, quod seminatur animale, etiam exterior percipiet caelestis habitudinis dignitatem, ut totum, quod creatum est, recreetur et totum, quod factum est, reficiatur illo recreante, qui creauit, et reficiente, qui fecit.* See also *ep. Io. tr.* 4, 3, some eight years later, on the perfection of renewal: *coepisti non defendere peccatum tuum, iam inchoasti iustitiam: perficietur autem in te, quando nihil aliud facere delectabit, quando absorbebitur mors in uictoriam, quando nulla concupiscentia titillabit, quando non erit lucta cum carne et sanguine, quando erit corona uictoriae, triumphus de inimico; tunc erit perfecta iustitia.*

<sup>110</sup> *c. Faust.* 12, 21 *seorsum uiri, seorsum feminae commemoratae sunt. in hoc enim tempore huius sacramenti caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem. exeunt autem Noe et uxor eius et filii eius et uxores filiorum eius, nunc coniuncte commemorati masculi et feminae, quia in fine saeculi atque in resurrectione iustorum omnimoda et perfecta pace spiritui corpus adhaerebit nulla mortalitatis indigentia uel concupiscentia resistente.*

<sup>111</sup> In the Pelagian debate, this will offer Julian an easy target for the accusation of Augustine's concealed Manichaeism, as we shall later see. Cf. the use of *concupiscentia* in *adn. Iob*, in which the word usually seems to be mentioned as belonging to people who are not under renewal, with the exception of *adn. Iob* 39 *ad euertendas in se terrenas concupiscentias*. In the same work, Augustine characterises Christians as hybrid creatures (*tragelaphus* [...] *compositum animal*), partly consisting of *lex peccati* and *lex mentis*. See Berrouard 1981, 112.

Romans 7, and in this work, he was particularly focused upon *concupiscentia* in the state before Christian renewal, using exceptionally strong colours to paint the servitude to evil desire and inherited sin. Even so, there is an undeniable awareness of the effects of the past life, or some residue of sinfulness that is still there to be opposed in the renewed state. This awareness is shown in several works that were written at approximately the same time as *Simpl.* Thus, in *doctr. chr.* Augustine maintains that *concupiscentia* should be somehow tamed during renewal, or transformed into something better. In *conf.*, Augustine depicts his divided state of mind before his actual conversion and thus treats Romans 7 as that of a narrative of a person still under the law, but in *conf.* 10, he also wishes to create an effect of a similarly close scrutiny of the presence of the worldly temptations in his renewed life (although he is also very keen to point out the rather good progress through God's grace). Similarly, in *c. Faust.*, Augustine seems to admit the presence of *concupiscentia* in the baptised person, locating it mainly in the domain of the body. Together with this growing awareness and gradual emergence of a clearer and more detailed picture of the effects and quality of *concupiscentia* in the renewed state, is also Augustine's oscillating view of Romans 7 and its application; despite his fluctuating practice of assigning especially verses 24–25 to either a *sub lege* or a *sub gratia* stage, he mainly sees Romans 7 as depicting too serious a division for it to be read as a self-description of a Christian person.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Augustine's developing exegesis on Rom 7, a close and overlapping subject with this study, has attracted scholarship for a long time. Many studies stress the complex and gradual transitions in this respect; many studies also emphasise the way in which the different genres in Augustine's oeuvre do not proceed in the same pace in treating Rom 7. Hence, his "pastoral" motives are usually highlighted in cases where Rom 7 appears as a description of a *sub gratia* person, before his "official" change of exegesis. In Berrouard's (1981, 126–127) view, Augustine often already uses Rom 7 before the Pelagian debate to describe the inner division of a Christian. Berrouard has collected a wealth of material, in which Augustine seems to use Rom 7 as dealing with Christians' plight before 411. His collection is partly reliant upon mainly undatable sermons (both *s.* and *en. Ps.*), thus also rendering his conclusions on pp. 126–127 partly inadequate. This pertains especially to *s.* 145, for which no exterior grounds for dating can be found; also, Berrouard neglects Augustine's fine-tuned rhetorics of the sermon, for which Martin (2001, 69–75) is a better guide, with a slightly more careful conclusion: "Pastorally, Augustine has at least implicitly applied this *sub lege* text to *sub gratia* living" (ibid., p. 75). For Rom 7 in *en. Ps.* see Ring 1989, who also stresses Augustine's "pastoral" way of using Rom 7 to describe Christian reality before the year 411. Ring is aware of the problems in dating *enarrationes* (p. 387 n. 18, 391 n. 27, 393) but has decided to follow the generally accepted dates given mainly by Zarb in 1948 and Bonnardière in 1965 (with consequent studies in 1971, 1976, 1978–1980). Ring's conclusions on the pre-Pelagian *enarrationes* are somewhat more qualified as compared to Berrouard: he also emphasises the overall tendency of Augustine

Furthermore, running parallel to Augustine's gradually sharpened perception of grace, there is a need to specify the presence and effects of *concupiscentia* in the renewed life. I shall argue that this specification appears as a moderation or domestication of *concupiscentia* in the renewed state. This seemingly paradoxical connection could be seen as Augustine's capitulation to a totalising view of grace, in which it is no longer important to secure a free human contribution to one's salvation—be it in the *sub lege* or in *sub gratia* stage. Grace is thus needed not only at the point of conversion, but also along the process of renewal. A strong view of grace seems thus to weaken, or dilute the states of *concupiscentia* before and after the moment of being subjected to God's merciful action. But this is partly to anticipate; let us now turn to the last two decades in Augustine's life when he is driven to take the defensive on his insights into grace, and thereby on *concupiscentia* in the renewed state.

#### 6.4. RELOCATING *CONCUPISCENTIA*— THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PELAGIAN DEBATE

Thus far, we have noted a growing awareness of the presence and effects of *concupiscentia* in the renewed person. In the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that during the Pelagian debate, Augustine effectively expresses a detailed and outspoken conception of *concupiscentia* as internalised in the Christian self. We will now track this development by taking a closer look at some prominent texts from this period.<sup>113</sup>

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to apply mainly Rom 7, 24–25 for the Christian *sub gratia*. The clearest evidence of a pre-Pelagian *sub gratia* reading of Rom 7 Ring sees (ibid., 392–393) in *en. Ps. 42* (42, 7 *uidete si non est ista allocutio in illo conflictu apostoli, in se praefigurantis quosdam, et forte nos, et dicentis: condelector legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, uideo autem aliam legem in membris meis*), but here his discussion is contradictory (cf. p. 391, n. 27). Van Fleteren 2001 is a good and precise account of the process. Although van Fleteren uses sermons to hint of the changes in Augustine's use of Rom 7 in the first decade of the fifth century, he is cautious to draw any definite *termini* based on these. Van Fleteren 201, 106: "The texts from these years are catechetical and pastoral, not theological and polemical. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret them precisely." See also van Fleteren's (2001, 97 n. 37) moderate general comments on evolution vs. continuity in Augustine's thought. For dating Augustine's sermons (*ad populum*), see once more Drobner's (2000, 2003, 2004) sobering caveats.

<sup>113</sup> In the last four decades, Pelagius and other central figures in the Pelagian (or "Pelagian") struggle have been studied extensively and from new, interesting angles. It seems that a historically oriented research of the persons and issues in the doctrinal struggles of 410–430 has provided for something of a rehabilitation of Pelagius and Julian of Aeclanum (to be sure, a rehabilitative attitude precedes modern historical research of Pelagius, see e.g. Wolfson

Recently, many scholarly contributions have made the enterprise of pinpointing in detail how and when Augustine started to reconsider his analysis of Romans 7. In the works of the 390s Augustine maintains that the *ego* in Paul's description refers to a person *sub lege*. Early in the 410s the identity of the *ego* begins to reshape and it appears to be a Christian *sub gratia*. Not until the early 420s, however, does Augustine state explicitly that *ego* simply means Paul himself. Even this is not an exclusive reading, as we shall see.

However, in view of *concupiscentia* and its function in Christian renewal, there is of course more to this than to merely state a change of identity in Augustine's reading of a Pauline source text, albeit a central one. We will therefore ask, in which terms does Augustine usually describe *concupiscentia* in its new, baptised context during the Pelagian debate? Moreover, what kind of an effect does it have on Christian renewal, or vice versa, how does baptism affect *concupiscentia*? Another question is how does Augustine defend himself against polemical readings of his position, in particular those of Julian of Aeclanum? Furthermore, is Paul, and thereby every Christian, an akratic person, not able to fight against his or her evil desires? And finally, is the Christian able to resist *concupiscentia*, and if so, why?<sup>114</sup>

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1959, 562: "In our judgment, Pelagius, on the problem of freedom, represents the original Christian belief"). For surveys of studies, see Bonner 1966; 1972 for older scholarship, and for Lamberigts 2002; 2008b and Lössl 2007 for more recent studies. Souter 1927 and Rees 1998 are accessible works on Pelagius' texts. For the course of events in the Pelagian struggle from 410 onwards, see Wermelinger 1975 and Bonner 2002, 312–393. As modern scholarship has shown that it is rather difficult to argue for a conceptually and socially coherent 'Pelagian movement' anymore, the terms 'Pelagian,' 'Pelagian struggle,' 'Pelagian controversy' etc. are here used only for sake of convenience, referring mainly either to the period in question, or Augustine's own conception of what he saw as a systematic construction inimical to his own teachings of grace.

<sup>114</sup> In the two following sections I will focus on the the explicitly anti-Pelagian works of Augustine; this is, of course, not to imply that the questions related to *concupiscentia* and renewal were not treated elsewhere in Augustine's works in this period. Thus, e.g. in *Gn. litt.*, Augustine exploits several themes that he is developing in the undergoing Pelagian dispute. See *Gn. litt.* 9, 10, 18; 9, 11, 19; 10, 12, 21; 10, 18, 32. Again, in *trin.* 14, 22–25 Augustine treats the renewal of *imago dei*. Both instant and processual sides of renewal are stressed with the similes of fever and sickness, taking out an arrow and healing the wound. *trin.* 14, 23 *sane ista renouatio non momento uno fit ipsius conuersionis sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo renouatio remissione omnium peccatorum; neque enim uel unum quantulumcumque remanet quod non remittatur. sed quemadmodum aliud est carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate quae febribus facta est reualescere, itemque aliud est infixum telum de corpore demere, aliud uulnus quod eo factum est secunda curatione sanare. ita prima curatio est causam remouere languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in renouatione huius imaginis. quae duo demonstrantur in Psalmo ubi legitur: qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis [Ps 102,3], quod fit in baptismo; deinde sequitur: qui*

Let us begin to answer these questions by looking into Augustine's earliest anti-Pelagian work, *de peccatorum meritis et remissione* (411–412).<sup>115</sup> This work was dedicated to Augustine's committed Catholic friend, Marcellinus. The main goal of this work is to offer resources to answer the claims of Caelestius concerning baptism and Adam's sinful heritage. Besides Marcellinus, the audience would also clearly consist of those Catholic Christians who are interested in the implications of the new (*nouitas*) Roman teaching about human natural abilities to start and advance in Christian life.<sup>116</sup> The work can also be seen as an exposition of Pauline theology, against those interpretations of Paul that were suggested by Pelagius and Caelestius.<sup>117</sup>

Already at the start, Augustine briefly sketches his general idea of renewal. The process of renewal starts in this life in the inner man, and is only completed in the future life, when the body will be "made alive" as well.<sup>118</sup> This is later stressed with respect to the residue of past life still lingering in the renewed person: even though baptism is a full and perfect remission of sins, "the very quality of human being does not change right away and entirely." Through baptism, everything that is inimical to God and separates the human person from God, is "destroyed," but there remains, in Paul's words, a "law of sin" in *carnis uetustate*. This law of sin is, however, "conquered and annulled."<sup>119</sup> It is clear that Augustine has specifically *concupiscentia* in mind. Augustine has already contrasted the frightful bond of carnal and evil desire to the deliberation achieved in baptism. The

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*sanat omnes languores tuos [Ps 102,3], quod fit cotidianis accessibus cum haec imago renouatur. During renewal, cupiditas is gradually diminishing, while caritas is increasing. trin. 14, 23 in agnitione igitur dei iustitiaque et sanctitate ueritatis qui de die in diem proficiendo renouatur transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a uisibilibus ad intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritalia, atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere illisque se caritate alligare diligenter insistit.*

<sup>115</sup> Delaroche 1996, 40.

<sup>116</sup> The notion of newness is, of course, Augustine's own. For the circumstances of *pecc. mer.*, see Delaroche 1996, 15–48. See also Delaroche's (1996, 40) notion of Augustine's pastoral concerns in *pecc. mer.*, and p. 48 of the audience of the three books of the work.

<sup>117</sup> Most frequently used is Rom. For the sheer quantity of Paul's presence in *pecc. mer.*, see Delaroche 1996, 131.

<sup>118</sup> *pecc. mer.* 1, 6. See also *pecc. mer.* 2, 9.

<sup>119</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 44–45 *meminisse debemus tantummodo peccatorum omnium plenam perfectamque remissionem baptismo fieri, hominis uero ipsius qualitatem non totam continuo commutari [...] plena et perfecta fit remissio peccatorum omnibus inimicitis interfectis, quibus separabamur a deo, sed manet in uetustate carnis tamquam superatum et peremptum, si non illicitis consensionibus quodammodo reuiuiscat et in regnum proprium dominationemque reuocetur.* Delaroche (1996, 284) shows in detail the way Augustine uses Paul to mark baptism as a decisive moment in relation to *concupiscentia*.

disobedience of the flesh affects the natural birth, but the spiritual rebirth of baptism conveys the righteousness and eternal life of Christ.<sup>120</sup>

The concept of guilt as related to *concupiscentia* is present in a short observation already in the first book of *pecc. mer.*, where Augustine presents two possible outcomes for a baptised person. First, either the Christian will abandon the blessings of baptism after arriving in a “rational age,” or the Christian may also keep away from the guilt that has been “dissolved” in baptism, and thus be perfected in future life.<sup>121</sup> Later, in the second book, Augustine notes that the guilt for an evil action remains after the deed is done; similarly, *concupiscentia* may remain in the baptised Christian, disconnected of its guilt.<sup>122</sup> Guilt and sin are thus detachable from each other. The basic elements of this subsidiary concept are thus ready at this stage.<sup>123</sup> The function of the detached *reatus* in connection with *concupiscentia* is obviously to mitigate and render as harmless as possible the *lex peccati* of Romans 7.

The end of *pecc. mer.* 1, however, prepares the reader for the most important observation on concupiscence in Christian renewal. In Book 1, Augustine has argued for the necessity of baptising children, and he ends the book by stressing the harmless features of the remains of concupiscence in Christians. Although *concupiscentia* remains in the flesh (*consersa et innata*) its effectivity is strictly limited by baptism. Augustine lists many mitigating aspects concerning *concupiscentia*: it is left for useful practice and for the training of the body and continence; God will help in the struggle against it; its guilt is dissolved (*quo per illam diabolus animam retinebat*). Augustine finally ends the book by admitting that practically all have sometimes given consent to concupiscence in their renewed lives, for the reason that they have not “exerted the full powers of will” all the time. This is something not to worry about, however, for it is possible that there has never been a human person without sin. With this cliffhanger, Augustine ends *pecc. mer.* 1.<sup>124</sup>

*Pecc. mer.* 2, therefore, has to deal with the summary claims made at the end of the previous book. The tone is clear right from the start. By way of introduction, Augustine makes remarks against some people who “make too much of free choice of the will.” He argues that to have the infirmities of

<sup>120</sup> *pecc. mer.* 1, 21.

<sup>121</sup> *pecc. mer.* 1, 25; 1, 70; 2, 3–4; 2, 45–46.

<sup>122</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 46.

<sup>123</sup> For the concept of *reatus* in later debates in the history of theology, see Mausbach 1929, ii, 196–207.

<sup>124</sup> *pecc. mer.* 1, 70. For the cyclical and repetitive structure of *pecc. mer.* 1–2, see Delaroche 1996, 145.

everyday sins has a particular advantage: the Christian is obligated to pray for forgiveness every day, thus practising his or her dependence from grace. In other words, temptations keep the Christians awake and on their toes. However, sometimes these temptations grow so strong that they require the full powers of will, something which cannot be perfectly guaranteed in this life. In case of emergency, that is, in case one cannot but consent to these strongest temptations, God has given a good means to repair such accidents: there are “healthy medications against the guilt and bonds of sin even after baptism [...] namely, works of love (almsgiving).”<sup>125</sup>

After these introductory remarks, the subject of *concupiscentia* explicitly enters the discussion. *Concupiscentia* represents the temptations of Christian life. The stress is on the word *Christian*, for it is exactly life after baptism that Augustine is discussing here.

Concupiscence, therefore, as the law of sin which remains in the members of this body of death, is born with infants. In baptized infants, it is deprived of guilt, is left for the struggle [of life], but pursues with no condemnation, such as die before the struggle.<sup>126</sup> [transl. Holmes]

*Concupiscentia* thus becomes a sparring partner, and is part of God’s plan in Christian renewal. The dark side of *concupiscentia*, of course, is that if baptism does not intervene, *concupiscentia* has the power to draw the human being into damnation. But it is not the effects of *concupiscentia* before baptism that interest Augustine here. The emphasis lies on the renewal, and here Augustine seems to coherently downplay the effects of Adam’s heritage of *concupiscentia*. Consider the following way of describing how to withhold one’s consent to this residue of sin:

After all sins have been blotted out, and that guilt has been cancelled which by nature bound men in a conquered condition, it still remains,—but not to hurt in any way those who yield no consent to it for unlawful deeds,—until death is swallowed up in victory and, in that perfection of peace, nothing is left to be conquered.<sup>127</sup> [transl. Holmes]

Augustine heaps saving clauses one after another; he limits and mitigates and minimizes the actual effects of *concupiscentia* on a baptised Christian,

<sup>125</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 3.

<sup>126</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 4 *concupiscentia igitur tamquam lex peccati manens in membris corporis mortis huius cum paruulis nascitur, in paruulis baptizatis a reatu soluitur, ad agonem relinquitur, ante agonem mortuos nulla damnatione persequitur.*

<sup>127</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 4 *deletis peccatis omnibus, soluto etiam reatu, quo uinctos originaliter detinebat, ad agonem interim manet non sibi ad illicita consentientibus nihil omnino nocitura, donec absorbeatur mors in uictoriam et pace perfecta nihil quod uincatur existat.*



even though he also reminds us that to consent to temptations without recurring to the antidotes of Christ, constitutes a risk of damnation.

Concupiscence in the baptised Christian is thus a juncture to the original root and guilt (*reatus*) of Adam's sin. Baptism severs the connection between one's personal piece of concupiscence and the universal original sin. What is left are the remains, and they are only left for training (*ad agonem*). *Concupiscentia* brings Augustine to Romans 7, and the disjointed state of the will in that description is now seen as the state of a Christian will.<sup>128</sup> The fight consists of the baptised person struggling with the remains of concupiscence in a simple daily prayer (*dimitte nobis debita nostra*).<sup>129</sup> Indeed, Augustine sums up the entire struggle with *concupiscentia* by referring to the three final requests of the Lord's Prayer: if you consent to *concupiscentia*, you have a remedy for this consent in forgiving your neighbour. When you have been forgiven, you pray to be saved from further incidents with concupiscence. Finally, by asking for deliverance from evil, you wait for the final rest in heaven, where all traces of *concupiscentia* have been deleted.<sup>130</sup> In Augustine's narrative, the Christian struggle is made constantly dependent on God's *iustitia*. Therefore the Christian has to focus his or her inner eye on this divine light, for the moment one turns away from God, he or she ends up in "knowing according to the flesh," and stumbles almost in an automatic fashion upon his or her *concupiscentia*. Along with *iustitia*, Augustine also names the divine gift of *continentia* as a powerful means in restraining the temptations of *concupiscentia*.<sup>131</sup>

The entire passage of *pecc. mer.* 2, 4–6 is, of course, directed to Augustine's Catholic readers, who are exhorted to live their Christian calling by daily prayer so that God would constantly help them *in not sinning*.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>128</sup> See Delaroche 1996, 254–256, 264–265, 268.

<sup>129</sup> See also *pecc. mer.* 2, 17.

<sup>130</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 4.

<sup>131</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 5 *quid aliud dicimus quam: da quod iubes? cum iubet dicendo: intellegite ergo, qui insipientes estis in populo [Ps 93,8], nosque illi dicimus: da mihi intellectum, ut discam mandata tua [Ps 118,73], quid aliud dicimus quam: da quod iubes? cum iubet dicendo: post concupiscentias tuas non eas [Ecl 18,30] nosque dicimus: scimus quoniam nemo esse potest continens, nisi deus det, quid aliud dicimus quam: da quod iubes? cum iubet dicendo: facite iustitiam [Is 56,1] itemque dicit: beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, quoniam ipsi saturabuntur [Mt 5,6], a quo debemus petere cibum potumque iustitiae nisi ab illo, qui esurientibus eam et sitientibus promittit eius saturitatem? The allusion to *conf.* 10, 40 is clear. In a later work (*perseu.* 53), Augustine reports having heard that Pelagius, who is not mentioned in *pecc. mer.* 1–2 by name, was particularly irritated by such formulations.*

<sup>132</sup> *pecc. mer.* 2, 6 *repellamus itaque ab auribus et mentibus nostris eos, qui dicunt accepto semel liberae uoluntatis arbitrio nec orare nos debere, ut deus nos adiuuet, ne peccemus.*

Another work dedicated to Marcellinus was *de spiritu et littera* (412). Augustine answers Marcellinus' question on whether anyone has lived who would have reached perfection in this life. Augustine's answer is negative.<sup>133</sup> Considering *concupiscentia*, there are two points of view that are stressed in *spir. et litt.*

The first point is Augustine's insistence on the difference between the *sub lege*-type of persons and the *sub gratia*-type of persons in their relation to God's will. This is exemplified by the law that prohibits evil desires (*non concupisces*). In the first case (*sub lege*), the law only succeeds in arousing fear in its object, but none of the other goals of the law are reached. In the second case, God has poured out his grace and given the ability to resist evil desires. Most importantly, the inner motivation of a *sub gratia* person lies now in delight, instead of fear.<sup>134</sup> The second point of view involves emphasis on the simple fact that the effects of *concupiscentia* are nonetheless to be felt in a Christian, *sub gratia*-type of life. Renewal is again seen as a process and progress in diminishing the effects of *concupiscentia* in the actions of the Christian.<sup>135</sup>

Augustine's strategy in pointing out these facets of renewal and *concupiscentia* is once more to focus on the final perfection, in which nothing of the "movements of earthly passions" is any longer to be suffered as compared to this life of "lesser righteousness" (*minor iustitia*) in the Christian struggle, and to discern between "horrible vices and crimes" and "lighter" minor peccadilloes committed in the Christian life. Both kinds of these sins—the grave and the light—are the result of a consent to an "illicit delight," but the former ones are, according to Augustine, not part of a Christian's renewal, whereas the latter, the lighter versions of sin cannot actually be avoided. Fortunately, they can be expiated by modest prayer.<sup>136</sup> Augustine also offers some examples of such minor offences, which are the result of consenting to *concupiscentia* in a baptised life: to listen to, or to utter foul words, or to entertain a wish of something forbidden to be lawful.<sup>137</sup>

Similarly to *pecc. mer.*, Augustine downplays the effects and results of *concupiscentia* in the Christian life, and warns Marcellinus and the Catholic

<sup>133</sup> *spir. et litt.* 65.

<sup>134</sup> *spir. et litt.* 22; 25; 51.

<sup>135</sup> *spir. et litt.* 13; 59.

<sup>136</sup> *spir. et litt.* 65.

<sup>137</sup> *spir. et litt.* 65 *ut uel aurem alicui uoci, quae audienda non esset, uel linguam alicui, quae dicenda non esset, accomodet uel in ipso corde aliquid ita cogitet, ut mallet licitum quod male delectat et per praeceptum scitur illicitum.*

readership not to cherish the thought that a baptised Christian could “go after his or her concupiscence,” while he or she might, and indeed does, have and feel its “movements.”

The question of perfection is also dealt with in *de perfectione iustitiae* (415).<sup>138</sup> The work is a monotonic series of answers against theses on the perfection in this life. In the beginning of his treatise, Augustine firmly rejects those enterprises aspiring to perfection by referring to the circumstances of the human fallen nature. Indeed, certain aspects of human sinfulness make it appear to be inevitable and unavoidable. While sin could theoretically be avoided entirely by renewal in Christ, Christian progress never reaches perfection in this life due to the presence of *concupiscentia*.<sup>139</sup>

However, as we have already seen in previous works, Augustine discerns between the sins that will not appear in Christian renewal and the ones that do. The first instance is known as the *crimina damnabilia*. The second kind are called the *peccata uenialia*.<sup>140</sup> For the most part, Augustine speaks of these lighter sins, some of which are also the remains of *concupiscentia*. To struggle against these daily minor sins includes the means of fasting, works of charity and prayer. These should rein in *concupiscentia*, which tempts the Christian to “immoderate” behaviour.<sup>141</sup>

Augustine returns to his interpretation of Romans 7 in *perf. iust.* 28. While Romans 7 has previously appeared in a single mention in *perf. iust.*, this source text now receives a more extensive analysis. Romans 7 is clearly interpreted as describing the Christian *sub gratia* stage, and the strong terms of Paul that stress necessity, compulsion and division are interpreted in a mitigating scheme, the changed status of *concupiscentia* having a leading role in this reading. Thus, v. 15 (*non enim quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum hoc facio*) qualifies *concupiscentia* and its effects in Christian renewal. The “good” that the Christian should do means *non concupiscere*; and “to do what one hates” is to have such evil desires (*quia concupiscit*). Once more, Augustine adds, this does not mean a dissolute life driven by *concupiscentia*. Concupiscence exists in the body, but it does not “reign” the Christian.<sup>142</sup> By the very fact of having to admit the presence of *concupi-*

<sup>138</sup> For the date, see Bonner 1999, who seems to think also 412 as a possible year of composition.

<sup>139</sup> *perf. iust.* 1–2.

<sup>140</sup> *perf. iust.* 20. Burnell (1995) is an interesting discussion of this distinction in the Christian tradition preceding Augustine.

<sup>141</sup> *perf. iust.* 18.

<sup>142</sup> *perf. iust.* 28 *inest quidem peccatum in membris eius, sed non regnat.*

*scentia* and thereby not wishing to have it, the Christian “consents to the law.” The Christian thus identifies his or her life with faith (*fides*), and can therefore treat his or her *concupiscentia* as being *partly* an exterior problem to his or her true self. By not consenting to his or her *concupiscentia*, he or she “lives from the faith,” crying for help from God. Augustine thereby stresses the aspects of the renewed and mended will in the Christian. The good actions are listed as “hating your concupiscence,” “not to neglect almsgiving,” “forgiving those who sin against you,” “to pray for forgiveness of your debts and to sincerely promise to forgive others,” “to pray that you would not be led to temptation but to be delivered from evil.” Thus, the daily, regular, simple and easy tasks in practising one’s Christianity are mentioned as being sufficient medication to the small wounds afflicted by *concupiscentia*.<sup>143</sup> Moreover, over time, the effects of *concupiscentia* will be eased even more.<sup>144</sup>

In the final chapter of *perf. iust.*, Augustine, however, notes that despite the ability to reign over one’s tamed *concupiscentia* in the *sub gratia* stage, and despite the distinction between the consented and non-consented “movements” of *concupiscentia*, all Christians have to remember that they usually and normally will have some consented sins to ask forgiveness for. Augustine thus wants to preclude an interpretation that, based on Augustine’s own distinction between the consented and non-consented concupiscence, it is possible and easy to never consent to the remains of *concupiscentia*.

[One] should consider what relation all this bears to the Lord’s Prayer, wherein we say, “Forgive us our debts.” Now, if I judge aright, it would be unnecessary to put up such a prayer as this, if we never in the least degree consented to the lusts of the before-mentioned sin, either in a slip of the tongue, or in a wanton thought.<sup>145</sup> [transl. Holmes]

Again, however, Augustine’s description of consented sins under Christian renewal are rather mild: “a slip of tongue” or “to take delight in some thought.” Even the act of consent is here qualified with *aliquantum*, thus making the consent in these cases “slight.”

So far, we have seen the way Augustine consistently stresses both the imperfection of Christian renewal in this life, and the relative ease with

<sup>143</sup> *perf. iust.* 28.

<sup>144</sup> *perf. iust.* 31.

<sup>145</sup> *perf. iust.* 44 *uideat quid agatur de dominica oratione, ubi dicimus: dimitte nobis debita nostra [Mt 6,12]. quod, nisi fallor, non opus esset dicere, si numquam uel in lapsu linguae uel in oblectanda cogitatione eiusdem peccati desiderii aliquantum consentiremus.*

which *concupiscentia* may be overcome in the daily struggles of the Catholic Christian. Likewise essential for Augustine's treatment of *concupiscentia* in the early Pelagian debates is his emphasis on *concupiscentia* as necessitating a daily dependence on God's grace.

Before we turn to the major works of the later, or second anti-Pelagian phase, let us note how Augustine also underlines grace with *concupiscentia* in his *de gestis Pelagii* (416/417) and *de gratia Christi et peccato originali* (418). In both of these works, Augustine points out how the Pelagian understanding of grace as mere doctrine, law, or revelation, misses the point in the life of a Christian. In Pelagius' view, humankind after Adam only suffers from ignorance. In Augustine's view, there is something more amiss than mere insufficient knowledge of what is good. In other words, law alone, *scientia legis*, cannot but make things worse. *Concupiscentia* thus needs to be resisted by a much more powerful conception of grace than that of Pelagius.<sup>146</sup> In affirming this, Augustine uses the verses of Romans 7 to rebut the Pelagian view of grace. To Augustine, God's real grace appears as an effecting and activating force that strengthens the Christian in his or her fight against evil desires.<sup>147</sup> A Pelagian, in Augustine's view, may thus rightly identify *concupiscentia* as the sin living in his or her person, but is not able to resist it by mere knowledge of the law, or is able to resist it in an illusory way only.<sup>148</sup>

In *gr. et pecc. or.*, Augustine once more inculcates the positive effects of baptism against *concupiscentia*. Augustine points out that evil desire inhabits a baptised Christian, but it cannot form an obstacle to his or her salvation, as is the case of those who are still unbaptised. Augustine here makes his first soundings on the matter of how and why exactly *concupiscentia* also seems to be transmitted to the next generation from Christian parents. The reason lies in the already established fact that *concupiscentia* is (mainly) *located in the body*, which is *not yet under renewal* and is still under "damnation." A neat analogy for this odd situation is provided by biblical botany: the seeds of the olive tree still produce wild olives. In other words, acquired qualities, such as grace and forgiveness in baptism, are not transmitted.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>146</sup> *gest. Pel.* 20–21.

<sup>147</sup> *gr. et pecc. or.* 1, 9. See also *gr. et pecc. or.* 1, 3.

<sup>148</sup> In the polemics against Julian, Augustine will often note, however, how the representatives of the Pelagian party seem to show a happy inconsistency in their views: for, despite their inaccurate analysis of human abilities, they still demonstrate how the inner workings of grace oppose them against *concupiscentia* and give real powers to the fight against it.

<sup>149</sup> *gr. et pecc. or.* 2, 44–45.

Together with these two directly anti-Pelagian works, the problem of *concupiscentia* and Christian renewal is also treated extensively in *de continentia* (418–420).<sup>150</sup> The basic argument is already familiar from previous anti-Pelagian works. Thus, Augustine's way of reading Romans 7 in *cont.* emphasises again, how *bonum facere*, or *uelle adiacet*, in Paul means the Christian life, in which one should not consent to the existing *concupiscentia*, while *bonum perficere* (Rom 7, 18) is only achieved in heaven.<sup>151</sup>

However, Augustine now sharpens this reading by claiming that, in fact, only people who undergo Christian renewal are familiar with such a (victorious) internal struggle and opposition. While the virtue of continence is, like grace in general, a gift of God, it follows that only those who have received this gift can identify themselves with Paul's words in Romans 7.

They do not experience this fight within themselves who are not defenders of the virtues and opponents of the vices, nor does anything drive out the evil of concupiscence except the good of continence.<sup>152</sup> [transl. McDonald]

Augustine then begins to argue his claim in detail. He does this by applying once again his old four-fold scheme. First of all, people who have no knowledge of the law at all (*qui legem dei omnino nesciunt*) fall prey to evil desires, and do not even recognise them as their enemies but serve them as if their happiness would consist of satisfying their passions rather than of conquering them. But what about people who know the law (*sub lege*)? Theirs is no happier destiny, for they have no means to conquer their *concupiscentia*. On the contrary, the prohibition gives more force to their concupiscence and makes it, as it were, invincible (*auxit prohibitio concupiscentiam eamque fecit inuictam*)! Augustine develops the state of the *sub lege* person in directions where it is not difficult to note his anti-Pelagian tendencies: he describes people who confide in their own abilities in fulfilling God's law and ignore God's righteousness in trying to construct their own.<sup>153</sup> So far, Augustine has not yet depicted any "conquerors of vices"

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<sup>150</sup> An anti-Pelagian context for the work was first suggested by Bonnardière 1959. Hunter (1995) and Rackett (1995) give additional reasons for the dating. Hunter suggests that the contents of *cont.* link the work both to *gr. et pecc. or.* and the first debates with Julian. Such links are the connection of *concupiscentia* with sex, marriage and the transmission of sin; Julian's accusation of Augustine's crypto-Manichaeism; and the interpretation of Rom 7 as a narrative of Christian life.

<sup>151</sup> *cont.* 6.

<sup>152</sup> *cont.* 7 *hanc pugnam non experiuntur in se ipsis nisi bellatores uirtutum debellatoresque uitiorum; non expugnat concupiscentiae malum nisi continentiae bonum.*

<sup>153</sup> *cont.* 7.

(*debellatores uitiorum*). But when divine grace enters the scene, the situation is radically changed:

But when someone has become a transgressor and is wounded, as it were, so severely that he needs a physician, the Law, like a pedagogue, leads him back to grace. Against the harmful sweetness by which concupiscence was formerly gaining the victory the Lord gives a beneficent sweetness by which continence is the more delighted and “our land yields its fruit,” the fruit on which the soldier feeds who with the help of God battles sin.<sup>154</sup>

[transl. McDonald]

In the *sub gratia* state the inner delight (*suauitas benefica*) for continence is given by God, and according to Augustine, it is clearly *strong enough to conquer* the harmful delights of *concupiscentia*. Augustine’s exhortation to Catholic Christians continues with confident tones and optimism in defeating the enemy which, before grace came to play, was an invincible force.<sup>155</sup> Augustine uses lavishly his military analogy in describing the situation of the *sub gratia* person: the enemies consist of various vices (in Pauline listings) and the Christian arsenal consists in turn of various virtues, among which continence excels (*ualet plurimum*). Once more, Augustine stresses, that it is only the *sub gratia* state which can realistically be compared to a civil war, for unlike in the *sub lege* state, the power ratio is now equal or even more favourable to the “new man,” or to a Christian’s real self in spirit.<sup>156</sup>

The special feature of *cont.* is Augustine’s acute awareness of the distinction between the body (*caro, corpus*) and its corruption (*uitium*). Augustine also notes, how ‘flesh’ in the biblical language may denote life according to man (*secundum hominem*), i.e. according to human aspirations as opposed to God’s.<sup>157</sup> Against the Manichaean disavowal of the body, Augustine stresses the goodness of both the body and the soul.<sup>158</sup>

The rehabilitation of the body continues somewhat later, when Augustine attempts to pinpoint where the sinfulness of the flesh exactly lies:

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<sup>154</sup> *cont.* 7 *si autem lex factum praeuicatore, tamquam ad hoc grauius uulneratum, ut desideret medicum, tamquam paedagogus perducit ad gratiam, contra suauitatem noxiam, qua uincebat concupiscentia, dominus dat suauitatem beneficam, qua delectetur amplius continentia, et terra nostra dat fructum suum, quo pascitur miles, qui debellat deo iuuante peccatum.*

<sup>155</sup> *cont.* 8.

<sup>156</sup> *cont.* 9.

<sup>157</sup> On the other hand, he also notes, while commenting on Paul’s Gal 5, 16–21, that the Christian spiritual life refers not only to the human spirit but also to the Spirit of God. *cont.* 12 *itaque ut spiritu nostro opera carnis mortificemus, spiritu dei agimur, qui dat continentiam, qua frenemus, domemus, uincamus concupiscentiam.*

<sup>158</sup> *cont.* 18.

Now, the flesh desires nothing except through the soul, but the flesh is said to lust against the spirit when the soul through carnal concupiscence wrestles with the spirit. We make up this whole: the flesh itself, which dies when the soul departs, is our weak part, and is not dismissed as to be fled from, but is placed aside to be received again, and when it is received, it will be abandoned no more [...] These two, therefore, which now struggle against each other within us, since we consist of both, let us pray and endeavor that they may be in accord. For, we ought not to consider one of them an enemy, but an imperfection whereby the flesh lusts against the spirit.<sup>159</sup>

[transl. McDonald]

Augustine here makes a commitment, which could be named as being an identification with the body.<sup>160</sup> Accordingly, *concupiscentia* “happens” both in the body and the soul, of which neither is to be seen as the real enemy of the renewed Christian. The real enemy is the *uitium*, or discord element, which may be located in the body, but which still desires through the soul (*per animam*). Now Augustine returns to Romans 7, with focus on the ‘flesh’ and its exact meaning in Paul’s narrative. Augustine shows how even Paul identified himself with his own body (*se itaque dicit esse carnem suam*), and did not treat the body *per se* as an enemy (*non ergo ipsa et inimica nostra*). But what about the description of Romans 7, where the flesh serves the law of sin, while the mind serves God’s law? Augustine expressly denies that this would mean that Paul consented to his fleshly desires. Instead, the Christian reader should learn how Paul acknowledges his body as his own, how he notes the “movements there” (*motus desideriorum illic habendo*), the movements he does not want to have and yet has. But, Augustine claims, Paul did not consent to these movements and therefore he served the law of God and restrained his members.<sup>161</sup> Augustine’s Paul, and Augustine’s renewed Christian, are thus strong-willed persons, whose actions he describes in the indicative:

There are in us, therefore, evil desires, and by not consenting to these we do not live wrongly; there are in us the concupiscences of sins, and by not

<sup>159</sup> *cont.* 19 *caro enim nihil nisi per animam concupiscit; sed concupiscere caro aduersus spiritum dicitur, quando anima carnali concupiscentia spiritui reluctatur. totum hoc nos sumus. et caro ipsa, quae discedente anima moritur, nostra pars infirma est, non fugienda dimittitur, sed recipienda reponitur nec recepta ulterius relinquitur. [...] haec igitur duo, quae nunc inuicem aduersantur in nobis, quoniam in utroque nos sumus, ut concordent oremus et agamus. non enim alterum eorum putare debemus inimicum, sed uitium, quo caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum.* See also *cont.* 29.

<sup>160</sup> Babcock (1994, 192–193) emphasises the anti-Manichaean aspects of *cont.* in this respect. See TeSelle 2001, 315, 323, using Fredriksen 1988: “appropriating and internalizing.”

<sup>161</sup> *cont.* 19.



obeying these we do not accomplish (*perficimus*) evil, but by having them we do not yet accomplish (*perficimus*) good.<sup>162</sup> [transl. McDonald]

This image is once more argued by Augustine's rather artificial reading of Rom 7, 18 and Gal 5, 16, where the middle state of the Christian is seen as not yet being in perfect rest without any *concupiscentia* and not "perfecting," or consenting to the evil temptations of the same *concupiscentia*.<sup>163</sup> The relatively passive and domesticated state of evil inclinations in the baptised Christian is again depicted by the word "movement." These movements are felt when one is "pleased in something inappropriate" (*id quod non licet libet*). The mind serving the law of God efficiently curbs these movements, and wins them by "the good delight" (*bona delectatio*). Augustine treads a fine line between reducing the real effects of *concupiscentia* to nothing on the one hand, and having to hold on to his view of imperfect, grace dependent righteousness on the other. The words 'move,' and 'movements' seem to please Augustine, for they render well both the weak and passive but still existing and continuing effects of *concupiscentia*.<sup>164</sup>

[B]ut the perfection of good is not attained as long as, serving the law of sin with the flesh, lust allures. Even though it is restrained, it still moves, for it would not need to be restrained if it were not in motion.<sup>165</sup> [transl. McDonald]

While Augustine's depictions of the inner holy war in Christian renewal may be called confident for good reasons, he still acknowledges some dangers in warfare. The first danger is that of pride. Proud people are "pleased with themselves" and do not wish to be found guilty. They live in denial of the facts, that is, they do not recognize themselves as sinners. To resist the risk

<sup>162</sup> *cont.* 20 *sunt ergo in nobis desideria mala, quibus non consentiendo non uiuimus male; sunt in nobis concupiscentiae peccatorum, quibus non oboediendo non perficimus malum, sed eas habendo nondum perficimus bonum.*

<sup>163</sup> *cont.* 20 *utrumque ostendit apostolus, nec bonum hic perfici, ubi malum sic concupiscitur, nec malum hic perfici, quando tali concupiscentiae non oboeditur. illud quippe ostendit, ubi ait: uelle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non [Rom 7,18]; hoc uero, ubi ait: spiritu ambulate et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis [Gal 5,16]. neque enim ibi dicit non sibi adiacere facere bonum, sed perficere; neque hic dicit: concupiscentias carnis [Gal 5,16] ne habueritis, sed ne perfeceritis [Gal 5,16].*

<sup>164</sup> Thus, *motus (inordinatus)* as meaning *concupiscentia* is not necessarily a crypto-Manichaeen remnant in Augustine's thinking, but a simple way to express the passive state of *concupiscentia* in the Christian renewal. Cf. van Oort 1987; 1989.

<sup>165</sup> *cont.* 20 *sed boni perfectio non inpletur, quamdiu legi peccati carne seruiente libido incit et quamuis contineatur, tamen mouetur. non enim opus esset ut contineretur, si non moueretur.*

of pride, Augustine suggests that Christians practise the virtue of continence and living in daily prayer (*dimitte nobis debita nostra*).<sup>166</sup>

The second danger is a negligent, or even lax, attitude towards evil desires. Augustine admits that even in the Church, there are some carnal members who lust against Christ by their vices, and thus make *corpus Christi* appear to be a mixed creature in this life, comparable to the divided Christian of Romans 7. But Augustine warns his Catholic readership against such negligence. In short, *concupiscentia* should really be fought against. This means that a Christian cannot live in grave sins and presume that he or she will be saved despite them. In the end of *cont.*, Augustine offers a stern warning against a too careless way of living, based exactly on his conviction that grave temptations and *libidines* can be effectively resisted and conquered, while lighter temptations and lapses may be propitiated by daily repentance and by active Christian worship.<sup>167</sup>

#### 6.5. ENCOUNTERING CARICATURES— THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PELAGIAN DEBATE

It is now time to turn to the second phase of the Pelagian controversy. Augustine's understanding of *concupiscentia carnis*, or sexual desire, was a central and debated concept during the crisis. In this second phase, Julian of Aeclanum emerged as the main opponent of Augustine.<sup>168</sup> Whereas in the first phase of the Pelagian debate (411–418), the issues of baptism, grace and human nature were approached on a more general level, in the second phase (418–430), these and many more subjects of anthropology and theology were developed and scrutinized in detail by Julian and Augustine. It is, of course, not possible to give a satisfying account of the entire debate even with the limitation of focusing only on Augustine's way of treating *concupiscentia*. Some persistent features in Augustine's way of depicting *concupiscentia* and its effects on Christian renewal will, however, be pointed out in the following pages. It will become clear that Augustine's previous ideas of Christian renewal and *concupiscentia* during the Pelagian debate did also persist and evolve in his literary war against Julian of Aeclanum. Recurring themes in the debate with Julian are *a realistic optimism* on the possibilities

<sup>166</sup> *cont.* 13.

<sup>167</sup> *cont.* 30–31.

<sup>168</sup> For Julian's background and the circumstances of this debate, see Lössl 2001. For various aspects of Julian's theology, see e.g. Lamberigts 1988; 1990; 1996; Lössl 2002.

of controlling evil desires, a *mitigating reading of Paul*, a constant *self-identification* of the Christian *with his or her body* and a regular *pastoral concern* for the Catholic readership.<sup>169</sup> These themes have often been left unnoticed under the rhetorical racket of the two debaters. Especially Julian's accusation of Augustine's hidden Manichaean sympathies has received a benign readership, and has succeeded in muddling Augustine's own, admittedly narrow, carefully constructed position between an entirely exterior, strongly compulsory interpretation of *concupiscentia* and a completely neutralized form of *concupiscentia* expounded in Julian's terms as a natural, although irrational emotive energy. Instead of the plainly and overtly sexual contents of *concupiscentia* in the debate with Julian, we will attempt to highlight Augustine's background concerns for the Christian renewal and the process of justification even in sexual and marital matters.<sup>170</sup>

We will first turn to Augustine's treatise on marriage and sexual desires, *de nuptiis et concupiscentia* (418–421), written on the request of *comes* Valerius to answer some serious and detailed allegations by Julian of Aeclanum. The first book was written to Valerius after Augustine had heard from him of Julian's attack. Julian answered Augustine's first book with his *ad Turbantium*, of which Augustine then received some inaccurate excerpts, and based his answer—the second book—on these excerpts.<sup>171</sup>

Augustine dedicated the work to Valerius for various reasons. First, Valerius was a married man with a secular career, and second, he was clearly in a position to have influence on putting the Pelagians in their right minds. Third, Augustine also wished to offer Valerius some means of argument in the matter.<sup>172</sup> Augustine is under the impression that Valerius is very interested in the topic and is keen to hear his advice on the matter. This advisory and exhortatory character of *nupt. et conc.* is something one should keep in mind, for, although it is partly a polemical work, it is also a paedagogic treatise on Christian renewal in married life.<sup>173</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Cf. here Ring 1989, together with Martin 1995, 157.

<sup>170</sup> For analyses of Augustine's and Julian's views of sexuality, see e.g. Rist 1994, 321–327; Lamberigts 1997; 2000; Lössl 2001, 101–105 (criticizing Rist's pro-Augustinian stance).

<sup>171</sup> Lössl 2001, 6–8. Lamberigts (2005, 167) stresses the importance of *nupt. et conc.* 1 by way of an exaggeration: “all succeeding works of the controversies were little more than a deepening and rehashing of the questions raised in this work.” Zumkeller 1985 notes how *nupt. et conc.* 1. continues and deepens the discussions of *pecc. orig.*

<sup>172</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 2. For Valerius' person and role in the dispute, as well as for the general circumstances between Africa and Ravenna, see Lössl 2001, 280–286. Lössl (2001, 281) suspects that Valerius was initially closer to Julian than meets the eye.

<sup>173</sup> Perhaps there is also a nervous twinkle in the bishop's eye when he dedicates his work to a Christian husband—to be read at night hours. *nupt. et conc.* 1, 40 *ab homine dei, qui te*

One of the central themes in *nupt. et conc.* is familiar from the previous anti-Pelagian works, namely the emphasis on virtues as divine gifts. In the beginning of this work, Augustine aims very clearly at a Catholic readership by inculcating the impossibility of virtuous life without Christian faith. When he starts to expound the role and purpose of *concupiscentia carnis* for Valerius in the first pages of *nupt. et conc.*, the paraenetic tone is evident.

Thus, in the first chapters of *nupt. et conc.*, Augustine clarifies how Christian parents can use an evil means to good ends by using *concupiscentia* to produce offspring. But merely the existence of children is not enough, for Augustine also insists that the good in the Christian use of *concupiscentia* lies in the fact that those children will be baptised.<sup>174</sup> Augustine attempts to comfort Valerius and other Catholic Christians, who are perhaps concerned about their sexual behaviour in their marriages, that it is not a dangerous thing to have sex in order to get new citizens into the City of God. As usual, Augustine has an image at hand: it is as if a walker would reach his or her destination with a lame leg: nobody would praise the lameness of the leg, but the leg would nevertheless have been useful in reaching the goal.<sup>175</sup>

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*familiarius nouit, audissem, quod tam libenter legas, ut etiam nocturnas aliquas horas lectioni uigilanter impendas.* That the work was intended for the Catholic reading public, and not only for Valerius, goes without saying. Julian had a keen eye to spot Augustine's populist motives during the debate. See Lössl 2001, 284. That Augustine expected Catholic Christians, especially those who had any chance of using their time for reading, to be familiar with his works on baptism and concupiscence, can be seen in *ep.* 184A to Petrus and Abraham, to whom he recommends actually reading his works (with a poorly hidden innuendo that they should stop bothering him with their elemental questions on the problem, *plurimis autem opusculis nostris aut ad omnia aut paene ad omnia, quae requiritis, iam me respondisse, quantum potui, noueritis. quae si legatis, quoniam sic uos audio instituisse uitam, qua deo seruitis, ut uobis ad legendum uacet.* *ep.* 184A, 1). No other letters to these recipients survive. Morgenstern 1993, 64. See also *ep.* 6\* to Atticus, in which Augustine gives a brief account of his views on marital sexuality; the letter includes a rare occurrence of a 'good concupiscence' (*concupiscentiam nuptiarum* [...] *concupiscentiam pudicitiae coniugal*, *concupiscentiam legitime propagandae proles*, *concupiscentiam uinculi socialis*), but the pleonastic style here should warn against any complicated interpretations. For Augustine's own anticipations of his readership in his later years, see Vessey 1998, 264–267.

<sup>174</sup> To be sure, Augustine had of course treated the question of marriage and allowable sexual behaviour earlier in his *b. coniug.* and repeated the commonplace of having sex for the sake of conceiving *proles*, but there the problem is not related explicitly to baptism and renewal. *b. coniug.* 3 *habent etiam id bonum coniugia, quod carnalis uel iuuenalis incontinentia, etiamsi uitiosa est, ad propagandae proles redigitur honestatem, ut ex malo libidinis aliquid boni faciat copulatio coniugal*, *deinde quia reprimatur et quodam modo uerecundius aestuat concupiscentia carnis, quam temperat parentalis affectus. intercedit enim quaedam grauitas feruidae uoluptatis, cum in eo, quod sibi uir et mulier adhaerescunt, pater et mater esse meditantur.*

<sup>175</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 5; 1, 8.

Augustine also draws a clear line between a Christian use of sex and a non-Christian way of sexual behaviour. In Christian marriages, it is not a sin to use sex in serving good ends, while in the latter case, the “pleasure of the body” seems, as a rule, take the lead over reason. Augustine is also ready to allow sexual intercourse for a married Christian couple even in situations where their intention is not (at least primarily) to produce *proles*, but to take pleasure in *concupiscentia*. This is a venial sin, which prevents greater scandals (e.g. adultery).<sup>176</sup> While some irrational and sensual features of sexual behaviour may be partly identified with Augustine’s understanding of *concupiscentia carnis*, the main thrust of Augustine’s argumentation is that a Christian married couple has all the means necessary to deal with their sexual drives. The primary rule is to use this defect to good ends, and the secondary rule is to try not to put too much weight on temporary and venial lapses to sex that has been pursued just for the pleasure of it. While *concupiscentia carnis* is certainly not an original plan of God’s creation, it may be very well tolerated in Christian marriage.

More mitigating factors limiting the effects of *concupiscentia* follow in Augustine’s exposition. First, however, he has to acknowledge the existence and transmission of *concupiscentia* from generation to generation (*quomodo trahi possit captiuitas proles etiam de parentibus iam redemptis*).<sup>177</sup> It is clear that sexual, fleshly desire is not from God, but its root is elsewhere, in the world (*mundus*).<sup>178</sup> For the reason that the next generation has been infected with *concupiscentia* despite it being forgiven in the baptism of the parents, Augustine refers again to the analogy of the oleaster and domesticated olive tree (first used in *gr. et pecc. or.*), which tells its tale to the Christian readership.<sup>179</sup> Augustine admits that it may be difficult for non-Christians to understand why those freed by God’s grace still give birth to sinful children. “This is incredible to the unbelievers.”<sup>180</sup>

<sup>176</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 13. Augustine adds the reservation that no contraceptive methods should be used even in this case.

<sup>177</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 21.

<sup>178</sup> The primary source text for Augustine’s function of *concupiscentia* as the root of evil, 1Jn 2, 16, appears thus in a rather peculiar and extraordinary context, compared to its general use in earlier works. See Chapter 4.

<sup>179</sup> See Zumkeller 1985, 600.

<sup>180</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 21 *haec inuisibilia et infidelibus incredibilia, sed tamen uera ut haberent aliquod uisibile exemplum, hoc in quibusdam arbustis diuina prouidentia procurauit. cur enim non credamus propter hoc esse institutum, ut ex oliua nascatur oleaster? an credendum non est in aliqua re quae creata est ad usus hominum creatorem prouidisse et instituisse, quod ad generis humani ualeret exemplum? mirum est ergo quemadmodum a peccati uinculo per*

After constituting the inevitable transmission of *concupiscentia* as a link for original sin to the newborn children even in Christian families, Augustine hastens to mention important reservations to this state of affairs. First, Augustine emphasises the crucial importance of baptism as the starting point for Christian renewal; baptism is the most important single factor in changing and diminishing the effects of *concupiscentia*.

[T]his concupiscence, I say, which is cleansed only by the sacrament of regeneration, does undoubtedly, by means of natural birth, pass on the bond of sin to a man's posterity, unless they are themselves loosed from it by regeneration. In the case, however, of the regenerate, concupiscence is not itself sin any longer [...] <sup>181</sup> [transl. Holmes]

Augustine repeats the simple fact that, if not consented, *concupiscentia* cannot harm baptised Christians, and then creates a space for Christian attitude to *concupiscentia* in this life by juxtaposing again two biblical dictums on *concupiscentia*: the prohibition not to covet (Ex 20, 17) and the advise not to follow one's desires (Sir 18, 30). <sup>182</sup>

From this viewpoint, Augustine then considers the origin, the force and the effects of *concupiscentia* in a loose before vs. now-scheme. Before baptism, *concupiscentia* is truly a condemning and terrifying, sinful force. After baptism, the situation is radically different. It is true, Augustine notes, that *concupiscentia* has its origin not in God but in the Devil, who is the "source and author of all sin." Therefore, children born by *concupiscentia* are somehow "guilty" and under the Devil's authority. Moreover, even in the renewed state, *concupiscentia* may again become a link and a source for multiple sins, if it is given consent: thus *concupiscentia* may not only be called a "daughter of sin," but in some cases, also a "mother of many other sins."<sup>183</sup> While Augustine thus obviously acknowledges many features in *concupiscentia* which might render it as being terrifying and indeed sinful, even diabolical force, he never lets the horizon of Christian renewal and baptism to slip from his eyes. In *nupt. et conc.* 1, 25–29, Augustine attempts to convince his Catholic reader of the fact that in his or her life, *concupiscentia* is a tamed

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*gratiam liberati gignant tamen eodem uinculo obstrictos, quos eodem modo oporteat liberari. fatemur, mirum est. See also nupt. et conc. 2, 58.*

<sup>181</sup> *nupt. et conc. 1, 25 haec, inquam, concupiscentia, quae solo sacramento regenerationis expiatur, profecto peccati uinculum generatione traicit in posteros, nisi ab illo et ipsi regeneratione soluantur. nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis.*

<sup>182</sup> *nupt. et conc. 1, 25 si non fit quod scriptum est: non concupiscas [Ex 20, 17], fiat saltem quod alibi legitur: post concupiscentias tuas non eas [Ecli 18, 30].*

<sup>183</sup> *nupt. et conc. 1, 26–27.*

and defeated enemy that can and should be checked and subdued in daily struggle. Even though *concupiscentia* thus has many qualities of sin, it is no longer, however, a proper sin in a renewed Christian. Augustine maps the way *concupiscentia* remains in the baptised person and lists several factors that should console a Christian who is concerned about his or her observation of still being under the influence of bodily, and apparently sinful temptations:

If the question arises, how this concupiscence of the flesh remains in the regenerate, in whose case has been effected a remission of all sins whatever [...] the answer to be given is this: Carnal concupiscence is remitted, indeed, in baptism; not so that it is put out of existence, but so that it is not to be imputed for sin. Although its guilt is now taken away, it still remains until our entire infirmity be healed by the advancing renewal of our inner man, day by day, when at last our outward man shall be clothed with incorruption. It does not remain, however, substantially, as a body, or a spirit; but it is nothing more than a certain affection of an evil quality, such as languor, for instance. [...] [T]here remains this concupiscence of the flesh in the body of this death. Now we are admonished not to obey its sinful desires to do evil: "Let not sin reign in your mortal body." Still this concupiscence is daily lessened in persons of continence and increasing years, and most of all when old age makes a near approach. The man, however, who yields to it a wicked service, receives such great energies that, even when all his members are now failing through age, and those especial parts of his body are unable to be applied to their proper function, he does not ever cease to revel in a still increasing rage of disgraceful and shameless desire.

In the case, then, of those persons who are born again in Christ, when they receive an entire remission of all their sins, it is of course necessary that the guilt also of the still indwelling concupiscence should be remitted, in order that (as I said) it should not be imputed to them for sin. For even as in the case of those sins which cannot be themselves permanent, since they pass away as soon as they are committed, the guilt yet is permanent, and (if not remitted) will remain for evermore; so, when the concupiscence is remitted, the guilt of it also is taken away. For not to have sin means this, not to be deemed guilty of sin.<sup>184</sup> [transl. Holmes]

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<sup>184</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 28–29 *si autem quaeritur, quomodo ista concupiscentia carnis maneat in regenerato, in quo uniuersorum facta est remissio peccatorum, [...] respondetur dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non imputetur. quamuis autem reatu suo iam soluto manet tamen, donec sanetur omnis infirmitas nostra proficiente renouatione interioris hominis de die in diem cum exterior induerit incorruptionem; non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor. non ergo aliquid remanet, quod non remittatur, [...] manet in corpore mortis huius carnalis concupiscentia, cuius uitiosis desideriis ad illicita perpetranda non obediunt praecipimur, ne regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore. quae tamen concupiscentia coti-*

What emerges from this account is the following: baptism removes all guilt for every kind of sin, and this applies also to *concupiscentia*. Augustine treats sin (*peccatum*) here in terms of juridical liability. If such a liability is annulled, the existence of the original cause means nothing. “To have no sin means to be not guilty of sin.” It is easy to note how Augustine very strongly stresses exactly this point by repeating it time after time (*sicut dixi*). Moreover, Augustine highlights the encouraging visions of Christian progress: the effects of *concupiscentia* will concretely diminish and weaken in time, as the process of justification goes ahead. What is important and fully possible, is that Christians only remind themselves of not giving loose reins to *concupiscentia*. *Concupiscentia* is a “reigned sin,” but if allowed, it may again take the lead, even in old age, and then the result will be extremely sad (*turpius et procacius insanire non desinat*).

Augustine then takes up Romans 7 for the first time in *nupt. et conc.* for a more extensive treatment (a text he has mentioned only incidentally thus far in this work). Augustine’s tendency is strong and constant: after having recognised the subject of Romans 7 as the Christian Paul, he downplays all innuendos of compulsive and necessitating inclinations to sin in Paul’s narrative. We will now briefly review Augustine’s strategy in achieving this goal. The basic structure of Augustine’s interpretation is to interpret Paul as exhortating Christians not “to not have” evil desires, but “to not obey.” To illustrate this, let us compare Augustine’s source text and his interpretation in some detail:

## PAUL

A. 7, 15 non enim quod uolo [...] sed quod odi, facio

B. 7, 16 consentio legi

## AUGUSTINE

A. I wish to be perfect, but I have concupiscentia; therefore, I am not perfect.

B. Because the law commands: “Do not covet,” and I agree: I should not have *concupiscentia*

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*die minuitur in proficientibus et continentibus accedente etiam senectute multo maxime. qui uero ei nequiter seruiunt, tantas in eis uires accipit, ut plerumque iam aetate deficientibus membris eisdemque partibus corporis ad illud opus admoueri minus ualentibus turpius et procacius insanire non desinat.*

*in eis ergo, qui regenerantur in Christo cum remissionem accipiunt prorsus omnium peccatorum, utique necesse est ut reatus etiam huius licet adhuc manentis concupiscentiae remittatur, ut in peccatum, sicut dixi, non imputetur. nam sicut eorum peccatorum, quae manere non possunt, quoniam cum fiunt praetereunt, reatus tamen manet et, nisi remittatur, in aeternum manebit, sic illius, quando remittitur, reatus aufertur. hoc est enim non habere peccatum, reum non esse peccati.*



## PAUL

C. 7, 17 non ego operor illud, sed id quod in me habitat peccatum

D. 7, 18 scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum. uelle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio.

E. 7, 19–21 non enim quod uolo [...] mihi malum adiacet

F. 7, 22 condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem

G. 7, 23 uideo autem aliam legem in membris meis [...] et captiuam me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis

H. 7, 24–25 ipse ego mente seruo legi dei, carne autem legi peccati

I. 8, 1 nulla ergo condemnatio est nunc his qui sunt in Christo Iesu

J. 8, 2 lex enim spiritus uitae [...] liberauit me a lege peccati

## AUGUSTINE

C. Because I do not consent to *concupiscentia*, which I still have! It is impossible to deny one's responsibility to consented actions; therefore, Paul has not consented to his actions, which he denies to be his. "Inhabiting sin" means only (*tantummodo*) the passive state of *concupiscentia*.

D. I am able to do good, i.e. not consent to evil desires; but I am not able to be perfect, i.e. to not have any evil desires at all.

E. Repetition: I wish the same as the law, i.e. not to covet, but I still covet, against this wish (*nolens concupisco*).

F. Divine grace gives us an inner delight by which we are able to resist *concupiscentia* and we now willingly rejoice of God's will.

G. This law of sin is *concupiscentia*! It tries to capture us again under its power. We cannot read this as Paul would really mean that *concupiscentia* actually would hold us prisoners. Either it means that *concupiscentia* holds our flesh in captivity, or—which is a more natural reading—it has to be understood as "trying to capture" (*captiuare conantem*).

H. *Mente* means that I do not consent to *concupiscentia* (*non consentiendo legi peccati*), *carne* means that in my body I still have *concupiscentia* (*habendo desideria peccati, quibus etsi non consentio, nondum tamen penitus careo*).

I. Despite the existence of *concupiscentia* in our bodies, Christians are freed from condemnation.

J. This means: all guilt of *concupiscentia* has been absolved in baptism, and it is no more imputed as sin.

By now, it has become self-evident that Augustine interprets Romans 7 as a Christian self-reflexion.<sup>185</sup> The entire chapter is here read in terms of *concupiscentia* and its effects on the Christian struggle. Paradoxically, this means that Augustine has to use a soft focus in reading the verses that stress sin's compulsory character and its strong grip on the human person. The complaint of Paul's *ego* of his straightforwardly involuntary state is seen as a complaint of a Christian who yearns for perfection. The active verb-forms of Paul in committing a sin he does not accept (*quod odi facio*) are read as a passive state of *concupiscentia* (*concupisco*), still existing in the Christian. Whereas Paul does not say anything about a consent to passions, this concept is crucial in Augustine's interpretation. It is decisive in defining whether or not the Christian *ego* is responsible for a sin. Despite the feelings of frustration or self-loathing by Christians, once they consent to the temptations of *concupiscentia*, responsibility for their personal sins cannot be denied. Therefore, Paul's description cannot act as a defense of any kind for a double life. Augustine emphasises that the feelings aroused by one's state are not important: the only thing that matters is whether one has decided to enjoy or to act according to *concupiscentia* by one's "heart's consent," not to mention one's "body's assistance."<sup>186</sup>

Nonetheless, it is Rom 7, 23 that forms perhaps the most serious challenge to Augustine's reading. For in this verse Paul seems to depict the agony of his renewed self in more pessimistic tones than suits Augustine's view of the presence of *concupiscentia* in a baptised Christian. Augustine admits implicitly that there are some difficulties in interpreting the words *captiuantem me* in a correct way. Augustine's own solution entails a controversial reading, namely, one has to add "*conantem*" in order to get Paul right. Augustine would accept the verb *captiuare* as referring to the body, and then Paul would mean "holding my flesh in captivity."<sup>187</sup> But as the word *caro* does not

<sup>185</sup> Augustine had preached on Rom 7 (s. 151–156) in the previous autumn (in 417), exploring and preparing the account he now gives to Valerius in 418. It seems that in those sermons Augustine explicitly treats the *ego* of Rom 7 as the autobiographical Paul. See Partoens 2008 and Lössl 2008, for dating of the sermons. Lössl 2008, xlvii: "In serm. 154, 4 he clearly states, for the first time ever, that Paul speaks of himself in this verse. From now on he will do so frequently." Note, however, Augustine's wording in *nupt. et conc.* 1, 30, *uelut ex sua personae introductione nos instruit*. The *ego* is still not the purely autobiographical Paul, but also a rhetorical construction, whose goal is paedagogical. *Ego*, in Augustine's reading, includes Paul, but also every Christian acknowledging his or her situation.

<sup>186</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 31. For a discussion of this passage as evidence for an "implicit two-phased consent process of the will," see Pang-White 2003, 154–155.

<sup>187</sup> As in *cont.*, Augustine here also makes the distinction between the 'flesh' and 'body' or 'bodily constitution.' The 'flesh' or *carnele nostrum* refers to a *morbida carnis adfectus, non*

appear in the text, and Paul explicitly says (in first person with an *ego* that should be identified as a renewed Christian) that *concupiscentia* “holds me in captivity,” he actually must mean that *concupiscentia* is only *trying and attempting* to capture me as a renewed Christian.

Augustine concludes his exegesis on Romans 7 by recapitulating the most important points. Paul, or the typical Christian, fights off and defeats carnal captivity and the temptations of the concupiscence with new spirit (*lex mentis meae*), even though there is still a presence of evil desires in his or her mortal body. Augustine’s goal has now become evident: he needs to modify and mitigate the effects of the involuntary *concupiscentia* of Paul’s narrative and to explain them as relatively harmless and ineffective. Accordingly, it is perfectly possible to control *concupiscentia* by a renewed will that has been affected by grace. Augustine eloquently puts his position in the form of a metaphor, again taken from warfare:

[T]here is in our members another law which wars against the law of the mind, so long as the flesh lusts against the spirit—without, however, subjugating the mind, inasmuch as on its side, too, the spirit has a concupiscence contrary to the flesh. Thus, although the actual law of sin partly holds the flesh in captivity (whence comes its resistance to the law of the mind), still it has not an absolute empire in our body, notwithstanding its mortal state, since it refuses obedience to its desires. For in the case of hostile armies between whom there is an earnest conflict, even the side which is inferior in the fight usually holds a something which it has captured.<sup>188</sup> [transl. Holmes]

Once more, Augustine uses a mitigating modification to depict the effects of *concupiscentia*: *aliquid teneat*. He notes that *concupiscentia* will not “reign” us anymore, unless consent is given to it. Finally, *concupiscentia* is a defeated enemy, still waging a desperate guerrilla war in our lives. Even though it still holds some insignificant ground and has some prisoners-of-war (*aliquid*), it is a weak and beaten force; therefore, there is no need to worry!<sup>189</sup>

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*ipsam corporis conformationem. nupt. et conc. 1, 35.* Augustine’s tendency to rehabilitate the body is again apparent. Paul’s body belongs to the Christian self. A Manichean interpretation of Rom 7 is thereby warded off by Augustine.

<sup>188</sup> *nupt. et conc. 1, 35 alia lex in membris repugnet quidem legi mentis, dum caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum [Gal 5,17], etsi mentem non subiuguet, quia et spiritus concupiscit aduersus carnem. atque ita quamuis lex ipsa peccati captium teneat aliquid carnis, unde resistat legi mentis, non tamen regnat in nostro licet mortali corpore, si non oboeditur desideriis eius. solent enim et hostes, aduersus quos dimicatur, et inferiores esse in certamine et uicti aliquid tenere captium.*

<sup>189</sup> Augustine uses e.g. the words *pugna*, *agon*, *certamen*, and *bellum* in describing the situation of Christians fighting against their inner adversary. For the inner fight referred to as a military combat, but also as a wrestling or boxing match, see the pertinent comments by TeSelle 2001, 325–327.

Augustine thus has found his initial depiction of the tamed *concupiscentia* confirmed by Paul's account. This new account of Paul is rather far away from Augustine's earlier attempts to read the same text as describing the agony of a *sub lege* person: the compulsory and akratic features have been omitted tidily, and now Romans 7 neatly speaks with the words of a renewed Christian, able to resist the evil inclinations of *concupiscentia*. While *concupiscentia* is perhaps not a force to be carelessly played with, it is a caged and domesticated beast surrounded by the more powerful forces of Christian renewal conducted by God's grace. Moreover, Augustine invites his Catholic readers to consider their brilliant future in Christian progress. He refers to a time that awaits Christians when they have no adversaries to wrestle, and even their bodies will be entirely free from the scars and the lameness of *concupiscentia*.<sup>190</sup>

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Augustine's ground conviction in *nupt. et conc.* thus emerges as something that could be described as a confident or enkratic view of Christian life. Baptism, God's grace and the daily prayers and works of charity all work as strong medications against *concupiscentia*; they render the Christian with a strong, even if not yet a perfect, will. The paraenetic function of *nupt. et conc.* is constantly present in the work; thus, Book 1 ends with final remarks on the importance of baptism as a cleansing sacrament, after Augustine has expounded his views of the weak and tamed *concupiscentia*, and has argued this view with an extensive exegesis of his biblical key text, Romans 7.

Simultaneously with *nupt. et conc.*, Augustine also composed another answer to Julian's critique in *contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* (419–420).<sup>191</sup> From the viewpoint of *concupiscentia* and Christian renewal, the most interesting discussion of *c. ep. Pel.* is located in the first book, which is aimed against Julian's letter to the Pelagian Christians in Rome (*Jul. ep. Rom.*).<sup>192</sup> Augustine attempts to answer and refute Julian's caricatures of him as a Manichaean.<sup>193</sup> Some of these caricatures are either too inaccurate or do

<sup>190</sup> *nupt. et conc.* 1, 35 *quod in carne nostra quamuis sub peccati lege teneatur, tamen in spe redemptionis est, quia ipsa uitiosa concupiscentia nulla omnino remanebit, caro autem nostra ab ea peste morboque sanata et tota immortalitate uestita in aeterna beatitudine permanebit.*

<sup>191</sup> For the circumstances, see Wermelinger 1975, 232–238; Lössl 2001, 286–292.

<sup>192</sup> The main arguments of *Jul. ep. Rom.* are neatly collected in Lössl 2001, 290 n. 228.

<sup>193</sup> To accuse one's theological opponent of Manichaeism was something of a commonplace. See Markus 1990a, 48, 56–57. See also Markus 1991. Evans (1982, 139) thinks that Julian's accusation was an attempt to show not that Augustine still had secret sympathies for the sect but that “the tendency of Augustine's thought is ‘Manichaean.’”

not concern the question of *concupiscentia* and renewal. At least two accusations by Julian, however, merit a more extensive discussion. The first is his allegation that Augustine would think that the apostles were gravely sinful characters, who were driven by their base passions. The second is Julian's image of Augustine's theology of baptism, in which *concupiscentia* is left to grow and produce fresh sins in the same way a razor leaves the roots of a beard to grow and produce new hair.

Augustine himself seems to devote his first more extensive treatments in *c. ep. Pel. 1* to these two allegations, while some other charges by Julian he passes by and answers them with shorter comments.

Let us first turn to the charge of "apostles as debauchers" (*apostolum etiam Paulum, inquit, uel omnes apostolos dicunt semper inmoderata libidine fuisse pollutos*).<sup>194</sup> Against this claim, Augustine *firmly denies* that Paul or any other apostle would have been "polluted by immoderate *libido*." He notes that the question pertains to Romans 7, and to the identity of the *ego* in that text. Augustine's argumentation then aims to deny Julian's accusation, which would entail that Paul and his fellow apostles were at the same time both practising Christians and practising debauchers, i.e. that they were not able to resist consenting to sinful suggestions.<sup>195</sup> To achieve his aim, Augustine once more returns to Romans 7 and provides another detailed interpretation of this text. Augustine is convinced that Julian is here led to his accusation by his mistaken reading of Paul concerning the identity of *ego* in Romans 7.<sup>196</sup> The mistake of Julian also lies in the fact that he does not understand the qualitative difference between law and grace in relation to *concupiscentia*. Whereas the law only commands, grace also assists Christians in their struggle.<sup>197</sup> Augustine notes that the first half of Romans 7 does not necessarily conflict with the Pelagian reading, for in these verses Paul seems to speak of his past. The crucial turn in which opinions differ is in v. 14, where Paul admits that he is "carnal" and "sold into slavery under sin." Here Pelagians think that Paul "transforms into somebody else," whereas Augustine holds on to the continuity of the past

<sup>194</sup> *c. ep. Pel. 1, 13.*

<sup>195</sup> Augustine makes an outraged side remark to Bonifacius and to his Catholic audience: *quis hoc uel profanus audeat dicere? c. ep. Pel. 1, 13. Cf. ep. 265, 2 et quis hoc fuerat, ut primum apostolorum inter tales paenitentes numerandum putemus?*

<sup>196</sup> *c. ep. Pel. 1, 13 contendunt id, quod dixit apostolus [...] non eum dixisse de se ipso, sed nescio cuius alterius, qui illa pateretur, induxisse personam. propter quod locus ipse in eius epistula diligenter considerandus est et scrutandus, ne in eius aliqua obscuritate delitiscat error istorum.*

<sup>197</sup> *c. ep. Pel. 1, 13.*

and present in Paul.<sup>198</sup> Augustine now shows less insecurity than in *nupt. et conc.* 1 in maintaining that Paul here clearly refers to his body, which is not yet spiritual and has not undergone similar changes to those of the mind, but nevertheless suffers from the effects of mortality and of the original sin.<sup>199</sup> In fact, Augustine remarks once more that Paul's description should be read as being rhetorically extended, but not in the way that the Pelagians suggest. For in addition to Paul's own life, Rom 7, 14–25 also includes all those Christians who experience a conflict between their “spiritual delight” and “carnal affections,” and yet “without consent [to these].”<sup>200</sup>

Augustine's basic intention thus remains unchanged. Now he only has to give a verse-by-verse account of his view of a strong-willed Christian, affected by grace. For the verses 7, 15–16, he repeats the position of *nupt. et conc.* 1, but perhaps in more determined language:

[The apostle] says that he rather consents to the law than to the concupiscence of the flesh. For this he calls by the name of sin. Therefore he said that he acted and laboured not with the desire of consenting and fulfilling, but from the impulse of lusting itself (*ipso motu concupiscendi*).<sup>201</sup>

[transl. Wallis]

At the moment, the weakest point in Augustine's reading is this: how could a word referring to action (*facio*) really be read as having such a passive sense as Augustine seems to presume (*non affectu consentiendi et inplendi sed ipso motu concupiscendi*)? The “movement” of *concupiscentia* is once again crucial, for it covers both the existence of evil desires in the Christian person and the renewed person's isolation from them.

However, the following verse eases the difficulties somewhat, as Paul then claims that *he* does not in fact do what he does not want, but *the sin*

<sup>198</sup> The words *in se alium transfigurauerit* are not accidental. Augustine himself has used the term *transfigurare in se* in several passages in a way that suggests a technical understanding of the word. See e.g. *Simpl.* 1, 1, 1; *nat. et gr.* 58; *c. Iul.* 6, 72; *ep.* 186, 40; *s.* 153, 9; 154, 2. These passages all concern Rom 7. Augustine also uses the word in other connections to denote rhetorical impersonation, see e.g. *bapt.* 6, 60; *ciu.* 17, 12; 20, 20. Towards the end of the 410s, there is an increasing tendency to include Paul personally in the descriptions of Rom 7. Delaroche 1996, 268. For rhetorical analyses of Rom 7 in general, and for the rhetorical device of *prosopopoiia* in particular, see Stowers 1994a; 1994b; 2003; Anderson 1996; Thurén 2000. For Augustine's use of *prosopopoiia*, see Drobner 1990; Martin 2000.

<sup>199</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 17.

<sup>200</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 17. See also *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 24.

<sup>201</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 18 *magis enim se dicit legi consentire quam carnis concupiscentiae—hanc enim peccati nomine appellat—; facere ergo se dixit et operari non affectu consentiendi et inplendi, sed ipso motu concupiscendi.*

which lives in him does. “Under grace,” Paul’s “delight of the will” has been freed from “the consent of cupidity,” and therefore the Christian can also disavow his or her new identity from evil desires, while at the same time suffering from their existence.<sup>202</sup> Augustine thus hints at the effective force of grace in generating a new kind of consent, which is oriented according to God’s will, but he will return to this a little later.

After having briefly stated his settled interpretation of verse 18 concerning the impossibility of perfection, i.e. total freedom from *concupiscentia*, Augustine sums up the three most difficult obstacles in Romans 7 for his reading, namely the verses that seem to make Paul act under compulsion, or those that identify him with his sinful self; *ego autem carnalis sum* (Rom 7, 14), *uenundatus sub peccato* (v. 14) and *captiuantem me in lege peccati* (v. 23). Augustine admits that these three phrases may lead readers to assume that Paul here refers to someone other than himself as a renewed Christian. But, as Augustine points, with *captiuantem me*, we can easily resort to the same device as with the two previous difficult verses in order to locate Paul’s description in a renewed life. This only requires that Paul’s *ego* here oscillates between the renewed *mens* and carnal body, which is nevertheless his “own”:

“Bringing me into captivity in the law of sin, which is in my members,” [here] the apostle seems to be describing a man who is still living under the law, and is not yet under grace. But as I have expounded the former two sayings in respect of the still corruptible flesh, so also this latter may be understood as if he had said, “bringing me into captivity,” in the flesh, not in the mind; in emotion (*motione*), not in consent; and therefore “bringing me into captivity,” because even in the flesh there is not an alien nature, but our own.<sup>203</sup>

[transl. Wallis]

Romans 7 is thus fully applicable to Christian renewal, given that all phrases suggesting a strong notion of the occupation of sin are understood as concerning the corruptible body.

<sup>202</sup> c. ep. Pel. 1, 18 *quid est nunc autem nisi iam nunc sub gratia, quae liberauit delectationem uoluntatis a consensione cupiditatis? non enim melius intellegitur: non ego operor* [Rom 7,17], *nisi quia non consentit exhibere membra sua arma iniquitatis peccato. nam si et concupiscit et consentit et agit, quomodo non ipse illud operatur, etiamsi se operari doleat et uinci grauiter ingemescat?*

<sup>203</sup> c. ep. Pel. 1, 20 *captiuantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis* [Rom 7,23], *potest uideri apostolus eum describere, qui sub lege adhuc uiuit, nondum sub gratia. sed sicut illa duo exposuimus propter carnem adhuc corruptibilem dicta, sic et hoc potest intellegi, ut captiuantem me dixerit carne, non mente, motione, non consensione et ideo captiuantem me, quia et in ipsa carne non est aliena natura, sed nostra.*

To Augustine, the final verses of Romans 7 seem to affirm his reading. Paul's heightening confidence in the grace of Christ confirms the identity of Paul as a renewed Christian in the entire context. In brief, Paul lives *sub gratia*. His inner mind thereby serves the law of God, and his flesh still has *concupiscentia*. No divine judgment due to *concupiscentia* follows or should be feared, however, because the grace of Christ fortifies the Christian so that it is possible to no longer give consent to the old habits.<sup>204</sup>

Now Augustine only has to conclude his answer to Julian's charge. This he does in a twofold way. First, he explicitly admits that earlier he has had an erroneous conception of the identity of the *ego* in Romans 7.<sup>205</sup> He has corrected his reading, however, due to Paul's disavowal of his sinful desires in v. 17, for this cannot be unless the person in question is a Christian *sub gratia* and there is a new will, or a new point of view, at work in Paul.<sup>206</sup> Secondly, Augustine returns to the changed status of consent that he has discerned in Romans 7. While the *sub lege* consent is a forced consent by fear of the Law and takes delight in sinning, the renewed consent *sub gratia* is drawn by a joy and pleasure in God's will.<sup>207</sup> Again, this cannot be achieved unless one is in the state of grace:

I do not see how a man under the law should say, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man"; since this very delight in good, by which, moreover, he does not consent to evil, not from fear of penalty, but from love of righteousness (for this is meant by "delighting"), can only be attributed to grace.<sup>208</sup> [transl. Wallis]

The circle is now closed and Augustine can draw the conclusions of his exegesis of Romans 7 which initially was motivated by Julian's caricature: even though the apostles were human beings and had a body which is not yet renewed, it is outrageous to think that they would have been driven by their evil desires and "polluted with immoderate lust." In other words, there

<sup>204</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 21.

<sup>205</sup> See Verschoren 2004, 228, 231; Lössl 2008, xlvii–xlvi. Lössl (2008, xlix–lv) suggests that Augustine's change of exegesis was triggered by two works: Jerome's *Dialogus*, in which a Pelagian interlocutor holds to a *sub lege* interpretation of Rom 7, and Pelagius' *Pro libero arbitrio* holding to this kind of reading of Paul.

<sup>206</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 22.

<sup>207</sup> See Pang-White 1999 for a more developed thesis of the two different modes of consent in Augustine.

<sup>208</sup> *c. ep. Pel.* 1, 22 *non uideo quomodo diceret homo sub lege: condelector legi dei secundum interiorem hominem [Rom 7,22], cum ipsa delectatio boni, qua etiam non consentit ad malum non timore poenae, sed amore iustitiae—hoc est enim condelectari—non nisi gratiae deputanda sit.*



is a crucial difference between consenting to depraved passions and reining in and controlling one's existing concupiscence:

And that the apostles, because they were men, and carried about in the mortality of this life a body which is corrupted and weighs down the soul, were, therefore, "always polluted with excessive lust," as that man injuriously affirms, be it far from me to say. But I do say that although they were free from consent to depraved lusts, they nevertheless groaned concerning the concupiscence of the flesh, which they bridled by restraint with such humility and piety, that they desired rather not to have it than to subdue it.<sup>209</sup>

[transl. Wallis]

But another caricature is still left for Augustine to respond to. Julian had compared Augustine's idea of incomplete renewal to shaving.

[Julian:] [B]aptism does not give complete remission of sins, nor takes away crimes, but it shaves them off, so that the roots of all sins are retained in the evil flesh [...] as if of shaved hair on the head, whence the sins may grow to be cut down again.<sup>210</sup>

[transl. Wallis]

Julian had thus cleverly referred to Augustine's old conception of evil desires as forming the root of evil actions, and claims that according to Augustine, baptism has only superficial effects on sins and on the "evil flesh." Such a banal analogy effectively also ridiculed the idea of daily repentance that was so important to Augustine. Of course, Augustine rejects Julian's caricature and points out that baptism has real and concrete effects on *concupiscentia* which Julian had called *radices peccatorum*. Augustine argues that in the renewed person, *concupiscentia* can no longer be treated as proper sin, for the guilt accompanying it has been removed. Therefore Julian's caricature misses the point: the very hair of sin has changed its quality in the baptised person, even though the "movements" of *concupiscentia* are often called sins.<sup>211</sup> Thus, Augustine's auxiliary concept of *reatus* serves well again in

<sup>209</sup> c. ep. Pel. 1, 24 et ideo apostolos, quia homines erant et corpus, quod corrumpitur et adgrauat animam, in huius uitae mortalitate portabant, absit ut dicamus, sicut iste calumniatur, semper inmoderata libidine fuisse pollutos [Julian. A. c. ep. Pel.], sed dicimus a consensione prauarum libidinum liberos, de concupiscentia tamen carnis, quam moderando frenabant, tanta humilitate et pietate gemuisse, ut optarent eam non habere potius quam domare.

<sup>210</sup> c. ep. Pel. 1, 26 baptisma non dare omnem indulgentiam peccatorum nec auferre crimina, sed rarare, ut omnium peccatorum radices in mala carne teneantur [...] quasi rasorum in capite capillorum, unde crescant iterum, reseccanda peccata. Brown 1972, 202, presents Julian's caricature in connection with the Pelagian concern of baptism as a radical watershed between the past and present. Julian's journalistic caricature would thus reflect a deeper concern for the radical interpretation of the rite of baptism.

<sup>211</sup> c. ep. Pel. 1, 27.

debutting Julian's caricature of shaving. Against Julian's notion, Augustine maintains that baptism has some real and concrete effects on the primary and most elementary sources of sinful behaviour.<sup>212</sup>

However, Augustine has to admit that there is one point in which Julian's comparison is rather accurate. This concerns the persistence of sinful behaviour even in the renewed Christian, a fact that Augustine stresses even here. Despite the real and deep effects of baptism, *concupiscentia* seems painfully able to produce sinful actions, words, and thoughts, for which the Christian has to ask forgiveness from God.<sup>213</sup> Augustine is once more keen to stress the idea that there are different classes of sin, those of the venial kind, and those of *crimina*. The former are efficiently propitiated by Lord's prayer and almsgiving, whereas the latter form an obstacle, for example, for an individual to be received in the ministry.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> For a thought-provoking recent study of Augustine's theology of baptism, see Cary 2008, 193–220. In short, Cary claims that for Augustine, baptism as such did not confer any real effects on the Christian, for the thrust of Augustine's teaching of baptism as a sacrament was formed in his anti-Donatist theology in which the efficacy of divine signs was bound to the inner unity of the Church, and not to the external act of baptism. Cary also argues that the conceptual work on baptism in the anti-Donatist writings was used in the anti-Pelagian debates. According to Cary's hypothesis, baptism was an ineffective door through which one could be transferred from the *massa peccati* ("unity in Adam") into the interior unity of all those who are saved in Christ. In the present study, the effects of baptism can be discussed only as far as they are connected to *concupiscentia* and its presence in the life *sub gratia*, especially on the question of *reatus*, for which see the present and following section.

<sup>213</sup> *c. ep. Pel. 1, 27 fiunt autem siue operando siue loquendo siue, quod facillimum atque celerrimum est, cogitando. a quibus omnibus quis etiam fidelium gloriabitur castum se habere cor aut quis gloriabitur mundum se esse a peccato?* For yet another caricature Augustine has to refute, see *c. ep. Pel. 3, 4*. Julian had depicted the Augustinian Christian as a double-faced creature, partly divine, partly diabolical. Augustine responds by stressing the real effects of baptism and by refuting a diabolical remnant in the human constitution. After all, in faith, Christians are children of God, while in their "infirmities" they can also be seen as children "of this world."

<sup>214</sup> *c. ep. Pel. 1, 28 multi quippe baptizati fideles sunt sine crimine; sine peccato autem in hac uita neminem dixerim, quantalibet Pelagiani, quia haec dicimus, aduersus nos inflentur et disrumpantur insania, non quia peccati aliquid remanet, quod in baptismo non remittatur, sed quia nobis in huius uitae infirmitate manentibus cotidie fieri non quiescunt, quae fideliter orantibus et misericorditer operantibus cotidie remittantur.* Apparently, for a married Christian couple, sex for the sake of pleasure would in Augustine's view be such a daily or venial sin, *c. ep. Pel. 1, 33*. The sketch by Brown (1972, 205) of the "ordinary Christian layman of the Later Empire" is highly attractive, but is prone to a misunderstanding not dissimilar to that of Julian's; that Augustine's theology of grace, baptism and concupiscentia was only a tailored attempt to include large masses of converts with them having to make only the slightest effort in their everyday lives as Christians. For Julian's disdain over what he saw as a typical audience of the Augustinian kind of a bishop, see *c. Iul. 2, 37*.

Augustine invests substantial energy in *c. ep. Pel.* 1 to refute Julian's charges that were aimed against his views on *concupiscentia* and Christian renewal. As we have seen, Augustine's analysis is essentially motivated by Julian's caricature of Augustine's apostles and by Julian's satirical depiction of daily repentance. Augustine's basic conviction is crystal clear: a baptised Christian is able and should control his or her evil desires and hold back their movements. Paul's Romans 7 now works as an important source text for this conviction, and all debilitating notions in this text are cleared out by an interpretation that sweeps away the notions of impotence and a weak will. Therefore, Julian's caricatures of Augustine's position as representing apostles (and Christians) as weak characters, or baptism seen as an ineffective ritual, are in Augustine's opinion inaccurate and wrong.

The theological debate between Augustine and Julian continued. *Contra Julianum* (421/422) was once again a response to Julian's *ad Turbantium*, now based on a more accurate version of Julian's work. This response was also conducted on a more massive scale than Augustine's previous engagements with Julian. Augustine obviously considered Julian's positions as presenting a severe threat for his own views on theological anthropology and grace, and therefore he felt obliged to expend some more effort in dealing with the case.<sup>215</sup>

In the following exposition I shall focus on the difference between Augustine and Julian in describing the presence of *concupiscentia* in a Christian. This includes the effects that Christian renewal would have on *concupiscentia*. Again, the debate was still going on as to whether *concupiscentia* is a problem for a Christian who was living renewed life. Finally, there was still disagreement on the kind of a person that Romans 7 describes. As we have seen above, Augustine has already sketched solid answers to these questions in the works preceding *c. Iul.* In *c. Iul.*, however, Augustine develops and expands his arguments in various interesting ways. His basic contention is constantly the same: Christians in an active renewed life are able to resist and fight *concupiscentia*, which has been effectively weakened by baptism. Let us now see how Augustine works out this contention.

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<sup>215</sup> There are numerous interesting theological aspects in this debate. See Chapter 3. The studies of Lamberigts (1988, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2008a) have repeatedly emphasised the theological relevance of these debates.

6.5.1. *Resistibility*

Augustine consistently stresses the resistibility of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal. All Julian's accusations about Augustine holding a laxist view of renewal or teaching a compulsory view of *concupiscentia* are refuted. In Book 2, Augustine discusses the previous tradition concerning *concupiscentia* and sin in Christian life. He cites Ambrose and Cyprian as examples of saintly Christians, who surely had to fight different vices but were not subdued by them.<sup>216</sup> Ambrose is the central figure in Augustine's argument of traditionality, and in the end of Book 2, Ambrose is depicted as a front man of the Christian civil war against the "dead sin" (*peccatum mortuum*). Thus, Ambrose and his teaching exemplify the weakened or debilitated character of sin in Christian life. Augustine also accentuates that even though Christians possess this "dead sin" during their Christian renewal, this possession as such does not give them cause to confess their daily sins; only consenting to the illicit temptations of *concupiscentia* necessitates Christians to seek forgiveness from God. Mortal sins, however, cannot be committed by faithful Christians.<sup>217</sup>

Augustine is also clear in pointing out the means by which *concupiscentia* may be resisted. The power (*uirtus*) to do so is in God's grace,<sup>218</sup> or, more directly, in God's presence in Christian life.<sup>219</sup> Even though lust (*libido*) is in its origins a divine punishment, it can be resisted by divine aid. In fact, there is no other way to resist and conquer *concupiscentia* than by God himself and through His love.

Therefore, when with the gift of God a man lives by faith, God Himself is present (*deus adest*) to enlighten the mind and to overcome concupiscence, and also to endure trials to the end. The whole work is done rightly when God Himself is loved gratuitously; which is to say, when He is loved with the love that can come only from Him.<sup>220</sup> [transl. Schumacher]

<sup>216</sup> c. *Iul.* 2, 24–25. For a compilation of Julian and Augustine's arguments about previous Catholic tradition in the issues under debate, see Lamberigts 2010.

<sup>217</sup> c. *Iul.* 2, 32–33.

<sup>218</sup> c. *Iul.* 3, 49 *in hac tamen re, unde nunc agimus, non uideo, cur dicas, me habenas omnes, quibus cupiditates frenantur, incidere* [Julian. A. c. *Iul.*]; *qui omni uirtute secundum gratiam dei, quae datur hominibus, omnes cupiditates frenandas esse decerno.*

<sup>219</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 9.

<sup>220</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 9 *quapropter, quando deo donante ex uera uiuitur fide, ipse deus adest et menti illuminandae, et concupiscentiae superandae, et molestiae perferendae. hoc enim totum recte fit, quando fit propter ipsum, id est, quando gratis amatur ipse: qualis amor nobis esse non potest, nisi ex ipso.*

On the contrary, if people rely on their own strength and powers in Christian renewal, their pride leads them to even more lamentable servitude to evil desires.<sup>221</sup>

Augustine vehemently denies that he would teach *concupiscentia* to be a compulsive force in Christian life, and that Christians would sin out of necessity. Compared to the Manichaean teaching that Julian often cites as a reference for Augustine's teaching, the Catholic view of *concupiscentia* limits and narrows the effects and force of *concupiscentia* so that it is "under the mind's control by the grace of God," and to be "castigated" in this life and finally "cured" in Resurrection.<sup>222</sup> The resistibility of *concupiscentia* becomes thus one of the trade marks of Christian renewal. Augustine can therefore with full reason claim Julian's picture of his views to be erroneous, at least when it comes to the possibilities of resisting and conquering the temptations of *concupiscentia*. On the contrary, *concupiscentia* should and can be conquered by God's grace and love and by the Holy Spirit, infused into the hearts of the faithful.<sup>223</sup> A Christian undergoing the divine process of renewal is thus not an akratic, weak-willed person, but an enkratic person, whose will is strengthened by supernatural means to persist and conquer evil desires and bad thoughts. Therefore, Augustine also emphasises that, despite regular shortcomings in exerting this divinely received strong will, there can be no necessity of sinning in a Christian person. Julian's conceptions are here gravely mistaken, Augustine claims, for a Christian person is not under any "necessity to commit crimes."<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 9.

<sup>222</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 24 *non enim, sicut insimulas, cum Manichaeis dicunt, inesse carni suae mali necessitatem* [Julian. A. c. *Iul.*]; *quod malum illi substantiale, et deo coaeternum esse mentiuntur: sed dicunt sane cum apostolo, uideo aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae* [Rom 7,23]; *esse tamen eam sub animi potestate, gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, in mortis corpore castigandam, in morte corporis resoluendam, in corporis resurrectione et mortis morte sanandam. tenent enim sanctam professionem, non solo habitu uestis, sed et mentis et corporis, resistendo concupiscentiae carnis, quod hic fieri potest; non ea prorsus carento, quod hic fieri non potest.*

<sup>223</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 32.

<sup>224</sup> c. *Iul.* 5, 56 *regeneratos autem absit ut redigamus sicut calumniaris, sub necessitate criminum, deo largiente dona uirtutum* [Julian. A. c. *Iul.*]. *quamuis ergo aliam legem uideamus in membris nostris, repugnantem legi mentis nostrae: non solum tamen necessitatem criminis non habet; sed habet potius honorem laudis, cuius spiritus spirituali munere adiutus aduersus carnis concupiscentiam concupiscit.*

6.5.2. *Interiority in Christian Life*<sup>225</sup>

Contrary to Julian's view of *concupiscentia* being a harmless, or even positive "vital energy," Augustine held that *concupiscentia* is not an original part of created humanity. He also aims much criticism at Julian's apparent contradiction in first claiming *concupiscentia* to be a neutral instinct and then exhorting continence in fighting against sexual drives. Augustine, for his part, depicts *concupiscentia* in *c. Iul.* again as a tamed evil force, internal to Christian life. Sometimes Augustine also makes the claim that the fight (*agon*) against *concupiscentia* is something that only renewed Christians can acknowledge and correctly identify in their lives. So Augustine had emphatically denied Julian's accusation of laxism.<sup>226</sup> In contrast, Augustine claims that Christians are by God's grace able to resist every kind of evil desire (*cupiditates*) of which sexual desire (*concupiscentia carnis*) is only a special case. These desires, stresses Augustine, are innate in human beings, including Christians (*in nobis sunt [...] quas bene uiuendo frenamus*).

This interiority of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal is highlighted for the first time in *c. Iul.* 2, 7, where Augustine notes that in regenerated Christians, the rite of baptism starts a "civil war" between the new mind and *concupiscentia*. Augustine carefully draws the line between not committing actual sins by only sensing this civil strife, and by assimilating them into the Christian renewed experience. This means that these "internal vices" are really "ours." They consist of passions which should be reined, checked and cured, and their effects should be gradually diminished.<sup>227</sup> Augustine argues that the civil war against *concupiscentia* is also dependent on the development of rational life: infants do not yet reveal the existence of this war, for their rational will as well as their vices are in a "dormant" state.<sup>228</sup>

A rather long debate is ensued by Julian's attempt to deal with the sexual *libido* by Aristotelian categories (*c. Iul.* 3, 26–43, *genus, species, modus, excessus*).<sup>229</sup> To Julian, *concupiscentia* is a form (*species*) of the *genus*, which he names the creative force of life (*ignis uitalis*), its origin being in God.<sup>230</sup>

<sup>225</sup> Cf. TeSelle 2001, 315, 323, "appropriating and internalizing erotic desire."

<sup>226</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 49.

<sup>227</sup> *c. Iul.* 2, 7. See also *c. Iul.* 3, 49.

<sup>228</sup> *c. Iul.* 2, 8.

<sup>229</sup> For Julian's (eclectic) philosophical training and modes of argumentation, see Lössl 2001, 80–82, 112–126 (*modus viz. excessus* represent the category of *differentia*).

<sup>230</sup> Lössl 2001, 126–129. Lössl correctly emphasises the theological implications of Julian's view of *concupiscentia*. Sexual drive is part of God's creative activity in the world, and thus tightly connected to the Christian doctrine of creation.

Only excess in the use of this force is condemnable. Augustine, of course, denies the validity of Julian's division and approaches the problem by denying Julian's view of *concupiscentia* as a created, peaceful and an honest urge to procreate, and by holding to *concupiscentia* as an undesirable element in Christian marriage.<sup>231</sup> It is exactly the Christian state of renewal that Augustine sees as opposing the force of *concupiscentia*, which is internal to the struggle of the renewed person (*honesti arbitrium coniugati, continens*). But this struggle lies merely in the continuing existence of *concupiscentia*, not in its compelling power in generating actual sins. While Augustine again admittedly describes the existence of *concupiscentia* in Christian life as something active (*inordinatis et turpibus motibus, moueri*) it can, however, be effectively resisted by an "honest spirit" and by a "watchful combat."<sup>232</sup> Augustine parodies Julian's views of *concupiscentia* that is exercised in marriage and reined by ascetics, and describes a married couple who do not rein nor do they wish to rein in their "natural" instincts (*sternunt se coniuges et inuadunt, quandocumque titillauerit*).<sup>233</sup> Augustine's ideal is that the Christian marriage is a battle, in which married couples fight against *concupiscentia*, "not permitting it to do anything unlawful." Because the force of sexual concupiscence is sometimes too powerful, the married couple may lapse into having sexual intercourse without having the intention to beget children. However, Augustine says, this is only a venial sin, which is cured by the formal married state as such.<sup>234</sup>

Implied in Julian's and Augustine's differing views on the quality of *concupiscentia* is their difference in viewing its relation to Christian renewal. While Julian takes *concupiscentia* to be a natural, bodily drive, which becomes culpable only in excess, Augustine sees in *concupiscentia* a force that should be resisted in every form and by non-believers and Christians alike, but which can actually be resisted only by faithful Christians. This two-tier view is hinted at, for instance, in Augustine's way of contrasting the "most vicious crimes with reproductive members" with "those very movements which it causes, to our sorrow, even in sleep, and even in the bodies of chaste men."<sup>235</sup> Moreover, Julian's example of the Sodomites, who according to Julian must have had natural abilities to check the excessive or illegitimate use of *concupiscentia*, is answered by a nature and grace-type of an

<sup>231</sup> For Julian's own views on sexual desire, see now Lamberigts 2008a.

<sup>232</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 26–27.

<sup>233</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 28.

<sup>234</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 30.

<sup>235</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 38.

argument, in which Augustine admits that the mind by nature has powers to resist *concupiscentia carnis*, but stresses immediately the aspect of Christian renewal.<sup>236</sup> In Augustine's own words, the gist of the debate is formulated as the following: "the whole point between us in this controversy is whether the thing of which good use is made is good or evil."<sup>237</sup> Anything but the latter choice is incomprehensible to Augustine, who views *concupiscentia* strictly as an evil, internal force in Christian life and marriage, whereas Julian would only be concerned by the harmful by-products of exceeding the virtuous use of *libido*. For Augustine, there is an ongoing raging battle with *concupiscentia*, whereas Julian views the relation of sex and marriage more like a peaceful gardener, who worries only about unnatural or excessive growth.<sup>238</sup>

Internality in Christian life also entails in *c. Iul.* some mitigating aspects concerning *concupiscentia*. One of these is Augustine's way of dealing with consent. First, even though the allurements of *concupiscentia* may be able to "steal" consent from the Christians in ascetic life when their rational judgment is held back, for example, due to a lowered state of consciousness, God will not impute *concupiscentiae* thus consented as sins, despite them being even grave and shameful (*turpes*).<sup>239</sup> Second, Augustine points out that there are different stages in how serious and continual one's consent is (*c. Iul.* 5, 11–12). In short, Christians are called to wage a war against their evil desires by God's grace. It is clear that accidental lapses of their consent to *concupiscentia* in this war should be swiftly compensated, even though Augustine does not mention this in the passage. At the other end of the scale, there is a special case of what could be called a punitive, habituated consent.

<sup>236</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 39.

<sup>237</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 42 in *hac controuersia de bene utendo isto, utrum bono an malo, tota inter nos causa uersatur*.

<sup>238</sup> For an example of Augustine's language of warfare, see *c. Iul.* 3, 43 (*uinci, belligerere, conflictus, dimicari, certamen, resisti*). Augustine also addresses Julian more personally in the following chapters, making much of Julian's admission that *concupiscentia* should be controlled in an ascetic lifestyle. According to Augustine, this proves that *concupiscentia* can be neither a good nor a natural drive. Augustine also makes an interesting point that one may err on the doctrinal level on original sin but live righteously on the practical level (*c. Iul.* 3, 50). *c. Iul.* 3, 44–46. See also *c. Iul.* 4, 1–9. Julian notes that Augustine's position leads to a qualitative difference in Christian and pagan sexual behaviour, which is absurd. *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 90–91. Lössl 2001, 140.

<sup>239</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 10 *si quando ab eis ullum uel in somnis furatur assensum, cum euigilauerint, gemere et inter gemitus dicere, quomodo impleta est anima mea illusionibus [Ps 37,8]? quia cum sopitos deludunt somnia sensus, nescio quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur assensus; quae si imputaret altissimus, quis uiueret castus?*



Augustine refers here to homosexual acts in Rom 1, 25–28 (*tradidit illos deus in reprobum sensum*). This kind of consent is continuous and automated, as it were, ultimately caused by God's punishment. People acting in habituated consent are "conquered, seized, drawn, and possessed" by their evil desires; Augustine here clearly wants to emphasise the difference between accidental consent given in the Christian process of renewal on the one hand, and the state of being abandoned by God in habituated consent, on the other.<sup>240</sup>

Another useful and mitigating aspect of *concupiscentia* and its presence in Christian life is its curative effect. Fighting against *concupiscentia* keeps Christians humble and wards off the more dangerous enemy of pride. A Christian fighting against his or her own fleshly desires easily avoids the temptations of pride. Here thus lies a Pauline paradox of the perfection of Christian virtues: they will be perfected by weakness (*uirtus in infirmitate perficitur*).<sup>241</sup> Once again, Augustine has managed to create a domesticated interpretation of *concupiscentia* that is internal to Christian renewal: concupiscence works as a watch-dog against more serious enemies.

### 6.5.3. Real Effects of Baptism

As we have already seen in previous works against his Pelagian opponents, Augustine tries to convince his Christian readership of the real effects of baptism on *concupiscentia*. In *c. Iul.*, Augustine defends his position against Julian's accusations that Augustine teaches an illusory (*quasi*) version of renewal.<sup>242</sup> Julian claims that Augustine's view of evil *concupiscentia* as being internal to Christian renewal leads to a limited and truncated concept

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<sup>240</sup> *c. Iul.* 5, 12 *cum ergo dicitur homo tradi desideriiis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a deo cedit eis atque consentit; uincitur, capitur, trahitur, possidetur*. For venial, non-lethal sins see e.g. *c. Iul.* 2, 33 *in hoc bello laborantes, quamdiu tentatio est uita humana super terram, non ideo sine peccato non sumus, quia hoc quod eo modo peccatum dicitur, operatur in membris repugnans legi mentis, etiam non sibi ad illicita consentientibus nobis—quantum enim ad nos attinet, sine peccato semper essemus, donec sanaretur hoc malum, si ei nunquam consentiremus ad malum—; sed in quibus ab illo rebellante, etsi non lethaliter, sed uenialiter, tamen uincimur, in his contrahimus unde quotidie dicamus, dimitte nobis debita nostra [Mt 6,12]. sicut coniuges quando modum generationi necessarium causa solius uoluptatis excedunt: sicut continentes, quando in talibus cogitationibus cum aliqua delectatione remorantur, non quidem decernentes flagitium, sed intentionem mentis, non sicut oportet, ne illo incidat, inde auertentes, aut si inciderit inde rapientes.*

<sup>241</sup> *c. Iul.* 4, 10.

<sup>242</sup> *Iulian. A. c. Iul.* 6, 40 *baptizatos ex parte mundari; 6, 44 non innouari homines per baptismum, sed quasi innouari; non liberari, sed quasi liberari; non saluari, sed quasi saluari*. Julian's critique thus shares similar features with Cary 2008, 156–252, who criticises Augustine for teaching "powerless sacraments."

of grace: “grace does not perfectly renew man.” Augustine denies this. On the contrary, the effects of grace given in baptism actually lead to perfect renewal; there is a reservation, however, for whereas this perfection is a perfect forgiveness for all sins (*peccata*), it is not yet a perfect liberation from all evils (*mala*).

You [...] state untruly that I said: “Grace does not perfectly renew man.” Note what I actually said: “Grace perfectly renews man, since it brings him even to immortality of body and full happiness.” It perfectly renews man now, also, as regards deliverance from all sins, but not as regards deliverance from all evils, nor from every ill of mortality by which the body is now a load upon the soul.<sup>243</sup> [transl. Schumacher]

Augustine thus holds steadfast to both a full remission of sins together with *concupiscentia* in baptism, and to a progressive perfection of new life in Christ.

Though we, even now dead to sin, live to God, there is still something in us to mortify in order that sin reign not (*non regnet peccatum*) in our mortal body so that we obey its lusts. The full and perfect remission of sins has freed us from subjection to them, yet they must be combated even by the chaste.<sup>244</sup> [transl. Schumacher]

Among the real effects of baptism also belongs the removal of guilt (*reatus*). The basic solution remains the same as in previous works, and in *c. Iul.*, Augustine only defends further his view of *reatus* of concupiscence having been forgiven in baptism. Julian had objected Augustine’s logic in the convertibility of contraries: while guilt may remain after a sinful act, it does not logically follow that an act could remain after removal of guilt. But Augustine is satisfied with an obtuse answer, “there can be conversion of some, not all; therefore, among the some, I find these [the convertibility of sin and

<sup>243</sup> *c. Iul.* 6, 40 *gratia non perfecte hominem nouum faciat* [Julian. A. c. *Iul.*]. *non hoc dico: attende quod dico. gratia perfecte hominem nouum facit; quandoquidem et ad corporis immortalitatem plenamque felicitatem ipsa perducit. nunc etiam perfecte innouat hominem, quantum attinet ad liberationem ab omnibus omnino peccatis, non quantum ad liberationem attinet ab omnibus malis, et ab omni corruptione mortalitatis, qua nunc corpus aggrauat animam.*

<sup>244</sup> *c. Iul.* 6, 42 *quamuis enim iam peccato mortui, deo uiuamus: est tamen quod in nobis mortificemus, ut non regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore, ad oboediendum concupiscentiis eius; a quibus nos soluit, ne his essemus obnoxii, plena atque perfecta remissio peccatorum, et remanserunt in nobis cum quibus gerantur bella castorum.* During the progress, the effects of *concupiscentia* diminish, while those of love (*caritas*) increase. *c. Iul.* 6, 50 *horum itaque malorum praeteritus omnis reatus sacro fonte diluitur. remittuntur ergo in renascentibus, minuitur in proficientibus. ignorantia minuitur ueritate magis magisque lucente: concupiscentia minuitur caritate magis magisque feruente.* For this common motif, see above Chapter 4.

guilt].”<sup>245</sup> However, Augustine wishes to clarify some of his statements concerning *reatus*. Baptism affects *concupiscentia* so that its guilt (*reatu suo*) is absolved. By this Augustine does not mean that *concupiscentia* should be thought of as a hypostatized being which would have its own guilt (*neque enim aliqua persona est*); *reatus suus* therefore has to be understood as that guilt which remains in the person carrying the evil quality of *concupiscentia*.<sup>246</sup> Augustine points out that although baptism removes the guilt that has been cast by *concupiscentia*, this does not sanctify or neutralize *concupiscentia* as such.<sup>247</sup>

Augustine also attaches to his discussion of *reatus* an additional notion of how in fact *concupiscentia* “remains in its action” while its guilt has been forgiven. He first describes the “acts” of *concupiscentia*, which can be seen when “evil desires (*desideria*) are aroused and which the mind must resist.” These are the movements (*motus*) of *concupiscentia*, and once again, if not consented to, they do not produce guilt for a baptised Christian.<sup>248</sup> There “is,” according to Augustine, however, “another evil” in the Christian person, which exists even in a latent, passive state, and even if it does not produce any notable evil wishes or aspirations. This evil is, of course, the quality of *concupiscentia*.<sup>249</sup> Augustine thereby depicts, if not a realistic depiction of

<sup>245</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 60. For the logical problems of these claims, see Lössl 2001, 115–116. Julian’s point is simple: why should forgiveness reverse a category of contraries (sin-not-sin), for the opposites are not each other’s aspects?

<sup>246</sup> Cf. c. *Iul.* 2, 12. For Augustine trying to struggle free from substance-ridden metaphors, see also c. *Iul.* 6, 58.

<sup>247</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 51 *secundum mirabilem intelligentiam tuam, quando audis in aliquo homicidii reatum solutum, non hominem, sed ipsum homicidium a reatu existimas absolutum.*

<sup>248</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 60 *actu enim manet non quidem abstrahendo et illiciendo mentem, eiusque consensu concipiendo et pariendo peccata; sed mala, quibus mens resistat, desideria commouendo. ipse quippe motus actus est eius, quamvis mente non consentiente desit effectus.*

<sup>249</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 60 *inest enim homini malum et praeter istum actum, id est, praeter hunc motum, unde surgit hic motus; quem motum dicimus desiderium. non enim semper est desiderium contra quod pugnemus: sed si tunc non est, quando non occurrit quod concupiscatur siue animo cogitantis, siue sensibus corporis; fieri potest ut insit qualitas mala, sed nulla sit tentatione commota: sicut inest timiditas homini timido, et quando non timet.* Lössl’s (2001, 115) observation on Julian’s criticism against Augustine’s muddled distinction between *affectus* and *affectionalis qualitas* also applies here: “wie Augustinus dazu komme, die Konkupiszenz als emotionale Qualität zu bezeichnen, wo er ihr doch nur die Eigenschaften einer vorübergehenden Emotion zubillige, insofern er sie nicht mit der Personsubstanz identifiziere, was manichäisch sei.” Augustine in his part assumes that *concupiscentia*, as a quality, somehow *is*, even in a state where it cannot be discerned by any “action” or effect. It is sometimes, to use Augustine’s own metaphor, a disease without any symptoms, yet an existing disease. Julian seems to hit more accurately in the following quotation from the Letter to Menoch (c. *Iul. imp.* 3, 187): *denique omne peccatum extra corpus est, quia actuale est; qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat; omne enim peccatum, antequam fiat, non est et post factum memoria sola eius*

Christian renewal, at least a very effective ideal of it, in which *concupiscentia* is a strikingly sterile force: its guilt removed, it can at best only produce evil desires that are perfectly resistible, and sometimes not even felt to be there.<sup>250</sup> Augustine urges his Catholic readership with an image of a life where the quality of *concupiscentia* perhaps remains but no movements can be felt:

When occasion for lusting arises, yet no evil desire is excited, not even against our will, we have full health.<sup>251</sup> [transl. Schumacher]

In trying to avoid any hypostatising references to *concupiscentia*, Augustine also offers a more specific notion of what *reatus* is:

What is this guilt and where does it remain [...]? It is in a subject, then, in the soul of him who remembers his transgression and is troubled by a scruple of conscience until relieved by the remission of the offense. If he forgets his transgression and is not stung by his conscience, where will this guilt be, since you concede it remains present after the sin is past until it is remitted? [...] Where, then, does it remain except in the hidden laws of God written in somehow in the minds of the angels; in order that there be no wickedness unpunished except what the blood of the Mediator expiates. By the sign of His cross the waves of baptism are consecrated so that they may wash away the guilt written as in a bond in the knowledge of the spiritual powers through which punishment for sins is required.<sup>252</sup> [transl. Schumacher]

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*operis, non ipse species manet. malum autem concupiscentiae, quia naturale est, antequam fiat, est, cum fit, augetur, post factum et uidetur et permanet. [...] qui his uerbis mihi interrogandi sunt: si omne malum actuale est, antequam malum quispiam agat, quare accipit purificationem aquae, cum nullum malum egerit per se?* [Manich. A. c. *Iul. imp.* 3, 187] Augustine's distinction between *mala qualitas* and *actiones* thus appear already in this Manichaeian text. See Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 153–154.

<sup>250</sup> See also the difference between the states before and after grace in c. *Iul.* 6, 61: *nullo modo, inquam, simile est sacrificium transiens manenti concupiscentiae, quae hominem iam non committentem quod solet ei consentiendo committere, iam plena fide et cognitione retinentem non esse talia facienda, stimulis tamen illicitorum desideriorum, quibus resistit castitas, inquietare non cessat: neque scientia finitur, ut non sit; sed continentia refrenatur, ut quo tendit peruenire non possit.*

<sup>251</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 60 *cum uero occurrit quod concupiscatur, nec desideria mala nobis etiam nolentibus commouentur, sanitas plena est.*

<sup>252</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 62 *dic mihi reatus iste quis sit, et ubi maneat [...] in subiecto est, hoc est, in animo eius qui deliquisse se meminit, et scrupulo angitur conscientiae, donec fiat delicti remissione securus. quid si obliuiscatur se deliquisse, nec eius conscientia stimuletur, ubi erit reatus ille, quem transeunte peccato manere concedis, donec remittatur? [...] ubi ergo manet, nisi in occultis legibus dei, quae conscriptae sunt quodam modo in mentibus angelorum, ut nulla sit iniquitas impunita, nisi quam sanguis mediatoris expiauerit; cuius signo crucis consecratur unda baptismatis, ut ea diluatur reatus tanquam in chirographo scriptus, in notitia spiritualium potestatum, per quas poena exigitur peccatorum?*

Guilt, claims Augustine, is surely a subjective mental state, accompanied with pangs of conscience which arise from images produced by memory. It is, however, also an objective, juridical state of affairs, which exists in divine record (note the forensic language here!), and stays in need of an objective, real expiation. This, implies Augustine, is what happens in baptism, where the guilt of past sins is forgiven and washed away in a similar mode to an annulled contract “in the presence of spiritual authorities.”<sup>253</sup> Hereby Augustine once again leads his Catholic readership to focus on their baptism as a decisive and really effective event in their battle against sinful life.<sup>254</sup>

#### 6.5.4. *Romans 7*

By now it has become clear how Augustine applies Romans 7 to his internalised view of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal. His work against Julian contains two major discussions of this text, and an additional one concerning Ambrose’s reading of it. Much of what Augustine has to say to Julian here has already been covered, but certain important points have to be made based on this work. For in *c. Iul.*, Augustine offers some highly interesting explanations for the change of his reading and the reasons behind this change. As we shall see, these reasons pertain to Augustine’s strengthened emphasis on *concupiscentia* under the control of the Christian, baptised will.

In Book 2, Augustine lists ecclesiastical authors backing his view of original sin. Ambrose’s short quotations of Romans 7 in *de paenitentia* is presented in this connection, and Augustine makes much of its weight as evidence. Augustine appropriates Ambrose as attesting to his views: Paul speaks (also, *etiam!*) for himself in the entire Romans 7; baptism cleanses all sins, including original sin; the guilt of *concupiscentia* is taken away, while its actions remain in the baptised. In addition, Augustine refutes Julian’s reading of Romans 7 as a description of a Jew, who is fighting against his

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<sup>253</sup> Lössl’s interpretation here (1997, 373) emphasises, in accord with his central thesis, the effects of grace as *intellectus* (“das Wirken der Gnade besteht genau darin, die Sünde vom Bewusstsein des Sünders her in einem Prozess der Selbst- und Gotteserkenntnis zu überwinden”) and seems to pass much of Augustine’s concern for the objective state of the divine record and real effects of baptism on guilt. Cf. however *c. Iul.* 6, 12, where the absolution of *reatus* is told to be discerned “in faith” only, i.e. by a new understanding in grace: *reatus autem ille, qui sola regeneratione dimittitur, quemadmodum cum inesset non sentiebatur; ita eius ablatio fide creditur, non carne uel mente sentitur*. Cary’s (2008, 206–209) discussion of guilt concentrates on its ahistorical, “Plotinian” connotations and does not consider the effective removal of guilt by baptism.

<sup>254</sup> A nod towards this readership: *haec quidem satis explicasti scientibus: sed quia contemnendi non sunt, qui lecturi libros nostros disciplinae huius ignari sunt. c. Iul.* 6, 54.

or her evil habits before grace. On the contrary, by studying the character of habit as a parallel case, Augustine claims, Julian could perceive how a Christian can both feel the stimulus and movements of *concupiscentia* and not be responsible for them as committed sins.<sup>255</sup>

The two major passages dealing with Romans 7 are *c. Iul.* 3, 61–65 and *c. Iul.* 6, 70–74. Various features concerning the mitigation of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal can be seen in these passages.

First, there is the basic task of the correct identification of the *ego* of Paul in Romans 7. Augustine presents different arguments for this identification. Verses 24–25 cannot belong to anyone but a baptised Christian; therefore, so should the preceding verses be heard as the words of a renewed Christian.<sup>256</sup>

Augustine thus refutes Julian's interpretation in which Romans 7 is read as the words of the former Jew Paul, who "takes the role" (*in se transfigurauerit*) of a Jew in these verses.<sup>257</sup> Augustine likewise argues against these words being read as words of a catechumen preparing for baptism.<sup>258</sup> Augustine here appeals to Christian experience, for only those who fight are able to recognize the words of a fighter.<sup>259</sup>

Second, Augustine provides an account of certain exegetical and hermeneutical devices by which Romans 7 can be correctly understood. Thus, Gal 5, 16–18 offers a hermeneutical key in understanding Romans 7.<sup>260</sup> After having introduced the crucial verse ("walk in the Spirit, and you will not fulfill the concupiscences of the flesh") Augustine notes various connections, or signals of the common ground covered by these two Pauline passages. These are the opposition between the Spirit and the flesh, and the new relationship to law that the life in the Spirit has effected.<sup>261</sup> Then he constructs a

<sup>255</sup> *c. Iul.* 2, 5.

<sup>256</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 61 *eius ergo uoces sunt etiam illae superiores, ex quibus haec consequenter expressa est.* By the "previous verses," Augustine refers to vv. 18–20, for these are quoted from Julian's work. The first half of the chapter can be understood as words of one living *sub lege*, for the verbs are in past tense. *c. Iul.* 6, 73.

<sup>257</sup> Julian. A. *c. Iul.* 6, 72.

<sup>258</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 62.

<sup>259</sup> *c. Iul.* 6, 70 *simul itaque cognoscamus uerba pugnantium, si pugnamus.* This argument entails, of course, a polemical point: if you fail to recognize Paul's words as the words of a renewed Christian, perhaps there is something wrong with your renewed life.

<sup>260</sup> For Augustine's way of working Rom 7 with a set of other biblical passages, see Martin 2001.

<sup>261</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 62 *caro enim, inquit, concupiscit aduersus spiritum, et spiritus aduersus carnem: haec enim inuicem aduersantur; ut non ea quae uultis faciat [Gal 5,17]. uide si non hoc est ad Romanos: non enim quod uolo facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago [Rom 7,19]. deinde ad Galatas addit et dicit: quod si spiritu ducimini; non adhuc estis sub lege [Gal 5,18]. uide si non hoc est ad Romanos: iam non ego operor illud [Rom 7,17]; et, condelector legi dei*

sustained argument on the key term *perficere* that appears in both Gal 5, 16 and Rom 7, 18. Here “perfection” of the works of the flesh entails a consent of the will and results in obvious sinful actions; in contrast, perfection of the good works entails a total disappearance of the evil *concupiscentiae*.<sup>262</sup> The connective signal between Gal 5, 16 and Rom 7, 18 is for Augustine thus a complementary one: in the previous passage, Paul discusses the “perfection” of evil actions, whereas in the latter, Paul speaks of the “perfection” of good. The former can be avoided, the latter is yet to be achieved. The remaining state is that of a Christian, who has the movements of *concupiscentia*, but who “fights in this combat by living well,” that is, does not consent to these movements.<sup>263</sup> A device that should be seen as already being a commonplace in Augustine’s reading of Romans 7, appears as well, namely Paul’s *peccatum* substituted by Augustine’s *concupiscentia*, “because it was made by sin and, if it draws and entices one consenting, it conceives and brings forth sin.”<sup>264</sup>

Augustine also gives a somewhat more personal account of his previous mistaken reading of Romans 7. Here he refers to vv. 14–23 and to his difficulties in reading the words that stress the compulsive character of *concupiscentia* (*ego carnalis sum, uenundatus sub peccato, captiuantem me*). He admits that he could not read these verses to denote any other people than those who “were compelled to do what *concupiscentia*” suggested. Later he learned to distinguish the difference between the spiritual mind and the captivity of the flesh, which refers to that part in the Christian that is still prone to the temptations of *concupiscentia*, without, however, entailing a notion of an automated consent to act according to it. Again, Augustine refers to an interpretation in which Paul’s inability to do what he wants is read as “wishing not to have carnal concupiscences.”<sup>265</sup>

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*secundum interiorem hominem [Rom 7,22]; et, non regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore, ad oboediendum desideriis eius [Rom 6,12].*

<sup>262</sup> c. *Iul.* 3, 62 *bona opera nostra tunc perficientur, quando ita spiritui caro consenserit, ut aduersus eum etiam ipsa non concupiscat. hoc enim uolumus, cum perfectionem iustitiae concupiscimus; hoc intentione non intermissa uelle debemus: sed quia id perficere in ista corruptibili carne non possumus, ideo dixit ad Romanos, uelle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio [Rom 7,18]. [...] id est, non mihi adiacet perficere bonum. non ait; facere; sed, perficere bonum [Rom 7,18]. quia facere bonum, est post concupiscentias non ire: perficere autem bonum, est non concupiscere.*

<sup>263</sup> c. *Iul.* 3, 62.

<sup>264</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 73.

<sup>265</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 70 *ego non mihi enim uidebatur apostolus et de se ipso dicere potuisse, ego autem carnalis sum [Rom 7,14], cum esset spiritualis: et quod captiuus duceretur sub lege peccati, quae in membris erat eius. ego enim putabam dici ista non posse, nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnis*

Augustine's discussions of Romans 7 also include similar notions of a qualified and mitigated view of *concupiscentia* than elsewhere in *c. Iul.* Thus, after giving his reasons as to why Romans 7 has to be read as a description of a baptised Christian, he stresses the presence of Christ in the believer (*Christus in nobis*) as a factor leading to a struggle and fight against *concupiscentia*. This means that only a person in whom the "spirit of Christ" lives is "rightly" (*recte*) able to battle and overcome *concupiscentia*.<sup>266</sup> Moreover, Augustine emphatically points out the difference between his and Julian's view of baptism and grace: whereas Julian thinks that baptism only affects a punctual remission of sins, Augustine also includes into the notion of grace the enduring ability to avoid and defeat (*ad uitanda et uincenda*) sins and *concupiscentia*.<sup>267</sup>

A most interesting detail in the attempts to define the core elements and differences between his and Julian's interpretation of Romans 7 appears after Augustine has given a close reading of Romans 7 in *c. Iul.* 3, 62. Augustine then moves forward to point out the inconsistencies in the implications that Julian's reading will produce. One of these is the fact that Julian wants to both fight against *concupiscentia* and to hold on to its good and natural quality. According to Augustine, Julian wishes "it to appear that [he has] reached the height of virtue."

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*concupiscentia subiugatos, ut facerent quidquid illa compelleret; quod de apostolo dementis est credere: cum etiam innumerabilis multitudo sanctorum, ne concupiscentias carnis perficiat, contra carnem spiritu concupiscat. sed postea melioribus et intellegentioribus cessi, uel potius ipsi, quod fatendum est, ueritati, ut uiderem in illis apostoli uocibus gemitum esse sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium. qui cum mente sint spirituales, adhuc tamen isto corruptibili corpore quod aggrauat animam, recte intelleguntur esse carnales; quia erunt et corpore spirituales, quando seminatum corpus animale, resurget corpus spirituale: et recte adhuc intelleguntur ea parte captiui sub lege peccati, quae desideriorum, quibus non consentiunt, motibus subiacet. hinc factum est ut sic ista intellegerem, quemadmodum intellexit Hilarius, Gregorius, Ambrosius, et ceteri ecclesiae sancti notique doctores, qui et ipsum apostolum aduersus carnales concupiscentias quas habere nolebat, et tamen habebat, strenue conflixisse, eundemque conflictum suum illis suis uerbis contestatum fuisse senserunt.*

<sup>266</sup> *c. Iul.* 6, 70 simul itaque cognoscamus uerba pugnantium, si pugnamus. hoc enim modo non uiuimus nos, sed uiuit Christus in nobis, si et ad pugnam contra concupiscentias exercendam, et ad uictoriam usque ad consumptionem eorumdem hostium capessendam, in illo fidimus, non in nobis. *c. Iul.* 6, 71 in quantum quippe in illo uiuit Christus, in tantum expugnat et superat quod non habitat bonum in eius carne, sed malum. neque enim recte cuiusquam spiritus concupisceret aduersus carnem suam, nisi habitaret in illo spiritus Christi.

<sup>267</sup> *c. Iul.* 6, 72 atque utinam ipsa dona Christi saltem ita sapes, ut ad uincendam concupiscentiam ualere aliquid crederes. [...] putatis gratiam dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum sic in sola peccatorum remissione uersari, ut non adiuet ad uitanda peccata et desideria uincenda carnalia, diffundendo caritatem in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui ab illo datus est nobis.



You wish it to appear that you have reached the height of virtue, and from the summit itself on which you think you stand, are warring against pursuing concupiscence as though from a fortress (*in arce*), so that, no matter how superior your position, you never cease to combat the internal enemy. Yet you do not blush to praise concupiscence, which will unquestionably make your destruction more complete if it conquers you—and that against Him who seeks you who have been lost, even when it conquers.<sup>268</sup>

[transl. Schumacher]

According to Augustine, there is a dangerous illusion in Julian's picture of *concupiscentia*. For Julian thinks that he has reached an intact ground from which he can fight against the lower and outward impulses of *concupiscentia* (*in ipso culmine quo te existimas euasisse*). Hence, Julian does not see that he is not alone in his "citadel of virtue": for in reality, the enemy has come through the gates already (*tamquam in arce configas [...]* *tamen cum hoste interno dimicare non desinas*). This metaphor effectively underlines Augustine's own position in the issue, and it may well be compared to the similar depiction in *lib. arb.* 1., where the mind is appointed the "citadel of virtue" and should not give up to outward attacks of *libido*, which is trying to subjugate one's rational self-control under the servitude of passions. Decades later Augustine dissolves his own metaphor, perhaps unconsciously, by stressing that no intact ground is left: the battle has to be fought *inside* the citadel. What follows in *c. Iul.* 3, 65 is then a vigorous refutation of Julian's accusations about Augustine teaching an irresistible and compulsory version of *concupiscentia*.<sup>269</sup> The implications of this connection is clear: as Augustine had taken *concupiscentia* as being part of the Christian's inner, post-baptismal struggle, he also had to modify and qualify the strength of *concupiscentia*, which he earlier had thought to be an irresistible force, binding mainly people living *sub lege*.

<sup>268</sup> *c. Iul.* 3, 65 *atque ita uis uideri te culmen ascendisse uirtutis, ut in ipso culmine, quo te existimas euasisse, cum persequente concupiscentia, tanquam in arce configas, et quantumlibet ex loco superiore, tamen cum hoste interno dimicare non desinas. nec erubescis concupiscentiam, quae te amplius perdet sine dubitatione si uicerit, laudare aduersus eum, qui te perditum etiam cum uincit inquit.*

<sup>269</sup> Indeed, Augustine's stand on the citadel of virtue-metaphor is framed within Julian's accusations. In *c. Iul.* 3, 64 Augustine quotes Julian: *dubium non sit euerisionem sanctitatis, contaminationem pudicitiae, morum labem nostris conuenire, imo inesse dogmatibus: neque id esse me negaturum, qui ideo, sicut dicis,—in naturae inuidiam malae conuersationis sordes refundo, ut peccantibus metum demam; quorum obscenitates, apostolorum et sanctorum omnium consolor iniuriis, eo quod uas aureum apostolum Paulum saepe dixisse commemorem, non enim quod uolo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio [Rom 7,15].* Julian claims that Augustine's position is contrived to appease the sins of the masses, and that Augustine's new reading of Rom 7 is thus a result from a wilful thinking.

In both of the passages discussing Romans 7, Augustine makes perfectly clear what he feels of Julian's charges in which his position is described as a laxist, laissez-faire kind of desperation with respect to *concupiscentia* and *obscae libidines*. This is a lie, says Augustine, for with divine help, Christians are able to control their evil desires, just like the apostles.<sup>270</sup>

Julian seems to interpret Romans 7 as the words of a rhetorically constructed, akratic Paul, who "exaggerates the force of habit," and thereby describes the state of "wicked people" who have a weak and impotent will and thus cannot produce any virtuous acts. On the contrary, Augustine interprets the same text as the words of an enkratic Paul, who first describes his life in past tense (Rom 7, 7–13), that is, the time that he was not yet able of rational thinking and lived under the Law, but then moves on to describe his present life *sub gratia*, "still battling against his own concupiscence, not so that he consents and sins, but so that he experiences desires which he resists." For Julian, the baptised Paul is an enkratic apostle, and therefore cannot be the subject of Romans 7; for Augustine, the baptised Paul is an enkratic apostle as well, and still may be the subject of Romans 7, as long as the passage is subjected to a careful exegetical analysis, and all the compulsive connotations of *concupiscentia* from v. 14 on are read in a qualified and mitigated way.<sup>271</sup>

Of the four works written in the latter half of the 420s on human agency and God's grace, *de gratia et libero arbitrio* contains some concise but noteworthy remarks on the effects of *concupiscentia* on the human will.<sup>272</sup> It also serves as an interlude for Augustine's final, extensive work against Julian, anticipating some of the arguments presented there on the role of grace.<sup>273</sup>

Augustine highlights the crucial importance of grace by a two-fold strategy related to *concupiscentia*. First, he stresses the irresistibility of *concupiscentia* in the *sub lege* state. Augustine connects biblical quotations and

<sup>270</sup> c. *Iul.* 3, 65 *quod non sit alia mei sensus intentio, quam [...] adipiscendae castitatis desperatione repugnantes turpitudini territare, mentiri me tantas obscae libidinis vires, ut eam ratio regere ac frenare non possit, cui nec apostolorum legio repugnauerit* [*Iulian. A. c. Iul.*]. *haec de me prorsus ipse mentiris. ego enim non infero uirtutibus bellum; sed uitii, quantum adiuuor, infero, et inferendum esse proclamo. [...] mentiri me dicis tantas libidinis vires, ut eam ratio regere ac frenare non possit. ecce ego non dico tantas libidinis vires, ut humana ratio diuinitus accensa et adiuta eam regere ac frenare non possit [...] ecce ego uoce qua possum, quod me negare asseris clamo, apostolorum legionem repugnasse libidini.*

<sup>271</sup> c. *Iul.* 6, 73–74.

<sup>272</sup> For an overview of the work, its position in the series of *corrupt.*, *perseu.* and *praed. sanct.*, and its central theological problems, see Weaver 1996, 16–22.

<sup>273</sup> For the role of grace, see Weaver 1996, 21–23.

allusions in order to show that a person bound by *concupiscentia* cannot blame God for his or her inability to fulfil the law.<sup>274</sup> “I wish to obey the commandment of the law, but I am conquered by the strength of my concupiscence.”<sup>275</sup>

Secondly, Augustine affirms that only in the state of grace (*sub gratia*) one is able to resist temptations and do good. This ability to resist concupiscence is solely due to God’s grace.<sup>276</sup>

In the struggle then against his concupiscence, let each one pray that he enter not into temptation, that is to say, let him pray not to be drawn away and enticed by this concupiscence. Now if a person overcomes concupiscence by a good will, he does not enter into temptation. But man’s free will is not enough unless he is given the victory by the Lord in answer to his prayer that he be not led into temptation.<sup>277</sup> [transl. Russell]

Augustine also expands on the abilities to do good with the new good will. In the early stages of renewal, the will is “faint” and “weak.” It may grow to a “strong” and “robust” will (*uoluntas robusta*), such as that which the martyrs had in offering their lives for their faith. Yet Augustine is keen to stress that although faint and weak, even such a renewed will is existing and as such also a gift of God.<sup>278</sup>

#### 6.6. LAST MEANDERINGS WITH JULIAN— RESISTIBILITY AND NECESSITY

*Contra Julianum opus imperfectum* (429/430), Augustine’s massive rehearsal of arguments against Julian has been described by Thomas Martin as a “theological ‘theater,’” in which Augustine “has full control as both ‘director’ and ‘actor.’” According to Martin, *c. Iul. imp.* is “more intended to move Augus-

<sup>274</sup> *gr. et lib. arb.* 5; 24.

<sup>275</sup> *gr. et lib. arb.* 8.

<sup>276</sup> *gr. et lib. arb.* 9; 13; 24; 26.

<sup>277</sup> *gr. et lib. arb.* 9 *ergo unusquisque contra suam concupiscentiam dimicans oret, ne intret in tentationem, id est, ne sit ab illa abstractus et illectus. non autem intrat in tentationem, si uoluntate bona uincat concupiscentiam malam. nec tamen sufficit arbitrium uoluntatis humanae, nisi a domino uictoria concedatur oranti, ne intret in tentationem.*

<sup>278</sup> *gr. et lib. arb.* 33. *Voluntas robusta* is a rare expression in Augustine. He uses it in *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 167 of the present Christian state where *concupiscentia* should be resisted with *robustiore uoluntate*. See Pang-White 2000 for a discussion of qualified *akrasia* in Augustine’s later works. For the relation between a martyr and an “ordinary Christian,” see Markus 1990, 92–95.

tine's readers than to change Julian's own mind."<sup>279</sup> Throughout the work, Augustine's lowbrow audience is anticipated by both Julian and Augustine.<sup>280</sup> Julian even uses the sociological argument that the doctrine of "natural sins" is forged by Augustine and his fellows to meet the expectations of the masses of the Church who are not interested nor able to convert their lives to meet the strict ethical standards of genuine Christianity.<sup>281</sup>

Due to the circumstances, the arguments around *concupiscentia* are only occasionally developed further, while the debaters often find fault in each others' methods of discussion and provide ample space for dealing with meta-argumentative questions.<sup>282</sup> Therefore, in face of the sheer mass of the work, the most economical option is to either summarize only shortly what Augustine has already said in his previous anti-Pelagian works, or occasionally focus upon some new thread of argumentation.

<sup>279</sup> Martin 2001, 196–197. I agree with Martin. It remains doubtful, however, as to what kind of reader would really be moved by the exhausting and repetitive pseudo-dialogue of *c. Iul. imp.* See also Lancel's (2000, 417) description: "dialogue of the deaf." Even Augustine himself seems to get bored in writing the last books (note also his comment already in *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 44 *iam nescio quotiens haec dicta sunt eisque responsum est; [...] et usque ad odiosum fastidium eadem per eadem repetens*). Lössl 1997, 383–384. More than a genuine play, the work resembles of a dull monologue interspersed with often not so witty remarks. On the other hand, one should admit that Augustine gives a fair treatment to his opponent in incorporating Julian's text into his own work. Lamberigts 2008, 245. For Augustine's own concerns of his readership and future reception, see Vessey 1998. Vessey (1998, 266–267) distinguishes between the polemical works against Julian and the less polemical works of this period (*gr. et lib. arb., corrept., praed. sanct., persequ.*), to the disadvantage of the former: "the tracts against Julian, written at a rhythm dictated by the latter, retain to the last the air of business the author would finish if he could and then have die with him."

<sup>280</sup> See *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 33; 1, 41; 2, 8; 2, 11; 2, 14; 5, 4; see especially 6, 3 *IUL. pars igitur et uoluptati consulens et paupori, uel arenae, uel circi, uel scenae populis comitata luxuria, ambiens in omnibus flagitiis obtendere necessitatem, qua commissi inuidia semper leuatur [...] AUG. innumerabilis multitudo fidelium, quae promissa est Abrahae, quasi a uobis uulgaris turba contemnitur*. Weber (2001b, 507–508) points to the diverging readership as explaining the stylistical differences between the two authors: Julian, the elitist, writes to an educated minority, whereas Augustine, the populist, writes to an uneducated majority ("er übernimmt bewusst die Rolle des mit dem einfachen Volk Vertrauten").

<sup>281</sup> *Iul. c. Iul. imp.* 2, 15 *illud tamen nequaquam infitiri possumus, quod plurimum ut dixi turbis placeat, luteis tamen, delicta uoluntatis imputare naturae et infamatione seminum morum; petulantiam uindicare, ut numquam quis emendare conetur, quod sperat in se ipso alterum perpetrare*; 3, 58 *tamen, ut mentibus subueniatur incautis, quae crassiores quasque opiniones et malis moribus blandientes in solacium assumunt conscientiae sauciatae*. For a contemporary version of such a sociological argument, see Pagels 1988a, 98–126, especially p. 119: "Augustine's theory of original sin could make theologically intelligible not only the state's imperfection but the church's imperfections as well." For a critique of Pagels's central thesis, see Burnell 1995.

<sup>282</sup> See e.g. *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 14–17.

While many readers of *c. Iul. imp.* readily notice Augustine's disillusioned and stern views of human sexuality, the underlying theological motivations of the debate cannot be neglected. Thus a passage that is very typical for the entire debate, *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 167, in which Augustine reproaches sexual desire (*concupiscentia carnis et quae libido etiam nuncupatur*) may overtly reveal the raw nerve that Augustine had for sexual matters. But read more closely, it only repeats what has been the subject of the latter part of our chapter: an exhortation to Catholic Christians to live out their Christian vocation after baptism, and doing this by the divine aid of Christ's grace:

AUG. I do say that concupiscence of the flesh by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit and which is also called sexual desire (*libido*) is evil. I say that now in this flesh it must be reined in and diminished by good habits, but that in eternal life it will be completely healed. It will not be separated from us like some evil substance that was added to or mixed into us, as the Manichees so foolishly think. But whatever you hold regarding it, I would not believe that you could locate in paradise such a concupiscence as now exists, if I had not found it in these books of yours filled with vain and insane wordiness [...] <sup>283</sup>  
[transl. Teske]

In general, *c. Iul. imp.* repeats, in a monotonic drumbeat tone, the standard role of sexual desire in Christian marriages: in procreating children, Christian parents use a defect of their bodily constitution for good ends (*bene utuntur malo*). Christian marriage also renders occasional "recreative" sex only as a venial sin.<sup>284</sup>

There are also features in *c. Iul. imp.* that sets it somewhat apart from the flow of anti-Pelagian works, at least what comes to Christian renewal. For in this work, Augustine seems to be driven to a corner where he still holds to the strictly qualified character of *concupiscentia*, but at the same time

<sup>283</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 167 Aug. *ego concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et quae libido etiam nuncupatur, malam esse dico, nunc in hac carne frenandam et bona consuetudine minuendam, in aeterna uero uita omni ex parte sanandam, non, quasi addita uel commixta nobis fuerit aliqua mala substantia, sicut Manichei desipiunt, separandam; sed, quodlibet de illa sentias, talem te illam, qualis nunc est, ut ad illicita perpetranda etiam castorum siue coniugatorum siue continentium corda sollicitet et, nisi ei robustiore uoluntate resistatur, euertat, in paradiso constituere posse non crederem, nisi in istis tuis libris uana et insana loquacitate plenissimis inuenirem.* Note also *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 168 *uos potestis congruenter seruire laudatae libidini, nos autem in adiutorio domini obpugnamus et uincimus accusatam.*

<sup>284</sup> E.g. *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 68; 5, 10; 5, 13. It should be noted that Augustine seems to treat marriage implicitly as a Christian order. While the married status is acknowledged in rather general terms in *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 23, there soon follows a qualification that leads the reader to think of a Christian marriage in particular. Marriage as a secular institution should be implemented with the Christian *castitas*, and a wish to baptise one's children—and this kind of marriage "alone can make good use of the evil which you [sc. Julian] monstrously praise."

he also stresses the compulsory and necessitating aspects of *concupiscentia*, even in such a post-baptismal narrative as Romans 7. Let us now look at how this ambiguity is reflected in a relevant selection of passages concerning Christian renewal.

### 6.6.1. Resistibility and the Real Effects of Baptism

Faithful to his previous practises, Augustine consistently denies Julian's charges of laxism.<sup>285</sup> *Concupiscentia* is amputated of its guilt, and is left *ad agonem*.<sup>286</sup> It can be resisted and conquered by God's help.<sup>287</sup> Furthermore, in Christian marriages, the pleasures of *libido* can and should be resisted.<sup>288</sup> Julian recurs to the charge that Augustine's interpretation makes the saints "polluted and conquered by" *concupiscentia*, which Augustine, in turn, once again denies.<sup>289</sup>

In debating over Rom 6, 12 (*non ergo regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum ei*), Augustine emphasises the fight to which Christians are called. He affirms the powers of a baptised Christian to hold concupiscence in check, and warns of the consequences in case one consents to its allurements. In Christians, *concupiscentia* is thus "present, but it does not reign" (*inest quidem, sed non regnat*). In fighting against *concupiscentia*, the inner delight of righteousness given by God renders the temptations of *concupiscentia* void and weak (*probatur autem esse, dum concupiscuntur mala, et probatur non regnare, dum iustitiae delectatione uincente non fiunt*).<sup>290</sup>

Augustine argues (as he had done in *c. Iul.*) that divine grace entails a twofold gift: both a forgiveness for sins and an ability to resist *concupiscentia*, or "love [...] to do the good things which we ought to do" (*c. Iul. imp.* 1, 84). This stance is repeated during the work.<sup>291</sup>

<sup>285</sup> See *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 70 *actio pia est in hac uita deum colere et eius gratia contra uitia interna pugnareisque ad illicita instigantibus cogentibusue non cedere*.

<sup>286</sup> E.g. *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 31; 5, 12; 6, 26.

<sup>287</sup> E.g. *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 71; 1, 72; 2, 137; 4, 57; 4, 114; 6, 8 *nunc ergo nostra iustitia est, ut iustificati per fidem pacem habeamus ad deum; contra uero carnis concupiscentiam nos oppugnantem, per ipsius dei auxilium repugnante spiritu dimicemus. non est ergo huius uitae iustitia, uitium non habere; sed uitia non eis consentiendo minuere, eisue resistendo, temperanter et iuste et pie uiuere*; 6, 14.

<sup>288</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 39; 2, 218; 4, 14; 5, 7.

<sup>289</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 71; 3, 72. Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 14.

<sup>290</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 226. See also 2, 228; 6, 8.

<sup>291</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 106; 1, 108; 2, 97 *donat etiam gratia, ut contra concupiscentiam carnis spiritus concupiscat; et, si quando fidelis homo in hoc certamine uenialiter uincitur, debita dimittit oranti et, quando damnabiliter uincitur, dat humiliorem paenitentiam, cui tribuat indulgentiam*; 2, 227 *utroque enim modo adiuuat gratia, et dimittendo, quae male fecimus, et optulando, ut declinemus a malis et bona faciamus*.

Julian has noticed how Augustine distinguishes between the state of will before and after baptism, and tries to reveal Augustine's view as being inconsistent.<sup>292</sup> In defending his position, Augustine modifies the ways in which the spirit relates to the flesh. The imperfect state of the will consists of "having *concupiscentia*" in this life. Augustine also admits that despite the new forces of the spirit, some slips of consent are prone to happen even *sub gratia*.<sup>293</sup>

### 6.6.2. Romans 7

The ambiguity of *c. Iul. imp.* in denoting *concupiscentia* in a Christian both as a passive state of "having" evil desires and temptations and as something that can, in fact, be called sin (*peccatum*) as such is best revealed in Augustine's reading of Romans 7.<sup>294</sup>

First, it can be noted that Augustine holds to his *standard explanation* of Romans 7. It is clearly, at least from v. 15 on, a narrative concerning *Paulus christianus*. This also works on the level of stressing the *interiority* of *concupiscentia* and a correct identification with one's body.<sup>295</sup> Augustine notes that Paul's intention in these verses is not so much to ask forgiveness from God, but to ask strength to resist temptations, "that is what he does in this passage." This implies that the state Paul is lamenting is a state (*locus*) in which the Christian finds herself fighting against temptations, but explicitly not committing actual sins (*non est locus ut dicat: dimitte nobis debita nostra sed ne nos inferas in temptationem*).<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> See *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 90–94, in which Julian ridicules Augustine's view of *concupiscentia* before and after baptism: it seems to Julian that Augustine's concept of grace in baptism is rather weak, for nothing seems to happen to the force and effects of sexual desire, e.g., in the case of married Christian couples. Augustine replies that in this life, the effects of grace and baptism remain invisible, while in the future life, all defects will be repaired. *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 90–97; 2, 140 *hic enim accipimus per pignus spiritus et certandi et uincendi uires; ibi autem sine hoste ullo externo et interno ineffabili ac sempiterna pace perfruemur*; 2, 217.

<sup>293</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 101.

<sup>294</sup> Gal 5, 17 is also used as parallel evidence for the post-baptismal struggle against the existence of *concupiscentia* in Christian bodies. *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 72; 6, 8; 6, 14.

<sup>295</sup> Julian claims that the religiously and intellectually low-level audience of Augustine is eager to hear that their sinful behaviour is the result of necessity, and that they would love to find sin as "what they hope someone else commits in them." This is, of course, a variant of the accusation of Augustine's Manichaeism. Augustine replies by appealing to Rom 7 and by stressing the interiority of sin (*suum esse*). He also holds on to the divine aid in curing *concupiscentia* and its effects in human nature. *c. Iul. imp.* 2, 15.

<sup>296</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 67. In response to Julian's comparison of Augustine's and Mani's interpretation of Rom 7 in the Letter to Menoch, Augustine also notes the Christian's fight against *concupiscentia*: *aut uictus abstrahitur aut, ne in eius labatur assensum, aduersus eam, si pius*

Hence Augustine, as usual, stresses the present tense of Paul's verbs in Rom 7, 17–19 against Julian, who transfers them to Paul's Jewish past; however, he is not able to persist in their literal, active meaning of really committing sins: they refer to a continuing state of having temptations, but not consenting to them.<sup>297</sup> Sometimes Augustine makes a concession for argument's sake: what if Romans 7 really was written from the *sub lege* perspective and should be read in Julian's way as describing a self-afflicted habit to sin (*consuetudo*)?<sup>298</sup> Then "Paul's" state would indeed represent a "heavy weight of necessity."<sup>299</sup> In all these cases, Augustine's concession should, however, be understood as a way of showing that even Julian himself seems to unobservingly assume a kind of non-voluntary evil.<sup>300</sup>

But there are also some deviations, real or apparent, to this standard reading of Romans 7, in the way that the necessitating aspects of Paul's narrative are pushed to the extreme, and that Augustine actually seems to insist that *concupiscentia* described in Romans 7 should be called sin. Romans 7 is used in responding to Julian's definition of sin as a purely voluntary, individual event. Augustine has a broader view: Paul's narrative works as evidence for the fact that the punishment that he suffers may also be called sin.<sup>301</sup>

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*est, domino adiuuante confligit. c. Iul. imp. 3, 178. See also c. Iul. imp. 3, 186 and the discussion of Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 147–150.*

<sup>297</sup> *c. Iul. imp. 1, 67. Similarly in c. Iul. imp. 1, 69 (beatus Gregorius non inter principia emendationis suae, sed iam episcopus, uolens exponere uel potius quae nota sunt ammonere, in quali quantoque certamine cum uitis interioribus propter corpus, quod aggrauat animam, constituti sint sancti), where Augustine appeals to Gregory of Nazianzus' Oratio apologetica to refute Julian's charge that Augustine has inherited his reading of Rom 7 from the Manichean Faustus.*

<sup>298</sup> Pelagius had already approached Paul's Romans with the concept of *consuetudo*. See de Bruyn 1993, 43–44. Brown (1972, 196) stresses the "external" character of *consuetudo* in Pelagius' thoughts.

<sup>299</sup> *c. Iul. imp. 1, 99 si enim sub lege, non sub gratia constitutus haec loquitur, istum nega sub graui necessitatis pondere ingemere; hunc ad bene uiuendum et ad recte agendum per uoluntatis arbitrium assertere liberum clamantem tibi: mentiris aut falleris; non quod uolo ago [Rom 7,19]. si autem sicut melius sensit Ambrosius, hoc etiam de se ipso dicit apostolus, nec iustorum est in hac uita ad perficiendum bonum tanta libertas propriae uoluntatis, quanta erit in illa uita, ubi non dicitur: non quod uolo ago [Rom 7,19]. See also Augustine's subversive argument in c. Iul. imp. 3, 112. Here Augustine refutes Julian's argument against a "captive will" by Julian's own reading of Rom 7, 15. See also c. Iul. imp. 1, 105; 6, 13.*

<sup>300</sup> Note that in these cases, Augustine deliberately emphasises the compulsive and necessitating aspects of Rom 7, but when advocating his own position, the same verses are read in a different, softer tone.

<sup>301</sup> *c. Iul. imp. 2, 38 haec definitio peccati est eius, quod non est etiam poena peccati. nam ubi malae consuetudinis uoces esse contenditis atque ita uoces uestri dogmatis suffocatis, dic, si audes, quomodo uoluntati hominis liberum sit abstinere a malo, ubi audis: non quod uolo ago [Rom 7,15], aut nega esse malum, ubi audis: non quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod nolo*



According to Augustine, Paul clearly thinks that *concupiscentia* is also a sin; this is demonstrated by Rom 7, 7, and thus Julian's definition of sin is deficient.<sup>302</sup> Recall, however, that in the latter case, Augustine only shortly interjects to Julian, and that the verse is usually read by Augustine to concern a *sub lege* person; that is, *concupiscentia* may well be defined sin in the unregenerated person with its guilt still undetached.

Romans 7 appears again in a rather lengthy discussion about sin either as a possibility or a necessity (*c. Iul. imp.* 5, 50–64). This distinction is introduced by Julian, and seems to be only reluctantly taken up by Augustine. While Julian denies all the necessitating aspects of sin, Augustine objects that Paul clearly knew of a necessity to sin, or “to do evil” (*agendi malum*) in Romans 7: this necessity is called *concupiscentia*.

AUG. Pay attention to the apostle who says, *I do the evil that I do not will* (Rom 7:19), and answer whether he does not have a necessity to do evil, who does not do the good he wills, but does the evil he does not will. But if you dare to oppose the apostle, look, the man who does evil out of necessity destroys and does away with your definitions. He, of course, does evil out of necessity who does not will it and does it. But if what he does unwillingly is only to desire carnally without any assent of the mind or action of the members, such concupiscence of the flesh is also evil, even if one does not consent to it to do evil. And yet, it delights you to praise it. But if the one who cries out, *I do the evil that I do not will* (Rom 7:19), is compelled so much that he offers his members as weapons to sin, then evils are not merely desired, but also committed out of necessity.<sup>303</sup> [transl. Teske]

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*malum hoc ago* [Rom 7,19]. *sed utique agnoscimus hoc peccatum poenam esse peccati et ideo discernendum ab illa definitione peccati, ubi uoluntas hoc committit, unde liberum est abstinere.* Augustine also uses here Julian's own reading of Rom 7 as describing a *sub lege* person suffering from a self-inflicted bad habit (*consuetudo mala*). See above p. 284.

<sup>302</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 3, 210 *quid est, rogo, quod dicis nec concupiscentiam peccatum esse? itane contra apostolum te disputare non uides? ille namque peccatum esse concupiscentiam satis omnino monstrauit, ubi ait: peccatum non cognoui nisi per legem; nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non concupisces* [Rom 7,7]. *quid hoc testimonio clarius, quid tua sententia uanius dici potest?*

<sup>303</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 50 *Aug. attende eum qui dicit, quod nolo malum, hoc ago* [Rom 7,19]; *et responde utrum necessitatem non habeat agendi malum, qui non quod uult facit bonum, sed quod non uult malum, hoc agit. quod si apostolo repugnare non audes, ecce homo a necessario malum agens definitiones tuas dirumpit et dissipat: necessitate quippe malum agit, qui non uult, et agit. hoc autem quod nolens agit, si tantummodo concupiscere est carne, sine ulla mentis consensione membrorumque operatione; mala est et concupiscentia carnis, etiamsi non ei consentiatur ad malum; quam te tamen laudare delectat: si autem tantum cogitur iste qui clamat, quod nolo malum, hoc ago* [Rom 7,19], *ut etiam sua membra exhibeat arma peccato; non solum concupiscuntur a necessario mala, uerum etiam committuntur.*

Here the compulsory element of *concupiscentia* seems to be stressed in an extraordinary way.<sup>304</sup> However, Augustine uses here the “necessity to do evil” in a dubious manner; for after he has claimed that due to *concupiscentia* there is a necessity to “do” (*agere*) evil even in the renewed Paul, he immediately reviews this claim by positing two kinds of voices in Paul’s narrative: one who does not give his consent to the desires of the flesh, and one who “offers his members as weapons to sin” by his consent. Thus, even in the necessity advocated by Augustine in this passage, there are two stages: one where evil things are desired *a necessario*, and another where these things are also actually committed.

In what follows, Augustine’s elaborations on these statements move in similarly confusing tones: even to “have such desires in the flesh” without the consent of the mind is to be counted as “to do” out of necessity. Finally, this conceptual chicanery amounts to the same basic result which is familiar from Augustine’s previous works and appears elsewhere in *c. Iul. imp.*: the renewed Christian does not commit sin, if he or she does not consent to its temptations.

Catholic teachers [...] understand that the apostle Paul said these things even about himself, and they do not doubt that it comes from the law in the members which resists the law of mind and without which no human being is born. And they see that even saints say, *I do not do the good that I will, but I do the evil that I do not will* (Rom 7:19), precisely because they see how great a good it is not even to desire with the flesh those things which they reject in the mind. And they see that the saints will it and do not do it, and that it is evil, nonetheless, even to have such desires in the flesh, although the mind does not give its consent. They see that they do not will it and yet do it, without any condemnation because, once the guilt of this sin has been wiped out by rebirth, they resist with the mind so that they do not do what they desire with the flesh. But they are not without some evil of their own, because it is not a foreign nature mingled with theirs, but it is their own nature both in the mind and in the flesh.<sup>305</sup> [transl. Teske]

<sup>304</sup> See also the exceptionally strong language used in *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 61 *unde ille posteaquam peccati habitantis in carne sua, quo cogeatur malum agere quod nolebat, necessitatem poenamque defleuit, mox ad quem confugiendum esset ostendens: miser ego homo [Rom 7,24 sq.]; c. Iul. imp.* 5, 62 *iste quippe ex necessario malum agit, qui non uult et agit.*

<sup>305</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 59 *agnoscunt eam catholici doctores, qui Paulum apostolum intellegunt etiam de se ipso ista dicentem, et ex lege quae in membris repugnat legi mentis, sine qua nullus hominum nascitur, uenire non dubitant; et ideo dici et a sanctis uident, non quod uolo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago [Rom 7,19]: quia uident quantum bonum sit nec carne concupiscere, quae mente auersantur; eosque id uelle, nec facere: et malum esse, quamuis mente non consentiente, uel carne tamen talia concupiscere; eosque id nolle, sed facere, sine ulla quidem condemnatione, quoniam peccati huius reatu regeneratione deleta, resistunt mente, ne*

Augustine therefore has a rather tortured way of saying that by the activity of *concupiscentia*, we as Christians do not really commit sins. “The flesh, of course, acts through desiring, even if it does not pull the mind to consent.”<sup>306</sup> So the active verbs in Paul’s narrative again refer to the actions of *concupiscentia*, which take place in the renewed person, but for which no real responsibility should be claimed without *consensio mentis*.<sup>307</sup>

Julian’s views of the present human freedom of the will are countered with Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17.<sup>308</sup> These verses are evidence for the fact that the post-baptismal state of a Christian is not a completely repaired state of freedom, comparable to that of Adam and Eve, but is under a slow and gradual process of healing (*paulatim effectus potestatis accedat, aliis citius, aliis tardius*).

In the final pages of *c. Iul. imp.* Augustine once more describes the qualified character of *concupiscentia* in Christians with the aid of Romans 7, while explicitly claiming that it is a sin (*peccatum*)—at least before baptism takes place:

[The apostle] most clearly showed that it is sin when he said the words I quoted: *I would not have known sin except through the law*. And as if we asked, “What sin?” he said, *For I would not have known desire unless the law said, “You shall not desire”* (Rom 7:7). This desire (*concupiscentia*), then, which is surely evil, this desire by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, did not yet exist before that great sin of the first human being. But it then began to exist, and it damaged human nature as if in its root from which it contracted original sin. Every human being is, of course, born with it, and the guilt of this concupiscence is not removed except in those who are reborn. And after this forgiveness no one is defiled by it unless one consents to it to carry out an evil act, when the spirit does not have any desires opposed to it or does not have stronger desires opposed to it.<sup>309</sup> [transl. Teske]

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*perficiant quod concupiscunt carne; sed non sine suo aliquo malo, quia non eis aliena commixta, sed eorum natura est et in mente et in carne.*

<sup>306</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 5, 59 *dicendo quippe, quod nolo facio* [Rom 7,19]; *se facere ostendit: et rursus dicendo, non ego operor* [Rom 7,17]; *non mentem consentientem, sed carnem suam concupiscentem id facere ostendit: concupiscendo quippe caro agit, etsi ad consensum mentem non attrahit.*

<sup>307</sup> For Julian’s biting critique of Augustine’s reading of Rom 7 in this sense, see *c. Iul. imp.* 1, 71 *nam si lex peccati id est peccatum et necessitas peccati membrum est inserta naturaliter, quid prodest non ei praeberere consensum, cum propter hoc ipsum quod est necesse sit subire supplicium? aut si est lex quidem peccati, sed, quando ei non consentio, non peccat, inestimabilis potentia uoluntatis humanae, quae, si dici permittat absurditas, cogit ipsum non peccare peccatum; c. Iul. imp.* 1, 72 *est peccatum et non peccat, id est una res est et non est.*

<sup>308</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 11.

<sup>309</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 6, 41 *apertissime quippe illam demonstravit esse peccatum, qui dixit, quod commemoravi: peccatum non cognoui, nisi per legem. et uelut quaereremus quod peccatum: nam*

6.6.3. *Christ As a Model for Renewal*

The extensive discussion of Christ's humanity and *concupiscentia carnis* in *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 45–89 is a complex mixture of polemical exaggeration and of genuine differences in anthropology, while it perhaps reflects some real differences in the christological departure points of the adversaries as well. Clearly for Augustine, the person of Christ reflects the final goal of the Christian's renewal. The person of Christ did not include the defect of *concupiscentia carnis* and all its bothersome consequences, and is thus concrete evidence for the kind of person into which the Christian will turn in Heaven.<sup>310</sup>

If, nonetheless, he had evil desire (*cupiditatem malam*) and, to use your word "a desire for sins," it would have begun to exist in him from his will, because he was not born with it, as we are. And for this reason, his virtue meant that he did not have it; our virtue means that we do not consent to it and that we imitate him so that, as he did not commit sin because he did not have this desire, so we do not commit sin because we do not consent to it. And as he willed not to have this desire and was able not to have it, so let us too will to be without it because we will be able to be without it. His grace will, of course, set us free from the body of this death, that is, from sinful flesh, the grace of him who came to us in the likeness of sinful flesh, not in sinful flesh.<sup>311</sup>

[transl. Teske]

Augustine operates here and in the following pages with the already familiar distinction of *non consentire*—*non habere*. Christ exemplifies the goal in which also the latter commandment (cf. Sir 18, 30 "do not go after your

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*concupiscentiam, inquit, nesciebam, nisi lex diceret, non concupisces. haec igitur concupiscentia, utique mala, qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, nondum erat ante primi hominis illud grande peccatum: sed esse tunc coepit, naturamque humanam tanquam in traduce uitiauit, unde trahit originale peccatum. cum illa quippe omnis homo nascitur: nec huius concupiscentiae reatus, nisi in renascentibus soluitur, ut eo post hanc absolutionem non inquinetur, nisi qui ei ad perpetrandum opus malum, spiritu aduersus eam uel non concupiscente, uel non fortius concupiscente, consentit.*

<sup>310</sup> The problem is not here approached with the division of *propassiones* and *passiones*, which was the usual way to make Christ's person sufficiently human (i.e. he felt the first movements of emotions) but without sin (i.e. he did not consent to emotions proper).

<sup>311</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 48 *uerumtamen si haberet cupiditatem malam, atque ut tuo uerbo utar, cupiditatem uitiorum, ab ipsius uoluntate in illo esse coepisset; quia non cum illa est natus, ut nos. ac per hoc, illius uirtus haec erat, eam non habere: nostra uirtus est, ei non consentire; et in hoc illum imitari, ut quemadmodum ipse peccatum non fecit, eam non habendo, ita nec nos faciamus, non ei consentiendo; et quemadmodum ipse eam uoluit et potuit non habere, sic ea nos uelimus, quia poterimus, carere. eius quippe gratia nos liberabit de corpore mortis huius, hoc est, de carne peccati, qui uenit ad nos in similitudinem carnis peccati, non in carne peccati.* See also the lurid sections of *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 54 and 4, 58.

desires,” and Ex 20, 17 “you shall not desire”) is fulfilled.<sup>312</sup> While the person of Christ had been a part of Augustine’s discussions of *concupiscentia* during the 410s, in *c. Iul. imp.* he explicitly makes the positive connection between Christ and the renewal of a Christian (*ut ipse, ita nos*), rather than inculcating the radical difference of Christ’s human nature as compared to the rest of humanity born with *concupiscentia*.

Augustine’s final work against Julian was left unfinished. His position on *concupiscentia* in the renewed state appear in a somewhat tangled form, a feature not totally alien to the overall flow of the argument in this work. It seems that in some special cases, the dividing line between the (actual) voluntary sins (*peccatum*) and the involuntary, inborn inheritance of Adam is blurred, and the “necessity” of living in the state of having *lex peccati* still in one’s body is also said to be a sin; but these are special cases, and do not seriously challenge Augustine’s general idea of *concupiscentia* as a truncated evil presence in the baptised Christian. To say this is not to trivialise the importance of these cases; they may actually reveal something of Augustine’s “universalising” view of sin.<sup>313</sup> They also may signal something of Augustine’s adamant insistence upon the overarching importance of grace which in the end seems to trivialise the classification of sins into individual and voluntary on the one hand, and into punitive and non-voluntary on the other.<sup>314</sup>

## 6.7. CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have followed the way Augustine works his views of *concupiscentia* in relation to Christian renewal. It has been argued that in the earlier works of the 390s, Augustine mainly treats *concupiscentia* as a problem concerning people who are not yet converted to a life in Christ. Hence,

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<sup>312</sup> *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 57 *ad hoc se debet omnis imitator extendere, ut concupiscentias carnis, quas uetat apostolus perfici; nitatur atque optet penitus non habere: sic enim eas potest prouectu quotidiano minuere, quas nullas habeat salute perfecta.* See also *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 86–87.

<sup>313</sup> To use the word of Marksches (2001, 103). I do not find Marksches’s theory of two series (“Reihen”) or ways of speaking (“Sprechweisen”) as permeating Augustine’s thinking convincing (2001, 103–104). The standard version of *concupiscentia* in post-baptismal state as a sin only in transferred meaning seems to be in overwhelming majority compared to few, extreme cases of *c. Iul. imp.*, and in this work only.

<sup>314</sup> Similar development is to be found in Augustine’s dealings with the monks of Hadrumetum. “A person never stands before God guilty simply of particular misdeeds, but these very misdeeds attain their sinful reality as connected with the surpassing fault of Adam.” Weaver 1996, 26.

the depictions of *concupiscentia* tend to underline the strong invincible features of evil desire, from which especially those who are on the verge of being Christians and who live “under law” (*sub lege*) suffer. This outline is not clear cut enough to not allow Augustine to muse on “something” that is left from the old life to linger in the regenerate Christian. However, these musings seem to be experimental and they do not entail a comprehensive view of a full scale concept of *concupiscentia* in the renewed state. The development, in which the force of *concupiscentia* is depicted as an irresistible, compelling bond over the fallen humanity, finds its climax in *Simpl.*, that is, at the same time Augustine reaches his permanent stance on divine grace. From *Simpl.* onwards, Augustine begins to allow *concupiscentia* a more detailed role in Christian renewal. The strength of *concupiscentia* is re-evaluated and effectively downplayed. The immediate years after *Simpl.* and *conf.* offer only some sketchy evidence of this process of re-evaluation, but by the time the first anti-Pelagian works are published, Augustine has made some remarkable rearrangements and qualifications to his emphasis concerning *concupiscentia* in Christian life.

While *concupiscentia* in the works of the anti-Pelagian period still remains there, in the body of a Christian, it is now conceived more as of a sparring partner than an outer, dangerous enemy. The “movements” of *concupiscentia* are seen as forgiven movements and as such powerless or harmless, lest one goes with them, and reconnects once again with the old Adamic guilt. Thus, Augustine’s later emphasis views *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal as a beaten force, which is fully resistible by God’s grace. The force of *concupiscentia* is repeatedly qualified and limited by Augustine’s stress on the real effects of baptism; on the useful character of *concupiscentia* as driving the Christian to live from daily forgiveness; on the harmless nature of the “movements,” or temptations of *concupiscentia*; on the future outcome of renewal; and finally, on his new reading of Paul, in which the Apostle himself is seen as a model in fighting against the residue of Adam’s sinful heritage in his own life. As a result, *concupiscentia* begins to look more like a tamed beast, introduced in chains into the inner courts of a Christian heart, instead of being a raging force of nature outside of the citadel of virtue. While certainly seeing *concupiscentia* a *malum*, which is to be removed in Heaven once and for all, Augustine seems to think of a baptised Christian also as living relatively safely with this old adversary, keeping its leash short and whenever it manages to bite, to run for a cure in Christ.

It could be argued that the total aspect of grace as presented in *Simpl.* affected Augustine’s view of *concupiscentia* in a surprising way: when salvation became completely dependent from God’s inscrutable grace, and

was detached from all human initiative, the integrity of Christian renewal in relation to *concupiscentia* lost importance. It was replaced by a view in which the renewed Christian has become more vulnerable to the approaches of evil desires. Fortunately, the renewed Christian is also well prepared to meet them. *Concupiscentia* became an interior opponent, instead of being an exterior foe. At the same time, God's grace stripped this enemy of a great part of its strength, and the Christian reached a position in which he or she not only is able to correctly identify and review the genuine nature and quality of *concupiscentia*, but also to effectively resist it.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION

This study offers a systematic analysis of Augustine's concept of evil desire and its theological functions in their historical context. Deliberate emphasis was given to those texts from Augustine's entire *corpus operum* that discussed evil desire more comprehensively and were thereby more relevant for the topic.

The study commenced with a preliminary survey of the terminology for 'evil desire' including an overview on the Classical and Christian Latin literature on relevant words. Occurrences of the nouns *libido* and *cupiditas* and the verb *concupisco* in Classical literature exemplified how these words could be used to denote the reproachable desires for varying objects. Conversely, in the philosophical texts, *concupisco* was regarded as expressing an excessive emotion of desire or more generally, a strong, intensive wish. Again for Christian authors, the traditional fields of meaning are preserved: *libido* and *cupiditas* denote lust and greed and evil appetite for worthless objects. The Latin Bible translations offer yet another word for these purposes, namely the noun *concupiscentia*, used by authors such as Tertullian and Ambrose.

Typically, Augustine seems to have used these three standard nouns—*libido*, *cupiditas*, *concupiscentia*—rather flexibly with no static, fixed or detailed differences of meaning. An overview of their mutual synonymy and of the contexts in which they could be used in Augustine's texts revealed that, while certain preferences apply, strict limitations in respect of which word could be used in which context were rare (an instance of such rarity would be finding that *libido* never appears to denote a 'good desire,' that is, a good form of love, for which Augustine sometimes used *concupiscentia* or even *cupiditas* for rhetorical purposes). Again, none of the words could be found to correspond to one specific meaning, for instance, a sexual meaning. These findings supported the conclusion that to restrict an account of the functions of evil desire to one term only would distort the image. There were reasons (e.g. stylistic or source-related) for preferring certain nouns to others in certain contexts, but these reasons as a rule did not include strict semantic restrictions.

The examination of the functions of evil desire was conducted in four stages, each presented in its own chapter, and each following chronologi-



cally a particular function throughout Augustine's works. The starting point of the study was to examine the theological connections of *concupiscentia* to Augustine's central views on God, sin and grace, and to illustrate how *concupiscentia* (with cognates) was used, or was assigned varying functions in these contexts.

The first function of *concupiscentia* that was analysed in this study was its use as an ancient punishment for Adam and Eve's disobedience in Paradise (Chapter 3). Augustine's interest in investigating a variety of ideas related to the causality of sin and punishment can be traced to his early works. For this reason, the narratives of Paradise, consequences of Adam and Eve's crime, and the role of evil desire, all appear in his early theological and exegetical expositions. These notions, however, were not tightly linked until somewhat later when Augustine began to conceive of sexual desire as closely reflecting the circumstances of Adam and Eve's sin against God. Augustine's invention of *concupiscentia carnis* as the most fitting punishment for the original disobedience by humans against God, appearing as a prideful wish to free themselves from all domination but their own, was appropriated to his existing views on divine justice, the importance of obedience and the inability of humanity to conquer the debilitating sinful heritage of Adam. It was shown that Augustine also linked the function of *concupiscentia* as a punishment (*poena*) to interesting parts of his views on divine justice. The order and exact way of connecting *concupiscentia* to human propagation remains a mystery, reflecting the secret ways of divine justice. Again, the aesthetic harmony of Augustine's stance on the highest justice is reflected in his rhetorical depictions: he stresses the general complementarity between the primary disobedience of Adam and Eve and the secondary disobedience of retribution, which is exposed in the involuntary movements of the soul and the body during sexual intercourse.

Augustine attributed to sexual desire a deep theological importance. This claim is supported by the vehement critique from Julian of Aeclanum, who chose his targets well, including Augustine's assumptions on divine justice and the insights into Adam's disobedient act of will. Julian directed his critique particularly at the seemingly unrelated conceptions of divine and human justice and obedience. Julian thus correctly identified the important theological attachments of sexual desire that Augustine had created by his accounts of the involuntary (and therefore reproachable) activity of the sexual organs.

Next, the study analysed the rather simple function of desire as a general cause, or matrix, for individual sinful acts (Chapter 4). An overview was provided of how Augustine would oppose two forms of love: a good form

of love (*caritas*) towards God and neighbours, and an evil, privative and destructive form of love (*cupiditas*). Then, the function of root and matrix was depicted by following two formally distinct images with similar contents, namely the image of 'root' and the scheme of threefold concupiscence. Both these images were usually supported by scriptural quotations (that is, 1 Tim 6, 10 and 1 Jn 2, 16).

The image of evil desire as the 'root' of all evil actions appears early in Augustine's thought. That image also gave rise to disagreements in the debate with the Manichaean Fortunatus. It seems that Augustine resorted to his Manichaean past in his interest in using this image. This can be seen, for instance, in the Letter to Menoch, a Manichaean text quoted later by Julian of Aeclanum to demonstrate Augustine's residual Manichaeism. This letter exploits the biblical imagery of evil desire as the root of all evil. However, Augustine rather constantly departs from Manichaean ontology each time he resorts to using the image of the 'root,' and he is always careful to point out the fundamental difference between his position and that of the Manichaeans. By using the image of the 'root,' Augustine does not intend to suggest that there are two different natures: evil is parasitic and deprivative in character, not a competing substance against God's good creation. It seems that Augustine was thoroughly convinced of the persuasiveness of this difference and therefore did not assign much weight on the formal and terminological parallels between the Letter to Menoch and his own formulations of *concupiscentia carnis*. Nevertheless, to Julian of Aeclanum, the parallels seemed incriminating.

The scheme of threefold concupiscence provided Augustine with a generalising instrument to describe the various levels of sins and temptations. This scheme also had its polemical application, for it was commonly used by Augustine to characterise his former co-religionists, the Manichaeans. While this scheme no longer appears to have substantially exploited after *ep. Io. tr.*, the separate elements in the scheme—pride, depraved intellectual curiosity and sensual desires (often exemplified by sexual desire)—remained part of Augustine's apparatus of dealing with sin. There are no straightforward, convincing answers to the question of why this scheme lost importance during the last two decades in Augustine's thought, but the emphasis on sexual desire during the Pelagian debates obviously forced Augustine to narrow his scope in this respect. Moreover, what seems to have gained importance in the later years is pride as an independent, single source for all evil (*initium omnis peccati superbia*, in a parallel sense to the image of *cupiditas* as the root of all evil, but not, according to Augustine's rather artificial explanation, contradictory to it).

An important factor of Augustine's formulations of evil desire were the previous philosophical traditions of emotions. Augustine's use of these traditions and his relation to them, particularly related to *concupiscentia*, was traced in Chapter 5.

The instrumental value of these psychological traditions was emphasised in this study. In his earlier works, Augustine regularly used a commonplace version of the Platonic soul structure, combined with certain Stoic notions of the distinction between the preparatory stages of the emotion and the emotion proper, *in order to counter* the radically dualistic Manichaeian psychology of two opposite substances. This means that for Augustine, the philosophical traditions of emotions in general and desires in particular, provided a respectable monistic explanation for a phenomenon he had previously been forced to analyse in the framework of Manichaeian dualism, which involved all the problems of moral responsibility and God's omnipotence.

However, Augustine later turned a more critical eye towards the philosophical traditions of emotions in relation to the status and role of *concupiscentia*. In this respect, this study concentrated on Augustine's major discussion of emotions and *libido* in *ciu.* and on selected examples from his debate with Julian of Aeclanum. It was argued that Augustine's manner of dealing with philosophical traditions remained instrumental, despite his more critical stance towards them. They now provided Augustine with evidence of the abilities of philosophers to correctly identify the main problems in human constitution and its moral inclinations, but also worked as evidence for his vision that a virtuous life was possible only within *ciuitas dei*. To Augustine, the philosophers could not, in the end, prevail in affronting and controlling the emotions. To illustrate the futility of these "wise men of the *ciuitas terrena*," Augustine discusses sexual desire and its wildly compulsive and overwhelming features that cannot be tempered or used correctly outside *ciuitas dei*.

The examples selected from the debates with Julian corroborate Augustine's reluctant attitude towards the philosophical traditions when explaining *concupiscentia* with what he now conceived as being better dealt with in Christian and biblical terms. Augustine admits a certain usefulness, in an instrumental way, in the discussions of authors such as Cicero and Aristotle (cited by Julian), but at the same time, Augustine very clearly points out the inadequacy of these "wise men" when it comes to providing a full description of the human condition. It was thus concluded, that while the philosophical traditions of human emotions appeared rather constantly in conjunction with Augustine's accounts of evil desire, their function was

mainly instrumental and subordinated to Augustine's more urgent theological agendas, both in the course of the Manichaean debate and the Pelagian polemics.

The last function of *concupiscentia* analysed in this study was its role within the Christian renewal (Chapter 6). More than the previous functions, this role was tightly connected to Augustine's understanding of divine grace and its effects. Acknowledging the scholarly consensus of the crucial role of *Simpl.* in Augustine's developing notion of grace, the earlier remarks (in works preceding *Simpl.*) made on the role of *concupiscentia* (with cognates) in the life of a baptised Christian, were contrasted with later expositions, notably those composed from the year 411 onwards. It was demonstrated that while Augustine discusses the role of *concupiscentia* during the Christian renewal only experimentally and superficially in his works preceding *Simpl.*, the shift towards an entirely theocentric view of the grace in *Simpl.* also affected Augustine's position on *concupiscentia*. It was suggested that after *Simpl.*, a strong and invincible picture of the *concupiscentia* in people living *sub lege* was gradually replaced by another picture that consistently downplayed and qualified the effects of *concupiscentia* in the Christians who live *sub gratia*. Thus, Augustine frequently depicts *concupiscentia* as "remaining, but forgiven"; the movements of *concupiscentia* in Christians exist, but they remain harmless unless they are given consent (the old notion of consent thus serves theological purposes here, located as it is in the Christian renewal as a decisive factor in *battling* and *conquering* temptations); even Augustine's invention of Adamitic guilt (*reatus*), when removed from *concupiscentia*, emphasises the domestication process that it undergoes during Christian renewal.

During the analysis of the function of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal, the study also explored Augustine's reading of a related crucial scriptural text in this respect, namely Romans 7. As Augustine's changing interpretation of Romans 7 has already been well documented, the task of this study was to examine how that changing interpretation coincided with Augustine's shift of emphasis with regard to *concupiscentia* and its role in Christian renewal in general. It was demonstrated that, for example, in *nupt. et conc.*, where Augustine offers a detailed reading of Romans 7 as regarding a Christian *sub gratia*, some of the verses that emphasise the necessitating and compelling effects of residual sin were toned down to accommodate Augustine's new conception of *concupiscentia* under Christian renewal. Of course, these passages had not been problematic in Augustine's previous interpretation, which portrayed in Romans 7 a depiction of a person *sub lege*.

To summarise, it was claimed that the position adopted in *Simpl.* affected Augustine's view of *concupiscentia* in a surprising way: as all human initiative was stripped from salvation, the integrity of Christian renewal in relation to *concupiscentia* lost its importance. An overwhelming emphasis on divine grace diminished the importance of making a black-and-white-distinction between the sinful life ridden with the tyranny of *concupiscentia* and the new life lived free from distracting desires and temptations. Augustine gradually internalised the concept of *concupiscentia* in the life of a baptised Christian, consistently qualifying, however, the effects and force of *concupiscentia*. This can be seen in the way Augustine underscores the real ability of Christians to ward off the temptations of *concupiscentia*, and in his way of refuting Julian's caricatures as for example the Apostles as being "driven by shameful lusts."

The analysis of these four functions of evil desire in Augustine's theology has revealed, in various cases, that the notion of *concupiscentia* was deeply connected to Augustine's other perhaps even more central theological concepts. Thus, as for the function of punishment, *concupiscentia carnis* appears as a psychological sign of a deeply theological reality, reflecting divine justice (and thereby God's own being) and Augustine's more abstract insights into the role of obedience to God as a primal virtue. Indirectly, *concupiscentia carnis* therefore works in Augustine's construction as a reminder of our relationship to God. Again, Augustine's use of a commonplace psychological apparatus in analysing the emergence of sin from temptations testifies to a more general need to build a coherent explanation for sin in a uniformly good, created reality. Moreover, while Augustine later adopts a more reflective and critical stance towards the traditional theories of emotions in connection with *concupiscentia*, he nonetheless maintains an acute sense of putting these discussions to use in his own theological structures. Thus even apparent discontinuities mirror Augustine's compact and coherent way of approaching theology. In the case of Christian renewal, Augustine's picture of *concupiscentia* followed, albeit in time, his shifting emphasis on divine grace, and went hand in hand with his scriptural argumentation related to Romans 7.

It was crucial for Augustine to emphasise the role of *concupiscentia* as a constant, evil (although a relatively harmless) object of Christian struggle against what he conceived as a Pelagian ideal of perfection in this life. That Julian saw *concupiscentia* as a created good that was able to be controlled against the risk of its excessive indulgence, was from Augustine's perspective related to the same Pelagian ideal: by establishing *concupiscentia* as a neutral, even a positive force, Julian had secured that there were few obstacles left on the path to the perfection of virtue in this life.

As to the relative importance of the functions of *concupiscentia*, it could be claimed that the functions of *concupiscentia* as a punishment and the function of *concupiscentia* in Christian renewal were both tightly interwoven into Augustine's view of God's being and God's grace. Indeed, they appeared in varying forms throughout his oeuvre, although in earlier works, they occurred only in an experimental or very initial stage. Augustine's use of the philosophical traditions of emotions is also rather consistent in his works, albeit growing in its reflective and critical attitude. Characteristically, however, this function contained less of Augustine's own contribution than the other two, appearing in an instrumental role only. Furthermore, the function of the root and matrix more or less dispersed with time and underwent transformations to the degree that it essentially disappeared from Augustine's later works, surfacing in the second Pelagian debate only by Julian's instigation. On the level of the imagery used, pride seems to have taken the place of honour as the single fundamental starting point of sin (*initium*), instead of *cupiditas* as the 'root' of all evil (*radix*).

Finally, the study has demonstrated the importance of reading Augustine's discussions of evil desire with a constant awareness of their role in a larger context, that is, of their function in each situation. A too simplistic and unifying reading runs many risks. One way to misunderstand Augustine's *concupiscentia* would be to see him as constantly advocating a scheme of desire-consent-sin, where *concupiscentia* is always regarded as merely an opportunity to sin, but never as a sin in itself. This kind of reading would underestimate Augustine's emphasis on *concupiscentia* as being both a sin and a punishment (a stance vehemently criticised by Julian) and the function of *cupiditas* and *concupiscentia* as the 'root' and threefold matrix for all sinful acts. Another way to misrepresent Augustine's position would be to over-emphasise his claims about the necessitating aspects of *concupiscentia*, appearing as an unavoidable presence of sinful forces in each human being, and thus to neglect the constant domesticated features of *concupiscentia* during Christian renewal that Augustine considered to be the result of God's grace.



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#### 1. *Augustine*

CCL	Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina. Turnhout 1953–.
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Wien 1865–.
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Wien 1865–.
PL	Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina (ed. J.P. Migne). Paris 1844–1864.
PLS	Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina, supplementum (ed. A. Hamman). Paris 1958–1974.
<i>Acad.</i>	<i>De Academicis</i> CCL 29, 3–61
<i>c. Adim.</i>	<i>Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum</i> CSEL 25/1, 115–190
<i>adn. Iob</i>	<i>Adnotationes in Iob</i> CSEL 28/2, 509–628
<i>c. adu. leg.</i>	<i>Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum</i> CCL 49, 35–131
<i>agon.</i>	<i>De agone christiano</i> CSEL 41, 101–138
<i>an. quant.</i>	<i>De animae quantitate</i> CSEL 89, 131–231
<i>bapt.</i>	<i>De baptismo</i> CSEL 51, 145–375
<i>beata u.</i>	<i>De beata uita</i> CCL 29, 65–85
<i>b. coniug.</i>	<i>De bono coniugali</i> CSEL 41, 187–231
<i>b. uid.</i>	<i>De bono uiduitatis</i> CSEL 41, 305–343
<i>cat. rud.</i>	<i>De catechizandis rudibus</i> CCL 46, 121–178
<i>ciu.</i>	<i>De ciuitate dei</i> CCL 47, 1–314; 48, 321–866



- conf.* *Confessiones*  
CCL 27, 1–273
- cont.* *De continentia*  
CSEL 41, 141–183
- corrept.* *De correptione et gratia*  
CSEL 92, 219–280
- dii. qu.* *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*  
CCL 44A, 11–249
- doctr. chr.* *De doctrina christiana*  
Ed. M. Simonetti, *Sant'Agostino, L'istruzione cristiana*. Milano 1994.
- duab. an.* *De duabus animabus*  
CSEL 25/1, 51–80
- en. Ps.* *Enarrationes in Psalmos*  
CCL 38, 1–616; 39, 623–1417; 40, 1425–2196; CSEL 95/3, 37–340; CSEL 95/4, 223–228
- ench.* *De fide spe et caritate*  
CCL 46, 49–114
- ep.* *Epistulae*  
CSEL 34/1, 1–125; 34/2, 1–746; 44, 1–736; 57, 1–656
- ep.\** *Epistulae ab I. Divjak repertae*  
CSEL 88, 3–138
- ep. Io. tr.* *In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem*  
PL 35, 1977–2062
- c. ep. Man.* *Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti*  
CSEL 25/1, 193–248
- c. ep. Parm.* *Contra epistulam Parmeniani*  
CSEL 51, 19–141
- c. ep. Pel.* *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*  
CSEL 60, 423–570
- ep. Rm. inch.* *Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio*  
CSEL 84, 145–181
- exp. Gal.* *Expositio epistulae ad Galatas*  
CSEL 84, 55–141
- exp. prop. Rm.* *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos*  
CSEL 84, 3–52
- c. Faust.* *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*  
CSEL 25/1, 251–797
- c. Fel.* *Contra Felicem Manichaeum*  
CSEL 25/2, 801–852
- c. Fort.* *Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum*  
CSEL 25/1, 83–112
- gest. Pel.* *De gestis Pelagii*  
CSEL 42, 51–122
- Gn. litt.* *De Genesi ad litteram*  
CSEL 28/1, 3–435

- Gn. adu. Man.* *De Genesi aduersus Manicheos*  
CSEL 91, 67–172
- gr. et lib. arb.* *De gratia et libero arbitrio*  
PL 44, 881–912
- gr. et pecc. or.* *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*  
CSEL 42, 125–206
- c. Iul.* *Contra Iulianum*  
PL 44, 641–874
- c. Iul. imp.* *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*  
c. Iul. imp. 1–3 CSEL 85/1, 3–506  
c. Iul. imp. 4–6 PL 45, 1337–1608
- lib. arb.* *De libero arbitrio*  
CSEL 74, 3–154
- c. litt. Pet.* *Contra litteras Petiliani*  
CSEL 52, 3–227
- mend.* *De mendacio*  
CSEL 41, 413–466
- mor.* *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum*  
CSEL 90, 3–156
- mus.* *De musica*  
PL 32, 1081–1194  
*mus. 6:* M. Jacobsson, *Aurelius Augustinus, De musica liber VI*. Stockholm 2002.
- nat. b.* *De natura boni*  
CSEL 25/2, 855–889
- nat. et gr.* *De natura et gratia*  
CSEL 60, 233–299
- nupt. et conc.* *De nuptiis et concupiscentia ad Valerium*  
CSEL 42, 211–319
- op. mon.* *De opere monachorum*  
CSEL 41, 531–596
- ord.* *De ordine*  
CSEL 63, 121–185
- pat.* *De patientia*  
CSEL 41, 663–691
- pecc. mer.* *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum ad Marcellinum*  
CSEL 60, 3–151
- perf. iust.* *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*  
CSEL 42, 3–48
- perseu.* *De dono perseuerantiae*  
PL 45, 993–1034
- praed. sanct.* *De praedestinatione sanctorum*  
PL 44, 959–992
- qu.* *Quaestiones*  
CCL 33, 1–377
- qu. eu.* *Quaestiones euangeliorum*  
CCL 44B, 1–118

- retr.* *Retractationes*  
CCL 57, 5–143
- c. Sec.* *Contra Secundinum Manicheum*  
CSEL 25/2, 905–947
- s.* *Sermones*  
PL 38, 39  
*Sermones* 1–50: CCL 41  
*Sermones* 151–156: CCL 41 Ba
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- s. dom. m.* *De sermone Domini in monte*  
CCL 35, 1–188
- Simpl.* *Ad Simplicianum*  
CCL 44, 7–91
- sol.* *Soliloquia*  
CSEL 89, 3–98
- spir. et litt.* *De spiritu et littera ad Marcellinum*  
CSEL 60, 155–229
- trin.* *De trinitate*  
CCL 50, 25–380; 50A, 381–535
- uera rel.* *De uera religione*  
CCL 32, 187–260
- uirg.* *De sancta uirginitate*  
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frg. 84	256	24, 5, 5	21
<i>Verr.</i>		28, 24, 9	21
1, 78	24	28, 43, 5	22
3, 77	23	29, 9, 11	21
3, 82	23	30, 14, 5	21
3, 207	23	34, 4, 8	22
3, 220	23	39, 8, 6	21
		42, 11, 3	22

## Plinius Maior

*nat.*

14, 140	19
26, 95	20
26, 99	20

## Rhetorica ad Herennium

2, 2, 3	24
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## Sallustius

*Catil.*

2, 1	22
5, 4	22
11, 3	22
21, 4	22
55, 33	22

## Seneca

*benef.*

2, 14, 1	26
7, 2, 2	25
7, 10, 3	26
7, 26, 4	25

*clem.*

1, 1, 5	26
2, 1, 4	26

*dial. 11*

11, 9, 5	26
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*dial. 12*

12, 10, 2	26
12, 11, 4	26
12, 13, 2	26

*epist.*

7, 7	26
16, 9	26
77, 6	25
89, 6	26
101, 8	26
117, 25	26
124, 3	25

*ira*

1, 3, 2	26
1, 3, 3	25
1, 8, 6	26
1, 10, 1	26
1, 17	19
2, 28, 7	26

## Suetonius

*Nero*

26, 1	20
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*gramm.*

23, 5	19
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## Tacitus

*Agr.*

15, 2	21
21, 2	22

*ann.*

2, 85, 1	21
3, 54, 1	19
4, 1, 3	20
6, 16, 2	19
11, 37, 4	20
12, 20, 1	22
13, 30, 2	21
13, 44, 3	21
14, 20, 5	22
14, 51, 3	20
16, 21, 1	22
16, 32, 3	21

*Germ.*

18, 1	21
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*hist.*

1, 7, 2	21
2, 31, 1	19
2, 62, 1	22
4, 73, 3	22

b. *Greek Writers*

Alcinous		439e	184
16, 2	207	441–442	170
24, 1	212	<i>Tim.</i>	
25, 7	196	69a	196
29	196	69e	207
32	196	70e–71e	196
		86b–c	34
Aristoteles		86d	196
<i>Cat.</i>			
8b–9b	249	Plotinus	
9b	251	<i>En.</i>	
		1, 1, 4	34
Platon		1, 8, 8	34
<i>Phaedr.</i>		3, 2, 7	73
246a–256e	195	3, 2, 8	63
<i>Rep.</i>		3, 6, 4	150
439c–440b	196	5, 1, 1	64

c. *Christian and Jewish Writers*

Ambrosiaster		<i>Hel.</i>	
<i>in Rom</i> 7		9, 30	34
7, 22	280	19, 69	34
		<i>Iac.</i>	
Ambrosius Mediolanensis		1, 1, 3	33
<i>Abr.</i>		1, 1, 1–1, 2, 5	33
1, 3, 12	34	1, 1, 3–4	35
1, 4, 24	34	1, 1, 4	33
2, 4, 13	35	1, 2, 5	33
2, 7, 43	34	1, 2, 6	33
2, 9, 67	35	1, 2, 8	33
<i>bon. mort.</i>		1, 6, 24	32
3, 9	34	8, 36	32
5, 16	34	<i>Iob</i>	
7, 28	34	1, 3, 9	34
12, 55	35	<i>Ioseph</i>	
<i>Cain et Ab.</i>		4, 19	35
2, 9, 31	34	<i>Isaac</i>	
<i>fid.</i>		7, 60	33, 233
2, 11	33	8, 65	34, 195
3, 1	32	8, 67	34
5, 17	34	<i>Nab.</i>	
<i>fug. saec.</i>		1, 2	34
1, 1	34	2, 26	35
		12, 52	34

<i>Noe</i>		37, 38, 3	32
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10, 34	35	<i>in psalm. 118</i>	
11, 38	34	2, 35	34
14, 49	34	3, 33	35
15, 51	35	8, 12	32
15, 53	35	8, 42	32
18, 64	34	11, 28	32
25, 93	35	13, 27	32
29, 113	34	16, 12	32
33, 125	34		
<i>obit. Theod.</i>		Cyprianus Carthaginensis	
51	34	<i>Demetr.</i>	
<i>off.</i>		9-10	32
1, 4, 14	34	11	31
1, 5, 17	34	<i>ad Donat.</i>	
1, 47, 229	34	7	32
1, 49, 241	34	9-10	32
1, 50, 246	34	<i>Fort.</i>	
<i>paenit.</i>		7	31
1, 14	34	<i>testim.</i>	
<i>parad.</i>		3, 11	31
2, 11	206	3, 60	31
6, 34	33, 35	3, 61	31, 32
<i>patr.</i>		<i>patient.</i>	
3, 12	34	10	31
<i>epist.</i>		20	32
3, 8	34	<i>domin. orat.</i>	
7, 10	34	14	31
7, 31	34, 35	16	31
10, 8	34	<i>hab. virg.</i>	
14, 26	34	4	31
27, 16	34	6	31
57, 3	35	7	31
<i>hex.</i>		18-19	32
1, 8, 31	34, 35	22	31
3, 12, 50	34	<i>laps.</i>	
3, 12, 52	34	2	31
5, 7, 19	34	12	32
5, 10, 30	34	19	32
5, 15, 52	34	<i>mortal.</i>	
6, 9, 71	34	4	32
<i>exhort. virg.</i>		24	31
7, 48	34	<i>eleem.</i>	
<i>in psalm.</i>		10	32
1, 28, 5	32	13	31
1, 29, 2	34	22	31
36, 32, 2	34		



Cyprianus Carthaginensis (*cont.*)*epist.*

14, 1, 2	31
55, 26, 2	32
55, 27, 2	31
65, 3, 1	31
65, 2, 3	32

## Epiphanius

*Panarion*

30, 6	154
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## Evagrius Ponticus

*malign. cogit.*

1	169, 176
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## Gregorius Nyssenus

*Vit. Moys.*

2, 256	150
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## Gregorius Magnus

*moral.*

4, 27	209
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## Hieronymus

*epist.*

121, 8	32
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## Manichaeus

*ep. fund.*

frg. 2, 9	151
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*ep. Men.*

2, 3-4	154
2, 4	153
5, 2	153

## Philo

*all.*

2, 71-108	205
3, 107-160	205

*QG*

1, 31	206
1, 47	206

## Tertullianus

*mart.*

4, 2	31
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*nat.*

1, 10	31
1, 16	31
2, 14	31

*uxor.*

1, 4, 3	29
1, 4, 5	29
1, 5, 4	31
2, 8, 2	29

*adv. Marc.*

1, 25, 4-5	30
3, 14, 3	29, 30
3, 18, 4	30
4, 40, 1	30
4, 40, 3	30

*apol.*

17, 4-5	28
22, 6	31
45, 3	29
46, 11	29
49, 2	31

*anim.*

16	30
16, 3-6	30
27, 4	31
38, 2-3	29
38, 3	26, 29
40, 2-4	28, 30

*bapt.*

12	31
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*cult. fem.*

1, 1	31
1, 9	29, 30

*castit.*

9, 1-3	29
13, 4	29

*idol.*

1, 1	29
2, 3	29, 30
23, 3	28

*paenit.*

3, 13	29
6, 19	29

<i>patient.</i>		<i>spect.</i>	
7	3 <sup>1</sup>	2	29
<i>pudic.</i>		10	3 <sup>1</sup>
6	29, 30	14	28, 29
14	3 <sup>1</sup>	21	3 <sup>1</sup>
17	3 <sup>1</sup>	<i>virg. vel.</i>	
<i>resurr.</i>		7, 2	29
61	3 <sup>1</sup>		

